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Abstract
This thesis examines the role of multinational enterprises (MNEs) in 
industrialization in developing countries through a case study of Thailand. The key 
hypothesis is that the policy environment of the host country, in particular the trade 
policy regime, conditions gains from MNE involvement. The involvement of MNEs has 
been a key feature of the process of industrial transformation in Thailand over the past 
three decades, but the role of MNEs in determining developmental outcomes of 
industrialization has not been systematically examined. This study aims to fill this gap.
The introductory chapter spells out the purpose and scope of the study. The 
remainder of the thesis is structured in nine chapters. Chapter 2 presents the analytical 
framework for examining how MNE involvement contributes to economic development 
in host countries and what factors potentially condition gains from MNE involvement. 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the investment climate and the incentive structure of 
Thai manufacturing over the past three decades, and the related key policy shifts, with 
emphasis on the trade policy regime. Chapter 4 surveys trends and patterns of the 
presence of MNE participation in Thai manufacturing.
The analytical core of the thesis comprises four chapters. Chapter 5 probes the 
FDI-growth nexus at the macro level by estimating a growth equation derived in the 
context of the new growth theory, which provides for capturing the impact of FDI 
interactively with openness on economic growth, using time series data for the period 
1970-2002. In Chapter 6, an inter-industry cross-sectional econometric analysis of FDI 
technology spillover on domestic manufacturing is undertaken, using the unpublished 
returns to the Industrial Census 1997. Chapters 7 and 8 provide in-depth firm-level case 
studies of two key industries —processed foods and automotive— to gain insights into 
various non-FDI dimensions of MNE involvement. Chapter 7 surveys the development 
of the processed food and automotive industries over the past three decades. This is to 
lay down a foundation for probing the mechanisms of MNE involvement and its
V
contribution in Chapter 8. The analysis in Chapter 8 is based on information gathered by 
interviewing senior managers of a sample of firms (16 in the processed food industry and 
11 firms in the automotive industry) between December 2003 and February 2004, chosen 
using the purposive sampling technique. The final chapter summaries the key findings, 
makes policy inferences and presents suggestions for further research.
The findings support the hypothesis that gains from MNE involvement in 
manufacturing, in terms of the key criteria such as output and export growth, and 
technology spillover, are greater under a more open trade regime compared to a closed- 
economy (import-substitution) regime. There is also strong evidence to suggest that the 
conventional approach of focusing solely on FDI as the main link between MNEs and the 
domestic manufacturing tends to overlook an important part of the story relating to the 
role of MNEs in the industrialization process. MNEs contribute significantly to export- 
led industrialization through various non-FDI channels such as providing marketing 
channels, improving technological capability, and assisting to overcome export obstacles.
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1Chapter 1: Purpose and Scope
1.1 Significance of Issues
Multinational enterprises (MNEs)1 are key players in the process of global 
economic integration. Foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, a widely used measure of 
MNEs’ cross-border activities, have grown much faster than global trade, which in turn 
has increased faster than world output (Hill and Athukorala, 1998; Craft, 2000; Brooks et 
al. 2004). Most developing countries changed their attitude toward MNEs and their 
involvement in the growth process. MNEs, which used to be regarded a modem form of 
economic colonialism and exploitation in the early post-war years, are now widely 
acknowledged as facilitators of global integration. MNE involvement can facilitate the 
industrialization process of host countries by bringing in not only capital but also 
production technology, managerial skills, international marketing channels, etc. to host 
countries (Sjöholm, 1997; Borensztein et al., 1998; Lipsey, 2000; Vernon, 2000).
Until the 1980s, most developing countries treated MNEs as symbols of 
colonialism and imposed restrictions on their involvement in their economies. However, 
the successful experience of some developing countries that opened their doors to MNEs 
and gained benefit from their involvement has gradually diluted and changed this 
pessimistic attitude. In addition, the adverse outcome resulting from debt crisis during 
the 1970s persuaded many countries to reform their foreign investment policies to 
promote MNE involvement. Rapid technological change and the emergence of globally 
integrated production and marketing networks, which greatly reduced the ability of the 
national state to control the activities of MNEs, have also acted as a catalyst for the 
reform of foreign investment policy. In this context, an increasing number of developing 
countries have begun to offer lucrative investment incentives and to undertake policy 
reforms to improve the investment climate with a view to enticing MNE involvement.
'A multinational enterprise (MNE) is defined as an enterprise that controls and manages 
production establishments/plants located in at least two countries.
2However, many countries still regulate and limit the economic activities of MNEs 
operating within their borders in various ways in the hope of maximizing gains from such 
involvement.
Nevertheless, analysis of the impact of MNE involvement in host countries and 
factors that prevent MNEs from functioning more effectively in these countries have 
lagged behind the growing policy emphasis. Four main aspects of this knowledge gap 
are worth emphasizing. Firstly, many studies examining the impact of MNE involvement 
have focused solely on FDI e.g. Markusen (2002: p.5). There is, however, ample 
empirical evidence that MNEs can be involved through non-FDI channels , which have a 
considerable influence on the operation and performance of indigenous firms. Thus, the 
conventional approach of treating FDI as a synonym for MNEs tends to understate the 
impact of MNEs on host countries and the industrialization process.
Secondly, previous studies have not properly taken into account the economic and 
policy environment in host countries that potentially conditions gains from FDI. While 
FDI has the potential to create a favourable impact on the industrialization process, the 
economic and policy environment in host countries plays a crucial role in turning the 
potential into reality. So far, two key factors, trade policy regime and human capital 
development, have been hypothesized. However, there is a dearth of studies that bring 
these two factors together in an analytical framework for a systematic analysis of the 
contribution of MNEs to the industrialization process.
Thirdly, the overwhelming majority of studies have examined the impact of MNE 
involvement at either the macro- or industry/firm-level analyses without a systematic 
connection between these two analyses. In macro-level analysis, these studies mainly 
examine the relationship between output growth and FDI inflows, or the FDI-growth
2 Some studies use different terminology. For example, Oman (1984) referred to the non- 
FDI channel as ‘New Forms of Investment’.
3 For example, Richardson (1972), Hone (1974); Nayyar (1978); Westphal et al. (1979); 
Lall (1980); Keesing (1983); Keesing and Lall (1992); Oman (1984); Dunning (1993).
3nexus. This analysis could provide an evaluation of the overall FDI impact on host 
economies with a presumption that FDI creates technological benefit. However, the 
favourable impact on locally non-affiliated firms, particularly on technological capability, 
cannot be explicitly examined. This impact is very important because it is often argued 
to be the most desired benefit host countries anticipate from FDI. This can be 
systematically examined only through inter-industry/inter-firm studies of the relationship 
between the presence of foreign firms and the productivity of local manufacturing firms. 
While both the macro- and industry/firm-level analyses need to be brought together in 
order to produce a systematic quantitative analysis in evaluating gains from FDI, so far 
there has not been a systematic link between the macro- and industry/firm-level studies.
Finally, there is a dearth of systematic analysis of non-FDI channels through 
which MNEs impact on host countries. Mainly because of data scarcity, research in this 
subject area has failed to go beyond FDI in examining the impact of MNEs on the host 
country. However, in reality, MNEs can substantially influence business operations of 
enterprises in host countries through various non-FDI channels such as technology 
licensing, international subcontracting, and MNE buyer channels. Most of these non-FDI 
channels are not quantifiable. Thus, it is important to examine these channels through 
firm/industry-level case studies in order to provide a complete picture of the contribution 
of MNE involvement in the industrialization process of host countries.
1.2 Purpose of the Dissertation
This dissertation aims to examine the involvement of MNEs in both FDI and non- 
FDI forms in the Thai manufacturing sector. It has three main objectives:
(1) To probe and evaluate the impact of MNE involvement in Thai 
manufacturing.
4(2) To gain insight into the principal mechanism MNEs contribute to the 
industrialization process, and obstacles preventing them from functioning 
more effectively.
(3) To recommend policies for maximizing the benefits from MNE involvement.
Both quantitative and qualitative analyses are combined in the dissertation to 
provide a comprehensive scope of MNE involvement in Thai manufacturing as well as to 
evaluate their contribution to the Thai industrialization process. The quantitative analysis 
is undertaken at both macro- and inter-industry levels to provide quantitative indicators of 
the FDI contribution. These analyses are complemented with firm-level case studies in 
order to provide insights into the mechanism of how MNEs, both FDI and non-FDI, can 
be involved in and contribute to the Thai industrialization process. Several 
unquantifiable aspects related to MNE involvement are captured in the firm-level case 
studies analysis. The key hypothesis is that the policy environment of the host country, 
in particular the trade policy regime, conditions gains from MNE involvement.
MNEs have been involved in Thai manufacturing since the early 1960s 
(Tambunlerchai, 1975; Santikam, 1981; Pongpisanupichit, 1985; Akira, 1989). As 
measured by FDI inflows, the role of MNE involvements has become increasingly 
important over the past three decades. The annual average value of FDI inflows to Thai 
manufacturing increased from $34.6 million during 1971-5 to $700 and $2,486.3 million 
during 1986-90 and 1996-2000, respectively. Manufacturing FDI inflows accounted for 
3.7 per cent o f the total manufacturing investment in the 1970s. Its share increased 
noticeably to 12.7 per cent in the 1980s and to 51.5 per cent in the 1990s.4
Despite the significant involvement of MNEs in the Thai economy, their role in 
the industrialization process has remained a controversial issue for the past two decades. 
Among the few available studies, Tambunlerchai (1975) and Pongpisanupichit (1985)
4The sharp increase in the figures in the 1990s was mainly due to the dramatic drop of 
domestic manufacturing investment during the 1997-8 crisis. For the period 1991-6, the share of 
FDI in total manufacturing investment was 14.7 per cent.
5come up with the inference that MNEs played a rather negligible role, if any, in the 
process of industrial development in Thailand. By contrast, Santikam (1981), who 
undertook a qualitative analysis based on personnel interviews and questionnaire surveys, 
noted significant technology transfer from MNE parents to Thai affiliates but there was 
no evidence of technology spillover from these affiliates to local firms. Santikam (1981) 
provides some useful insight into the technology acquisition process, but the inferences 
are mostly drawn from the experience of enterprises in textile industries. Quite apart from 
the mixed inferences and the lopsided nature of the subject coverage, these studies are 
now very dated. More recent studies have by and large focused mostly, if not solely, on 
trends and patterns of FDI e.g. Pananond (2004). Moreover, all existing studies have 
treated ‘MNE involvement’ and ‘FDF as synonymous. Little attention has been paid to 
various non-FDI channels of MNE involvement, which have presumably played an 
important role in some sectors, the export-oriented processed food industry in particular 
(Jaffee and Gorden, 1993).
The foreign investment policy regime and policies impacting on the overall 
investment environment (trade policy, in particular) in Thailand have undergone notable 
changes over the past three decades. By developing-country standards, Thailand’s trade 
policy regime has remained relatively open throughout the post-war period (Sachs and 
Warner, 1995). Thailand resorted to a high level of tariff protection to promote import- 
substitution industries during the 1970s and 1980s. From the late 1980s onwards, these 
trade barriers have been gradually removed. The foreign investment regime has also 
become increasingly liberal. Foreign ownership restrictions in specific sectors and the 
domestic procurement requirement imposed on MNE affiliates have been considerably 
relaxed or completely removed. Thus, Thailand provides an excellent setting for 
examining the link between gains from MNE involvement and changes in the domestic 
policy regime.
61.3 Structure
The dissertation is composed of nine chapters. The following chapter provides an 
analytical framework to examine the role of MNEs in industrialization in host developing 
countries. The scope of MNE involvement covered in this chapter encompasses both FDI 
and non-FDI. Relating to the FDI channel, the contribution to technological capability is 
identified as the major source of gain. Three possible non-FDI channels are identified, 
namely, technology licensing, international subcontracting, and MNE buyer links that 
significantly influence local enterprises. A key theme running through the chapter is that 
the domestic policy context, in particular trade policy, plays a pivotal role in determining 
the nature and degree of host-country gains from MNE involvement.
Chapter 3 surveys the general investment climate and policy-induced incentive 
structure in Thai manufacturing over the past three decades from 1970 to the present. Six 
aspects of the commercial environment are discussed to illustrate the general investment 
climate in Thai manufacturing. These are the macroeconomic environment, labour 
markets, the quality of human capital, institutional factors, the role of government, 
infrastructure availability and policies towards foreign investment. To evaluate the 
overall investment climate, an international comparison is undertaken with emphasis on 
the four major Southeast Asian counterparts, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and 
Singapore (henceforth referred to as ASEAN-4). This is followed by discussion on 
investment and trade policy regimes. Various measures of trade restrictiveness, such as 
the degree of openness, the trade to goods GDP, the export-output ratio in the 
manufacturing sector, the incidence of applied tariffs, the nominal rate of protection 
(NRP) and effective rate of protection (ERP) are used to evaluate changes in the degree 
of trade restrictiveness over the past three decades.
Chapter 4 provides an overview of industrialization in Thailand and MNE 
involvement. Growth performance and its structural changes in the Thai economy are 
discussed in order to highlight the evolution of Thai manufacturing. Patterns and trends 
of Thai manufacturing during the period since 1970 are examined, followed by trends and
7patterns of FDI involvement. The final section in this chapter examines manufacturing 
FDI to shed light on the level of MNE involvement and its characteristics.
The analytical core of the thesis comprises the four following chapters. Chapter 5 
probes the FDI-growth nexus for total manufacturing. This is done by estimating a 
growth equation derived in the context of the new growth theory, which provides for 
capturing the impact of FDI interactively with openness on manufacturing output growth. 
The growth equation is estimated by applying the co-integration technique to time series 
data for the period 1970-2002. The key hypothesis is that the greater the trade openness, 
the greater the impact of FDI on output growth. Three alternative indices of trade 
openness, (i.e. trade to goods GDP, the ratio of export-output in the manufacturing sector 
and the incidence of applied tariff rates in the manufacturing sector), are used in order to 
test the sensitivity of results on these indices.
In Chapter 6, an inter-industry cross-sectional econometric analysis of FDI 
technology spillover on domestic manufacturing is undertaken, using unpublished returns 
to the Industrial Census 1997 (data for 1996). The data relate to 105 industries at the 4- 
digit disaggregating level, classified according to the Thai Standard Industry 
Classification (TSIC). The key hypothesis emphasizes the role of the trade policy regime 
across industries. Two alternative measures, i.e. NRP and ERP, are used to proxy the 
nature of trade policy that varies across industries. Both productivity and FDI 
determinants equations are estimated simultaneously in order to guard against any 
potential simultaneity problem. By the single-equation estimation, i.e. productivity 
determinant, the estimated positive relationship between foreign presence and the 
productivity of domestic manufacturing might simply reflect the fact that foreign 
investment gravitates towards more productive industries rather than representing any 
technology spillover from foreign presence. In addition, the productivity determinants 
equation of the whole manufacturing sector (covering both foreign and local 
manufacturing) is estimated to shed light on the impact of the foreign presence.
8Chapters 7 and 8 provide an in-depth firm-level study of two key industries — 
processed foods and automotive — to gain insights into the mechanisms of MNE 
involvement. The two industries are different in terms of the trade policy regime facing 
them. Thailand is one of the world’s major exporters of processed foods. The trade 
policy regime facing processed food producers has remained highly open over the past 
four decades. By contrast, the Thai government has long attempted to influence 
economic incentives for the automotive industry (covering both cars and components 
manufacture) by providing protection on vehicles as well as imposing local-content 
requirements (LCRs) to promote local parts manufacture. Since the early 1990s, the 
incentive regime for the automotive industry has become increasingly neutral. Thus, 
these two industries provide an excellent opportunity to look at the role of MNE 
involvement under different policy environments.
Chapter 7 surveys the development of the processed food and automotive 
industries in order to lay down a foundation for probing into the mechanism of MNE 
involvement and its contribution in the following chapter. Domestic policy regimes, 
especially trade and investment policies and several aspects of industrial development 
such as output growth, employment, market orientation and MNE involvement are 
discussed and compared to one another. To probe the mechanism of MNE involvement, 
the analysis in Chapter 8 is based on information gathered by interviewing senior 
managers of a sample of firms (16 in the processed food industry and 11 firms in the 
automotive industry) between December 2003 and February 2004. The sample was 
chosen using the purposive sampling technique.
The final chapter provides key inferences and policy lessons. It also draws policy 
lessons from Thailand for other developing countries and makes suggestions for further 
research.
9Chapter 2: Analytical Framework
The chapter aims to provide the analytical framework to examine the role of 
MNEs in industrialization in host countries. The chapter begins with the scope of MNE 
involvement in host countries in Section 2.1. In this study, there are two broad ways 
MNEs can link and become involved in host countries: through FDI (equity) and non- 
FDI (non-equity). This is followed by the role of the general investment climate in 
enticing MNE involvement in host countries. Section 2.3 provides discussion of potential 
determinants of gains from FDI. Two potential determinants, trade policy regime and 
level of human capital development, are proposed. In Section 2.4, the proposition of FDI 
backward linkage conditioning gains from FDI is addressed and probed for its relevance. 
Conclusions and key inferences are in Section 2.5.
2.1 Scope of MNE Involvement
MNEs play a crucial role in assisting host countries, especially in developing 
countries, to access advanced technology, to upgrade their production structure, to 
penetrate the global market successfully, and to facilitate the industrialization process. 
This is due to the fact MNEs are now widely regarded as the principle bearers of 
technology across international borders (Sjöholm, 1997; Borensztein et al., 1998; Lipsey, 
2000; Vernon, 2000). When MNEs become involved in host economies, their 
involvement is likely to be associated with advanced technology that can benefit both 
their affiliates and other enterprises within host countries.
Since there is no universally accepted definition of technology, this study pursues 
the most common approaches where ‘technology’ is referred to as a collection of physical 
processes that transform inputs into outputs, and knowledge and skills that structure the 
activities involved in carrying out these transformations (Kim, 1997a: p.4). According to
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this definition, technology is defined in a broad sense covering production technology, 
managerial skills, international marketing know-how, etc.
In general, there are two broad ways MNEs can involve themselves in host 
countries: through FDI and non-FDI channels.
2.2.1 FDI Channel
FDI is the outcome of a firm’s decision to diversify all or some operational 
activities across countries. The key factor that drives a firm to transplant its activities 
abroad relates to its competencies as well as to business opportunity. This means a firm 
taking this step is able to use abroad its technology that is proprietary. Hence, investing 
abroad is a way to maximize benefit from a firm’s competitive advantage (Dunning and 
Rugman, 1985;Teece; 1985).
An alternative way for firms to exploit this benefit is arm’s length sale of 
technology, including the right to use or infringe on patents (Caves, 1996: p.166). The 
choice between investment abroad and arm’s length sale is governed by a host of factors 
such as the nature of host economies, transaction costs incurred, the nature of technology 
(codificability and teachability), and the risk of technology leakage into the hands of 
competitors.1 Interestingly, FDI seems to be a more efficient way for firms to exploit 
their latest technology innovation (Teece, 1977, 2000; Mansfield and Romeo, 1980). 
Generally, the market for technology is imperfect. Technology owners and licensees 
have asymmetric information so that pricing the value o f technology is complicated. 
Buyers only realize the real value of technology if they actually use it, so they tend to 
undervalue it. At the same time, technology owners try to sell technology at the highest 
price possible to maximize the profit from their innovation. This is particularly true of 
the latest technology where the information gap between technology owners and 
licensees is even wider. It becomes harder to obtain an optimum price for the latest 
technological innovations, compared to more mature technology. As a result, the latest
1 For a succinct discussion of these factors, see Caves (1996: p.168-72).
1 1
technology developed by MNEs is not generally available for international licensing. 
The only effective way for a given country to access such technology is to entice MNEs 
to set up affiliates (Mansfield and Romeo, 1980; Teece, 2000: p.112). In addition, 
possessing a technological advantage is essential for firms establishing affiliates abroad 
in order to successfully compete with existing or potential competing indigenous firms, 
which have familiarity with local markets.
As a result, FDI reflects the objective of an entity resident in one country to obtain 
a long-term relationship between the direct investor and the host country enterprise, in 
which the former has a significant degree of influence on the management of the latter. 
To obtain a significant ability to influence enterprises, it does not always mean that 
MNEs must hold the majority o f the voting stock, i.e. 50 per cent or greater. In fact, to 
some extent, the correspondence between ownership rights and control over the 
enterprises is complicated. There are cases where MNEs with minority equity ownership 
can have considerable influence on firms (Oman, 1984: p.19). Hence, owing to the 
dominant current definition by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other 
institutes such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), the US Department of Commence as well as several scholars studying 
multinational firms,2 FDI is defined as the inflows of investment necessary to acquire a 
lasting management interest (10 per cent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise 
operating in an economy other than that of the investor (IMF, 1993: p.86). Based on this 
definition, FDI covers both fully-owned MNE affiliates and joint ventures between 
MNEs and local enterprises.
Through the FDI channel, MNEs have the potential to generate considerable 
impact on host countries’ economies. Similar to other forms of capital flows (OFCF), 
FDI provides additional capital funds to host economies thereby lowering the cost of
2 For example, the early Harvard studies under the direction of Raymond Vernon: Vaupel 
and Curhan, (1969: p.3) and Wilkins (1970), both cited in Lipsey (2001a)
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capital, and encouraging domestic production.3 This is widely regarded as the direct 
impact (Sjöholm, 1997; Blomström et a i, 2000). Nevertheless, with integrated 
international capital markets as well as possibilities to borrow in the host country’s 
capital market, the direct impact of FDI is becoming less important to some host 
countries. Besides the direct impact, FDI still has great potential to affect host 
economies.4 It is likely to influence the economic structure as well as the conduct and 
performance of locally owned firms in the host country. Since FDI means there are new 
entrants in industries, this can affect industry concentration.5 Their entry can increase 
domestic market competition and eventually influence the behaviour and performance of 
incumbent firms. FDI inflows can create linkages to upstream and downstream 
industries, thereby promoting complementary domestic investment in host economies. In 
addition, superior technology associated with MNE affiliates can spill over into the rest 
o f the host economy and benefit locally non-affiliated firms and other foreign-invested 
firms. All of these impacts can be a result of the productivity improvement of locally 
non-affiliated firms. Such indirect impact is referred to as FDI technology spillover. In 
other words, spillover is said to take place when the presence of a foreign firm generates 
productivity or efficiency benefits for the host country’s local non-affiliated firms 
(Blomström and Kokko,1998). Of all the gains from FDI, it is often argued that 
spillover is the most desirable benefit
There are at least three channels, through which FDI spillovers can occur:
(1) Demonstration Effect
The presence of foreign firms can have a demonstration effect that allows local 
firms to become familiar with superior technologies, marketing and managerial practices 
used in foreign affiliates. For instance, local firms might not know about certain 
technologies and production processes until they become available in the domestic
3 See, for example, MacDougall (1960) for the systematic treatment of the impact of 
capital flows. In this study, there is no difference between FDI and OFCF.
4 See a full discussion of the difference between FDI and OFCF in Appendix 1.
5 It is inconclusive as to whether FDI increases or lowers industry concentration. Its 
impact depends on the nature of industry, competency of indigenous firms, and other policy 
environments in host countries. See Caves (1996: p.87-8) for a comprehensive discussion.
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economy, due to the entry of foreign firms. Thus, spillover can take place in the form of 
imitating the foreign subsidiaries’ technology. Apart from enhancing the demonstration 
effect, the presence of foreign affiliates can exert pressure on local firms exhibiting 
technical or allocation inefficiencies to adopt more efficient methods. This allows local 
firms to survive successfully or even compete with foreign firms. In the short run, local 
firms respond to the presence of foreign affiliates by improving their X-efficiency, such 
as enforcing more cost-conscious management, and motivating employees to work 
harder. In the longer term, local firms seek new technology or innovations to upgrade 
their existing production. Since both demonstration and competition effects are likely to 
occur simultaneously, these two effects are regarded in the literature as a single channel 
of spillover.
To our knowledge, while there are a few studies examining the demonstration 
effect of FDI on local firms, e.g. Swan (1973); Tilton (1971); Riedel (1975); and Lake 
(1979), there is so far no direct econometric evidence of spillover through demonstration 
effect. These studies have simply inferred the presence of FDI spillover through 
demonstration effect from a estimated positive relationship between the productivity of 
locally non-affiliated firms/industries and a foreign presence. Indeed, under these 
studies, spillover can take place either through demonstration effect, labour mobility or 
both, as seen below.
(2) Linkage Effects
Where foreign investors are linked to upstream and downstream industries in host 
countries, the linked indigenous firms have the possibility of gaining technological 
benefits. The former is referred to as backward linkage and the latter as forward linkage. 
By backward linkage, foreign investors establish an inter-firm relationship with local 
suppliers and create a demand for inputs from local suppliers in upstream industries. 
When these local firms are engaged to supply certain raw materials, the high quality, 
reliability and speed of delivery that MNE affiliates demand, force them to enhance 
productivity. Moreover, in some cases, local suppliers in upstream industries receive 
technical and managerial training in the production of the required inputs. This is likely
14
to generate additional economic activity and income, and transfer technological and 
management skills to the host country.
Similarly, forward linkage effects are created when one industry uses another 
industry’s output as its inputs. Every activity that does not by its nature cater exclusively 
to final demand will induce attempts to utilize its outputs as inputs in other industries. 
The sum of the backward and forward linkages gives a total linkage effect, which can be 
seen as the growth in other new industries induced by establishing an industry.
Many studies have examined the role of backward linkages of MNEs and their 
contribution to host economies e.g. Schive (1990); Schive and Majumdar (1990); Barry 
and Bradley (1997); Kelegama and Foley (1999); Smarzynska (2002).6 Only 
Smarzynska (2002) explicitly examines the backward linkages channel for FDI spillover 
by estimating a firm’s production function in Lithuanian manufacturing during 1993— 
2000. Variables of foreign presence (measured by capital share) and backward linkages 
(measured by the proportion of sales to foreign firms to total sales) are incorporated in 
the production function to test their relationship. The key findings support the existence 
of productivity spillovers from FDI taking place through contacts between foreign 
affiliates and their local suppliers in upstream sectors, but there is no indication of 
spillovers occurring within the same industry. Nevertheless, as fully discussed in Section 
2.4, this study ignores the nature of backward linkages created. They can be policy- 
induced (i.e. LCRs) linkages rather than linkages that are economically induced.
6 For example, Schive (1990) and Schive and Majumdar (1990) measure the magnitude 
of backward linkages of MNE affiliates across industries, and examine patterns over a period of 
time, based on Taiwanese manufacturing during the 1970s, with the presumption that the greater 
the linkages the larger the benefit host economies received from FDI. Meanwhile Barry and 
Bradley (1997) and Kelegama and Foley (1999) argue that even though insignificant linkages of 
export-oriented MNE affiliates existed, these affiliates still made a significant contribution to the 
whole economy in several aspects, such as foreign exchange earning, experiencing new 
marketing and managerial skills, and promoting employment. Their arguments are based on the 
cases of Irish manufacturing and garment industry in Sri Lanka, respectively.
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(3) Labour Mobility
In addition to demonstration effects and linkages, FDI technology spillover can 
still take place through labour mobility. Generally, foreign affiliates play a more active 
role than local firms in educating and training local labour. Through this training and 
subsequent work experience, workers become familiar with the foreign affiliates’ 
technologies and production methods. Technology spillover through this channel occurs 
when employees of foreign affiliates move on to local employers or set up their own 
business, using knowledge learned during their previous employment.
There are a few empirical studies that examine the presence of FDI technology 
spillover through the labour mobility channel but indicate likelihood of its presence, e.g. 
Lindsey (1986); Gershenberg (1987); Djankov and Hoekman (2000); and Sousa (2001). 
Lindsey (1986), Djankov and Hoekman (2000); Sousa (2001), for example, find that 
MNEs actively provided worker training. Gershenberg (1987) provides evidence of 
managers moving from MNE affiliates to local firms. Thus, there is possibility that FDI 
technology spillover would take place through the labour mobility channel. The only 
published empirical study, which has explicitly tested the role of the labour mobility 
channel, is by Görg and Strobl (2002), using firm level data in Ghana. The productivity 
determinants equation of locally owned firms was estimated, and they introduced a zero- 
one dummy of working experience with MNE affiliates (1 for owners that have such 
experience; and 0 otherwise) to test whether these working experience variables are 
positively related to a firm’s productivity. The key finding supports spillover through 
labour mobility only within the same industry.
Besides empirical works that examined certain channels of FDI spillover, there 
are numerous studies examining gains from FDI in a wider context. They can be grouped 
into two broad categories: macro- and firm/industry-level analyses. In macro-level 
analysis, empirical studies focus the relationship between output growth and FDI inflows
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(henceforth referred to FDI-growth nexus).7 Growth equations are estimated in this 
analysis. FDI affects economic growth as a channel of technology spillover according to 
endogenous growth theory.8 On the other hand, there are a number of studies that 
concentrate on firm/industry-level analysis and examine the presence of FDI spillover as 
summarized in Table 2.1. The productivity determinant equations are estimated across 
industries within a given country. The statistical relationship between performance of 
locally non-affiliated firms/industries and the presence of MNE affiliates is examined to 
test the presence of technology spillover.9
Results from both macro-level and firm/industry-level analyses are far from 
conclusive. Some countries make large gains whereas others gain only marginally. 
Moreover, in some countries, FDI can even generate an adverse effect on the host 
country.10 The key inference of these studies is that the economic and policy 
environment in the host country conditions gains from FDI. This is fully discussed in 
Section 2.3.
2.1.2 Non-FDI Channel
MNEs can be involved in and have considerable influence on enterprises in host 
countries, even without equity participation. Such involvement is referred to as non-FDI 
channel, and has been increasingly important as a mode of MNE involvement in host 
countries in the global economy (Oman, 1984, 1989; Dunning, 1993: p.91-4; Hobday,
7 For example Balasubramanyam et al. (1996); Borensztein et al.(1998); De Mello 
(1999); Lipsey (2000); Nair-Reichert and Weinhold (2001).
8 The other channels of international technology spillover are international trade, and 
geography. See Keller (2002) and works cited therein.
9Görg and Strobl (2002) argue that these studies treated the channels, through which 
these spillover effects work as a black block.
10There are several possible instances where FDI inflows can retard economic growth. 
FDI inflows may crowd out domestic investment. The entry of MNE affiliates generates a fierce 
competition effect so that existing local firms may be forced out of business. MNE affiliates are 
more reliant on imported raw materials and/or intermediates rather than locally produced ones. 
The linkages to the rest of economy can be limited. In certain circumstances, where FDI inflows 
are directed into protected sectors, the associated adverse impact from resource misallocation is 
enlarged, leading to immiserizing growth in host countries. Recently, Brooks and Hill (2004: 
p.6-7) provide a fruitful summary of the possibilities of the negative impact of FDI.
17
1995, 2000; Nabeshima, 2004). In the context of the manufacturing sector, MNEs can be 
involved in host countries through three modes of non-FDI channel.11
Table 2.1
Summary of Empirical Studies Testing the Competition Effect from FDI in
Developing Countries
Empirical studies Country Analysis Aggregation Study period
Positive Spillover
Blomström and Persson (1983) Mexico CS Industry 1970
Blomström (1986) Mexico CS Industry 1970/75
Blomström and Wolff (1994) Mexico CS Industry 1970/75
Kokko (1994) Mexico CS Industry 1970
Kokko (1996) Mexico CS Industry 1970
Blomström and Sjöholm (1999) Indonesia CS Firm 1991
Chuang and Lin (1999) T aiwan CS Firm 1991
Sjöholm (1999a) Indonesia CS Firm 1980-91
Sjöholm (1999b) Indonesia CS Firm 1980-91
Kokko ei al. (2001) Uruguay CS Finn 1988
Negative Spillover
Aitken and Harrison (1999) Venezuela p Firm 1976-89
Djankov and Hoekman (2000) Czech Republic p Firm 1993-6
Kathuria (2000) India p Firm 1976-89
Ambiguous
Haddad and Harrison (1993) Morocco p Firm/Industry 1985-89
Kokko et al. (1996) Uruguay CS Firm 1990
Bosco (2001) Hungary p Firm 1993-7
Notes: CS denotes cross-sectional analysis.
P denotes panel analysis.
"Oman (1984) lists additional non-FDI channels such as management contracts, product- 
in-hand, production sharing contracts, risk service contracts. However, these channels are mainly 
involved in the non-manufacturing sector, especially the petroleum and mining sectors.
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(1) Technology Licensing Channel
Technology licensing refers to a circumstance where a host country enterprise 
(licensee) directly contacts technology owners who are likely to be MNEs, in order to 
gain rights o f access to one or a set o f technologies or know-how in return for value. The 
value may take a variety of forms: an initial lump-sum fee, a percentage of sales, 
royalties etc. On the other hand, the licensee gains access either to ‘know-how’ that is 
secret unpatented technology, trademarks, copyrights or patents, or a combination of 
these for a specified or unspecified duration. Sometimes, under the licensing contract, 
the licensee receives training from the technology owner. While it seems that technology 
sale and licensing are very similar, the major difference between these two channels is 
that, under the former, the technology owner sells technology per se to the buyer and 
there is no constraint on its use. By contrast, licensing usually gives carefully defined 
rights o f access to technology and to its use by the owner so that MNEs as technology 
owners to some extent have influence on the operation of host country enterprises.
Technology licensing in practice can take several forms, such as technological 
assistance agreements, franchising, management contracts, or patent licensing. All of 
these vary according to the degree of inter-firm participation. For the purpose of this 
study, they are treated as a single channel to illustrate a broad picture of the ways 
indigenous firms can access advanced technology.
Empirical evidence suggests that among developing countries, there are few 
countries successfully benefiting through the technology licensing channel. In particular, 
in the context o f East Asian economies, there are many success stories, found mainly in 
the cases o f Korea and Taiwan.13 This is due to the fact that, through the technology 
licensing channel, the licensee requires more technical capability than through other 
channels. The licensee needs to understand the underlying technology in order to use it
12 MNEs conduct a large proportion of the world’s total research and development (R&D) 
and own most of the world’s advanced technology (Sjöholm, 1997; Borensztein et al. 1998; 
Lipsey, 2000).
13Nabeshima (2004) provides a recent survey of cases where technology licensing was 
successfully used in East Asian countries.
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efficiently (Hobday, 1995). Nevertheless, the bulk of international payments for 
technology licensing are between MNE parents and their foreign affiliates, rather than 
independent firms.
(2). International Subcontracting Channel
According to Oman (1984), the international subcontracting channel normally 
involves a ‘principal’ contractor based in an industrialized country — often a MNE or 
trading company, occasionally an importer or wholesaler — ' that places orders with sub­
contractors in a developing country to produce components or assemble finished products 
with the inputs it provides. The principal normally sells the final product, sometimes in 
its home market, sometimes in a third-country market. Based on this definition, the 
international subcontracting channel is in line with the so called Original Equipment 
Manufacture (OEM) channel as proposed by Hobday (1995: p.35).
One crucial aspect of the international subcontracting channel is that the finished 
product is made to the precise specification of particular buyers. Thus, to obtain a 
finished product, intensive inter-firm cooperation is needed (Hobday, 1995, 2000). In 
this way, MNEs can considerably influence the business operations and technological 
capabilities of host country subcontractors. In general, MNEs (the principal contractors) 
provide technical know-how and service to ensure that subcontracting firms can produce 
quality components to meet specifications. Nevertheless, host country subcontractors 
need to show their potential to deliver the final goods. This requires firms to posses a 
certain level of production skill and technological capability. Usually, MNEs take part in 
the selection of capital equipment and the training of managers, engineers, and 
technicians as well as in giving advice on production, financing and management 
(Hobday, 1995: p.37). This eventually raises the technological capability of host country 
subcontractors.
Empirically, the role of the international subcontracting channel is highlighted in 
previous studies as one of the key factors contributing to the export success of North East 
Asian newly industrialized countries (NICs), i.e. Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong in the
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electronics industry (Hobday, 1995; Nabeshima, 2004). Note that experience of Malaysia 
and Thailand in the electronics industry is different from these NICs. FDI instead of the 
international subcontracting channel plays a dominant role.
(3) MNE Buyer Channel
A MNE buyer channel can be classified as another specific form of 
subcontracting. There are foreign investors, mostly MNEs, large trading companies 
(either retailing or wholesaling), and large supermarkets from developed countries,14 that 
travel the world in search of potential suppliers in developing countries to manufacture 
tailor-made goods. These companies operate in many countries and have considerable 
influence on local suppliers (Hone, 1974: p.149; Keesing, 1983: p.339; Rhee et al., 1984: 
p.54). Based on the definition of MNEs used in this study, these companies are regarded 
as such and are henceforth referred to as MNE buyers.
The relationship between MNEs and local suppliers resembles general arm’s 
length transactions in that these buyers and local suppliers contact each other to negotiate 
their commercial contracts (e.g. price, quantity, quality, delivery, payments, etc.). The 
feature that distinguishes MNE buyers from other foreign buyers is that they form a long­
term relationship with local suppliers (Richardson, 1972; Keesing 1983). Their 
relationship goes far beyond the negotiation and fulfillment of orders. In fact, MNE 
buyers not only bring in commercial orders but also help local suppliers to penetrate 
international markets successfully, especially developed country markets where final 
goods must fulfill several quality aspects required by final consumers. There is a wide 
range of these required quality aspects, including input specifications and quality, product 
design, and labeling and packaging (Keesing 1983: p.339; Rhee et al. 1984: p.61). While 
some of these aspects may not even be of interest in developing countries, consumers in 
developed countries are highly sensitive to them and therefore are vital to market success.
14Samples of these MNE buyers are Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Marubeui-Ida, Nichimen, J.C. 
Penny, Macy’s, Bloomingdales, Marcor, Sears Roebuck, Wall Mart, Marks and Spencers, C&A 
Modes and Kaufhof (Hone, 1974: p.149).
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Richardson (1972: p.885) provides an example of Marks and Spencer and their suppliers 
to exemplify the MNE buyer channel.
‘Not only do Marks and Spencer tell their suppliers how much they wish to buy 
from them, and thus promote a quantitative adjustment of supply to demand, they 
concern themselves equally with the specification and development of both 
processes and products. They decide, for example, the design of a garment, 
specify the cloth to be used and control the process even to laying down the types 
of needles to be used in knitting and sewing.’
Where a wide range of quality is concerned, the manufacturing process is far 
beyond the simple manufacturing process, and the final product is the result of several 
activities, comprising research and development (R&D), product design, marketing, and 
manufacturing. MNE buyers are extensively involved with R&D activities, product 
design, and the control process, as well as a strong marketing network that tend to 
specialize in such related activities. Nevertheless, MNEs might not necessarily be 
superior to local suppliers in the manufacturing process, especially in industries where 
the production process needs to be involved with intensive local labour and access to 
local raw materials. On the other hand, even though indigenous suppliers are capable in 
the manufacturing process, they lack knowledge of all quality aspects required, making it 
unlikely they would export successfully without assistance from MNE buyers. Empirical 
studies point out that the first few shipments from developing countries to developed 
ones received substantial assistance from these MNE buyers.15
Before placing orders, MNE buyers visit local suppliers to check their production 
process in order to conduct their own assessment of their capability. After finding 
potential suppliers, the buyers provide technical information for improving existing 
facilities. Based on Korean manufacturing experience, Rhee et al. (1984) illustrates a 
wide spectrum of the technical information provided, ranging from production 
techniques, product specification, product design, styling to market requirement, quality 
control technique, etc. Host country suppliers receive considerable benefits from these
15 See Keesing (1983) for the general experience of developing countries and Rhee et al. 
(1984) for Korean manufacturing.
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buyers’ factory visits (Keesing, 1983; Rhee et al., 1984). To become integrated into the 
MNEs global chain, local enterprises must comply with all requirements and apply the 
technical information. In many cases, manufacturers are required to install additional 
facilities. Furthermore, buyers will continue to conduct periodic visits to local suppliers 
in order to check quality control and introduce the development of new products and new 
product varieties. The relevant role of the MNE buyer channel in the manufacturing 
sector has been cited in sizable studies.16 In particular, Hone (1974) clearly spells out 
the MNE buyer channel is on a par with the MNE affiliates in the export success of East 
Asian countries in the 1960s and early 1970s in consumable manufactured goods.
There are two specific features of MNE buyer channels. Firstly, even though it 
seems that international subcontracting and MNE buyer channels are similar, a key 
difference is that, the latter do not necessarily rely on explicit contracts as does the 
former. Secondly, the relative importance of MNE buyers as opposed to other foreign 
buyers depends on the export destination and types of products. As suggested by 
previous studies, the MNE buyer channel is likely to be more important for developed 
country destinations than for developing countries. In addition, it is more likely that the 
MNE buyer channel occurs in the area of consumable finished products e.g. clothing, 
footwear, processed foods, rather than in other manufacturing industries such as 
automotive industries or electronics (Richardson, 1972; Hone, 1974: p.148-9; Rhee et al., 
1984: p.59-63). In consumable finished products, production technology per se is likely 
to be widely known rather than being proprietary to any specific firms. It is also not 
subject to frequent change. Thus, it is less likely that MNEs would internalize all the 
production processes within the firm to prevent leakage of a technology.
Table 2.2 provides a summary of channels, through which MNEs can be involved 
in host economies. The degree of involvement in host economies varies across channels. 
Technology licensing seems to feature the least degree of MNE involvement in host 
economies whereas FDI seems to be the highest. International subcontracting and MNE
16 For example, Richardson (1972); Hone (1974); Nayyar (1978); Westphal et al. (1979); 
Lall (1980); Keesing (1983); Keesing and Lall (1992).
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buyers are in the middle. However, the degree of involvement does not necessarily 
reflect gains from MNE involvement. Gains from MNE involvement through FDI linkage 
might be fewer than those made through international subcontracting or MNE buyer 
channels. As seen in the fuller discussion in Section 2.3, FDI could even have an adverse 
impact on host economies.
Table 2.2
Channels of MNE Involvement
FDI Channel
1. Demonstration effect
2. Labour mobility
3. Backward linkages
4. Forward linkages 
Non-FDI Channels
1. Technology licensing
2. International subcontracting
3. MNE buyer 
Source: See text.
2.2 Role of the General Investment Climate and the Likelihood of 
MNE Involvement
Discussion in this section aims to highlight the role the general investment climate 
of the host country plays in successfully enticing MNE involvement. Since there is no 
consensus as to the definition of general investment climate, in this study (for example, 
see Dollar et al. 2004), it is a catch-all term for various considerations impinging on 
investment decisions, such as macroeconomic stability, political stability, policy 
uncertainty, civil liberties, the attitudes of the host country towards foreign enterprise 
participation, the rule of law, and the clarity of rules governing foreign investment.
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The general investment climate is significant because a decision o f MNE 
involvement in host economies, especially FDI, involves risk and uncertainty. Some o f 
these risks and uncertainties can be resolved when firms begin operating but often it takes 
time to reveal relevant information and eventually resolve them (Rivoli and Salorio, 
1996). For example, political instability cannot be resolved just because MNEs establish 
their affiliates. In addition, FDI involves sizable sunk costs, so that a large proportion o f 
the fixed investment cannot be recovered, i.e. this is a case o f irreversibility. The only 
way to recover the initial investment is to operate for a longer period. The role o f  the 
general investment climate is to reduce this risk and uncertainty involved in direct 
investment. Promoting a FDI-friendly environment affects the success o f business 
operations at the micro level and creates a foundation o f competitiveness and growth at 
the macro level. Similarly, the entry o f MNE buyers occurs when the conditions in host 
countries are right. The right conditions include the general business environment that 
fosters trade rather than impedes it ( Rhee et a l,  1984: p.51; Keesing and Lall, 1992).
There is a consensus among economists that the general investment climate is 
much more important than investment incentives and the like to influence MNE entry 
decisions (Wells, 1986; Brooks et al. 2004; Dollar et al. 2004). Investment incentives 
might matter only when host countries create certain levels o f a conducive investment 
climate that allows foreign investors to make profits from their investment. While their 
governments offer investment incentive schemes such as tax holidays, tariff exemptions, 
etc to entice MNE involvement, especially FDI, the effectiveness o f investment incentive 
schemes is still inconclusive.17 On the one hand, these investment incentives could create 
distortions and inefficiencies such as bias against small and medium enterprises, and lack 
o f transparency and accountability (Brooks et al., 2004). In addition, as countries 
compete to attract investment, the incentives offered by a given country are generally 
counter-balanced by similar moves by other competing countries. Hence, investment 
incentives may matter only when other conditions are roughly similar in alternative host 
countries. On the other hand, with the harmonization o f many other policy differences
17 See the comprehensive discussion of FDI incentives in Blomström and Kokko (2003).
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between countries as a part of meeting reform commitments under the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and several regional integration agreements, investment incentives 
appear to take on a stronger role. For example, Easson (2001: p72) argues that while 
MNE executives used to downplay the role of incentives, they now readily admit their 
increasing importance for investment decisions. Moreover, Taylor (2000) provides 
econometric evidence in supporting the increased importance of investment incentives on 
international direct investment flows.
A wide range of economic and social factors, such as macroeconomic stability, 
the general business environment, and institutional context combine to build and sustain a 
favourable general investment climate. Macroeconomic stability plays a central role in 
providing an economic environment conducive for a country to maintain long-term 
economic growth (e.g. Fischer, 1993; Hobday, 1995; Yusuf et a l, 2003; Hill, 2004). 
Macroeconomic stability allows private sectors to forecast investment returns more 
precisely, based on the underlying economic fundamentals. In addition, the general 
business environment, as well as several institutional factors, are as relevant as 
macroeconomic stability in forming a favourable investment climate. This involves 
consideration of a wide range of non-economic factors such as: basic rights for foreign 
investors, civil liberties, rule of law, clarity of rules of governing foreign investors, labour 
market environment (e.g. labour strike, labour unionization), political stability, and 
infrastructure availability.18
2.3 Determinants of Gain from FDI
While FDI has high potential to generate favourable impacts on the host country, 
as suggested by empirical evidence (see above), gains from FDI are not automatic but 
depend on the economic environment and domestic policies in host countries. So far
18 For example, Kravis and Lipsey (1982), Mascarenhas (1982); Chase et al. (1988); and 
Rivoli and Salorio (1996) for institutional framework and political stability; Kravis and Lipsey 
(1982) for infrastructure quality; Wei (1997 and 2000) and Smarzynska and Wei (2000) for 
corruption and recently Stein and Daude (2001) testing for a wide range of institutional 
indicators.
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there are two determinants that are generally recognized as conditioning gains from FDI: 
the trade policy regime and human capital.
2.3.1 Trade Policy Regime
Starting with the pioneering paper by Bhagwati (1973), a sizable theoretical 
literature has sought to explain how the restrictiveness (openness) of the host country’s 
trade regime conditions gains from FDI (Bhagwati, 1978, 1985, 1994, 2003; Brecher and 
Diaz-Alejandro 1977; Brecher and Findlay 1983). The theory of the effect of the trade 
policy regime on gains from FDI in a given host country was conceived as an extension 
to the theory of immiserizing growth (Johnson, 1953; Bhagwati, 1958).19 A key 
hypothesis arising from this literature (which is now referred to as the ‘Bhagwati 
hypothesis’) is that gains from FDI are likely to be far less or even negative under an 
import substitution (IS) regime compared with a policy regime geared to export 
promotion (EP). As postulated by Bhagwati (1978), the criterion to classify a trade 
policy regime is based on the effective rate of exchange (ERE). The ERE for a certain 
activity simply reflects the net economic return from that activity so that the criterion to 
distinguish between IS versus EP regimes is reliance on the degree of policy neutrality 
toward economic activities, i.e. import-competing versus export-oriented. Hence, an EP 
regime is defined as one, which equates the average ERE for exports (EREx) with the 
average effective rate of exchange for imports (EREM). In short, under an EP regime 
there is no difference in economic return between import-competing and export-oriented 
activities, i.e. a trade-neutral or bias-free regime (Bhagwati, 1985). In contrast, an IS 
regime is referred to as one where EREM is greater than EREx. Hence, an IS regime 
provides uneven economic return in favour of import-competing activities.
19 Bhagwati (1958: p.201) argues that, “economic expansion may harm the growing 
country itself. Under certain economic circumstances, economic expansion may harm the 
growing country. Economic expansion increases output which, however, might lead to a 
sufficient deterioration in terms of trade to offset the beneficial effect of expansion and reduce the 
real income of the growing country”. In general, immiserizing growth occurs in the case of a 
large country. Johnson (1967) argues that a small country growing from the tariff-induced-FDI 
inflows could experience immiserizing growth in particular circumstances.
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The trade policy regime conditions gains from FDI because it can influence 
economic incentives confronting enterprises, which operate in host countries (including 
MNE affiliates). Meanwhile FDI inflows are not homogenous (Dunning, 1993) and each 
of them could generate different benefits to host countries. Hence, with different trade 
policy regimes, host countries could entice different types of FDI.
Under an IS regime, government policies create artificial economic incentives in 
favour of domestic markets as opposed to exports. The highly-protected domestic market 
is the key motivation for FDI inflows. Thus, MNE affiliates are established mainly to 
capture economic rents induced by government policies in host countries. On the other 
hand, under an EP regime, FDI inflows are dictated by market mechanisms. The main 
incentive is the comparative advantage of the host country. In the context of developing 
countries, the main incentives would be the relatively low labour costs and/or availability 
of raw materials. MNE affiliates rely on the comparative advantage of host countries in 
order to enhance production efficiency and gain international competitiveness. Hence, 
the nature of the trade policy regime could alter gains from FDI.
Gains from FDI tend to be lower under an IS regime, compared to an EP regime, 
in the following three ways:
(1) Direct Impact
As mentioned, direct impact refers to the impact of FDI as additional capital to 
host economies (see above). The dollar amount of FDI inflows under an IS regime seems 
to be less than under an EP regime. Since the highly-protected domestic market is the 
motivation for FDI inflows under an IS regime, the dollar amount is mainly determined 
by the size of domestic demand. In contrast, the main incentives for FDI inflows under 
an EP regime is the comparative advantage of host countries that MNEs can use to 
strengthen their international competitiveness. The dollar amount of FDI inflows under 
an EP regime are not likely to be constrained by limited domestic demand but by export 
opportunity. Balasubramanyam and Salisu (1991) empirically support this, based on
20 According to Dunning (1993), an IS regime is likely to entice rent (market)-seeking 
FDI whereas efficiency seeking FDI is likely to gravitate to host countries pursuing an EP regime.
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inter-country cross-sectional data analysis. While other factors such as market size of the 
host country (measured by GDP per capita and its growth), macroeconomic stability 
(measured by the wholesale price index), and attitudes toward foreign investors are taken 
into consideration, the magnitude of FDI inflows tends be lower for countries pursuing an 
IS regime. Thus, the direct impact tends to be less under an IS regime, compared with an 
EP regime.
(2) Impact on Resource Allocation and Immiserizing Growth
FDI inflows under an IS regime are likely to generate immiserizing growth in host 
countries. Generally, countries pursuing an IS regime impose protection on capital- 
intensive sectors where they are less internationally competitive. Thus, FDI inflows 
under an IS regime would be directed into the capital-intensive sector. This causes 
expansion in the protected capital-intensive sector and enlarges the existing distortion 
effect. According to the Rybczynski Theorem, this leads to contraction of the 
protection-free labour-intensive sector. Thus, the impact of FDI could possibly reduce 
social welfare and real income.
A two-factor, two-good Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) model can illustrate 
this. Suppose there are only two input factors, capital (AT) and labour (L ). There are two 
goods, X  (export-oriented) and Y (import-competing) goods. Assume that Y is capital 
intensive. The general equilibrium model setting is as follows;
X  = g x(Lx,Kx) (2.1)
Y = g r (Ly,Ky) ' (2.2)
L = LX + Ly (2.3)
K  = KX+Ky (2.4)
21 According to the Rybczynski Theorem, the endowment of one of the factors of 
production increases, the endowment of the other being constant, the output of the good using the 
accumulating factor intensively will increase and the output of the other good will decrease in 
absolute terms, provided that commodity and factor prices are kept constant (Södersten and 
Reed,1994: p.125).
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where g l(LitK.) = production function of zth good, 
z = A and F
Assume the production function is linear homogenous, i.e. exhibits constant 
returns to scale. With this assumption, the production function can be considered in 
terms of the input-output coefficients. Thus, equations (2.1) and (2.2) can be transformed 
into equations (2.5) and (2.6), respectively. That is, equation (2.1) is divided by X  and 
rearranged to obtain equation (2.5). Equation (2.5) states that 1 unit of good X  can be 
produced by aLX units of labour and axx units of capital.
1 = S LX  J a KX )
where a LX = —  and aKX =
(2.5)
Similarly, equation (2.6) is expressed as the production function of 1 unit of good
F.
1 = gy (a LY, a KY) (2.6)
.  L y  K ywhere aLY— aKY =
Rearrange equations (2.2) and (2.3) to be a function of aLi and aKi as in equations 
(2.7) and (2.8), respectively.
L = aLXX  + aLYY (2.7)
K = a ^ X  + aKYY (2.8)
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FDI inflows enlarge the capital in host countries. Differentiating equations (2.7) 
and (2.8) with respect to FDI, it obtains as in equation (2.9) and (2.10), respectively.
dL dX dK dY dK
dFDI ~ aLX dK dFDI (‘Lr 8K 6FD1
(2.9)
dK dX dK
dFDl ~ d K  dFDI + ÜKV dK dFDI
(2. 10)
FDI inflows do not have any impact on the labour force so that 
Therefore, a matrix of linear equation system is obtained as in Equation (2.11).
dFDI
0 .
r - A  Y
^ 2 x 1  -r l 2 x 2 r l 2xl (2 .11)
where C2x1 , A2
a LX a LY 
a KX a  KY
; and X 2 dKd r
dK
Thus, X  = Ä 1 C
[dx~\ a LY
dK
dY =
a LXa KY ~  a KXa LY 
a LX
_dK. _a LXa KY ~  a KXa LY _
(2 .12)
With the assumption that Y is capital intensive, and thus
a KX a  KY
aLxaKY ~ aKxaLY >®- FDI inflows cause the expansion of goods Y on the cost of goods X
To draw an inference on social welfare, the prices of goods X  and Y as well as 
consumer’s utility must be incorporated into the general equilibrium framework. For
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simplicity, assume that X  as numeraire and p is the price of goods Y relative to X, 
depending on world price, ( p ) and tariff (t).
p = (l + t)p* (2.13)
Hence, the total value of output is as follows:
R(p,L,K) = pg>’(Ly,Ky) + gx(Lx,Kx)
= pgy(Ly,Ky) + g x( L - L y, K - K y) (2.14)
where R(p, L,K)= value of output in terms of goods X.
This setting is in line with the theoretical model developed by Edwards and 
Wijnbergen (1986). Consumer behaviour, on the other hand, is summarized by the 
concave expenditure function E(p, U) as in equation (2.15).
E(p,U) = X(p,U) + PY(p,U)
= X(p,U) + pY(p,U) (2.15)
where X(p,U)= Hicksian demand for goods X
Y(p,U)= Hicksian demand for goods Y
Assume that R (p,K,L) and E(p, U) are twice differentiable. At the equilibrium,
R (p,K, L)+ tY= E(p, U) (2.16)
Note that the second term of the left-hand side is the tariff revenue, the product of 
tariff rate and equilibrium quantity of Y (Y). The equilibrium quantity of Y is jointly 
determined by both demand for and supply of goods Y so that it is a function of both 
utility and capital stock. The presence of tariff on goods Y entices the FDI inflows, 
thereby increasing the level of domestic capital stocks. Take total differential to equation
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(2.16) and assume other variables except dU and dK are equal to zero. Hence, the 
welfare impact of the FDI inflows is as follows:
dY Jzr dX Jvrp — dK h-----dK+t
dK dK
' m u , p ) d U _ eY(p,K) d K '
V dU
dU
dK
f dY d X \  dY 
p —  + —  I- t
V dK dK J dK
dX dY
+ P
dU dU
- t
dY
dU
dX dY
----dU + p ---- dU
dU dU
(2.17)
According to the duality theory,
YM( p J )  = YM[p,E(p,U)] = Y(pJJ) = Ep(p,U) = dE<f U)
dp
where YM (p,I)= Marshallian demand function of goods Y.
I = Money income
(2.18)
Differentiating equation (2.18) with respect to U, it obtains
dY(p,U)
dU
f
ei j
( ^
V A
dU J 
dX d Y '----+ p -----
dU dU
r)Y(  n  T
Substitute — ——- from equation (2.19) into equation (2.17); 
dU
dU
dK
r dY dX\p —  +
V dK dK
cW
dK
fd X  dY V v
dYM .where a  = ------, income effect
dl
(2.19)
(2 .20)
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The first term o f nominator o f equation (2.20),
dY d X \p — - + ■—
dK dK, 
dY
, is the marginal
productivity o f capital that is always positive. The second term t is positive because
dK
dY  22
according to equation (2.12), —  is positive. Thus the sign is ambiguous. On the other
dK
hand, the sign o f the denominator depends on the last bracket ( l - a t ) .  With the 
assumption that Y is normal goods a  e (0 ,l). Hence with fe (0 ,l) ,  a t  e (0 ,l) . The 
denominator is always positive. At the positive tariff rate, t >0, FDI inflows could result 
in immiserizing growth and lower income in host countries. In other words, under an IS 
regime, MNE affiliates that are motivated by high tariff protection could generate an 
adverse impact on host economies. Such an adverse effect is unlikely to occur under an 
EP regime.
It becomes clearer when remittances are taken into consideration. Under the 
assumption that the capital market is perfectly competitive, direct investors earn interest 
return on foreign capital equal to the marginal product o f capital. In the extreme case 
where these investors fully remit this return to home countries, the nominator in equation
dY
(2.20) will be only - t —  as in equation (2.21). Thus, FDI inflows under an IS regime
dK
always result in immiserizing growth.
dU
dK
- t
dY 
dK
dX dY
—  + p ------
dU dU
H \
(2 .21)
(l - a t )
In a case where foreign affiliates remit this return partly, the general version o f 
equation (2.20) is
22 Edwards and Wijnbergen (1986) refer to the term as Rybczyncki term.
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( 2.22)
where y e (0,1)= the fraction of interest return remaining in host countries 
3. Technology Spillover
While FDI inflows can create technology spillover to indigenous non-affiliated 
firms, which result in enhancing productivity and long-term economic growth in host 
countries, technology spillover seems to occur far less under an IS regime, compared 
with an EP regime. Some countries might even experience negative FDI technology 
spillover on the productivity of locally non-affiliated firms.
To illustrate the impact of FDI inflows on technological capability in the host 
country, total factor productivity (A) is introduced into the revenue function. The greater
dRthe value of A, the greater the productivity gained by firms in host countries, i.e. —  > 0.
Assume FDI technology spillover affects A in general (Hicks-neutral technological 
progress), not in particular goods, so there is no need to disaggregate into goods X  and Y. 
The economy is represented by revenue and expenditure functions. Thus, in the revenue 
function A is incorporated.
Following the mathematical procedures from equations (2.16) to (2.22), the effect 
of FDI inflows to utility in host countries is as in equation (2.23):
R(p9K,L,A)=E(p,U)
dU
dK
dR(p,K,L,A) dR dA dRp(p,K,L) 
Y dK + dA dFDI dK (2.23)
dU
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dR dA
While — > 0 ,  the sign o f --------
dA dFDI
is ambiguous as suggested by a number of
empirical studies (see above). It can be positive or negative, depending on how MNE 
affiliates and locally non-affiliated firms interact with each other. In circumstances 
where local firms actively respond to the presence o f MNE affiliates and try to maximize
dA
the advanced benefits, --------tends to be positive. In contrast, where local firms fail to
dFDI
respond to the presence of MNE affiliates, it is likely the latter will bring in with them
dA
advanced technology in a once-and-for-all manner at the time o f establishment. --------
dFDI
tends to far lower in these circumstances. How locally non-affiliated firms react to the 
entry o f MNE affiliates depends on the trade policy regime.
The theoretical model developed by Wang and Blomström (1992) is employed to
dA
illustrate the sign o f . The model is based on a dynamic game theory framework.
Assume two firms in the manufacturing sector: an affiliate o f an MNE and a locally non- 
affiliated firm (henceforth referred to as the ‘foreign’ and ‘local’ firms, respectively), 
producing differentiated but substitutable products for the host country market. This 
assumption o f serving the domestic market can be generalized to a situation where both 
types o f firms produce for a third country market without affecting the key result. The 
market success o f each firm depends on the level o f technology employed. The more 
advanced the level o f technology, the greater the consumer demand and expected profits. 
On the one hand, the entry o f a foreign firm is associated with some amount o f 
proprietary technology from the parent company so as to offset the potential disadvantage 
against the local firms possessing superior knowledge o f the availability o f factor inputs, 
business practices and/or consumer preferences. Beyond that there is still an incentive 
for the foreign firm to put extra effort into undertaking technology transfer activities to 
increase market share.23
23 See the fuller discussion of the model’s dynamic optimization setting in Appendix 2.
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It is assumed the effort to undertake technology transfer activity is observable and 
represented by If . However, transferring technology activities is costly. The effort to
transfer technology If  is associated with dollar costs, Cf  where Cf  is an increasing 
dCf d2Cf
function of If , i.e. > 0, with decreasing rate, i.e. 2- < 0. Because of the presence 
of cost and benefit, the foreign firm has to decide the amount of If  undertaking such
activities to maximize its net benefit. In addition, the amount of If  will depend on the
local firm’s response to the presence of the foreign firm. In a situation where the local 
firm actively puts in the effort to learn the advanced technology associated with the 
foreign firm, the technology superiority of the latter will not last long. As the result, it 
will need to keep undertaking technology transfer activities in the following period in 
order to maintain the advantage or even just to survive in the host country environment. 
In contrast, a situation where local firms are less responsive in attempting to learn the 
associated technology provides relatively less incentive for foreign firms to continue to 
actively undertake technology transfers from their parent company.
On the other hand, the local firm can observe, learn, and adapt technological 
superiority associated with the MNE affiliate (so called Teaming effort’) to enhance its 
own technological capability. This is because the technology accompanying with the 
foreign firm has certain public good qualities, which cannot be fully internalized, thus the 
localization of the foreign firm could potentially generate positive externality in terms of 
technological benefit to the local firm.
As mentioned earlier, the market success of each firm depends on the level of 
technology it employs. This encourages local firms to leam the associated superior 
technology. However, the learning effort of the local firm is associated with the dollar 
amount of cost. The effort that the local firm devotes to the learning process is observed 
by Id and its associated dollar costs, Cd, which increases with the level of effort, Id, but
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at a decreasing rate (that is — -  > 0 and — < 0). Similar to the foreign firm, Id also
3 4  did
depends on If and the local firm has to decide on its level of effort (Id).
Each firm chooses its own optimal level of effort, given the other’s effort over the 
period. The optimal path of effort level each firm decides on could be represented by the 
so-called ‘best reply’ mapping. That is, IF, the best reply mapping of a foreign firm, is a 
function that illustrates the optimum level of If with a given level of Id as well as other
factors, such as capital costs and age of technology transferred. Similarly, the best reply 
mapping of local firm, ID, is a level of effort where the local firm maximizes its return at 
the certain level of If as well as other related factors such as policy environment in the 
host country and domestic opportunity cost.
Figure 2.1 illustrates both IF and VD mappings. Both are positively sloped.24 
Intuitively, the upward slope of the IF curve implies the foreign firm positively responds 
to Id in order to keep technological superiority and secure market share in the host 
country. The concavity of IF reflects the leaming-by-doing feature of technology 
enhancing activities. That is, as a foreign firm becomes more involved with technology 
transfer activities, the additional effort to advance its technological capability is less. The 
positive y-axis intercept on IF represents the prerequisite the foreign firm needs to 
accompany the advanced technology to offset its initial disadvantage in local market 
conditions. As a mirror image of IF, the fD function exhibits a positive relationship 
between Id and If with the convexity. Unlike the foreign firm, the local firm possesses 
superior knowledge of the local market condition so the best reply mapping of local firm, 
I ]D, starts from the origin.
24 The positive slope of IF needs a certain but not counter-intuitive assumption over the 
parameter. See details in the Appendix 2.
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Both firms will attain the equilibrium levels of and I ld at the intersection 
between I F and ID functions at point A in Figure 2.1. Given the steeper slope of ID, the 
equilibrium is locally stable and steady-state Nash equilibrium. There is no incentive for 
either of these firms diverting from this equilibrium level. Both I )  and Id levels jointly
determine the magnitude of technology spillover the host country can expect from FDI. 
Given the equilibrium level of If , the higher the equilibrium level of Id, the higher the
level of technology spillover. All other things being equal, the higher level of If at the 
equilibrium implies the higher technology spillover the host country expects to gain.
Figure 2.1
Best Reply Mappings of Foreign and Local Firms
To demonstrate the role of the trade policy regime, the model discussed here is 
modified by hypothesizing that trade policy influences the cost effectiveness of the 
technology enhancing activities for the local firm. That is, every effort to enhance the 
technological capability of the local firm is more costly in any industry where the trade 
regime is more restrictive. This is because much of the FDI flowing to a sector with high 
trade restrictions often enters relatively capital- and skill- intensive products where output 
is mainly supplied for a highly protected domestic market. Although the production
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technology associated with FDI is typically older and less advanced than used in the 
MNE’s home country (Moran, 2001), it is often relatively capital and skill intensive, 
compared to that employed by the local firm. Technology gap in this circumstance is 
likely to be wide. This is also far from the host country’s comparative advantage. Thus, 
it is difficult for local firms to use the advanced technology.
In addition, the nature of the capital intensity and the requirement for huge fixed 
and sunk costs in the early stages limit the number of local enterprises able to become 
involved. Learning and adapting such technology does not automatically take place (Bell 
et al., 1984; Eveson and Westphal, 1995). In order to effectively benefit from 
technology, the acquisition process requires successive effort and incurs sizable dollar 
costs. An IS regime does not provide the economic incentive for local enterprises to 
commit to such long-term investment. Instead, the highly-protected domestic market 
encourages local firms to produce products not directly competitive with those being 
produced by foreign affiliates and to enjoy economic rents induced by the regime. 
Kokko (1994) refers to this as a situation where the foreign affiliate in certain industries 
may operate in ‘enclaves’ in isolation from local firms. Thus, an increase in the level of 
trade restrictiveness raises the dollar cost of learning effort for the local firm, Cd. This 
results in shifting ID left from IDX to ID2 in Figure 2.1. That is, at any level of If , the
effort of the local firm to learn technology becomes less. Thus at point B, the equilibrium 
levels of If2 and ld2 are lower than those at point A, thereby lowering the expected
magnitude of technology spillover from FDI.
In contrast, in the context of a liberal trade regime, technology spillover is likely 
to generate a more productivity enhancing effect. This is because the main incentives for 
FDI in a given host country are the relatively low-labour costs and/or availability of raw 
materials. FDI inflows under an EP regime can be expected to employ technologies more 
in line with the host country’s comparative advantage. A higher level of policy neutrality 
creates a higher likelihood for MNEs to become involved with the host country’s 
production to serve their strategy for maintaining a competitive position in international
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markets. With this motivation, the associated advanced technology will be cutting edge 
and making use of existing resource endowments in the host country (Moran, 2001). 
Under these circumstances, it is easier for the demonstration effect of foreign 
involvement in the host country to operate. Global competition makes all economic 
agents actively seek technological innovation to improve efficiency.
It is arguable that the technology gap between foreign MNEs and local firms in 
EP industries can be expected to be smaller. This encourages local firms to learn the 
advanced technology associated with the foreign presence. In such an industry, the 
advanced technology might be related to special skills in management, distribution, 
product design, marketing and other links in the value chain, or be made up of 
internationally recognized brand names and trade marks. Lowering trade restrictiveness 
reduces the cost of learning effort at any level of Id. This results in an outward shift of 
Ip to / D3. The new equilibrium level is attained at point C in Figure 2.1 where the 
equilibrium levels of 7/ 3 and Id are both higher than points A and B. Technology 
spillover could have a more growth conducive effect in the EP industry.
Nevertheless, the main shortcoming of this proposed theoretical framework is that 
FDI cannot adversely affect productivity of local firms. However, there is empirical 
evidence that FDI can result in a negative outcome, e.g. Aitken and Harrison (1999) for 
Venezuela, Djankov and Hoekman (2000) for Czech. Republic, and Kathuria (2000) for 
India. It is unlikely that a spillover effect per se could be negative. Rather it would be 
either zero or positive. Nevertheless, there is a possibility that the entry of MNE 
affiliates could create an indirect effect that would have an adverse impact on the 
production level and productivity of local firms as argued by Aitken and Harrison (1999). 
In particular, even with positive technology spillover the foreign presence could steal 
market share, reducing the local firm’s output level. In a highly capital-intensive industry 
where fixed costs are significant, lower production levels are likely to result in higher 
average costs and lower production efficiency. Aitken and Harrison (1999) refer to this
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adverse effect as the so-called ‘market-stealing effect’. As a result, the net effect on local 
firms’ productivity is ambiguous, and could be either positive or negative.
The market-stealing effect can be illustrated in Figure 2.2. The presence of fixed 
costs makes the average cost function downward sloping. ACo represents the average 
cost curve before the entry of MNE affiliates. In an oligopolistic market environment, 
the entry of MNE affiliates can affect indigenous firms in two ways. Firstly, the entry of 
MNE affiliates creates a positive effect on the productivity of indigenous firms thereby 
shifting down the average cost curve from ACo to AC 7 .  At any output level, indigenous 
firms can produce their products with lower average costs. However, when MNE 
affiliates sell their product domestically, the new entrant causes the fraction of market 
demand for each individual firm to become smaller so that the fixed cost per unit is raised 
and the net effect on average cost is ambiguous. The larger the amount of output 
reduction, the less the net benefit indigenous firms can anticipate from the entry of MNE 
affiliates. Suppose the entry of MNE affiliates causes the total sales of ith firm to slightly 
drop from q0 to <77 but the average costs of ith firm are still lower after the entry of MNE 
affiliates. Thus, the net impact is still positive. However, if the total sales of ith firm 
dramatically drop to q2, the average costs of i firm increase. In the latter example, the 
entry of MNE affiliates adversely affects the productivity of indigenous firms.
In the context of trade policy regimes, this market-stealing effect is more likely to 
operate under an IS regime than an EP regime. As the promoted industry under an IS 
regime is generally characterized as highly capital-intensive and domestic-market 
oriented, a foreign presence is likely to share the domestic market, thereby generating an 
adverse impact on the local firm’s productivity. Combining this market-stealing effect 
with favourable technology spillover means the net impact of a foreign presence could be 
either positive or negative. In contrast, the market-stealing effect is unlikely to take 
place in an EP industry because production is not limited by the size of the domestic 
market.
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Figure 2.2
Output Response of Indigenous Firms to Entry of MNE Affiliates
Unit costs
Quantity of output
Source: Aitken and Harrison (1999)
Therefore,
dA
dFDI
a + ßTP (2.24)
where TP= proxy for the trade policy regime, i.e. an increase in TP implies the 
trade policy regime is geared toward an EP regime.
dFDI
in equation (2.24) can be either positive or negative. Parameter a  captures
the direct effect of the entry of MNE affiliates (adding more productive firms into the 
economy) as well as the partial effect of technology spillover to local firms. ßTP is the 
remaining effect of FDI technology spillover that is conditioned by the trade policy 
regime. According to the ‘Bhagwati hypothesis’, ß  must be negative.
All in all, under an IS regime, the impact of gains from FDI, either direct or 
indirect, seems to be less or even negative, compared to a policy regime geared toward an 
EP regime. Despite its immense policy relevance, empirical studies to examine the role 
of a trade policy regime conditioning gains from FDI (the ‘Bhagwati hypothesis’) are
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sparse. So far there are only four studies, i.e. Balasubramanyam et al. (1996), Athukorala 
and Chand (2000), Kokko et al. (2001) and Kohpaiboon (2003). These studies provide 
support for the ‘Bhagwati hypothesis’.
2.3.2 Human Capital
Human capital in host countries is another factor that plays a crucial role in 
conditioning the gains from FDI. The role of human capital is derived from the concept 
of absorptive capability, proposed by Nelson and Phelps (1966), Abramovitz (1986) and 
Benhabib and Spiegel (1994). The entry of MNE affiliates is associated with advanced 
technology, so the level of human capital development in host countries is needed to turn 
the opportunities into reality and enhance technological capability.
Borensztein et al. (1998) propose a theoretical model to illustrate how FDI and 
human capital affect gains from FDI measured in terms of output growth, and empirically 
test the model across developing countries. This model is based on endogenous growth 
theory. FDI inflows in the model affect economic growth in host countries because they 
are usually associated with the introduction of advanced technology. Hence, this 
generates technological progress.
Yt = A,H*K)-S (2.25)
*.=n x'rdjf* (2.26)
where Y = output
A = the exogenous state of environment 
H  = human capital 
K  = physical capital
thXj = j  capital goods 
6 , a  = parameters and e (0,1)
44
In this model, the physical capital in equation (2.26) is defined as a composite of a 
continuum of varieties of capital goods, Xj. The number of capital goods available, N, 
plays a crucial role in determining economic growth in the host countries. The larger the 
value of N, the higher the economic growth. This is analogous to expanding the variety 
of intermediate products, as in Römer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991); Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (1995). In the model, FDI inflows play two important roles in determining 
economic growth. Firstly, FDI inflows enhance the variety of capital stocks that 
favourably affect economic growth. That is, N  is positively related to the presence of 
FDI in this model. Secondly, as applying new capital goods into the production process 
incurs fixed costs from learning how to use the goods efficiently as well as how to adjust 
them to the local environment, the presence of FDI saves such fixed costs. This is 
because it is likely to be cheaper to imitate products and/or processes already in existence 
than those that are at the frontier of innovation.
This does not mean acquiring such technology is costless. To absorb and utilize 
the technological benefits effectively, host countries must first surpass a certain threshold 
level of human capital development. Beyond this threshold level, the higher the 
absorptive capability, the lower the cost to apply the new capital goods. In other words, 
the relationship between FDI and economic growth is not linear but is conditional on the 
level of human capital development in the host country.
Empirical studies examining the role of human capital have emphasized macro­
level analysis. Nevertheless, there is a puzzle about the role of human capital in 
conditioning gains from FDI inflows. Except for Borensztein et al. (1998), the level of 
human capital development seems unsatisfactory to explain the various outcomes of the 
FDI-growth nexus. For example, Nair-Reichert and Weinhold (2001) examine the 
relationship between FDI and economic growth in 24 developing countries over the 
period 1970-95, and introduce both human capital and trade policy regime to condition 
the growth-enhancing effect of FDI. The coefficient corresponding to the trade policy 
regime is the only one found statistically significant. Carkovic and Levine (2002) and
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Ram and Zhang (2002) find the same outcome as Nair-Reichert and Weinhold (2001), 
based on experience from both developed and developing countries.
One explanation for this unsatisfactory outcome could be the measurement 
problem of how to quantify the level of human capital development. All of these studies 
measure the level of human capital development based on education indicators because of 
data availability. In fact, Abramovitz (1986) and Blomström et dl. (1994) argue that 
human capital measured by the level of attainable education is one of several ways to 
build a country’s absorptive capability. Indeed, absorptive capability widely covers the 
level of education, political stability, openness to competition, and the freedom to operate 
business, etc. (Abramovitz, 1986: p.389). Similarly, it is argued by Parente and Prescott 
(2000: p.66) that evidence that a certain industry performs better in one country than in 
another, and vice versa, points out the limitations in solely focusing on human capital as 
the key factor in determining gains from FDI.
Besides trade policy and human capital, a recent study by Alfaro et al. (2004) 
proposes that local financial markets play a role in determining gains from FDI. The key 
proposition is countries with better financial systems can exploit FDI more efficiently. 
While the econometric results support the role of local financial markets, it seems more 
reasonable that the level of financial development seems to have an impact on FDI gains 
only at a certain level, i.e. a threshold level. In countries whose financial development 
levels pass this threshold level, the financial system would no longer condition FDI gains. 
For example, it does not seem reasonable that levels of financial systems among 
developed countries could condition FDI gains. In addition, their study examined the 
relationship between economic growth and FDI rather than FDI technology spillover, in 
which the impact on locally non-affiliated firms is emphasized. It is unlikely that MNEs 
are constrained by the financial system in host countries. For these reasons, financial 
intermediation is not included in the analytical framework of determinants of gains from 
FDI.
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2.4 Gains from FDI and the Role of FDI Linkages
Recent theoretical studies, i.e. Rodrigueze-Clare (1996); Markusen and Venables 
(1999), highlight FDI linkages as the other key determinant of gains from FDI. Their 
general proposition is that the greater the magnitude of FDI linkages, particularly 
backward linkages , the greater the gains from FDI. Backward linkages are not included 
in the previous section because FDI linkages are indeed a performance indicator of FDI, 
rather than the economic and policy environment in host countries. Nevertheless, it is 
important to spell out this proposition clearly, because it is still an issue in the foreign 
investment policy debate. Many governments in developing countries regard LCRs as a 
complementary measure that must go hand in hand with liberalizing foreign investment 
policy (Battat et al., 1996). LCR measures are always pursued, based on the belief that it 
is required to develop ‘specific’ industries in order to provide a transition period and to 
allow them to compete in an open trading environment. There is evidence that these 
countries have been reluctant to call off such measures, although the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/ World Trade Organization (WTO) stipulated certain rules 
to eliminate LCR measures by 1 January 2000 (Belderbos et al. 2001; Bora, 2001 cited in 
Brooks et al. 2004).26
While both Rodrigueze-Clare (1996), and Markusen and Venables (1999) point to 
the relative importance of FDI linkages with local indigenous firms as a key factor in 
determining gains from FDI, these two studies have a different focus. Rodrigueze-Clare 
(1996), on the one hand, proposes a theoretically sound measurement of the size of
25 The significance of linkages to overall economic development is first developed by 
Flirschman (1958).
26 Even though in the industrialized and more advanced developing countries the use of 
local content has officially been banned after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the GATT, 
in practice local content rules for foreign investors are present in several guises. For example, in 
the United States, local content rules are embedded in the rule of origin regulated with the 
establishment of the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA). As another example, the 
European Union (EU) embedded a local content requirement in the anti-dumping law. This 
affects foreign investors whose exports to the EU have previously been targeted by EU anti­
dumping actions (Belderbos et al., 2001).
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97backward linkage. On the other hand, Markusen and Venables (1999) directly address 
the necessary role of backward linkages in the context of FDI-growth nexus. Thus the 
following discussion concentrates on the latter.
Gains from FDI through backward linkages in Markusen and Venables (1999) are 
referred to as gains in terms of output expansion rather than as a favourable impact on the 
technological capability of local suppliers. In the circumstance where MNEs establish 
affiliates for the domestic market, they directly compete with locally non-affiliated firms 
within the same industry (henceforth referred to as the competition effect). The 
competition effect can eventually crowd local firms out of the market and create an 
adverse effect on the host country’s economic growth. Backward linkages are needed 
because their positive impact on economic growth in upstream industries will mitigate 
any potential adverse effect from direct competition in downstream industries. Hence a 
substantial amount of backward linkages could result in a net gain from FDI.
The model proposed by Markusen and Venables (1999) is partial equilibrium 
analysis consisting of two types of goods; final and intermediate goods, and three types 
of firms; domestic, MNE affiliated, and foreign. While all three types of firms compete 
in final goods, only the first two types of firms produce locally. As intermediate goods 
are assumed to be nontradable, the entry of MNE affiliates automatically generates 
demand for intermediate goods in the host country. As a result, MNE affiliates lead to 
expansion of intermediate input production in the host countries, widening their 
availability and deepening the industrial development level. In addition, a well- 
developed domestic upstream industry could induce the development of a domestic 
downstream industry, i.e. the presence of forward linkages.
27 Rodrigueze-Clare (1996) proposes the number of workers employed in the upstream 
industry could be a good proxy for the level of backward linkages generated.
28 The competition effect is somewhat similar to the ‘market-stealing’ effect proposed by 
Aitken and Harrison (1999), as discussed above.
48
Even though the model comes up with a strong theoretical outcome for the role of 
FDI linkages on economic growth, the implications for policy and for appraisal of FDI 
projects must be interpreted with caution. In particular, Markusen and Venables (1999: 
p.352-3) argue that
‘While the research in this paper provides a framework for identifying 
some of the characteristics of FDI projects most likely to have a positive 
impact on host country development, we caution against drawing policy 
conclusions from such a simple model. Further work is needed to broaden 
the scope of project appraisal techniques to encompass the sort of linkages 
analysed in this paper and to address the more difficult policy issues raised 
by cumulative causation.’
This point is highly important in the policy design context because it is easy to 
mislead by overemphasizing the role of backward linkages from FDI, and to favour 
LCRs-induced linkages as a result. In the Markusen and Venables’ model, the necessity 
of linkages, especially backward ones, derives from the circumstance that FDI inflows 
aim only to substitute trade and directly compete with local final product suppliers 
(Markusen and Venables, 1999: p.344). Indeed, ample studies of FDI, e.g. Hill and 
Athukorala (1998); Athukorala (2003a) point to sizable export-oriented FDI inflows. For 
these export-onented FDI inflows, there is no threat of a competition effect and even FDI 
with low linkages is unlikely to retard economic growth. This is supported by a number 
of empirical studies e.g. Barry and Bradley (1997) in the case of Irish manufacturing; 
Kelegama and Foley (1999) in the case of Sri Lanka; and Athukorala and Santosa (1997) 
in the case of Indonesia.
In addition, linkages in the theoretical work are referred to as ‘natural’ linkages. 
That is, the linkages take place according to underlying economic conditions, i.e. product 
quality, price competitiveness, and transportation costs. In particular, with the 
assumption of non-traded intermediate products in the model, the entry of MNE affiliates 
is naturally associated with the demand for intermediates and such linkages promote the 
host country’s economic growth. This would be different from another type of linkage 
induced by governments in host countries, so called ‘policy-induced’ linkages
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henceforth. The following question arises —  do ‘policy-induced’ linkages still benefit 
host countries in the same way as ‘natural’ ones?
Indeed, policy-induced linkages seem to be less beneficial to the technological 
improvement of indigenous firms than ‘natural’ linkages. Imposing policy-induced 
linkages distorts the mechanism where FDI generates technology spillover through 
backward linkages. To some extent, LCRs would be regarded as protection for 
intermediate producers in host countries. To maintain their operation in host countries, 
MNEs in downstream industries are obligated to use locally produced intermediates 
regardless of price and quality, so that the presence of LCR measures increases the 
operating costs of MNE affiliates. In this situation, MNEs must isolate their affiliates 
from the rest of the organization. In the context of small developing countries, MNEs
will seek protection of final goods in return for keeping their operation in the host
™  #
country. As a result, host countries must offer protection to downstream industries to 
compensate for the presence of LCR measures.
Since policy-induced linkages do not rely on a country’s comparative advantage, 
complying with LCR measures requires a greater effort. At the same time, the protection 
o f final outputs offered provides MNE affiliates (as well as local producers) shelter from 
world competition. To comply with the LCR measures, MNE affiliates will procure 
locally manufactured inputs that just meet minimum requirements. In addition, the 
quality o f intermediate inputs is of less concern to MNEs. What is of concern is that FDI 
backward linkages create healthy competition and put pressure on these intermediate 
suppliers to improve their production efficiency. MNEs only expect an acceptable 
quality of intermediate goods at acceptable prices. The word ‘acceptable’ refers to a 
situation where MNEs still receive a net gain from the net economic rents created by the
29The policy-induced linkages equate with LCRs although of course in practice they are 
broader than this.
30 This might not be true for extremely large developing countries like China and India. 
Their enormous domestic markets could compensate for the addition operating costs resulting 
from the LCR measures. See the discussion based on the automotive industry in Doner et al. 
(2004)
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protection of final output and the costs related to the presence of LCRs (i.e. higher input 
costs and other costs incurred to assist local suppliers). Thus, they would expect less 
benefit from ‘policy-induced’ linkages, compared to ‘natural’ linkages.
One sensible basis for support of the LCR measures in the context of gains from 
FDI is the well-known ‘infant industry’ argument. The key element in this argument is 
the presence of dynamic economies. The dynamic economies cannot be achieved 
overnight but need a certain amount of time. The presence of LCR measures provides 
time for these indigenous firms to learn and mature with the expectation that they will 
eventually enable a country to complete the industrialization process. However, 
empirical evidence suggests the opposite. To gain dynamic economies is not costless 
(Bell et al., 1984; Eveson and Westphal, 1995). It requires long-term commitment and 
real resources. When these suppliers receive protection from LCR measures, they tend 
to be ‘unresponsive’ to improved technological capability as well as requests for 
improvement in the quality and price of what they offer. This in turn results in a general 
deterioration of technological and management skills (Moran, 2001). The LCRs and 
‘policy-induced’ linkages retard rather than promote growth and efficiency.
2.5 Conclusions
The chapter combines previous theoretical and empirical studies in order to form 
the analytical framework of MNE involvement and their contribution to the 
industrialization process in host countries. There are four key findings drawn from 
previous studies. Firstly, MNEs can become involved and generate a favourable impact 
on host economies in two broad ways: FDI and non-FDI channels. Through the FDI 
channel, MNE involvement can generate both a direct and indirect impact on the host 
economy. Nevertheless, indirect impact, i.e. technology spillover, seems to be far more 
important because it is unlikely to be associated with OFCF and is at the centre of current
31 See the excellent treatment of the ‘infant industry’ argument in Corden (1997: Chapters 
8 and 9).
32 See Moran (2001), Belderbos et al. (2001) and works cited therein.
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policy debate. On the other hand, non-FDI channels are another important way MNEs 
can be involved in host countries. Three channels are classified under non-FDI: 
technology licensing, international subcontracting, and MNE buyers. Empirical evidence 
suggests that there has been substantial technology transfer to host countries through 
these channels. Ignoring non-FDI channels vastly understate the contribution of MNE 
involvement.
Secondly, the general investment climate plays a crucial role in enticing MNE 
involvement in host countries. Investment incentives, which are widely used by many 
host developing countries to entice MNE involvement, do not necessarily have much 
bearing on the entry decision of MNEs.
Thirdly, FDI technology spillover is not automatic but depends on the economic 
and policy environment in the host country. So far, there are two key determinants: trade 
policy regime and human capital. In addition, the former seems to be more promising in 
examining various outcomes of gains from FDI found in previous empirical studies.
Finally, FDI linkages are heterogeneous in terms of potential to generate benefit 
to host countries. In this study, the linkages are separated into ‘natural’ and ‘policy- 
induced’ linkages. The former seem to be more beneficial to host countries than the 
latter. Hence, these two types of linkages need to be separated in the analysis.
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Appendix 1
Difference between FDI and OFCF
FDI inflows are not only simply a transfer of capital but are associated with 
advanced technology. These forms of capital flow are distinctly different from OFCF (Ito 
and Krueger, 2000: p.3) Thus, it is necessary to treat FDI separately from OFCF in 
analyzing its determinants and impact.
Traditionally, an explanation of the direction, motivation and impact of capital 
inflows is based on the neo-classical theory of international capital investment, namely 
the interest arbitrage theory (for example MacDougali, 1960). Capital funds will flow 
from a country where the expected rate of return is low to one which provides a higher 
return. However, as described above, the motivation for establishing MNE affiliates is 
far more complicated than the difference in the nominal rate of return, as postulated by 
the arbitrage theory. This is first pointed out by Hymer (1960), based on the US 
experience during the 1950s. The US experienced simultaneously net FDI outflows and 
net inflows of OFCF. Based on the interest arbitrage theory, the US should have 
experienced either net outflows or net inflows in both FDI and OFCF. Net OFCF inflows 
imply that the US interest rate must be higher than somewhere else. Thus, if the 
movement of FDI flows were fully explained by the interest arbitrage theory, the US 
would experience net FDI inflows. Hymer’s breakthrough became a starting point for 
other researchers to seek and develop new theories to explain FDI determinants, such as 
Vernon’s product-cycle theory (1966), Dunning’s eclectic theory (1977), and Rugman’s 
internalization theory (1980).
There are four major differences between FDI and OFCF.
(1) Investors and Conduits to Transfer Capital Funds
MNEs are the world’s major direct investors. In 2002, foreign assets of the 100 
largest MNEs (less than two per cent of the total number of MNEs worldwide) accounted 
for around 12 per cent of the world’s total stock of FDI (UNCTAD, 2004). Many studies
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use MNEs and FDI in an interchangeable manner. More importantly, over four-fifths of 
the stock of FDI originates from half a dozen countries — the US, United Kingdom, 
Japan, Germany, Switzerland, and the Netherlands — which are also the major producers 
of the most advanced technology (Blomström et al, 2000). On the other hand, OFCF 
investors are far broader in scope, ranging from individuals to institutional investors and 
banks. In addition, the main conduit for FDI to inject capital funds is through a 
subsidiary. In contrast, capital funds from OFCF can either go directly to the recipient or 
to financial brokers.
(2) Investment Motivation
Inflows of FDI and OFCF are motivated by different factors. As mentioned 
earlier, FDI inflows are the result of a firm’s decision to transplant across countries so 
they are mainly motivated by business opportunity, competitive advantage, and global 
strategy, all related to long-term underlying economic fundamentals. In contrast, OFCF 
is a capital fund allocation across countries to benefit from differences in financial rates 
of return, e.g. interest rates, exchange rates, etc. These financial returns are related to 
short-term fluctuations in key macroeconomic indicators such as interest rates, exchange 
rates, and stock prices. Even though there are some common factors and/or external 
shocks that can have considerable impact on the returns from FDI and OFCF, such as 
overall economic performance, political stability, and policy uncertainty, it is still far 
from conclusive to group both kinds of international capital flows together. The observed 
evidence during the recent economic crisis in East Asian economies that started in mid 
1997, provides a strong case for treatment of these two different capital flows. During 
the onset of the crisis, OFCF in the five-crisis hit countries experienced huge net outflows 
while there were still FDI inflows into these same countries, cushioning the large shift of 
capital flows (Athukorala, 2003a).
(3) Volatility
By their nature, OFCF seem more volatile than FDI (Frankel and Rose, 1996; 
Radelet and Sachs, 1998; Kim and Hwang, 2000; Lipsey, 2001b; Athukorala, 2003a). 
OFCF are attracted by financial return and are highly sensitive to any external shock. In
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addition, a rapid movement of OFCF from one country to another could generate a 
considerable amount of profit for investors. With its higher volatility, Frankel and Rose 
(1996) point out that a country with a high ratio of OFCF to total capital flows is more 
likely to experience a currency crisis. In contrast, FDI is likely to exhibit a greater sunk 
cost of investment, i.e. once the investment has been made none of it can be recovered 
(Rivoli and Salorio, 1996). Thus, the FDI decision on entry/exit takes longer, compared 
with OFCF. Quick movement (entry-exit) is unlikely to generate a net return to direct 
investors.
(4) Impact on Economic Development in Host Countries
FDI and OFCF generate different impacts on a host country. Apart from 
providing additional capital funds, FDI is likely to influence the economic structure as 
well as the conduct and performance of locally owned firms in the host country. Since 
FDI means there are new entrants in industries, this can affect industry concentration 
(Caves, 1996: p.87-8). Their entry can increase domestic market competition and 
eventually influence the behaviour and performance of incumbent firms. More 
importantly, the entry of MNEs with their extensive involvement with world R&D 
activities can provide opportunities for local firms to access advanced technology. Such 
opportunity is not limited to a subsidiary but other local firms can also gain these 
benefits. Nevertheless, the net impact of FDI is not necessarily always positive but is 
conditioned by several economic factors in host countries, as discussed in Section 2.3. In 
contrast, OFCF obviously provides additional capital funds to the host country and allow 
the market mechanism to allocate them. The efficiency of the market mechanism in 
allocating funds depends on the stage of development in the capital and financial markets 
as well as policy-induced incentives (e.g. tariff protection) in host countries.
Table A. 1.1 provides a summary of key distinct characteristics between FDI and 
OFCF. While it seems clear the common contribution of FDI and OFCF to host countries 
is to achieve investment levels beyond their own domestic saving, there are strong 
reasons to believe FDI inflows are considerably different from OFCF as mentioned
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above. Hence, it is necessary to treat FDI differently from OFCF to evaluate its impact 
on host countries’ economies.
Table A.1.1
Distinct Characteristics between FDI and OFCF
Feature FDI OFCF
Investors MNEs Individuals, institutional 
investors, etc.
Conduit to transfer Establish affiliates Contact recipient directly or 
indirectly through financial 
intermediates
Investment Motivations Underlying economic 
fundamentals
Short terms fluctuations of 
several macroeconomic 
variables such as exchange 
rates, interest rates, share 
prices
Volatility More stable More volatile
Impact on host countries’ 
economies
- Capital funds
- Opportunity to access 
advanced technology
- Structure-conduct- 
performance (S-C-P) of 
incumbent firms
- Capital funds only
- Funds are allocated 
according to market 
mechanisms.
Appendix 2
Theoretical Model of Technology Spillover
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This appendix elaborates on the theoretical model proposed by Wang and 
Blomström (1992). A foreign affiliated and local firms are both producing differentiated 
but partly substitutable products for the host country’s consumers. There is an incentive 
for firms to use resources to enhance their technology capability, as this makes their 
product more attractive to consumers (i.e. for the foreign affiliate to transfer advanced 
technology from its parent company and for the local firm to learn the new technology 
that accompanies the foreign presence). Even though technology can influence both 
demand and supply aspects, for analytical tractability, it is assumed to impact solely on 
the demand side. Assuming consumer preferences can be represented by the following 
aggregate utility function:
U(Y) = UC£JpiY i) (A.2.1)
where G, represents the attractiveness of the /'th firm’s product that is an increasing 
function of the level of technology the firm zth employed, Kr Technology here covers the 
product’s quality and/or other favorable characteristics embodied in the product. That is,
Gi = Gi(Ki) and ——^ > 0 (A.2.2)
dKj
Assuming logarithmic utility function and that G( = G((AT() = Kf* where a > 0, 
the utility function can be written as follows:
U(Y) = \n(KJaYJ +Kf aYf )
U(Y) = \n[KJa(YJ -¥kYf )] = a\n(A.2.3) 
where k = the technology gap between the foreign affiliate and local firm
57
Following the traditional maximization of consumer utility, i.e. the equality of 
marginal utility and price, demand schedules for products produced by the foreign 
affiliate and local firm are in (A.2.4) and (A.2.5), respectively.
Pf  = k(Yd+kYf T' dPwith —-  < 0 
dk
(A.2.4)
PJ ={Yi +kYf Y '
dPf
with —— > 0 
dk
(A.2.5)
Analytically, each firm’s decision can be decomposed into two steps. Each firm 
chooses its output to maximize its monetary profit, given the status quo of both firms’ 
technology levels and its competitor’s current output. On the second step, each firm 
chooses a level of effort to undertake technology enhancing activities. With the feature 
that technology level influences demand for goods, the continuously and differentiable 
quasi-rent function, R^k) can be constructed as a function of k.
Ri(k) = Max{Pi(k J i YJ')Yi -~ciYi if is feasible} (A.2.6)
where Pt{k, Yt Y*) = demand for its own product the firm ith faces 
Yi = level of output of the firm ith
Yj* = Coumot-Nash equilibrium output of the other firm.
c{ -  per unit cost of production assumed here constant.
i = d and/  for local and foreign firms
As shown in equations (A.2.4) and (A.2.5), the partial derivative of quasi-rent 
function with respect to k can be attained as in equation (A.2.7)
(A.2.7)
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K dR, dRf< 0 and R' = — f-  > 0
Assuming R" = — < 0 and Rf — — < 0 is to ensure the existence of
d dk2 f dk2
solutions to the firm’s maximization problem. Importantly, (A.2.6) is similar to the 
firm’s profit function except that the key variable is the technology gap, thereby called 
the quasi-rent function.
So far, the analysis suggests both firms can earn quasi-rent from upgrading 
technological capability. Thus, they need to choose their own optimum levels of effort to 
undertake technology enhancing activities, which is observable by assumption. If  and ld
are the levels of effort undertaken by the foreign and local firms, respectively. The 
growth rates of technology level of the foreign and local firms are expressed in equations 
(A.2.8) and (A.2.9), respectively. Where the foreign firm is concerned, the marginal 
productivity of effort to generate technological progress is assumed to be 1. However, for 
the local firm, the marginal productivity of effort is instead equal to the product of $ and 
k. (j) as a function of Id is introduced in order to reflect diminishing return of the 
learning effort, i.e. (f> >0 and <f) <0. Moreover, as postulated by Findlay (1978) that the 
rate of technological progress in a relatively ‘backward’ country is an increasing function 
of the gap between its own level of technology and that of the ‘advanced’ country, the 
model adds technology gap variable, k, as in equation (A.2.9).
Kf  = If Kf  (A.2.8)
Kd = <Kh )kKd (A.2.9)
Equations (A.2.8) and (A.2.9) can be combined together as a function of k as in 
equation (A.2.10).
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ic = k[If-</)(!d)k] (A.2.10)
However, transferring advanced technology for the foreign firm and learning 
associated superior technology for the local firm are not cost-free activities. A certain 
level of If  is associated with dollar costs, Cf . Assuming Cf  is an increasing function of
If , i.e. Cf  > 0, with decreasing rate, i.e. C" <0. The decreasing rate reflects the concept
of Teaming-by-doing’. Similar to the foreign firm, the total dollar cost associated with 
the learning effort of local firm is the product of 6 and Cd where 6 is the shifting 
parameter. Introducing 6 allows policy environment and/or other specific factors in host 
countries that potentially alter the total cost of learning effort and eventually the level of 
effort. The smaller the 6 , the more cost effective the domestic firm in its learning 
activities is.
As postulated by the ‘Bhagwati hypothesis’ that the trade policy regime can alter 
the magnitude of FDI technology spillover, this study departs from the original model by 
hypothesizing this parameter as an increasing function of trade policy regime (TP), i.e. 
dO- >  0. That is, the higher the degree of trade restrictiveness, the larger the cost 
effectiveness and the larger the cost in learning effort.
Thus, deciding the levels of If  and Id is a dynamic optimization problem of the
foreign and local firms respectively. The objective functions of the optimization problem 
are as in equations (A.2.11) and (A.2.12) for foreign and local firms respectively. In the 
optimization problem, k is state variable and its growth rate follows equation (A.2.10).
M a x
/ /  e +
M a x
I d e R +
V,  = J e - " [ R f ( k ) -  C / ( / / )]rf< 
0 
oo
Vi = \e-<’, [Rd( k ) - e ( T P ) C ä ( / , ) ] *
0
(A.2.11) 
(A.2.12)
where r = the world interest rate
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p  = the world interest rate
At the steady-state equilibrium, we attain the following two implicit functions
(A.2.13)
___ R'Ak)
Tf (If J J-r) = r - ^ - C f{k) = 0V + If]
___ (Irf<j>'U,)R'(k)
W f J ä . r )  = /  _ ! '  -g(r?)c;(A:) = 0 (A.2.14)
where k
< K h )
level of technology gap at the steady-state equilibrium
Equation (A.2.13) represents a best reply mapping of foreign firm. That is If  is a 
function of Id with the positive relationship. Similarly, (A.2.14) illustrates the best reply 
mapping of the local firm that is affected by both If  and TP. The condition
0C'd(Id =Q)(p + If ) r
<KId =  0 ) > -R'Aif/v)
is needed to ensure the existence of Id>0.
Intuitively, this condition suggests the domestic firm will not invest in learning effort 
unless the marginal benefit of its first unit of resource spent on such activities exceeds the 
cost of learning with v representing the costless benefit of technology the local firm could 
acquire from the foreign presence.
Solving equations (A.2.13) and (A.2.14) simultaneously yields the equilibrium 
levels of If  and Id . Importantly, to attain a unique locally stable steady-state Nash
equilibrium with positive values of / ,  and / . , dl L * ^ ±
Kdlf  81'*)
>
ydlä dlf j
is required.
This implies the slope of best reply mapping of the foreign affiliate is less than that of the 
local firm. The equilibrium levels of If  and Id show potential technology spillover from
FDI. The larger the levels of If  and Id , the greater expected technology spillover would 
take place.
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To demonstrate the ‘Bhagwati hypothesis’, we take total differential to the two 
implicit functions as in equation (A.2.13) and (A.2.14) with respect to TP as in equations 
(A.2.15).
"37} 37}"
\ dJr] dTf  "eif 8Id dTP dTP
dTd STd 5Td
[ dIf
---1 _dTP _ L dTP]
(A.2.15)
By Cramer’s rule, the impact of TP on the equilibrium values of If  and Id can be 
illustrated as in equations (A.2.16) and (A.2.17), respectively.
dTP
dTf dTf
dTP dh
8Td STd
dTP 3Id
0 —*-(+)
dl<
0(TP)(+) ^ ( - )
07} M
<0
dTP
dTf 37}
81 f dTP
8Td dTd
II a // dTP
dTf
— ( - )  odlf
! } ( + )  0(TP)(+)
8If
where |J|
dTf dTf
ei/ 8Id
8Td 8Td
dlf 8Id
'dTf *8Td
{d l. 8Id
M
<o
' d_Ii_
did difJ
>0
(A.2.16)
(A.2.17)
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Chapter 3: Thai Manufacturing: The General Investment 
Climate and Incentive Structure
This chapter aims to survey the general investment climate and incentive structure 
in Thai manufacturing from 1970 to the present. Both the general investment climate and 
policy-induced incentives can influence the involvement and developmental implication 
of MNEs in host countries. In making an entry decision, MNEs first take into 
consideration the overall investment climate and then the incentive structure.
The chapter begins with a discussion of the general investment climate. In this 
section, six aspects of the Thai commercial environment are discussed. These are the 
macroeconomic environment, labour markets and the quality of human capital, 
institutional factors, the role of government, infrastructure availability and the attitude 
toward foreign business. In addition, to evaluate the commercial environment, an 
international comparison is undertaken with emphasis on ASEAN-4 countries. 
Investment and trade policy regimes are discussed in Section 3.2 and Section 3.3. 
Section 3.2 provides a discussion of the investment regime in the Thai manufacturing 
sector. In Section 3.3, various indices of trade restrictiveness are constructed and used to 
demonstrate changes in the degree of trade restrictiveness over the past three decades. 
The chapter ends with a summary of the key elements of the policy environment in 
Thailand during the past three decades.
3.1 The Overall Investment Climate in Thailand
3.1.1 The Macroeconomic Environment
Thailand has had an impressive record of domestic price stability for most of the 
past half century. Inflation on average was around 5.7 per cent between 1970 and 2003. 
This was far lower than the average figure for developing countries (Figure 3.1.A). 
Despite the onset of the economic crisis and the drastic currency depreciation in 1997,
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Thailand has maintained price stability well during the ensuing years. Inflation increased 
from 5.8 per cent in 1996 to 8.1 per cent in 1998, despite a more than 60 per cent 
depreciation of the exchange rate. Thailand’s inflation rate is about average that of 
ASEAN-4 countries. From 1970 to 2003, inflation in Thailand was higher than that of 
Singapore (3.2 per cent) and Malaysia (3.9 per cent) but lower than that of the Philippines 
(11.7 per cent) and Indonesia (13.1 per cent) (Figure 3.1.B)
Thailand’s success in maintaining price stability has been attributed to the 
combination of conservative fiscal and monetary policies, and a stable nominal exchange 
rate. Even though Thailand experienced 12 consecutive years of fiscal deficits between 
1975 and 1987, the expansionary fiscal policy was mainly used to compensate for the 
slowdown of private investment and maintain short-term economic growth, except 
between 1975 and 1979 (Figure 3.2). In addition, the size of the budget deficit was 
limited to around 3.2 per cent of GDP between 1975 and 1985. This level was relatively 
low, compared with the average level for developing countries. The budget deficit from 
1975 to 1979 was the result of expansion in the area of administration and defense. 
Whatever fiscal expansion there was during this period was to ensure political stability 
and social harmony.1 The purpose of the deficit between 1980 and 1987 was to cushion 
the adverse impact of the slowdown of the overall economy and the shortfall in 
government revenue (Warr and Nidhiprabha, 1996). Similarly, the government relied on 
deficit financing from 1997 to 2002 following the onset of the financial crisis (Figure 
3.2).
Throughout the period under study, government expenditure was mostly financed 
by public revenue and domestic borrowing, rather than through inflationary means, i.e. 
borrowing from the Thai central bank, the Bank of Thailand (BOT) (Warr and 
Nidhiprabha, 1996: p. 165; Warr, 1999). As observed in Figure 3.2, the increase in public
’Patmasiriwat (1995: p.145) argues that the increase of public administration expenditure 
was a result of the government adopting several socially oriented policies such as rural public- 
works programme, free buses and hospital care for the needy, after the student-led uprising in 
1973. The increase in defense expenditure was introduced by the new military-supported 
government against the communist insurgency.
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revenue in the current period was likely to be associated with the increase in public 
expenditure in the following period.
Figure 3.1
Inflation (per cent) in Thailand and Selected Countries, 1970-2003 
Figure 3.1.A: Thailand and developing countries
Thailand -  -  Developing countries
Figure 3.1.B: Thailand and ASEAN-4 Countries.
20 -
1970-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-2000 2001-03
Thailand ®  Indonesia □  Malaysia □  The Philippines 0  Singapore
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics (CD ROM).
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Figure 3.2
Public Revenue and Expenditure, and Fiscal Balance in Thailand, 1970-2002
— Public revenue (per cent of GDP)
—m—  Public expenditure (per cent of GDP) 
a Fiscal Balance (per cent of GDP:+ surplus/-deficit)
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, (CD ROM).
Changes in public revenue in general are positively related to overall economic 
performance. This limited the growth rate of fiscal deficits. Public foreign borrowing, 
on the other hand, was disciplined by the legally imposed ceiling on the debt-service 
ratio. The ceiling significantly restrained public sector foreign debt during the early 
1980s.
With a considerable degree of policy independence, the BOT effectively pursued 
a conservative monetary policy. Monetary policies appear to have been countercyclical 
and stabilized domestic price levels from World War II onward. Inflationary monetary 
policy, which was strong in the early 1970s, has been remarkably reduced since 1980. A
2 Warr and Nidhiprabha (1996: p.143) point out that the correlation between public 
revenue as a proportion of GDP and GDP growth from 1970 to 1990 was almost 0.7.
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conservative monetary policy has been associated with stabilizing the nominal exchange 
rate and with short-term capital control measures. The nominal exchange rate in practice 
has been stable, closely related to the value of the US dollar, although the exchange rate 
regime was officially described as a managed floating regime and a floating regime in 
1984 and 1997, respectively. The nominal exchange rate was 20 baht/$ from 1961 to 
1980 and devalued to 27 baht/$ at the end of 1984. Between 1985 and 1996, the nominal 
exchange rate appreciated slightly to 25.6 baht/$.
Following the onset of the crisis in July 1997, there was a short period of massive 
fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate under the new official floating exchange rate 
regime. The nominal exchange rate rapidly depreciated from around 25 baht/$ in June 
1997 to almost 50 baht/$ in January and returned to around 37-38 baht/$ in July 1998. 
However, the crisis-driven freely floating exchange rate regime in Thailand did not last 
long. There is convincing evidence that the Thai authorities have gradually resurrected 
the dollar peg that existed during the pre-crisis era (McKinnon, 2001; Calvo and 
Reinhart, 2002; Hernandez and Montiel, 2003). After about mid-1998, the nominal 
exchange rate tended to stabilize at around 42-^ 43 baht/$.
To be able to pursue an independent monetary policy under the fixed exchange 
rate regime, targeting the stability of the nominal exchange rate, the government imposed 
regulations that restricted free capital movements until 1990. As a general rule, all 
matters involving foreign currency were regulated and required the permission of the 
BOT, through The Exchange Control Act, B.E. 2485 (A.D. 1942). Hence, the BOT 
acquired some degree of monetary independence. This was evident from significant 
divergences between domestic and foreign interest rates in the short run (Warr and 
Nidhiprabha, 1996: p.169). After May 22, 1990, the BOT considerably relaxed foreign 
exchange controls. At present, certain transactions in Thai baht or foreign currency can 
be performed virtually without restriction, and only a few require approval from the 
BOT. Given the fixed exchange rate regime, therefore, this lessens the degree of 
monetary independence.
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In order to shed light on the cumulative effect of macroeconomic policy on 
economic incentives, a real exchange rate (RER) index is constructed and presented in 
Figure 3.3. The RER index is generally defined as the ratio of the domestic price of 
traded (PT) to non-traded goods (TV). An increase in the RER index implies an increase 
in the price of traded goods relative to that of non-traded ones, and vice versa. Thus, an 
increase (decrease) in the RER signifies depreciation (appreciation). With the indices of 
both traded and non-traded prices unavailable, the RER has to be proxied by available 
domestic and world price indices and the nominal exchange rate. In this study, traded 
and non-traded price indices are represented by the wholesale price index (WPI) and 
consumer price index (CPI), respectively. By construction, the WPI is dominated by the 
price of traded goods whereas the CPI is a weighted-average of the prices of tradables 
and nontradables. Besides, the export share is employed here because of its superiority in 
representing the country’s competitiveness rather than other possible weights such as 
total trade or import shares (Athukorala and Warr, 2002).
The time pattern of the RER index is a good reflection o f the macroeconomic 
development in Thailand over the past three decades. There were RER appreciations 
from 1980 to 1984 and from 1990 to 1996. The 1980 to 1984 RER appreciation was a 
result o f successive expansion of public expenditure and government deficit during the 
late 1970s and early 1980s. The RER appreciation harmed international competitiveness 
of export sectors. Such appreciation was rectified by the moderate currency depreciation 
at the end of 1984 and the favourable world price of agricultural products. Between 1985 
and 1988, the RER index moved back to the level it was at before the late 1970s. RER 
appreciation emerged again from 1990 to 1996 and persisted longer than in the first 
period. This controversy is far beyond the scope of this study. Clearly, the persistent 
appreciation of the RER would hurt the country’s international competitiveness. Since 
1996, the relative profitability of tradables production has improved, mainly due to 
nominal exchange rate depreciation from mid 1997 to 1998.
3Causes of the RER appreciation between 1990 and 1996 are still subject to an ongoing 
debate in the recent economic crisis literature. The focus is on the relative importance of the 
pursued exchange rate regime and capital account liberalization. See Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(1995); Summers (1998); Fischer (2001); Bhagwati, (1998); Stiglitz (2001); Corden (2002).
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Figure 3.3
Real Exchange Rate (RER) Index in Thailand, 1970-2003 (1990=100)
Notes: The RER index is defined as the ratio of the domestic price of traded (PT) to non-traded 
goods (Pn). An increase (decrease) in RER index means depreciation (appreciation).
Source: Author’s calculation using data from IMF, International Financial Statistics, (CD ROM)
3.1.2 The Political Environment and Policy Certainty
The policy environment in Thailand has been stable over the past three decades. 
Even though Thailand’s political history since World War II has been punctuated by a 
succession of military coups and attempted coups, as well as subject to frequent changes 
in government administration, these have not had a marked impact on the key political 
and economic ideology. Thai policy makers continued to follow a similar basic political 
and economic ideology with main differences emerging in distributional matters. 
Thailand’s bureaucracies have played a particularly important role in maintaining the 
continuity of economic policy along these lines (Warr and Nidhiprabha, 1996: p.7). 
Hence between 1970 and 2003, there has not been a drastic change in the general 
economic policy regime in Thailand. This has created a reputation for policy certainty.
For international comparison, Table 3.1 reports the index of the political 
environment from the World Survey conducted by the Freedom House Organization.
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The index is the result of a worldwide survey in two aspects: political rights and civil 
liberties. The lower the number, the greater the degree of political freedom. The general 
pattern occurring in Table 3.1 suggests that since 1981, Thailand has ranked very 
favourably, compared to other developing countries, including many of its neighbours in 
Southeast Asia.
3.1.3 The Labour Market Environment and the Quality of Human Capital
The Thai labour force is largely non-unionized. Domestic and foreign investors 
have been able to carry on their business activities without any fear of labour problems. 
This is a result of the abolition of the Labour Act of 1956. Establishing labour unions, as 
well as any form of labour movement, was prohibited until 1978, when the Labour Act 
was amended to allow firms to set up labour unions under the auspices of the Labour 
Relations Law. Nevertheless, there has not been any threat of labour unions in Thai 
manufacturing. In addition, despite the presence of minimum wage regulations since 
1973, their impact on actual wage behaviour has been low in Thailand (Warr and 
Nidhiprabha, 1996).
Placing the record in comparative international perspective highlights the fact that 
wage levels in Thailand have always been relatively low, not only by the average 
developing-country standards, but also compared to other high-performing economies in 
the region. To provide a broad comparison of wages, especially in the manufacturing 
sector across countries, this study uses the wage compensation per worker in the 
manufacturing sector of majority-owned US affiliates from 1983 to 2002 (Table 3.2). 
The wage rate, proxied by the manufacturing wage compensation per worker, reflects the 
actual payment, in which other relevant aspects such as standard of living, labour skill 
and minimum wage regulation, etc. are taken into consideration. The clear pattern 
shown in Table 3.2 is that increases in wage rates in Thailand have fluctuated widely, but 
were lower than the average for developing countries between 1983 and 2002. However, 
the changes have been at a comparable level with three other Southeast Asian neighbours 
(Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines). While China and India were much lower
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throughout the period 1983-2000, the gap between these two countries and other 
Southeast Asian countries, especially Thailand and Indonesia, narrowed between 1997
Table 3.1
State of Freedom of Selected Developing Countries, 1972-2003
1972- i oo o 1981--90 1991--2003
Political
rights
Civil
Liberties
Political
rights
Civil
Liberties
Political
rights
Civil
Liberties
Latin America and
Caribbean
Argentina 4.9 4.3 2.6 2.3 3.9 3.8
Brazil 4.1 4.5 2.6 2.5 2.1 2.8
Chile 5.7 4.6 5.6 4.6 2.5 3.5
Colombia 2.0 2.6 2.1 3.1 3.2 3.4
Mexico 3.9 3.4 3.5 3.9 2.0 1.8
Peru 5.3 4.5 2.0 3.1 3.5 4.4
Uruguay 5.1 5.4 3.0 2.9 1.0 1.8
Venezuela 1.4 2.0 1.0 2.1 T 0 3.4
East Asia
China 6.4 6.6 6.1 6.1 7.0 6.7
Indonesia 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.4 7.0 6.5
Korea, South 4.7 5.5 3.9 4.8 2.8 3.5
Malaysia 2.9 3.6 3.4 4.5 2.0 2.2
The Philippines 4.9 5.1 3.6 3.5 5.3 4.8
Singapore 5.0 5.0 4.1 4.9 4.6 4.8
Taiwan 5.4 4.8 4.9 4.5 4.8 4.8
Thailand 4.6 4.1 2.9 3.5 2.3 3.2
Vietnam 7.0 7.0 6.8 6.8 1.2 1.7
South Asia
Bangladesh 4.1 4.0 4.5 4.8 2.6 3.5
India 2.0 3.1 2.0 3.0 3.9 3.8
Pakistan 5.1 4.9 4.9 4.5 2.6 3.8
Sri Lanka 2.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.6 5.0
Sub-Saharan Africa
Ghana 5.3 5.0 5.9 5.3 6.5 5.5
Kenya 5.0 4.4 5.6 5.3 3.5 3.6
Madagascar 5.4 4.8 5.1 5.4 5.5 5.2
Nigeria 4.6 3.9 4.6 4.3 2.5 3.9
Senegal 5.0 4.4 3.5 3.9 5.5 4.8
Developing Countries 5.0 4.7 4.6 4.7 5.4 5.1
Note: The lower the score, the greater the freedom
Source: Freedom House available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm
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and 2000. This is likely to be as a result of the economic crisis and the currency 
depreciation in these four Southeast Asian countries that began in 1997.
Table3.2
Wages paid by Majority-owned US Multinational Enterprises, 1983-2002
(annual $ wage per worker)
1983-5 1986-90 1991-6 1997-2002
Developing countries 6,599 8,170 11,904 13,096
Latin America 7,531 8,844 13,577 15,344
Argentina 10,463 11,464 25,867 30,173
Brazil 8,096 11,578 20,210 21,910
Chile 12,304 11,358 17,563 19,459
Colombia 11,899 10,058 15,621 19,401
Mexico 4,993 5,624 9,040 11,212
Panama 7,413 8,678 11,780 16,298
Ecuador 5,878 5,164 7,098 7,234
Venezuela 11,491 8,966 11,044 19,482
ASIA (excluding Japan) 4,427 6,464 9,857 10,942
South Korea 5,316 9,321 21,473 28,587
Taiwan 5,179 10,074 20,010 24,181
Hong Kong 4,606 7,719 11,380 14,446
Singapore 7,208 8,942 16,566 23,906
Malaysia 4,083 4,682 6,473 8,557
Thailand 4,107 4,319 6,371 5,925
Indonesia 4,384 5,872 5,886 4,561
The Philippines 2,675 3,575 6,105 7,636
China n.a. 1,813* 3,334 6,661
India 3,105 3,895 3,887 6,072
Africa 7,017 7,396 10,674 12,012
Egypt 3,973 3,882 5,858 7,862
Nigeria 9,849 5,440 4,759 6,667
South Africa 8,333 10,627 16,997 16,699
Middle East 15,919 22,415 26,446 27,606
Notes: n.a. = not available and * denotes the average of 1989-90.
Source: Calculated from US Bureau of Statistics, US Investment Abroad, various issues.
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In terms of worker quality, Thailand was average, compared with other middle- 
income developing countries. Table 3.3 presents six indices measuring the quality of 
human capital for Thailand compared with selected developing countries from 1990 to 
2000. The first three indices basically represent levels of human capital quality whereas 
the other three indices reflect the effort of government to improve human capital. In 
general, the quality of human capital in Thailand was close to the average of middle- 
income developing countries. Thai workers were better than the average middle-income 
countries as measured by the illiteracy rate and tertiary school enrolment, but far behind 
in terms of secondary school enrolment. In comparison with ASEAN-4 countries, the 
quality of human capital in Thailand is about average, slightly better than Indonesia and 
the Philippines except in secondary enrolment, but behind Malaysia and Singapore. On 
the other hand, in terms of government effort to improve human capital, Thailand is 
comparable to middle-income developing countries and ASEAN-4 (Table 3.3).
3.1.4 The Role of the Government and Infrastructure Availability
From 1960 onwards, the Thai government has maintained a firm commitment to 
the ideology of private-sector led industrialization combined with prudent public 
investment in infrastructure. Influenced by The World Bank mission in the late 1950s, 
government involvement shifted from direct production via state enterprises toward 
investment in public infrastructure required for economic development such as electricity 
and water supply, and transportation facilities. The government virtually prohibited state 
participation in those commercial and industrial activities, which might be expected to 
compete directly with private capital (Akira, 1989: p.180).
However, there has been underinvestment in basic infrastructure thereby creating 
excess demand for public infrastructure, especially in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
From 1970 to 1975, the amount of public investment in basic infrastructure exhibited 
moderate expansion and then declined from 1976 to 1985. This decline was displaced by 
the increase in public expenditure on administration and military defense for political 
stability and social harmony (see footnote 1 above). In addition, the economic slowdown 
during the late 1970s and the early 1980s resulted in a shortage of public revenue. All of
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these constrained public expenditure to building basic infrastructure. This situation eased 
between 1986 and 1996 when the economy exhibited rapid growth, thereby expanding 
the tax base and increasing public revenue. Despite the persistence of excess demand for 
public infrastructure, the rapid expansion of public revenue allowed the government to 
increase public expenditure rapidly to build basic infrastructure.
Table 3.4 provides a broad comparison of infrastructure availability in Thailand 
and other middle-income developing countries. There are four indicators, i.e. electricity 
production per head of population, telephone mainlines per 1,000 people, improved water 
source, and percentage share of R&D expenditure to GDP for the 1990s. The first three 
indicators reflect the availability of physical infrastructure, i.e. electricity, telephone 
services, and water supply, whereas the fourth one is another key infrastructure that has 
become increasingly important in promoting long-term economic growth. Private 
investments in R&D activities like technology are likely to be subject to the problem of 
free-riders (i.e. public goods problem). Private agents who conduct R&D investment are 
unable to charge all people who receive benefit from R&D activities. Without 
government intervention, this could lead to underinvestment. Underinvestment is even 
more severe in the context of developing countries where there is a relatively weak legal 
system to protect property rights (Hill. 2004: p.358).
In terms of physical infrastructure availability, Thailand performed poorly 
compared with middle-income developing countries between 1990 and 2001. In all 
indicators except improved water supply, Thailand was below the average of the middle- 
income developing countries. There is minor improvement in infrastructure availability 
between 1990-5 and 1996-2001. The level of electricity production per head of 
population in Thailand is closer to, but still below, the average of middle-income 
developing countries. In comparison with ASEAN-4 neighbours, Thailand is behind 
Singapore and Malaysia in these three respects, especially electricity and telephone 
services. However, the availability of infrastructure services in Thailand is better than in 
Indonesia and the Philippines, especially as far as the electricity supply is concerned. In
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terms of public R&D expenditure to GDP, Thailand is also below the average of other 
middle-income developing countries. This is even true when compared with ASEAN-4.
Table 3.4
Selected Indicators of Infrastructure Availability of Selected Developing Countries,
1990-2001 ^
Electricity 
production 
(kwh per 
capita)
Telephone 
mainlines 
(per 1,000 
people)
Improved water 
source (per cent of 
population with 
access)
R&D expenditure 
(per cent of GDP)
1990-95
Middle-income 1514.8 53.5 75.7 n.a.
Indonesia 249.7 10.2 71.0 0.07
Malaysia 1,702.8 122.7 n.a. 0.36
Singapore 5,710.4 377.2 100.0 1.13
Thailand 1,064.5 38.7 80.0 0.13
The Philippines 432.1 13.5 87.0 0.21
1996-2001
Middle-income 1,696.4 112.8 81.6 0.57
Indonesia 393.8 28.1 78.0 n.a.
Malaysia 2,709.7 195.4 n.a. 0.31
Singapore 7,160.6 463.5 100.0 1.70
Thailand ■ 1,521.2 86.0 84.0 0.11
The Philippines 552.7 34.9 86.0 n.a.
Notes: Data above are the annual average with data missing in some years.
kwh = kilo-watt hour
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (CD ROM)
3.1.5 The Policies Governing Foreign Investment
From about the early 1960s, Thailand has always pursued a ‘market-friendly’ 
approach towards foreign investors in manufacturing. There have not been major 
discriminatory policies and foreign investors have been able to be involved in almost any 
business. There are legal restrictions on foreign ownership of commercial banks, 
insurance companies, commercial fishing, aviation businesses, commercial 
transportation, commodity exports, mining and other enterprises. But these restrictions 
are not generally applied to foreign investors alone. Even local investors frequently 
require permission from government authorities to pursue these activities.
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Under the Foreign Business Act of 1999 (better known as the ‘Alien Business 
Law’) which replaced the 1972 National Executive Council Announcement 281, the 
government restricted certain types of business for Thai enterprises only. Nevertheless, 
most of the listed activities are related to non-manufacturing, such as newspaper 
undertakings and radio and television station undertakings, lowland farming, upland 
farming, or horticulture, and raising animals.
Foreign investors are usually guaranteed the same rights as domestic investors. 
There are guarantees against expropriation and nationalization. The government permits 
freedom to export and freedom to remit investment capital, profits and other payments in 
foreign currency. Despite the presence of capital control measures during the pre-1990 
period, in practice repatriation of foreign capital related to direct investment (e.g. 
investment capital, profit or dividends, interest and principal o f foreign loans, royalties 
and payments on other obligations) has not been restricted (Akira, 1989: p.179).
There have been restrictions on land ownership and hiring of foreign migrants by 
foreign investors. In general, according to the Land Code (1954), foreign-owned firms 
are generally not allowed to own land.A According to the Alien Occupation Law, passed 
in 1973 and amended in 1978, foreigners require a work permit. Such restrictions have 
not been prohibitive. They have not applied to foreign investors who received investment 
privileges from the Thai Board of Investment (BOI). Hence, this implicitly encouraged 
foreign investors to apply for BOI promotion privileges, which are discussed in the 
following section.
4Under the Thai-US Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations signed in 1966, US 
companies in Thailand are granted equal treatment to Thai companies. This permits 100 per cent 
US-owned companies to operate in sectors where other foreign companies are generally allowed 
a maximum ownership level of 49 per cent. In addition, US companies are allowed to own land 
up to 10 rai or 0.16 hectares with an approval from the Ministry of Interior. The Land Code 
(1954) was amended in 1999 to relax this restriction. Since 1999, foreign investors regardless 
nationality have been able to own up to 4 rai of land for residential purposes.
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3.2 The Investment Promotion Regime
3.2.1 A Historical Overview (before 1970)
From 1960 onwards, the government pursued an open investment promotion 
regime to encourage private sector involvement in local manufacturing activities. 
Investment incentive policies were introduced in order to reinforce the IS strategy, and 
the BOI was established in 1959 as an independent office that would decide which firms 
would receive promotion privileges under the Investment Promotion Act (1960). 
Investment promotion measures included tax concessions on imported machinery, 
equipment, raw materials, and intermediate inputs needed directly for production. It was 
this set of privileges, which could be considered an encouragement to import capital 
goods and intermediate products including components for local assembly.
The tax concessions involved varied across diverse groups of the promoted 
industries, and the privileges granted differed according to the activity. In general, 
promoted industry activities were classified into three groups, i.e. A, B and C. Group A 
received a full exemption from tariff and business tax for 5 years, groups B and C 
received a one half and one third exemption, respectively. Group A consisted of 38 
types, including agricultural machinery, metal products, and basic chemicals, all of which 
are capital intensive. Auto-assembling and electrical appliance manufacturing were 
classified in Group B. Group C covered as many as 66 industries, mostly concentrated in 
the labour-intensive industries, and those such as the weaving industry, which used 
widely prevailing technology (Akira, 1988: p.181).
It is clear that the pattern of privileges granted promoted activities was 
complementary to the effect of the restrictive trade policy regime for promoting import- 
substituting industries. As a result, MNE involvement in Thailand commenced to 
respond to the economic rents created from these trade and investment promotion 
regimes. As described in Chapter 4, FDI inflows during the late 1960s and 1970s were 
directed to the consumer import-substituting industries. The Investment Promotion Act
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(1960) was amended several times in the 1960s and early 1970s (i.e. 1965, 1968, and 
1972), but there were minor changes in the promotion privileges.
3.2.2 The Development of the Investment Promotion Regime from 1970- 
present
Since 1970, the investment promotion regime has changed from promoting 
import-substituting industries to encouraging export-oriented industries. Until the mid 
1980s, the role of investment promotion schemes remained complementary to the 
escalating tariff structure to promote import-substituting industries. Amendments to the 
Investment Promotion Act in 1972 and 1977 vested the BOI with even more power in 
determining the length and magnitude of fiscal incentives that promoted firms could 
receive. For instance, the BOI can grant a corporate income tax exemption for 3-8 years 
compared with 5 years in the 1962 Act. The list of promoted activities remained more or 
less the same.5
Attempts to promote investment in import-substituting industries became more 
aggressive in the late 1970s. According to the 1977 Investment Promotion Act, the BOI 
could impose an import surcharge over and above a tariff in order to protect particular 
promoted industries. This was designed to allow the BOI to be able to act promptly to 
solve problems facing promoted industries. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the BOI 
actively used import surcharges to protect promoted firms producing a variety of 
products. This protection was normally renewed for periods longer than a year, over and 
above import tariff measures. In 1980, there were about 20 products and product groups 
subject to import surcharges ranging from 10 to 40 per cent of c.i.f. prices (Akrasanee 
and Ajanant, 1986: p.89). At the end of 1985, import surcharges applied to about 30 
products and the rates varied from 5 to 50 per cent, with most being between 20 and 30 
per cent (World Bank, 1988: p.58-9). These changes strengthened the restrictive impact 
derived from the trade policy regime in favour o f import-substituting industries, as 
opposed to export-oriented industries.
5 Groups A and B, which began in the 1960s, were merged together.
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The 1977 Act also stipulated majority Thai ownership for projects serving the 
domestic market and those in agriculture, mining, and services industries. It had an 
implication for equity ownership by foreign businesses. While not all foreign firms were 
required to be BOI-promoted, some of the BOI privileges, such as special rights to own 
land, and foreign worker permits, implicitly forced foreign businesses to apply for the 
investment incentives. Hence, the restriction on foreign ownership remained implicitly. 
Nevertheless, these conditions did not apply to projects where at least 50 per cent of 
output was exported. In practice, the BOI still had considerable discretion to apply the 
restriction of foreign ownership to promoted projects. For example, projects associated 
with advanced technology and/or creating sizable employment were likely to be exempt 
from foreign ownership restrictions (World Bank, 1988).
In the mid-1980s, changes took place to at least three aspects of BOI privileges: 
enhancing transparency, promoting industrial decentralization and promoting export- 
oriented activities. The BOI scheme became more transparent. The first public 
announcement of the BOI’s promotion criteria was made in 1983. The level of policy 
discretion regarding the length and magnitude of fiscal incentives was reduced. For 
example, according to the 1983 investment promotion criteria, the BOI was able to 
determine corporate income tax exemptions for 3 to 5 years, extendable to 8 years, 
depending on the investment scale or the number of employees. From 1987, the criteria 
were clearly spelled out. Corporate income tax exemption was granted to projects 
located in industrial estates in Bangkok and Samut Pakam for 3 years, extendable to 5 
years only.
To promote industrial decentralization, investment privileges were granted to 
activities located in remote areas outside Bangkok and its surroundings. This shift 
corresponded to overall planning goals set out in the Fifth and Sixth National Economic 
and Social Plans, the long-term economic plan of Thailand. In 1987, more privileges 
were granted to remote areas than for Bangkok and its surroundings, with the rationale 
that privileges would compensate for the inadequate infrastmcture in remote areas. 
Under the 1987 investment promotion criteria, the promoted zones were clearly classified
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into 3 zones; Bangkok and Samut Pakam, the four neighbouring provinces to Bangkok 
(i.e. Nakhom Pathona, Nonta Buri, Pathum Thani and Samut Sakhon) and another 67 
provinces referred to as Investment Promotion Zones (EPZs). Firms located in Bangkok 
and Samut Pakam received the fewest privileges compared to those located in the 4 other 
neighbouring provinces and the EPZs. For example, domestic-oriented promoted firms 
located in Bangkok did not receive exemption from import duty and business tax on 
machinery, whereas this exemption was granted to projects located in IPZs. Promoted 
firms located in 4 other neighbouring provinces received a 50 per cent reduction on duty 
and tax (Appendix 3 for additional information).
In order to strengthen the objective to promote manufacturing activities in remote 
areas, the zones were reclassified in 1989. There were now three investment promotion 
zones, i.e. zones 1, 2 and 3. Zone 1 has 6 provinces, including Bangkok and its 
neighbouring areas, whereas Zone 2 covers 10 provinces in central and eastern parts of 
Thailand.6 All other provinces are in Zone 3. The fewest investment incentives are 
granted for projects in Zone 1 and the most for Zone 3. This new classification widens 
the difference in privileges granted between Bangkok, the central areas and the remote 
zones. Furthermore, in 1993 and 2000, the BOI introduced additional incentives to 
encourage firms to move from zone 1 to zones 2 and 3. In particular, in 2000, further 
groups were identified within zone 3 and granted additional privileges to strengthen 
industrial decentralization.
From the early 1980s, there has been a clear shift in emphasis from import- 
substituting activities to export promotion. The key importance of this change is the 
introduction in 1983 o f tariff exemptions by the BOI on imported raw materials as an 
additional privilege for export-oriented promoted firms (i.e. for an export-sale ratio of 
greater than 30 per cent). This was supplemented by another two tariff exemptions: tariff 
exemptions/drawbacks (Section 19 of the Custom Laws) given by the Department of
6 Five areas surrounding Bangkok are Samut Prakam, Samut Sakom, Nakom Pathom, 
Nonta Buri and Pathum Thani. Zone 2 covers Samut Songkhram, Ratchburi, Suphan Buri, Ang 
Thong, Ayutthaya, Saraburi, Nakhon Nayok, Chachoengsao, Chon Buri, and Map Ta Phut 
Industrial Estate.
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Customs, and tax rebate schemes given by Fiscal Policy Offices (FPO).7 The timing of 
such a change was more or less in line with changes in the global environment when 
many East Asian manufacturers started losing their international competitiveness in 
labour-intensive products. This was instrumental in making Thailand an attractive 
location for export-oriented labour-intensive FDI for East Asian investors.
It is worth clarifying the difference between tariff exemptions granted by the BOI 
and the alternative schemes. While tariff exemptions and tax rebate schemes are 
administered by the Department of Customs, the BOI scheme offers a prior exemption 
scheme that is less cumbersome than the two existing schemes. After receiving approval 
from the BOI, export-oriented promoted firms are automatically allowed to access their 
imports without a delay to calculate and pay levies. This reduces custom procedures that 
before 1997 were considered unusually cumbersome and imposed costs on importers 
(European Commission, 1999; and United States Trade Representative, 1999, cited in 
Warr, 2000: p.1233).
The data on the value of foregone revenues from each scheme are available for 
some years only.8 Nevertheless, nesting such data together sheds light on transactions 
taking place in each scheme and their relative importance. For example, between 1983 
and 1987, the annual average revenue loss from the BOI-tariff exemption on imported 
inputs was B6,086 million. This accounted for around 57 per cent of the total forgone 
revenues from all tariff exemption schemes (World Bank 1988: p.60-1). The 1998 
revenue losses from the tariff exemption of imported inputs amounted to B60 billion 
(WTO, 1999: p42), as opposed to B14.8 billion of revenue losses from the duty
7 From 1990, there have been another three alternatives, i.e.(i) duty relief for goods 
placed under the Custom Bonded Warehouse scheme; (ii) duty exemption for goods taken into 
the Free zones established by Customs; (iii) duty exemption for goods taken into the Export 
Processing Zones (EPZ). Except for (ii) these measures are directly under the administrative 
responsibility of the Thai Customs Department to grant duty drawback, and duty exemption. 
Measure (ii) is under the control of the Industrial Estate Authority of Thailand.
8 The ‘Trade Policy Review 1995’ by the WTO contains this specific criticism that 
“..Thailand has made much progress in the creation of a more neutral incentive structure yet a 
substantial degree of non-transparency still remains; examples include the lack of a published 
tariff schedule since 1992, and the unavailability of details concerning the usage of tariff 
concessions and investment incentives.” (WTO, 1995: p.32)
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exemption scheme administered by the Custom Department in the fiscal year 2002 (June 
2001-May 2002) (WTO, 2003: p.42). Since data on the value of imported inputs to 
which these exemptions refer are not available, it is not possible to make any inferences 
on the efficiency of any one scheme. The figures shown above indicate the relative 
significance of the BOI scheme compared with the alternative ones.
After the onset of the financial crisis in 1997, the BOI made slight adjustments to 
the promotion criteria. First, privileges granted to promote export-oriented activities 
were abolished according to the WTO commitment on trade-related investment measures 
(TREMs) agreement. Secondly, the BOI lifted the restriction on foreign ownership to 49 
per cent for promoted activities in Zones 1 and 2. This abolition was in response to the 
need to attract foreign capital inflows, especially FDI, during the onset of the 1997 crisis 
(WTO, 1999: p.30).
3.2.3 Evaluation of the Investment Policy Regime
It seems clear that the investment promotion regime in Thailand generally treats 
domestic and foreign investors equally. Investment promotion privileges, except import 
surcharges and input tariffs exemption, are used in order to influence decisions to allocate 
resources to promoted targets. However, effectiveness is still unclear. Most firms 
intending to invest for the long term do not become profitable for some time, making the 
five year tax holiday less useful than it might seem. Obviously, the tariff exemption 
privilege for machinery becomes less significant when applied tariff rates drop to around 
five per cent or less. Evidence from the automotive industry also raises questions 
regarding its effectiveness. Although the BOI dropped automotive assembly activities 
from the promotion lists in the late 1960s, more entrepreneurs were attracted to operate 
without these BOI privileges in the 1970s (Nawadhinsukh, 1983). The same evidence 
was also found for some cases in textile industries during the late 1970s (Suphachalasai, 
1992; Kohpaiboon, 1995).
The imposition of import surcharges over and above tariffs in order to protect 
particular promoted industries distorts the incentive structure. However, in recent years,
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use of this measure has been limited, and has been applied on a temporary basis since the 
late 1980s. For example, at the end of 1987 it affected only nine products, mainly 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals. In 2002, for example, there was only one case where the 
BOI imposed an import surcharge on steel imports. It lasted for seven months (January- 
July 2002). The other exception was an exemption from input tariffs. This measure is 
probably more significant for exported-oriented enterprises. While the presence of input 
tariffs could distort international competitiveness, becoming a BOI promoted firm is a 
way to bypass the burden of input tariffs, as well as customs procedures.
3.3 The Trade Policy Regime
3.3.1 The Situation before 1970.
Ever since the Bowring Treaty with Great Britain in the 1850s, Thailand has 
remained a relatively open trading economy. Under the Bowring treaty, Thailand could 
not impose import or export tariffs of more than 3 per cent. In addition, British 
merchants were allowed to buy and sell goods directly, without any of the interference 
that had taken place when the King controlled trade. Fourteen other countries, mostly 
European countries, the United States and Japan, were included in the Bowring Treaty. 
As a result, Thailand pursued broadly free trade policies and concentrated on exporting 
primary goods such as rice, tin, and teak and imported manufactured products (Ingram, 
1971).
After the abolition of the Bowring Treaty in 1926, Thailand began raising its tariff 
rates. The aim was to increase government revenue rather than to protect local industry. 
The average level of tariff rates increased to around 20 per cent in the 1960s, from about 
3-4 per cent between 1855 and 1927 (Akrasanee and Ajanant, 1987: p.80). To some 
extent the high tariff could provide protection to local production as opposed to imports, 
but the response from private investment in manufacturing continued to be low. Hence, 
the government began to make public sector investment, in both infrastructure and
84
manufacturing (Isarangkun, 1969). Several public enterprises in areas such as textiles, 
paper, glass, and gunny bags were established between 1947 and 1957.9
However, Thailand’s trade policy regime continued to remain remarkably free 
compared to other developing countries. According to Sachs and Warner (1995), 
Thailand is one of only seven developing countries that have always been relatively open. 
Thailand embarked on an IS industrialization strategy in the early 1960s. The 
government introduced an escalating tariff structure to encourage local manufacturing, as 
well as pursuing private-sector-led industrialization. The government at that time (i.e. the 
Sarit government) also attempted to restructure drastically the existing tariff system of 
selected products. Unlike the system adopted from 1927 to 1959, which had primarily 
been aimed at increasing central government revenue, the changes in the tariff system 
under the Sarit government were designed to protect domestic manufacturers, including 
foreign investors, and to pursue IS industrialization. Nevertheless, the degree of tariff 
escalating structure in the mid-1960s was negligible. Tariff rates were scattered around 
20-30 per cent, i.e. 25-30 per cent for durable and non-durable consumer goods; 20-30 
per cent for intermediate products; and 20 per cent for machinery and equipment. To 
some extent this escalating tariff structure began then, in spite of the small difference in 
tariffs across sectors.
9This was partly due to the result of nationalistic policies, but it also reflected 
discrimination against the Chinese business community and fear of foreign investment. 
Akrasanee and Ajanant (1986) point out that Chinese business diverted their investments into 
high liquidity businesses such as retailing and mining (Muscat, 1966; Akira, 1989) and remitted a 
sizable amount of return to China. Hence, import tariffs and export taxes (especially on rice 
exports) were raised partly in response to the high remittance in spite of the government revenues 
(Ingram 1971).
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3.3.2 The Development of the Trade Policy Regime since 197010
As in other developing countries, Thailand implements both tariff and quantitative 
restrictions (QRs) as trade policy instruments. However, historically, there has been 
greater reliance on tariffs rather than QRs (World Bank, 1988). This is especially true for 
the manufacturing sector where tariffs were the main trade policy instrument to influence 
the country’s resource allocation, with a few exceptions. One exception was the 
automotive industry where the government has used both tariff and non-tariff measures 
i.e. LCRs, to encourage auto parts localization (see details in Chapter 7). In general, the 
tariff and QRs are mainly confined to agricultural trade (World Bank 1988, p.57-8).
For the past three decades, Thailand has maintained an escalating tariff structure 
where tariff rates for raw materials and intermediates have usually been lower than those 
on finished products. The escalating tariff structure, which began in 1964 in order to 
promote an IS strategy, has been pursued since then. Between 1970 and 1987, such a 
tariff structure was associated with high effective tariff rates. The government 
maintained tariff rates on output but reduced those on inputs. In 1971, tariff rates for 
durable and nondurable consumer goods were raised to around 30-55 per cent while 
remaining unchanged for intermediate goods, machinery and equipment at the 1964 level 
of 20-30 per cent. As a result, the gap in tariffs between the former and the latter was 
widened, thereby enhancing incentives for local manufacturing in finished goods. In 
1974, tariff rates for machinery and equipment for both agricultural and industrial use 
were reduced to 10 per cent. The purpose of reduction of tariffs on inputs was not purely 
motivated by industry protection. Averting inflationary pressure resulting from the world 
oil price hike was a dominant concern.
10The tariff discussed in this section is based on ‘applied’ not ‘statutory’ or ‘scheduled’ 
tariff rates. The statutory tariff rate is referred to as the tariff rate given by the Customs Decree 
B.E. 2500. Changes to statutory rates require legislative approval. The applied rate refers to the 
actually implemented one. The Minister of Finance (MOF) may modify the applied tariff rates 
without requiring approval by the legislative body. Consequently, applied tariffs for several 
products differ from statutory tariffs. Though the MOF has the power to raise or reduce tariff 
rates, the change in applied tariffs has generally worked to reduce the rate in recent years (WTO, 
1990: p.74-8).
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The key implication of an escalating tariff structure is to provide an incentive for 
local enterprises to produce finished goods as opposed to intermediate goods. The 
presence of input tariffs is compensated for by tariffs on outputs at a higher level. The 
fact that the value of outputs is generally greater than the total value of intermediate 
inputs, i.e. positive value added, means that the escalating tariff structure could generate 
net protection greater than the level of nominal protection on outputs. This encourages 
local enterprises to enter into the production of highly-protected finished goods, 
regardless of the existing comparative advantage of the country. Hence, it is likely to 
cause inefficiency in domestic resource allocation.
While government officials were aware of the adverse impact from the escalating 
tariff structure, as well as the great variation in tariff rates across industries, tariff 
restructuring could not be implemented until the late 1980s. This was due mainly to the 
poor fiscal situation. The awareness o f the adverse impact was even explicitly addressed 
and incorporated in the Fifth National Economic and Social Development Plan. 
However, in the early 1980s, this attempt was constrained by the consecutive budget 
balance deficit and high level of public debt, as well as inflationary pressures from the oil 
price crisis of the late 1970s (see above). For instance, tariff changes announced in 
October 1982 were intended to initiate reform and reduce the sectoral variation in 
protection impacts by lowering nominal rates to a maximum of 60 per cent.11 The 
consecutive fiscal deficits from 1975 to 1984 caused increases in tariffs on intermediate 
chemical products and machinery in order to narrow the tariff gap between intermediate 
inputs and finished products. However, fears about their impact on production costs 
caused an almost immediate reversal of most of these tariff increases. Eventually, a 
special surcharge on imports was temporarily imposed between 1982 and 1984. This was 
replaced with an increase in nominal tariff rates in 1985. Tariffs on raw materials and 
intermediate goods were raised by 5 per cent, while those on finished goods except for
11 In 1982, the Thai government decided to apply an upper limit of 60 per cent in general. 
The few chapters of the Harmonized System (HS), for which this upper limit on ad valorem 
tariffs has not been imposed are certain leather products, fur, hats, umbrellas, as well as certain 
ceramic products. For products with specific tariffs, it is not possible to ensure that such an upper 
limit always applies in terms of an ad valorem equivalent tariff. In 1989, for example, imports of 
several items faced applied tariffs of more than 100 per cent.
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certain textile and machinery items were raised by 10 per cent. Thus, the escalating tariff 
structure associated with the higher level of nominal protection remained in place.
During the late 1980s to the mid-1990s, the Thai government undertook a 
considerable tariff reduction in the context of the economic boom and the improvement 
in the fiscal position. During this period Thailand experienced rapid economic growth 
with price stability. From 1986 to 1995, the annual average growth of real GDP was 9.2 
per cent. The rapid growth of domestic income meant a rapid expansion of the tax base, 
thereby improving the government’s fiscal position. The budget balance recovered from 
12 years o f consecutive deficit between 1975 and 1987 to surplus in 1988 and remained 
in surplus until 1997 (Figure 3.2).
Tariff reduction commenced with electrical and electronic goods in Chapter 85 of 
the Harmonized System (HS) as well as with various industrial inputs, totaling 115 items 
in 1988 (See details in Annex 3, World Bank, 1988). In September 1990, tariffs on 
several machinery and equipment imports were reduced to 5 per cent (WTO, 1990: p.84). 
A comprehensive plan for tariff reduction was proposed in 1990 and implemented in 
1995 and 1997. It involved tariff reduction and rationalization. Maximum tariffs were 
reduced from 100 per cent to 30 per cent. Tariffs were significantly lowered on some 
4,000 items (at the 6-digit HS level) or 75 per cent of total tariff lines. By the end of the 
1990s, the tariff bands were reduced from 39 to six (0, 1, 5, 10, 20 and 30 per cent). The 
two low rates (0 and 1 per cent) were for raw materials and the two top rates (20 and 30 
per cent) for finished products, with the two middle rates for intermediate goods. As a 
result of these tariff cuts, the average applied tariff rates dropped from more than 30 per 
cent in 1990 to 17 per cent by 1997 (Table 3.5)
In m id -1997, the reform process was temporarily interrupted by the financial 
crisis. Tariffs on completely built-up (CBU) passenger cars and a number of other luxury 
imports were temporarily raised in 1997. Tariffs on these items were raised to
12 In October 1997, the government raised tariffs on completely built-up (CBU) passenger 
cars (from 42-69 per cent to 80 per cent), perfumes, cosmetics, clothing, leather products,
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discourage demand for imported goods, increase tax revenues, and as a response to 
pressure from domestic industry. At the same time, a surcharge of 10 per cent was 
introduced with the exception of goods subject to less than 5 per cent tariff rates. This 
was a temporary measure to increase tax revenue in order to meet the budget surplus of 1 
per cent o f GDP agreed to with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in late 1997. The 
surcharge was abolished in August 1999 as part of the Government’s package of 
measures to encourage investment, which also included autonomous reductions on over 
600 tariff lines, covering inputs used by Thailand’s main industries (WTO, 1999: p.37). 
Hence, the financial crisis interruption caused a reverse trend o f tariff rates. Applied 
tariff rates increased slightly to 20.1 per cent in 1998 and returned to 17.1 per cent in 
September 1999 after the temporary tariff measures were removed (Table 3.5).
Over the past two years, tariff restructuring has received renewed emphasis as an 
essential part of the overall economic reforms aimed at strengthening efficiency and 
competitiveness (Warr 2000; WTO 1990, 1995, 1999). The Thai government introduced 
another effort to lower tariff rates, commencing in June 2003 (implemented in October 
2003), followed by a four-year period of tariff reduction from 2004 to 2008. There are 
around 900 items involved in the second round of tariff reductions, covering a wide range 
of manufacturing products. Table 3.6 provides a summary of selected items scheduled to 
have tariff rates cut between 2002 and 2005 according to the magnitude of the cuts. 
Changes in tariff rates between 2006 and 2008 are minor, compared to the 2005 tariff 
structure. The clear evidence from Table 3.6 is that the tariff reduction in this round is 
mainly on intermediate products, thereby maintaining the escalating tariff structure. The 
top 10 items subject to tariff reduction consist of rubber and articles thereof (HS40), glass 
and glassware (HS70), knitted fabrics (HS60), other base metals (HS81), woven fabrics 
(HS58), articles of stone (HS68), man-made staple fibre (HS55), wadding yarns (HS56), 
cotton (HS52), and miscellaneous vegetable preparations (HS21). The magnitude of tariff 
reduction is moderate, within the range of 0 to 8.9 per cent.
glassware and crystal products, certain shoes and jewelry (from 20 to 30 per cent), and lenses, 
eyeglasses, cameras, watches, pens and lighters (from 5 to 30 per cent).
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Table 3.5
Average Tariff Rates in Selected Asian Countries, 1985-2001 (unweighted, per cent)
China Indonesia Korea M alaysia Philippines Taiwan Thailand V ietnam
1985 n.a. 27.0 n.a. n.a. 27.6 26.5 41.2 n.a.
1986 38.1 31.5 n.a. 15.8 27.9 22.8 n.a. n.a.
1987 39.5 n.a. 22.9 13.6 27.9 19.4 n.a. n.a.
1988 n.a. n.a. 18.9 13 27.9 12.6 n.a. n.a.
1989 n.a. 25.2 14.9 17 27.6 9.7 40.8 n.a.
1990 40.3 20.6 13.3 n.a. 27.8 9.7 39.8 n.a.
1991 n.a. 20.3 11.4 16.9 26 n.a. 38.7 n.a.
1992 42.9 20.0 10.1 12.8 24.3 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1993 39.9 19.4 8.9 14.3 22.6 n.a. 45.6 n.a.
1994 36.3 n.a. n.a. 13 21.7 n.a. 23.3 n.a.
1995 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 20 11.2 23.1 12.8
1996 23.6 13.2 13.4 8.7 14.3 9.7 n.a. n.a.
1997 17.6 n.a. 13.3 9.1 13.4 n.a. 17 13.4
1998 16.8 9.5 11.1 7.1 10.7 n.a. 20.1 n.a.
1999 n.a. 10.9 8.7 9.7 10.1 8.8 17.1 n.a.
2000 17.5 8.4 n.a. n.a. 7.5 n.a. 18.4 16.5
2001 17.5 8.4 n.a. 10.2 7.6 n.a. 18.5 15.7
Notes: n.a. = not available.
Source: Athukorala, Jongwanich and Kohpaiboon (2004), based on Hoekman et al. (2002, Table 
A -l)  for the period 1985-89; WTO, Trade Policy Review -  Country Report (various) and 
individual country tariff schedules available from the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) Secretariat online data base, www.apec.org for other years.
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Table 3.6
Average Tariff (per cent) of Top 30 Items under Tariff Restructuring in Thailand,
2002-5
HS
A verage T ariff Rates
T ariff
D ifference
2002-052002 2003 2004 2005
a ) (2) (3) (4) 0 M 4 )
40 Rubber and articles thereof 23.3 23.3 15.0 8.6 8.3
70 Glass and glassw ear 18.0 10.1 10.1 10.1 7.9
60 K nitted fabrics 20.0 20.0 12.5 5.0 7.5
81 Other base m etals 9.4 3.2 2.5 2.5 7.0
58 W oven fabrics, lace etc. 20.0 20.0 13.2 6.1 6.8
68 Articles o f  stone 18.3 11.6 11.6 11.6 6.6
55 M an-m ade staple fibre 15.9 15.9 9.4 4.8 6.5
56 W adding yam s 17.7 17.7 11.4 6.1 6.3
52 Cotton 15.5 15.5 9.2 4.8 6.3
21
M iscellaneous vegetable 
preparations 30.3 24.1 24.1 24.1 6.2
54 M an-m ade filam ents 15.0 15.0 8.9 5.0 6.1
13 Lacs, gum s and other vege.slabs 16.1 10.0 10.0 10.0 6.1
50 Silk 14.9 14.9 8.9 5.1 6.1
48 Paper and paperboards 17.7 12.2 12.2 6.8 5.5
83 M isc. articles o f  base metals 19.1 13.6 13.6 13.6 5.5
79 Zinc and articles thereof 9.0 5.9 4.1 4.1 4.9
87 V ehicles (other than railway) 38.2 38.2 33.5 32.2 4.8
78 Lead and articles thereof 9.2 4.9 4.5 4.5 4.7
69 Ceram ic products 22.7 18.0 18.0 18.0 4.7
11 Products o f  the m illing industry 30.1 26.2 25.5 25.5 4.5
82 Tools, im plem ents. Cutlery etc 20.6 16.2 16.2 16.2 4.4
74 Articles o f  iron and steal 10.6 6.3 6.3 6.3 4.3
34 Soap and w ashing preparations 12.0 8.1 8.1 7.3 3.9
32 Tanning or dyeing extracts 9.6 6.0 6.0 6.0 3.6
76 A lum inium  etc. 11.6 8.3 8.1 8.1 3.5
7 Edible v eg e tab le s , roots and tubers 38.7 35.4 35.4 35.4 3.3
53 Other vegetable textile fibres 9.8 9.8 6.8 5.0 3.0
35 A lbum inoidal substances 7.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 3.0
2 M eat and edible m eat offal 38.2 35.4 35.4 35.4 2.8
44 W ood and articles o f  wood 12.6 9.9 9.9 6.4 2.7
91 Clocks and w atches 11.1 8.4 8.4 8.4 2.7
80 Tin and articles thereof 7.5 5.2 4.9 4.9 2.6
(contd.)
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Table 3.6: (contd.)
HS
Average Tariff Raltes
Tariff
Difference
2002-052002 2003 2004 2005
(l) (2) (3) (4) (1H 4)
84 Non-electrical machinery 7.4 7.4 4.8 4.2 2.6
73 Articles and iron and steel 16.1 16.1 13.7 11.3 2.4
49 Printed books, newspapers etc.. 11.6 9.2 9.2 6.8 2.4
75 Nickel and articles thereof 8.4 6.1 6.1 6.1 2.4
89 Skips, boats etc 11.8 9.6 9.6 9.6 2.2
85 Electrical machinery and equipment 12.5 12.5 10.4 8.5 2.1
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Impregnated, coated or covered 
textile fabrics 14.3 14.3 12.2 10.3 2.1
51 Wool, fur or animal hair 5.7 5.7 3.8 3.1 1.9
94 Furniture, bedding etc. 20.2 18.3 18.3 18.3 1.9
8 Edible fruits and nuts 34.3 32.4 32.4 32.4 1.9
45 Cork and articles of cork 10.3 8.5 8.5 6.7 1.8
72 Iron and steel 7,6 7.6 5.9 4.7 1.8
A v erage  all ta r if f  item s 14.3 13.3 12.0 11.0 2.3
Source: See Appendix 4
Table 3,7 provides a summary of chronological events of tariff changes in 
Thailand over the past three decades. It seems clear that Thailand persistently pursued an 
open trade policy regime in the context that cross-border protection is heavily reliant on 
tariff rather non-tariff measures. Over the past three decades, the government tended to 
lower tariff protection unilaterally. Tariff reduction plans were delayed until the late 
1980s because of the poor fiscal situation. Significant tariff reduction was undertaken in 
the mid 1990s. Nevertheless, despite a series of tariff reductions, the escalating tariff 
structure is still the key theme in designing the tariff structure, thereby promoting 
differing economic incentives across industries.
The impact of reforms under the World Trade Organization (WTO) and various 
regional initiatives such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the 
ASEAN-Free Trade Area (AFTA) has been less important, compared to the ongoing 
unilateral tariff reduction. While AFTA would potentially have an impact on particular 
industries rather than the overall policy regime, its actual impact has at best had modest
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results in bringing down intra-regional trade barriers and is threatened by the proliferation
I T
of bilateral free trade agreements (FT As).
3.3.3 Nominal Protection
The past three decades have seen a significant reduction in nominal tariffs. The 
simple average applied tariff rate sharply declined from 40 per cent between 1985 and 
1994 to 23 per cent from 1995 to 1996 and 17 per cent in 1997 (Table 3.5). The 
downward trend of average tariff was temporarily reversed during the onset of the crisis. 
The average tariff rate was further reduced to 13.3 per cent in 2003, and was expected to 
decline further to 12 and 11 per cent in 2004 and 2005-8, respectively.
Table 3.7
A Chronology of Official Tariff Changes in Thailand, 1970-2003
Period Event
1971 The gap in tariffs between finished consumer goods and intermediate goods 
widened as a result of tariff increases in the former.
1974 Tariffs for machinery and equipment for both agricultural and industrial use were 
reduced.
1980 The government addressed tariff reform in the Fifth National Economic and 
Social Development Plan of Thailand.
Oct 1982 The first attempt to narrow the gap of tariff rates by increasing tariff rates for 
intermediate chemical products and machinery.
1982-4 - The change in October 1982 was abolished and the previous tariff structure was 
restored.
- A special surcharge on imports was temporarily imposed to generate public 
revenue.
(contd.)
13See the special issue of ASEAN Economic Bulletin (2005) Vol. 22, No.l for the 
comprehensive discussion of trade policies in Southeast Asia.
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Table 3.7 (contd.)
1985 Raise tariffs by 5 per cent on raw materials and intermediate goods, 10 per cent 
for finished goods.
1988 Lower tariff rates on several electronics and electrical appliances.
1990 Launch a comprehensive tariff restructuring (reduction and rationalization), 
implemented in 1995 and 1997.
Oct 1997 - Raise tariff for luxury products e.g. perfumes, cosmetics, clothing, leather 
products, glassware and crystal products, certain shoes and jewelry, etc. for two 
years.
- 10 per cent surcharge on other goods whose tariff rates are equal to or greater 
than 5 per cent for two years.
2003 Tariff reduction on 900 intermediate products.
Source: Author’s compilation
Despite the persistent decline in tariffs, Thailand remained a high-tariff country 
by regional standards until about the mid-1990s. During this period, Thailand’s simple 
average tariff rate continued to exceed levels in Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, and 
even China by a wide margin. Nevertheless, the utilization of non-tariff measures, 
represented by the coverage ratio of non-tariff barriers (NTBs), in Thailand has been low 
compared to most other East Asian countries (Table 3.8). This makes tariffs virtually the 
sole means o f border protection.
Despite the persistence of escalating tariff structures, the distribution of tariff lines 
has significantly changed between the pre- and post- mid-1990s tariff restructuring 
(Table 3.9). Since during 1997-2002, there was no significant change in tariffs, this 
study uses the 2002 tariff rates to represent the tariff structure during 1997-2002. In 
2002, more than 50 per cent of products were subject to tariff rates lower than 10 per 
cent. This was in sharp contrast to the pre-restructuring period where only around 30 per 
cent o f total tariff lines were at rates between 0-10 per cent and almost half were at rates 
o f 20 per cent or above.
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Table 3.8
Coverage Ratio of Non-tariff Barriers (NTBs) in Import Trade* 
(unweighted, per cent)
1984-87 1988-90 1991-93 1997-2000
China 10.6 23.2 11.3 5.7
Indonesia 94.7 9.4 2.7 3.1
Korea, Rep 8.8 4.0 2.6 1.5
Malaysia 3.7 2.8 2.1 2.3
The Philippines 44.9 n.a. n.a. 1.8
Thailand 12.4 8.5 5.5 2.1
Notes: n.a.= not available
*Calculated as a percentage of the import value of HS6 tariff lines affected by NTBs in total 
imports. NTBs include quantitative restrictions in the form of all types of licenses and import 
authorization, quotas, import prohibitions, advanced import deposits, foreign exchange 
restrictions, fixed customs valuations, and state trading monopolies. Figures reported under a 
given sub-period relate to a single year within that sub-period.
Source: Athukorala, Jongwanich and Kohpaiboon (2004) based on Hoekman et al. (2002, Table 
A-l) for the period 1985-89; WTO, Trade Policy Review -  Country Report (various) and 
individual country tariff schedules available from the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) Secretariat online data base, www.apec.org for other years.
However, the second round of tariff restructuring in 2002 did not alter the 
distribution of tariff lines. It basically involved shifting the tariff lines from the 16-20 
per cent bracket to a lower bracket with little impact on lines above the 20 per cent 
bracket (Table 3.9). The changes proposed for the next two years appear to follow the 
same pattern, while the changes proposed for 2006-2008 seem negligible. This will result 
in a further widening of tariff differences between intermediate and finished products.
Table 3.9
Share of 4-digit Harmonized System (HS) Categories of Applied Tariff Rates in
Thailand, 1989-2008
Tariff bands 1989 1995 2002 2003 2004-08
0 2.5 2.6 5.6 5.7 6.0
0.1-5 14.4 17.3 33.3 37.7 48.8
5.1-10 14.2 17.6 14.1 14.2 14.8
10.1-15 12.7 3.2 3.9 4.5 3.6
15.1-20 15.4 16.4 21.4 17.9 8.4
20.1-30 15.8 16 13.8 14.3 12.7
30-100 25 26.8 7.8 5.8 5.7
Source: Data for 1989 and 1995 from WTO (1990) and (1995), respectively. Data for 2002-08
are from Athukorala, Jongwanich and Kohpaiboon (2004).
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In general, tariff rates are higher for manufacturing, compared with agriculture 
and other primary product sectors. This is indicated in Table 3.10 by the fact that the 
average applied tariff rates (without the various exemption) for the manufacturing sector 
are higher than those for the overall economy between 1980 and 2003. This is consistent 
with patterns observed in other developing countries and reflects the belief in 
industrialization as the road to economic independence. Furthermore, the comparison of 
tariff rates across industries clearly points out the presence of a tariff escalating structure. 
Tariff rates are particularly high for agricultural-processing, especially beverages, food 
processing, and import-substituting consumer products e.g. garments, footwear. 
Intermediate products like metal products, machinery, chemical products are generally 
subject to lower tariff rates.
Table 3.10
Nominal and Effective Rates of Protection in Thailand, 1980-2003 (per cent)
1980 1985 2002 2003
Nominal rate of protection (NRP)
Agro-processing 34.4 30.9 22.7 20.3
Textile products 41.0 27.8 18.9 18.6
Leather and Footwear products 54.1 26.8 18.8 18.5
Wood products 31.6 28.2 13.7 13.5
Paper and pulp 24.0 17.8 14.4 10.5
Chemical and petroleum products 32.8 21.4 9.4 8.4
Rubber products 29.1 26.8 23.2 23.2
Other non-metal products 36.7 23.0 15.0 10.0
Metal products 25.2 16.6 13.2 10.7
Machinery 22.4 14.3 6.2 6.2
Consumer goods and motor vehicles 31.2 19.7 11.4 10.6
Total Manufacturing 32.9 23.8 16.4 15.4
Overall n.a. 22.9 14.7 13.9
Effective rate of protection (ERP)
Agro-processing 58.1 135.2 26.9 21.2
Textile products 74.5 118.4 35.6 35.4
Leather and Footwear products 87.8 152.7 26.3 28.5
Wood products 65.4 62.0 25.2 25.4
(contd.)
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Table 3.10 (contd.)
1980 1985 2002 2003
Paper and Pulp 20.4 53.5 46.8 31.8
Chemical and Petroleum products 43.0 44.5 15.6 13.9
Rubber products 2.1 42.0 65.3 65.6
Other Non-Metal products 72.1 108.5 32.5 20.1
Metal products 35.6 70.9 23.0 18.5
Machinery 27.1 29.3 2.0 3.1
Consumer goods and motor vehicles 48.4 45.6 15.3 15.3
Total manufacturing 51.7 78.4 25.2 23.6
Overall n.a. 65.9 20.6 18.2
Coefficient variation (CV) of ERPs 120 200 188 204
Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient with 2002 ERP 0.5618 n.a.
Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient with 2003 ERP 0.4809 n.a. 0.9334 1
Notes: detail of ERP estimates for 1985 is not available. Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient
r r2 ^
where d= the difference in statistical rank of(rho) is defined by 1 - 6 X
N ( N 2 -1 )
corresponding variables.
Source: ERP estimates for 1980 are from Akrasanee and Ajanant (1986), those of 1985 from 
World Bank (1988) and of 2002-3 are from Athukorala, Jongwanich and Kohpaiboon (2004). 
See details in Appendix 5.
3.3.4 Evaluation of the Trade Policy Regime
In this section, restrictiveness of the trade policy regime is evaluated using several 
indices, which can be categorized into two groups: aggregate measure and ERP. In the 
aggregate measure, there are five indicators, i.e. the widely used trade to GDP, the trade 
to goods GDP, the ratio of export-gross output in the manufacturing sector, the incidence 
o f applied tariff rates and incidence of applied tariff rates in manufacturing products. The 
clear advantage of the first group is to illustrate the time pattern of the level of trade 
restrictiveness over the past three decades.
Figure 3.4.A and 3.4.B illustrate the time pattern of five measures of trade policy 
restrictiveness, i.e. the widely-used trade to GDP or degree of openness (OPEN1), the 
trade to goods GDP (OPEN2), the ratio of export-gross output in the manufacturing 
sector (EX OUTPUT), the incidence of applied tariff rates i.e. the percentage of tariff
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revenues to total imports (TARIFF1), and the incidence of applied tariff rates in the 
manufacturing sector (TAR1FF2). For OPEN1, OPEN2, and EX OUTPUT, an increase 
in the measure implies the regime has become less restrictive and vice versa. In contrast, 
a downward trend of TARIFF1 and TAR1FF2 means a less restrictive regime and vice 
versa.
Despite the difference in the way each measure is constructed, all measures 
indicate the trade regime in Thailand has gradually become more open over the past three 
decades. The correlation coefficients of these measures are very high (Table 3.11). The 
time pattern for all measures is consistent with the development of the trade policy 
regime discussed so far. That is, the level of trade restrictiveness reduces considerably 
from around the mid 1980s.
Figure 3.4
Pattern of Indicators of Trade Openness in Thailand, 1970-2002
Figure 3.4.A: Trade to GDP (OPEN1), Trade to goods GDP (OPEN2) and Export-gross 
Output of the Manufacturing Sector (EX OUTPUT) (per cent)
0 4 * r
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 20 0 0
O P E N  1 — *— O P E N 2 E X  O U T P U T
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Figure 3.4.B: Incidence o f Applied Tariff Rate for the Whole Economy {TARIFF 1) and for the 
Manufacturing Sector (TARIFF2) (per cent)
1990 200019801970 1975
T A R IFF  1 —■— T A R IFF2
Source: See Appendix 6.
Table 3.11
Correlation Coefficient Matrix of Indices of Trade Policy Openness in Thailand,
1970-2002
OPENl OPEN2 EX OUTPUT TARIFF 1 TARIFF2
OPEN1 1
OPEN2 0.999 1
E X  OUTPUT 0.950 0.949 1
TARIFF1 -0.911 -0.913 -0.871 1
TARIFF2 -0.950 -0.948 -0.925 0.961 1
Notes: OPEN1 = trade to GDP (per cent)
OPEN2 = trade to goods GDP (per cent)
EX OUTPUT = export-gross output ratio in the manufacturing sector (per cent) 
TARIFF1 = incidence of applied tariff rate (per cent)
TARIFF2 = incidence of applied tariff rate in the manufacturing sector (per cent)
Source: See Appendix 6.
It is worth noting there is a significant difference between the incidence of applied 
tariff rates and average tariff rates. While the average applied tariff remained more or 
less unchanged from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, there has been a continuing 
reduction in TARIFF 1 and TARIFF2 especially since the mid 1980s. This could either be 
due to the change in import items from high-tariff to lower tariff items, or to the
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effectiveness of various tariff exemption schemes. The former does not seem to explain 
the widened difference satisfactorily because there have only been minor changes in the 
country’s import structure during this period. Hence, the difference would reflect the 
effectiveness of various import duty exemption and drawback schemes.
However, these indices cannot provide inferences on relative restrictiveness and 
resource allocation across industries. The relative restrictiveness across industries needs 
to be examined in the context of the escalating tariff structure as pursued in Thailand. 
The resource allocation effects of an escalating tariff structure on a given product sector 
depend not only on the tariff rate applicable to that sector but also on the rate applicable 
to all other sectors, which provide production inputs (intermediate and capital goods), 
both directly and indirectly. Thus, estimates of ERP are needed to examine the overall 
incentives provided for domestic traded goods production by combining the tariffs on 
each sector as well as tariffs on its input-supplying sectors in the context of input-output 
linkages within the economy. In this study, ERP estimates from previous studies from 
1980 to 2003 are compared. All the estimates are based on Corden’s method for 
calculating effective protection. All previous studies except Athukorala, Jongwanich and 
Kohpaiboon (2004) have implicitly assumed all tariff rates are binding on all products, 
and estimates of ERP accurately represent the potential incentive effects of the protective 
structure (henceforth referred to as import-competing ERP, ERP/c). In fact, as in many 
developing countries, Thailand has had several schemes of input tariff exemption for 
exporters, which are fully discussed in the previous section. Taking into account the 
presence of these schemes, ERP tends to be lowered (henceforth referred to as export- 
oriented ERP, ERP^o)- Thus, the ERP/c estimates tended to overestimate the degree of 
trade restrictiveness for export-oriented industries (Athukorala, Jongwanich and 
Kohpaiboon, 2004).
ERP/c estimates from different studies have been based on different types of data 
and different product definitions. Some have used official tariff rates, whereas others 
have used tariff rates estimated from customs duty collections or from price comparison. 
It is difficult to draw inference from direct comparison of the industry’s ERP/c estimates.
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In order to overcome such constraints, the rank correlation of ERP estimates rather than a 
simple correlation is constructed to provide statistical evidence of changes of inter­
industry protection structure over the period.
Table 3.10 provides a comparison of the ERP estimates between 1980 and 2003. 
Firstly, from 1980 to 2003, ERP/c estimates exhibited a downward trend in all industries. 
The simple average of the ERP/c in the manufacturing sector reduced from 51.7 per cent 
in 1980 to 20.6 per cent and 18.2 per cent in 2002 and 2003, respectively. It is consistent 
with the key finding drawn from the series of trade restrictiveness measures above. 
Statistical evidence in Chapter 6 suggests that the level of protection is one of the crucial 
factors determining a foreign presence across industries. The implication from the 
reduction of protection level in all industries is that the Thai manufacturing sector has 
become less attractive for tariff-hopping FDI. A more open trade and investment policy 
regime invites more export-oriented FDI.
Secondly, the pattern of ERP/c differences across industries did not change 
between 1980 and 2003. The escalating tariff structure resulted in higher ERP estimates 
for finished goods like agro-processing products, textiles, and leather products than for 
intermediate products. In some intermediates, the presence of the tariff structure caused a 
negative ERP/c value. This finding is not surprising but reflects the general belief among 
developing countries in an escalating tariff structure. In fact, such a structure creates a 
distortion impact on resource allocation in favour of import-substituting industries as 
opposed to export-oriented ones.
Thirdly, the dispersion of protection seems to be more or less unchanged. The 
coefficient of variation (CV) of ERP/c estimates, the standard deviation of ERP 
normalized by its mean, changed slightly between 1985 and 2003 to around 2. The 
unchanged CV was a direct outcome of uneven tariff reduction across industries. The 
increase in CV between 2002 and 2003 is an obvious example where tariff reduction 
emphasizes intermediate rather than finished products. Interestingly, the rank correlation 
coefficients of the ERP/c from 1975-2002 and 1975-2003 are 56.18 and 48.09 per cent,
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respectively. These coefficients indicate a change in the industry ranking according to 
the level o f  protection, thereby changing the degree o f tariff protection across industries. 
It implies that unchanged ERP dispersion does not necessarily mean there is no change.
Furthermore, Table 3.12 provides both ERP/c and ERP^o estimates for 2002-3 of 
selected items, according to the magnitude o f the difference between ERP/c and ERP^o.14 
W hile the former represents the potential incentive effects o f the protective structure, the 
latter measures the incentive toward exporters where exporters fully reimburse their tariff 
on imported inputs with the share o f exports in total output o f a given sector. Both o f 
these estimates are averaged, using the export-output ratio weight (ERIV).
Table 3.12
ERP Estimates of Import-competing (ERP/c), Export-oriented (ERP^o) Industries 
and their (weighted) Average (ERP^), of Selected Items, 2002-3
IO
Code
Description 2002 2003
ERP/c ERP//o ERP w ERP/c ERPa'o ERP w
118 Radios, television sets & 
communication equipment 6.2 -0.7 -0.1 6.7 -0.7 -0.1
130 Photographic & optical goods 5.9 -0.3 0.3 3.9 -0.2 0.2
117 Electrical industrial machinery & 
appliances 8.9 -0.5 0.8 10.1 -0.5 1.0
092 Other chemical products 14.8 -0.3 1.5 13.5 -0.3 1.3
046 Canning & preserving o f fruits & 
vegetables -65.6 -1.9 -7.5 -64.8 -1.9 -7.4
107 Non-ferrous metal 13.6 -0.2 1.8 7.0 -0.1 0.9
097 Other rubber products 66.8 -0.5 11.1 67.4 -0.5 11.2
099 Ceramic and earthware 46.6 -0.1 8.4 40.1 -0.1 7.2
071 Knitting 71.0 -0.4 13.8 71.4 -0.4 13.9
077 Footwear, except o f rubber 29.7 -0.6 6.0 30.9 -0.6 6.2
043 Canning & preserving o f meat 92.6 -0.2 19.2 90.5 -0.2 18.8
084 Basic chemicals 0.4 -0.1 0.1 0.7 -0.1 0.2
073 Carpets and rugs 30.3 -0.3 7.9 24.9 -0.3 6.5
116 Office equipment & machinery -1.5 -0.2 -0.4 -1.1 -0.2 -0.3
120 Insulated wire and cables 19.2 -0.3 5.2 22.8 -0.2 6.4
(cöhtd.)
14 See a full discussion of the calculation in Appendix 7.
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Table 3.12 (contd.)
IO
Code
Description 2002 2003 IO
Code
Description 2002 2003
ERP/c ERPa'o ERP/c ERP/ro
133 Recreational & athletic 
equipment 7.9 -0.5 2.2 9.1 -0.5 2.5
122 Other electrical apparatuses & 
supplies -4.4 -0.4 -1.3 -2.5 -0.3 -0.8
119 Other electrical appliances 37.2 -0.8 13.8 39.0 -0.7 14.5
095 Rubber sheet& block rubber 72.1 -0.1 27.0 72.2 -0.1 27.0
129 Scientific equipment -6.1 -0.3 -2.3 -5.7 -0.3 -2.2
M an u fa ctu r in g 25.2 -0.4 17.8 23.6 -0 .4 16.5
Source: See Appendix 8.
ERJV estimates for the manufacturing sector in 2002 and 2003 are 17.8 and 16.5 
per cent, respectively, compared to ERP/c of 25.2 per cent in 2002 and 23.6 per cent in 
2003. The considerable reduction in the total ERP in manufacturing comes from 19 
industry sectors where the ERP reductions are more than 60 per cent. These sectors 
include some processed food sectors -  canning & preserving of food (IO 43, and 46), 
some garment sectors (IO 71, 73,and 77), other chemical products (IO 92), rubber sheet 
& block rubber (IO 95), other rubber products (IO 97), ceramic and earthen wares (IO 
99), non-ferrous metal (IO 107), electrical products (IO 116-120, and 122), and 
photographic & optical goods (IO 130). For example, in 2003 the ERP of canning & 
preserving of meat (IO 43) reduces from 90.5 to 18.8 per cent and the ERP of knitting 
(IO 71) falls from 71.4 to 13.9 per cent. All of these tend to be labour-intensive sectors, 
in which Thailand has a comparative advantage in the world market. The findings imply 
a less adverse impact of an escalating tariff structure on export-oriented activities.
3.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have surveyed the general investment climate and policy- 
induced incentives in Thailand during the past three decades in order to provide the 
setting for the following analysis of the pattern and determinants of MNE involvement 
and its developmental implications. It is found that over the years, Thailand has 
successfully built a general investment climate conducive to enticing foreign investors.
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A favourable macroeconomic environment has been maintained by stabilizing the 
domestic price level and the nominal exchange rate, and implementing disciplined 
monetary and fiscal policies. Combined with political stability and policy certainty, 
Thailand has pursued a market-friendly approach toward foreign investors. Foreign 
business can operate without any significant discrimination between local and foreign 
entrepreneurs. Labour market conditions are likely to be favourable for labour-intensive 
industries because of low wage rates.
Nevertheless, the shortage of skilled labour could be a significant impediment in 
moving from simple assembly to higher value-added activities. The role of government 
in productive sectors is limited in the provision of basic infrastructure and limited R&D 
investment. Public investment in basic infrastructure and R&D is still lower than the 
standard in other middle-income developing countries. These could become another 
obstacle to the country’s long-term economic growth.
With regard to the policy-induced economic incentives, the government has used 
trade policy and investment promotion regimes to influence resource allocation in the 
private sectors. Trade and investment policy regimes started with an IS industrialization 
strategy, i.e. offering greater economic incentive for enterprises to produce for the 
domestic market as opposed to exports. The regimes have gradually changed toward 
liberalization. With regard to the trade policy regime where tariffs have been the key 
instrument, the escalating tariff structure with a high level of tariff rates was pursued until 
the late 1980s. From about the late 1980s, considerable tariff reductions have been 
implemented, thereby reducing NRP and ERP. A considerable reduction in tariffs has 
been less likely to entice tariff-hopping FDI inflows. However, the escalating tariff 
structure remains, thereby resulting in a wide spread of protection across industries. On 
the other hand, investment promotion schemes started with promoting import substituting 
industries. From the mid-1980s, the scheme has been more neutral, by gradually shifting 
to promote industrial decentralization. Several tariff exemptions on inputs were 
introduced to reduce the burden for exporters during transition periods of tariff reduction.
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From 1993 to the present, the BOI introduced additional incentives for enterprises 
to relocate their factories in remote locations. These incentives were changed in 2000 as 
summarized in Table A. 3. In addition, the BOI grants a corporate income tax exemption 
for 3 years to promoted projects, which invest in research and development activities. 
These projects can also import machinery and equipment for R&D activities with a tax 
reduction or exemption for a period of 8 years starting from the arrival date of the first 
shipment.
Table A.3
Incentives for Factory Relocation
1993 2000
Relocate to Zone 2
- Corporate income tax exemption for 3 
years, extendible to 7 years if projects are 
relocated to industrial estates or promoted 
industrial zones.
-Corporate income tax exemption for a 
period of 5 years, provided that such a 
project with capital investment of 10 
million baht or more (excluding cost of 
land and working capital) obtains IS09000 
or similar international standard 
certification within 2 years from the start­
up date of its new plant, otherwise the 
corporate income tax exemption will be 
reduced by 1 year.
Relocate to Zone 3
-8-year corporate income tax exemption,
50 per cent reduction of corporate income 
tax for a period of 5 years after the 
exemption period.
- Double deduction from taxable income of 
water, electricity, and transportation costs 
for a period of 10 years.
- Deduction from the net profit of 25 per 
cent of the costs of installation or 
construction of infrastructure facilities.
Relocate into 40 provinces in Zone 3
- Corporate income tax exemption for a 
period of 8 years, provided that such a 
project with capital investment of 10 
million baht or more (excluding cost of 
land and working capital) obtain ISO 9000 
or similar international standard 
certification within 2 years from its start-up 
date, otherwise the corporate income tax 
exemption will be reduced by 1 year;
- 50 per cent reduction of corporate income 
tax for 5 years after the exemption period
(contd.)
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Table A.3(contd.)
1993 2000
- Double deduction from taxable income o f 
transportation, electricity, and water costs 
for 10 years from the date o f first revenue 
derived from promoted activity.
2
Relocate into other 18 provinces in Zone 3
- Same as the above 40 provinces with the 
additional privilege i.e. deduction from net 
profit o f 25 per cent o f the project’s 
infrastructure installation or construction 
cost for 10 years from the date o f first sale, 
and net profit for one or more years o f any 
year can be chosen for such deduction. The 
deduction is additional to normal 
depreciation.
Notes: The 40 provinces consist o f Krabi, Kamphaeng Phet, Khon Kaen, Chanthaburi, 
Chai Nat, Chaiyaphum, Chumphon, Chiang Rai, Chiang Mai, Trang, Trat, Tak, Nakhon 
Rachasima, Nakhon Si Thammarat, Nakhon Sawan, Prachuab Khiri Khan, Prachin Buri, 
Phangnga, Phattalunk, Pichit, Phitsanulok, Phetchaburi, Phetchabun, Mukdahan, Mae Hong Son, 
Ranong, Lop Buri, Lamphang, Lamphun, Loei, Songkhla, Sa Kaew, Sing Buri, Sukhothai, Surat 
Thani, Nong Khai, Udon Thani, Uttaradit, Uthai Thani, and Ubon Ratchathani.
2 The 18 provinces consist of Kalasin, Nakhon Phanom, Narathiwat, Nan, Buri Ram, 
Pattani, Phayao, Phrae, Maha Sarakham, Yasothon, Yala, Roi Et, Si Sa Ket, Sakhon Nakhon, 
Sathun, Surin, Nong Bualamphu, and Amnat Charoen.
Sources: 1993 from WTO (1995) and 2000 from BOl available at 
(http://www.boi.go.th/english.announcements.announcementl 2543.html).
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Appendix 5
Estimates of Effective Rate of Protection in Manufacturing 
__________________ Sectors, 1980-2003__________________
1 0
C o d e D e s c rip t io n 1980 2 0 0 2 200 3
0 4 2 S la u g h te r in g n.a . -2 3 .3 8 -2 7 .1 5
043 C a n n in g  &  p re s e rv in g  o f  m ea t 7 1 .1 7 92 .61 9 0 .4 9
0 4 4 D a iry  p ro d u c ts 2 8 .9 9 5 .3 4 8 .7 0
045 C a n n in g  &  p re s e rv in g  o f  fru it &  
v e g e ta b le s
-3 6 .1 2 2 1 .1 8 11 .56
0 4 6 C a n n in g  &  p re s e rv in g  o f  f ish  &  seafo o d -2 2 .8 6 -6 5 .6 0 -6 4 .7 5
0 4 7 C o c o n u t a n d  p a lm  o il 9.91 -2 4 8 .4 1 -2 4 0 .0 5
0 4 8 O th e r  v e g e ta b le  &  an im a l o ils 8 4 .7 9 9 4 .1 6 9 2 .0 4
0 4 9 R ic e  m illin g -7 .1 2 2 0 .9 4 2 0 .9 7
0 5 0 F lo u r  &  m ille d  sag o  p ro d u c ts  &  tap io c a  
m ill in g
-1 .31 20 .11 2 5 .2 7
051 G rin d in g  c o m -4 .2 9 -1 .3 7 -1 .1 6
0 5 2 F lo u r  &  o th e r  g ra in  m illin g 124 .78 2 0 4 .1 7 164 .2 9
053 B a k e ry  a n d  o th e r 2 9 7 .6 6 4 0 .5 4 3 6 .6 9
0 5 4 N o o d le s  &  s im ila r  p ro d u c ts n .a. 55 .2 3 6 1 .2 3
055 S u g a r  re f in e r ie s -3 2 .0 4 3 8 .2 2 3 4 .1 5
0 5 6 C o n fe c tio n e ry  &  sn a c k s 87.31 5 8 .5 3 6 1 .4 5
05 8 M o n o s o d iu m  g lu ta m a te 125.6 55.71 -2 0 .2 9
0 5 9 C o ffe e  &  c o c o a  &  te a  p ro c e s s in g 59 .25 -0 .1 8 -7 .6 6
0 6 0 O th e r  fo o d  p ro d u c ts 1 5 2 .0 4 2 9 .5 7 19 .1 9
061 F is h  m e a l &  a n im a l feed -1 1 .0 6 -1 3 .0 9 -1 1 .8 6
0 6 2 D is ti l l in g  &  b le n d in g  o f  sp ir its 88.31 7 7 .4 0 7 7 .9 2
063 B re w e r ie s 71 .35 7 8 .8 2 79.61
0 6 4 S o f t d r in k s  &  c a rb o n a te d  w a te r 7 0 .0 7 3 .6 8 1.88
0 6 6 T o b a c c o  p ro d u c ts 6 3 .1 4 7 4 .0 6 7 4 .1 8
0 6 7 S p in n in g 2 0 .1 7 -1 2 .1 9 -1 1 .9 4
0 6 8 W e a v in g 3 4 9 .8 3 4 6 .2 5 4 6 .0 8
0 6 9 T e x tile  b le a c h in g , p r in t in g  &  f in ish in g -1 6 .5 9 2 2 .6 6 2 4 .0 5
0 7 0 M a d e -u p  te x tile  g o o d s 4 3 .6 4 2 .4 6 4 2 .8 0
071 K n it t in g 2 9 .4 4 71 .0 3 7 1 .4 2
0 7 2 W e a r in g  a p p a re l 75.1 71 .4 5 7 2 .5 8
073 C a rp e ts  a n d  R u g s 5 8 .4 6 3 0 .2 9 2 4 .9 4
0 7 4 J u te  m ill  p ro d u c ts 3 6 .2 6 12 .99 1 3 .5 4
075 T a n n e ry  a n d  le a th e r  f in ish in g 6 .12 -5 .9 2 -0 .4 5
0 7 6 L e a th e r  p ro d u c ts 172 .92 5 5 .0 8 5 4 .9 9
0 7 7 F o o tw e a r , e x c e p t o f  ru b b e r 8 4 .3 6 2 9 .6 8 30.91
(contd.)
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Appendix 5 (contd.)
IO
C o d e
D e sc rip tio n
1980 2 0 0 2 2003
07 8 S aw  m ill &  w o o d e n  c o n s tru c tio n  
m a te ria ls
2 0 .0 8 5 .86 4 .75
0 7 9 W o o d  an d  co rk  p ro d u c ts 5 1 .6 6 3 7 .1 9 3 8 .2 2
0 8 0 W o o d e n  fu rn itu re  &  fix tu re s 1 2 4 .3 8 3 2 .5 0 3 3 .2 9
081 P a p e r  an d  p a p e rb o a rd 36 .5 5 .46 3 .96
0 8 2 P a p e r  &  p a p e rb o a rd  p ro d u c ts 2 6 .6 115.51 7 7 .4 2
083 P r in tin g  &  p u b lish in g -1 .7 9 19.35 13.97
0 8 4 B a s ic  ch e m ica ls 2 3 .7 2 0.41 0 .68
085 F e rti liz e r , p e s tic id e s  and  in se c tic id e s -1 1 .6 4 8 .7 0 8 .56
0 8 6 P e tro c h e m ic a l p ro d u c ts 3 4 .4 3 0 .3 7 30 .95
0 8 7 P a in t 2 6 .0 4 10.05 1.05
08 8 D ru g s  an d  m e d ic in e s 12 .38 -2.21 -0.21
0 8 9 S o ap  &  c le a n in g  p re p a ra tio n s 7 3 .6 4 9 .48 3 .2 7
0 9 0 C o sm e tic s 8 3 .1 7 60 .3 3 6 3 .4 4
091 M a tc h e s 127 .8 8 30.11 2 7 .6 2
0 9 2 O th e r  c h e m ic a l p ro d u c ts 4 4 .2 6 14 .8 0 13.55
093 P e tro le u m  re f in e ry  &  g as  s e p a ra te d  
p la n t
n .a . 9 .6 4 4 .6 3
0 9 4 O th e r  co a l &  p e tro le u m  p ro d u c ts 15 .72 -0 .4 0 -0 .31
095 R u b b e r  sh e e t &  b lo c k  ru b b e r -3 4 .7 2 7 2 .0 9 7 2 .1 9
0 9 6 T y re s  a n d  tu b es 3 8 .8 9 56.91 5 7 .2 8
0 9 7 O th e r  ru b b e r  p ro d u c ts n .a . 66 .81 6 7 .3 8
09 8 P la s tic  w a re s 7 9 .7 4 2 3 .3 8 2 3 .7 4
0 9 9 C e ra m ic  an d  e a rth e n w a re 9 6 .4 5 4 6 .5 8 4 0 .1 3
100 G la ss  &  g lass  p ro d u c ts 6 4 .9 7 3 0 .9 4 19 .40
101 S tru c tu ra l c la y  p ro d u c ts 6 6 .9 4 5 3 .6 8 2 5 .2 4
102 C e m e n t 0 .35 -0 .53 0 .1 8
103 C o n c re te  a n d  c e m e n t p ro d u c ts 5 7 .4 6 4 2 .4 5 13 .07
104 O th e r  n o n -m e ta llic  p ro d u c ts 138 .9 3 1 .2 2 18 .99
105 Iro n  a n d  s tee l -2 .21 -1 .43 -0 .5 6
106 S e c o n d a ry  s tee l p ro d u c ts 2 0 .6 5 15 .37 14.66
107 N o n -fe r ro u s  m e ta l 4 .0 9 13.61 6 .9 8
108 C u tle ry  a n d  h a n d  to o ls 6 8 .3 7 3 7 .2 4 17 .54
109 M e ta l fu rn itu re  &  f ix tu re s n .a . 3 5 .4 9 34 .6 8
110 S tru c tu ra l m e ta l p ro d u c ts 4 5 .1 8 2 5 .6 8 19 .06
111 O th e r  fa b r ic a te d  m e ta l p ro d u c ts 7 7 .2 3 3 5 .3 0 37 .2 5
112 E n g in e s  an d  tu rb in e s 11 .59 10.87 11.91
(contd.)
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Appendix 5 (contd.)
IO
C ode
D escrip tion
1980 2002 2003
113 A gricu ltu ra l m ach inery  & equ ipm ent 10.81 -1.23 -0.85
114 W ood & m etal w ork ing  m ach inery 6.9 -3.44 -1.14
115 S pecia l industria l m ach inery 16.3 -1.68 -0.32
116 O ffice  equ ipm ent & m ach inery 97.33 -1.51 -1.12
117 E lectrical industrial m ach inery  & 19.46 8.93 10.09
app liances
118 R adios, telev ision  sets & 49.19 6.17 6.72
co m m unica tions equ ipm ent
119 O ther e lectrical appliances 44.86 37.18 39.01
120 In su la ted  w ires and cab les 44.86 19.16 22.82
121 E lectrical accum ulato rs & batteries 45.99 -15.12 -9.71
122 O ther e lectrical apparatuses & supplies 49.73 -4.45 -2 .50
123 Ship  b u ild ing 52.44 7.01 3.09
124 R ailw ay  equ ipm ent -2.91 -2.67 -1.71
125 M o to r veh ic les 181.73 61.04 62.00
126 M o to rcycles &  b icyc les & o ther 77.3 93.83 94.71
carriages
128 A ircraft n.a. -0 .94 -0 .44
129 S cien tific  equ ipm en t 19.44 -6.07 -5.75
130 P h o to g raph ic  &  optical goods 21.21 5.89 3.88
131 W atches and clocks 41.07 9.93 5.84
132 Jew e lry  & rela ted  articles 16.62 -4.56 -1.62
133 R ecrea tio n a l &  ath le tic  equ ipm ent 23.79 7.91 9.05
134 O ther m an u fac tu rin g  goods 60.43 29.70 19.94
N u m b er o f  av a ilab le  E R P  estim ates 84 90 90
U n w eig h ted  average 52.1 24.6 21.2
M in -36 -248 -240
M ax 350 204 164
C o effic ien t v a ria tio n 120 188 204
Source: ERP estimates of 1980 are from Akrasanee and Ajanant (1986), those of 2002-3 are from 
Athukorala, Jongwanich and Kohpaiboon. (2004).
Appendix 6
Measures of Trade Openness
As discussed in Chapter 2, there is no unique measure of the openness of the trade 
policy regime.15 In this study, five measures of trade openness are constructed.
1. A widely used trade to GDP or degree of openness (OPEN1). This is 
constructed by the dollar value of external trades of goods and services as a proportion of 
GDP. The data for external trade are from the BOT, Bank o f Thailand Quarterly 
Bulletin, and those for GDP from the Office of National Economic and Social 
Development Board (NESDB), National Income Account. The greater the value of 
OPEN1, the less the level of trade restrictiveness.
2. Trade-to goods GDP (OPEN2). This is from the World Bank, World 
Development Indicators (CD ROM). Similar to OPEN1, an increase of OPEN2 means 
that the trade regime becomes more open.
3. The export-gross output ratio in the manufacturing sector {EX OUTPUT). 
Manufacturing export value is obtained from the United Nations Trade Statistics 
available from the International Economic Data Bank (IEDB) at the Australian National 
University (ANU), whereas gross output is from the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO), Industrial Statistics Database (CD ROM). The 
greater the value o f EX OUTPUT, the less restrictive the trade regime.
4. Incidence of applied tariff rates for overall (manufacturing) economy, TARIFF1 
(TARIFF2) is the ratio between total (manufacturing) tariff revenues and value of total 
(manufacturing) import. Data are obtained from the BOT, Bank o f Thailand Quarterly 
Bulletin.
15 For a succinct discussion of various measures of openness and a detailed listing of 
related references, see Edwards (1998).
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Table A.6
Indices of Trade Openness in Thailand (per cent), 1970-2003
OPEN1 OPEN2 EX OUTPUT TARIFF1 TARIFF2
1970 34.4 65.0 0.9 20.1 19.9
1971 34.8 62.5 1.3 19.8 20.6
1972 37.3 64.4 2.3 18.2 19.8
1973 38.6 65.1 3.8 16.2 19.1
1974 45.6 80.5 4.1 13.0 16.2
1975 41.4 72.0 4.0 12.8 15.3
1976 42.9 75.7 5.2 13.0 17.3
1977 45.3 83.5 3.6 13.2 18.3
1978 44.0 82.0 6.6 13.6 18.3
1979 51.9 92.3 7.7 11.9 16.3
1980 54.5 93.6 6.8 10.1 14.6
1981 54.0 94.7 6.5 10.0 14.5
1982 47.6 88.1 6.8 10.3 13.6
1983 47.4 82.1 5.2 11.9 12.4
1984 48.1 86.0 6.0 11.9 14.9
1985 49.2 88.3 17.0 12.3 15.6
1986 49.2 85.9 20.1 13.0 15.4
1987 57.2 99.5 23.9 12.0 14.2
1988 67.4 115.8 26.4 11.5 12.6
1989 72.4 123.6 16.6 10.8 13.3
1990 75.8 133.0 17.8 11.0 13.2
1991 78.5 131.0 17.7 8.7 10.2
1992 78.0 130.4 23.2 8.7 10.1
1993 80.2 134.4 24.5 9.0 10.0
1994 82.6 138.5 34.5 8.7 10.9
1995 90.4 150.2 41.0 7.3 9.0
1996 84.8 139.1 36.3 8.1 9.5
1997 94.6 159.7 45.2 4.9 6.3
1998 101.9 172.4 57.1 3.5 4.5
1999 104.1 176.5 46.8 3.9 5.0
2000 125.4 211.0 56.0 3.5 4.6
2001 126.5 212.0 55.0 3.3 4.5
2002 123.3 201.9 51.9 3.5 4.8
Source: Author’s calculation from data discussed in text.
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Appendix 7
Estimation of Effective Rate of Protection
ERP measures the proportionate increase in per unit value added o f a sector due to 
the complete system o f tariffs (Corden 1966, 1971; Greenaway and Milner 2003). More 
specifically, it takes into account the protection on output and the cost-raising effects o f 
protection on inputs. By definition, ERP fo r jth product can be expressed as follows:16
n
t ■ —  /  Cl- t-J  Z - J  U ‘
ERP;C= ------^ ------ (A.7.1)
' - l x
1=1
where tj = nominal tariff on j  product
6 = nominal tariff on zth input
ay = share o f zth input in the v a lu e /h product
Equation (A.7.1) tells us that effective protection enjoyed by a given product 
depends upon the interplay between output (f .) and input tariffs (/, ) and the share o f
imported inputs in production costs (ay). In other words, the overall tariff structure has 
both tax and subsidy elements; whereas tariffs on the final good operate as a subsidy, 
tariffs on intermediate inputs operate as a tax.
We have so far assumed that tariffs are the only instrument o f trade protection. In 
general, countries might use other instruments such as subsidies and import quotas in 
addition to tariffs as instruments o f trade intervention. To capture these impacts, tj should 
be defined in broader terms to combine the nominal tariff on j  activity and tariff 
equivalent o f subsidies, quantitative restrictions, and other forms o f trade intervention.
Nonetheless, in Thailand, these various non-tariff barriers are now rather 
negligible as an outcome o f continuous liberalization reforms over the past two decades.
16 See details of this formula in Corden (1971) and Greenaway and Milner (2003).
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Thus, tariffs have been the main trade policy instrument to influence the country’s 
resource allocation since 1970.
In addition, as in many other developing countries, tariff exceptions on imported 
inputs used have been an important feature of the tariff regime in Thailand (see above). 
This study assumes exporters apply tariff exemptions for imported inputs under Section 
19 of the Customs Law to evaluate the presence of administration cost involved. Under 
this duty drawback scheme, the importer may use a bank guarantee or a guarantee issued 
by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) in lieu of the payment of import duty. The refund is 
administered after export. Within this scheme, it implies that exporters can reimburse all 
their import duty so that input tariffs for ERP calculation should be set at zero. However, 
exporters who use this scheme through the bank guarantee system have to pay the bank a 
2.3 per cent commission. This commission rate is a standard rate charged by several Thai 
commercial banks.
To incorporate the incentive effect of the duty drawback scheme in our effective 
protection calculations, we first estimate ERP separately for import-competing sectors 
(ERPic) and export-oriented sectors (ERPxo)• Total protection (that is, the combined 
protection on import-competing and export-oriented production), ERPw, is then obtained 
as the weighted average of the two measures.
As discussed, ERP/C is estimated by applying Equation (A.7.1). It is modified as 
follows to estimate ERP^ xo
n
0 - X aijti x 0.023
i = i
n (A.7.2)
i = i
The total protection ( ERPT) in the j lh sector is
(A.7.3)
where y j is the share of exports in the total output of a given sector.
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Chapter 4: Industrialization in Thailand and Multinational 
Enterprise Involvement
This chapter aims to illustrate the industrialization process in Thailand and MNE 
involvement over the past four decades. The chapter begins with a discussion of growth 
performance and structural changes in the Thai economy during the post war period. 
Section 4.2 focuses on the increasing industrialization in Thailand. Several aspects of 
Thai manufacturing such as output growth, sectoral composition, market orientation, and 
labour absorption are examined to evaluate the industrialization process and its 
contribution to the economy overall.
Section 4.3 discusses MNE involvement in Thailand. Even though MNEs can be 
involved in host economies through both FDI and non-FDI channels, this discussion 
mostly concerns the FDI channel. This is due to the unavailability of data concerning the 
non-FDI channels, especially secondary data. In this section, we begin with trends and 
patterns of total FDI inflows in Thailand over the past four decades. These are also 
compared with other developing countries, especially ASEAN-4 neighbours, in Section 
4.3.2. Direct investors in Thailand are broken down according to geographical 
distribution and their investment patterns are examined in Section 4.3.3. Section 4.4 
investigates manufacturing FDI as to trends, its relative importance and sectoral 
composition. We rely on the Industrial Census 1997 (data for 1996) conducted by the 
National Statistics Office (NSO) to evaluate the level of FDI involvement in Thai 
manufacturing. This section ends by closely examining characteristics of manufacturing 
FDI inflows from the mid-1980s onward. Data on BOI-promoted projects between 1989 
and 1998 are used to gain insight into several characteristics such as degree of capital 
intensity, market orientation and foreign equity holding. Concluding remarks are in the 
final section.
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4.1 Economic Growth and Structural Changes
During the post war period up to 1996, Thailand’s growth performance was 
remarkable. The average annual growth of real GDP between 1961 and 1996 was 7.7 per 
cent. Rapid growth occurred without a single year experiencing negative growth of 
income per capita (Figure 4.1). This was a unique achievement among developing 
countries (Warr, 1993). The Thai economy registered an annual growth rate of 7.1 per 
cent from 1961 to 1986. From 1987 onwards, economic growth rates were even higher. 
From 1987 to 1996, real GDP grew at an average annual rate of almost 10 per cent. 
Growth performance in this decade ending in 1996 exceeded that of any other country 
(Warr, 1999: 631). This period of rapid growth was interrupted by the financial crisis 
that began in 1997. Economic growth dropped dramatically to -1.4 and -10.5 per cent in 
1997 and 1998, respectively. The economy recovered gradually and achieved an annual 
growth rate of 7 per cent by 2003.
Figure 4.1
Economic Growth, GDP per Capita and Manufacturing Growth, 1961-2003
GDP and Manufacturing 
grow th GDP per capita 
----------- r 60000
- 50000
- 40000
- 30000
-  20000
-  10000
1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001
-  -  GDP growth (annual %) — *—  Manulacturing growth (annual %) — ♦—  Real GDP per capita (baht)
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics (CD-ROM)
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In terms of output, the agricultural sector, which was predominantly a tradable 
sector in the economy, has been displaced by the manufacturing sector. The agricultural 
sector, which accounted for 41.5 per cent in the 1950s, steadily declined to 24.1 and 17.7 
per cent in the 1970s and 1980s, respectively. In the 1990s, the agricultural share of GDP 
was 11.6 per cent (Figure 4.2 A). In contrast, the manufacturing sector, which accounted 
for only 11.6 per cent in the 1950s, has become increasingly important to the Thai 
economy since the early 1960s. In 1979, for the first time, the manufacturing share in the 
GDP overtook that of agriculture, increasing from 20 per cent in the 1970s to 24.5 and 
31.6 per cent in the 1980s and 1990s, respectively. During the period 2001-3, the 
manufacturing sector accounted almost 40 per cent of GDP.
Similar to the output structure, manufacturing goods have become the major Thai 
export since the mid-1980s. The share of manufacturing to total exports increased from 
16.5 per cent in the 1970s to 30.8 per cent in the first half of the 1980s. From 1987 
onwards, manufacturing exports have accounted for more than half of the country’s 
exports, increasing from 53.8 per cent in the second half of the 1980s to 75.2 per cent 
during the period 2001-3 (Figure 4.2.B).
Nevertheless, structural changes in output and export have not been matched by 
similar changes in employment. A large proportion of employment is still absorbed by 
the agricultural sector. The share of manufacturing employment increased slightly over 
the past three decades, from 7.2 per cent in the 1970s to 9.5 and 14.3 per cent in the 
1980s and 1990s, respectively (Figure 4.2.C).
4.2 Industrialization in Thailand
During the post war era, the manufacturing sector grew even faster than other 
sectors, resulting in the increased importance of the manufacturing sector, especially 
between 1986 and 1996. Manufacturing output grew at an average annual rate of 9.7 per 
cent during the period 1961-85. From 1986 to 1996, Thai manufacturing grew rapidly at
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an annual average rate of around 13 per cent. However, from the onset of the financial 
crisis, manufacturing sector growth has slowed down, dropping to 4.4 per cent per annum
Figure 4.2
Structural Change in the Thai Economy, 1950-2003
4.2.A: GDP Share (per cent)
1951 1956 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001
— ManufacturingAgriculture
Sources'. The data during the period 1951-59 are compiled from Warr and Nidhiprabha (1996) 
based on Wilson (1983) and those for the period 1960 to the present are from IMF, International 
Financial Statistics (CD ROM).
4.2.B: Export Share (per cent)
1995 20001970 1975 1980 1985 1990
— Manufacturing Agriculture
Sources'. Data during the period 1970-2000 are compiled from the UN COMTRADE database 
held at International Economic Data Bank (IEDB), the Australian National University, and those 
for the period 2001-3 are from the World Trade Atlas database.
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4.2.C: Employment Share (per cent)
60 -
i-A - A- -A -A-A
1970 1990 2000
Agriculture -  Manufacturing
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (CD ROM)
Over the past four decades, growth patterns of Thai manufacturing can be 
separated into two sub-periods: 1960-85 and 1986 to the present. The aim of this 
separation is to illustrate growth performance in different industrialization strategies 
between IS and EP regimes. As mentioned in Chapter 3, Thailand pursued a typical IS 
industrialization strategy between the early 1960s and the mid-1980s.1 From then on, the 
industrialization strategy has become more reliant on EP. The mid-1980s is selected 
because there is a noticeable change in the market orientation o f manufacturing products. 
As illustrated in Figure 4.3, the export-output ratio of the manufacturing sector was 
around 5.5 per cent from 1970-85. It has increased rapidly from the mid-1980s to the 
present (Figure 4.3). Henceforth, the first period is referred to as the IS industrialization 
period and the latter as the EP industrialization period.
‘Although according to the Third National Economic and Social Development Plan 
covering the period 1972-6 Thailand officially espoused an EP industrialization strategy, trade 
and investment policies between the 1970s and the mid-1980s were still typical of an IS 
industrialization strategy. On several occasions the Thai government increased tariffs and 
widened tariff differences between intermediated and finished products. See full discussion in 
Chapter 3.
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Figure 4.3
The Export-output Ratio (per cent) of the Thai Manufacturing Sector, 1970-2002
30  —
20  —
10  —
1970 1975 1980 1990 1995 2000
Source: See Appendix 6.
4.2.1 The Import-substitution Industrialization Period (1960-85)
During these first two and a half decades, Thailand promoted an IS 
industrialization strategy. As discussed in Chapter 3, while the government pursued 
private-sector-led industrialization, the government used investment privileges granted by 
the BOI, tariff protection and an escalating tariff structure to encourage local IS 
manufacturing. These policy-induced incentives distorted the domestic incentive 
structure and favoured import-substituting industries over export-oriented ones. This led 
to an expansion of private investment and output growth in the IS manufacturing sector.
As Krueger (1992: p.43-4) argues, in most developing countries, a rapid 
expansion of import-substituting industries continued while easy IS opportunities 
(meeting domestic demand in textiles, footwear, some food processing, and other light 
labour-intensive activities) could be exploited. Only after this did growth slow and the 
cost of additional investment in new import-substituting activities rise. This 
characterization is applicable to Thailand. Between the 1960s and the mid-1970s, the
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growth of the manufacturing sector was rapid at an average annual rate of 11.2 per cent 
(Figure 4.1). As a result, the share of the manufacturing sector to GDP rapidly increased 
from 11.6 per cent in the 1950s to 14.2 and 18.6 per cent during the 1960s and the first 
half of the 1970s, respectively (Figure 4.2.A). Between 1976 and 1985 the tendency of 
manufacturing growth was downward and bottomed out in 1985. The average annual 
growth dropped from 10.4 per cent during the period 1971-5 to 5 per cent during the 
period 1981-5. The manufacturing share in the GDP remained more or less the same at 
around 22 per cent between 1976 and 1985.2
In a case of Thai manufacturing, the shortfall of foreign exchange earnings as a 
result of the world oil price hike during the late 1970s constrained manufacturing growth 
under an IS industrialization strategy. While an IS industrialization strategy resulted in a 
substantial reduction in consumer goods imports, these import categories were displaced 
by imports of capital goods and raw materials. More importantly, the import dependence 
of the latter was less flexible so that output expansion must go hand in hand with 
intermediate imports, thereby creating demand for foreign exchange. As long as the 
country maintains the ability to earn foreign exchange, it can maintain import-substituting 
manufacturing growth.
During the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s, the world oil price hike raised 
demand for foreign exchange and adversely affected the growth of the manufacturing 
sector. However, this was cushioned by the boom in commodity prices as well as 
continued high transfer and service account earnings (World Bank, 1984). As a result, 
the country did not have a serious foreign exchange shortage and manufacturing growth 
was not disrupted. By contrast, between the late 1970s and the early 1980s when oil 
price increases hit the world economy for a second time, as well as a drop in commodity 
prices, this resulted in a foreign exchange shortage and an economic recession in the
2 Note that to some extent, the manufacturing share during this period reflected the 
distorted prices arising from industry protection because domestic prices were artificially high. 
The national accounts for this period could have overstated the actual size of the country’s 
manufacturing.
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early 1980s. This retarded import-substituting manufacturing growth (World Bank, 
1984).
During the IS industrialization period, the country’s industrialization process 
began with rapid manufacturing expansion in textiles and clothing, transport equipment, 
basic metal industries, and chemical products. As seen in Table 4.1, textile industries as 
a share of manufacturing value added dramatically increased from 1.7 per cent in 1950 to 
13.1 per cent from 1976 to 1980. Similarly, the share o f transport equipment industries 
dominated by the automotive industry increased from 0.4 to 8.3 per cent during the 
period under consideration. The clothing industry grew slightly faster than the overall 
manufacturing sector so its share increased slightly from 7.4 per cent in 1950 to 9.3 per 
cent during the period 1971-5.
In addition, many of these import-substituting industries began with easy IS 
opportunities, for example, the textile industries where there is a wide range of 
production technology involved, from highly capital intensive, i.e. synthetic fibres to 
labour intensive, i.e. fabrics. Rapid expansion of the Thai textile industry took place in 
the most labour-intensive segment, i.e. the weaving industry.3 Similarly, the Thai 
automotive industry began with local manufacture of bulky, simple and quasi nontradable 
parts4, whereas it was heavily reliant on imports of complicated parts, especially engines.
Import-substituting industries did not contribute significantly to employment 
(Figure 4.2.C). Between 1970 and 1985, manufacturing employment accounted for only 
8.2 per cent of total employment. The employment share of the manufacturing sector 
increased from 4.5 per cent in 1970 to around 8.4 per cent in 1975 and then remained 
more or less unchanged at this level during the following decade ending in 1985.
3In the weaving industry, there is a wide range of weaving machines involved, such as air 
jets, water jets, rapiers, projectiles, and shuttle looms (Pack, 1987). The degree of capital 
intensity is ranked ascendingly. During this period, the Thai weaving industry was heavily reliant 
on shuttle loom machines. (Akira, 1989; Suphachalasai, 1989,1992; Kohpaiboon, 1995)
4 See details in Chapters 7 and 8.
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4.2.2 The Export-promotion Industrialization Period (1986-present)
An IS industrialization strategy, which commenced in the early 1960s, resulted in 
local manufacturing being heavily reliant on imported intermediate goods. Thus, the 
successive balance of payment deficits between the late 1970s and the early 1980s 
gradually caused the government to shift the industrialization strategy toward EP. While 
the trade policy regime remained unchanged due to poor fiscal positions and high public 
foreign debt during the early 1980s, the government used the BOI promotion scheme 
partly to mitigate the adverse impact of input tariffs on the international competitiveness 
of export-oriented industries (Akira, 1989: p.270). The BOI granted tariff exemptions on 
imported inputs over and above usual investment promotion privileges for export- 
oriented activities.
In addition, the Thai government undertook a series of currency devaluations 
during the first half of the 1980s (Warr and Nidhiprabha, 1996: p.206) to improve 
external imbalances. Thailand’s exchange rate increased from roughly 20 baht/$ during 
the period 1960-80 to around 27.16 baht/$ in 1985, i.e. the nominal exchange rate 
devalued by around 36 per cent. The currency devaluation affected the incentives to 
manufacturing in favour of export. It raised the dollar costs of imported inputs and the 
price of finished products of import-substituting industries. In contrast, for export- 
oriented manufacturers, the currency devaluation lowered the price of domestic products 
for import-country consumers. It is usual for export-oriented products to use imported 
intermediates, and the currency devaluation increased the cost of imported inputs and 
production costs of finished goods (in local currency). However, increased production 
costs do not affect price competitiveness because they are converted from local to foreign 
currencies when these products are exported. Due to the fact that output value is always 
greater than input value, i.e. positive value added, the net effect of currency devaluation 
on price competitiveness is always positive, regardless of the level of import content. 
Changes in these internal factors made Thailand a very attractive location for export- 
oriented and efficiency-seeking MNEs.
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In the meantime, these East Asian investors were seeking an export base abroad to 
maintain their international competitiveness in labour-intensive export products in the 
mid-1980s. The erosion in their home countries’ international competitiveness was the 
outcome of wage increases and currency appreciation in the mid-1980s. In addition, the 
imposition and gradual tightening of quantitative restrictions by developed countries 
constrained certain labour-intensive exports, mostly textiles, garments and footwear, from 
these East Asian exporters (Wells, 1986). In the electronics industry and other durable 
consumer goods industries, technological innovations began to allow these investors to 
slice up the value chain of their production, relocating labour-intensive segments rather 
than entire industries to benefit from cheap labour available abroad (Krugman, 1995).5 
As a result, manufacturers from Japan and the North East Asian NICs have become 
actively involved with outward direct investment and have established a regional network 
to strengthen their international competitiveness. Thailand is selected by these investors 
to be their labour intensive export base.6
All in all, there were massive export-oriented FDI inflows in Thai manufacturing 
as discussed in detail in Section 4.4. In addition, Thai manufacturing exports rapidly 
expanded from 1986 to 1995.7 Their share in total exports increased from 21.7 per cent 
during the period 1970-85 to 55.8 per cent and 72.2 per cent in the second half of the 
1980s and the 1990s (Table 4.2). From 2001 to 2003, manufacturing export accounted 
for 75.2 per cent of the country’s exports. Manufacturing exports commenced with 
several processed food products, especially canned pineapple, canned tuna, frozen 
chicken and traditional labour-intensive manufactured goods, in particular garments, in 
the late 1970s. Other traditional labour-intensive manufactured items like footwear,
5 This is one of the ongoing processes of globalization. This process has been known by 
various different names such as vertical specialization, international production sharing, 
outsourcing, and product fragmentation. In addition, Athukorala (2003b) probes this process 
(referred to in his paper as ‘product fragmentation’) in the context of East Asian countries.
6For further discussion, see Petri (1993); Athukorala and Menon (1996); Dobson and 
Chia, (1997); and Hill and Athukorala (1998).
7Note that the average annual export growth during the period 1986-95 was slightly 
lower than that in the period 1970-85. However this comparison has to be qualified for the low 
export base in the latter period.
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jewels and gems showed a rapid rise in exports during the period 1986-95. Further 
diversification of the export mix took place as Thailand became an increasing attractive 
location for assembly activities, especially in electronics within the broader category of 
machinery and transport equipment (SITC 7). This resulted in the increased importance 
o f manufacturing exports (Figure 4.2.B). In contrast, exports of primary products, which 
were dominated by a few agricultural commodities, i.e. rice, tapioca and natural rubber, 
have become relatively less important, compared to manufacturing. Despite the presence 
o f double digit growth, the primary export share in total exports declined dramatically 
from 77.6 per cent in the first half of the 1970s to less than 25 per cent from 1996 to the 
present (Table 4.2).
The rapid growth in manufacturing exports in the mid-1980s led to the rapid 
growth in manufacturing output. This was a classic example o f the export-led growth 
phenomenon. Manufacturing export growth increased from 11.1 per cent in the first half 
o f the 1980s to 40.5 and 18 per cent during the periods 1986-90 and 1991-6, 
respectively. The average annual growth of manufacturing output jumped to 15.1 per cent 
and declined slightly to 10.5 per cent during the same periods, respectively (Figure 4.4). 
As a result, the share of the manufacturing sector in GDP increased from 22 per cent in 
the first half of the 1980s to 27 per cent in the decade ending in 1996.
Labour-intensive manufacturing industries — clothing, footwear, leather products, 
furniture, toys, jewels and gems, and electronics—  have had an impressive growth 
record.8 Their total share increased from 17.4 per cent in the 1970s to 28.7 and 31.2 per 
cent in the second half of the 1980s and the 1990s, respectively (Table 4.1). While 
capital-intensive industries, such as textiles and chemicals, figured prominently among 
the declining sectors, transportation equipment retained its share.
The expansion of such labour-intensive manufactured products not only meant 
increased importance for the sector in terms of export earnings but also in terms of
8 Toys, jewelry and gems were the dominant items in other manufacturing products. For 
example, in 1998-2000, they accounted for 70 per cent. The electronics industry is referred to in 
table 4.1 as electrical machinery and supplies.
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employment absorption. Its employment share increased to 13.6 per cent and 15.1 per 
cent in 1991-5 and 1996-2000 respectively, from around 8 per cent during the period 
1970-85 (Figure 4.2.C). Nevertheless, its performance in employment absorption 
seemed to be far from satisfactory. More than 50 per cent of employed workers are still 
in the agricultural sector whose income share is around 10 per cent.
Figure 4.4
Annual Growth Rate (per cent) of Manufacturing Output and Export, 1971-2003.
100 -
Export growth Output growth
Sources: Output growth is from National Economic and Social Development Board on-line 
database, available at www.nesdb.go.th
Export data during the period 1970-2000 are compiled from the UN COMTRADE 
database held at the International Economic Data Bank, the Australian National University, and 
those for the period 2001-03 are from the World Trade Atlas database.
There was a slowdown in manufacturing export growth during 1996-8. The 
average annual growth rate of manufacturing exports declined from 23.2 per cent during 
the period 1991-5 to zero per cent between 1996 and 1998 (Figure 4.4). This was mainly 
due to the upward trend of the real wage rate and the successive appreciation of the real 
exchange rate (RER), especially in the early 1990s (Warr, 1999: p.644-5). Hence, the
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competitiveness of manufacturing exports deteriorated. The export slowdown resulted in 
a decline in manufacturing output growth from 12 per cent in 1995 to less than 2 per cent 
in 1997, and to a negative growth rate of 11 per cent in 1998.
Although the dramatic currency depreciation during the onset of the crisis should 
have been the catalyst for a manufacturing export boom, manufacturing exporters were 
restrained by the credit crunch in the financial sector. Exporters could not access 
adequate funds to buy necessary imported materials. This was especially true for high 
import-content manufacturers. Devaluation caused an increase in the dollar costs of 
import intermediates so that exporters needed additional operating funds to buy these 
intermediates. The credit crunch in the financial sector could retard the growth of Thai 
manufacturing exports. Manufacturing export growth has resumed since 1999. The 
annual growth rate in 1999-2003 was 10 per cent, and manufacturing output grew 8 per 
cent a year during the same period.
4.3 Multinational Enterprise Involvement
4.3.1. Trends and Patterns of FDI Inflows in Thailand
MNE involvement measured by FDI inflows has been increasingly important to 
the Thai economy over the past four decades. FDI inflows increased from $32 million in 
the 1960s to $982 million and $4,481 million in the 1980s and the 1990s, respectively. 
From 2001 to 2003, FDI inflows were $7,952 million (Figure 4.5). The share of FDI 
inflows to gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) increased from 3.1 per cent in the 1960s 
to 5.4 and 12.3 per cent in the 1980s and 1990s, respectively. Between 2001 and 2002, 
FDI inflows accounted for 29.7 per cent of GFCF (Figure 4.5).
Growth patterns of FDI inflows in Thailand can be clearly divided into two 
periods; 1960-85 and 1986 to the present. The mid-1980s is when the industrialization 
strategy changed. FDI inflows in the former period were far lower than those in the 
latter. During the period 1960-85, when Thailand pursued trade and investment policy 
regimes to promote an IS industrialization strategy, annual average values of FDI inflows
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moderately increased from $32 million in the 1960s to $207 million and $508 million in 
the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, respectively (Figure 4.5). The 1960-85 FDI 
flows averaged out at 3.9 per cent of the country’s GFCF. By contrast, from 1986 to 
2003, when the policy regimes had changed toward an EP industrialization strategy, FDI 
inflows dramatically increased and became increasingly important to the country’s 
accumulation process. The annual value of FDI inflows jumped to $1,456 and $3,437 
million during the period 1986-90 and 1991-5, respectively. Despite the financial crisis 
in 1997, FDI inflows even increased from $5,525 and $7,952 million during the period 
1996-2000 and 2001-3, respectively. Their share of GFCF increased to 12.3 per cent in 
the 1990s, from 6.2 per cent between 1986 and 1990. For the period 2001-2, FDI 
inflows accounted for 29.7 per cent of GFCF. The evidence from Thailand strongly 
supports the argument that the amount of FDI inflows tends to be lower in an IS regime, 
compared to a policy regime geared toward EP.
Figure 4.5
FDI Inflows ($million) and Percentage Share to Gross Fixed Capital Formation
(GFCF), 1960-2002
FDI FDI/GFCF
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Sources'. Gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) is from National Economic and Social 
Development Board, on-line database, available at www.nesdb.go.th
FDI inflows are from Bank of Thailand, on-line database, available at www.bot.or.th
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Even though there was substantial merger and acquisition (M&A) FDI during the 
onset of the crisis, the net FDI inflows outside of M&A — greenfield FDI —  accounted 
for more than 50 per cent of total FDI inflows. M&A FDI inflows, which were $168 
million between 1990 and 1996, increased to $1,564 million during the period 1997- 
2002.9 Nevertheless, M&A FDI inflows between 1997 and 2002 accounted for only 23.5 
per cent of the total FDI inflows. More than three quarters were greenfield FDI inflows 
(Table 4.3).
Table 4.3
Total, Mergers and Acquisition (M&A), and Greenfield FDI Inflows 
______________ (Smillion) in Thailand, 1990-2003______________
Total FDI Inflows1 
(1)
M&A FDI Inflows2 
(2)
Greenfield FDI Inflows 
(3) = (l)-(2)
1990 3,030 70 2,960 (98.7)
1991 3,700 79 3,621 (97.9)
1992 5,340 498 4,842 (90.7)
1993 2,639 42 2,597 (98.4)
1994 2,452 89 2,363 (96.4)
1995 3,052 161 2,891 (94.7)
1996 3,940 234 3,706 (94.1)
1997 5,142 633 4,509 (87.7)
1998 6,981 3,209 3,772 (54)
1999 5,307 2,011 3,296 (62.1)
2000 6,256 2,569 3,687 (58.9)
2001 8,844 957 7,887 (89.2)
2002p 7,425 247 7,178 (96.7)
2003p 7,408 55 7,353 (99.3)
Notes: p = preliminary and the number in parentheses is the percentage share of total FDI 
inflows.
Sources : 1 Bank of Thailand, on-line database, available at www.bot.or.th
2 UNCTAD, World Investment Report, available at http://www.unctad.org
9The period coverage is due to data availability. UNCTAD commenced compiling M&A 
data in 1987, available at http://www.unctad.org.
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4.3.2 Comparisons between Thailand and Other Developing Countries
In the context of developing countries, Thailand has become increasingly 
important as a FDI recipient country. The share of FDI inflows in Thailand to total FDI 
in developing countries increased from 2.3 per cent during the period 1970-5 to 4.8 per 
cent in the decade ending in 1995. Between 1996 and 2003, its share declined slightly to 
3.5 per cent (Table 4.4). Notwithstanding the rapid growth of FDI inflows in Thailand, 
Thailand’s share of FDI inflows into East Asian economies has declined over the past 
three decades, mainly due to the sharp increase in FDI inflows into China. China became 
the largest FDI recipient country in the world between 1990 and 2003, accounting for 27 
per cent of inflows into developing countries and 51.9 per cent into East Asian 
economies. Excluding China from the East Asian economies, Thailand is average among 
other high-performance East Asian economies in enticing FDI inflows.
Among ASEAN-5 countries, Thailand is average in terms of attracting FDI 
inflows. Between 1970 and 2000, Thailand accounted for 18 per cent of total FDI inflows 
to ASEAN-5 countries. This share was lower than that of Singapore (accounting for 39.3 
per cent) and Malaysia (26.4 per cent), but larger than that of Indonesia (10.8 per cent) 
and the Philippines (5.5 per cent). During the period 2001-3, Thailand’s share sharply 
increased to 38.6 per cent. This was due to the negative FDI inflows to Indonesia that 
occurred between 1998 and 2002 and the declining trend of FDI inflows in Malaysia and 
the Philippines (Table 4.4).
In Thailand, the significance of FDI in the country’s capital accumulation, 
measured by a percentage of FDI to GFCF, is relatively high by developing countries’ 
standards. During the period 1970-2003, FDI amounted to 13.9 percent of GFCF in 
Thailand, while the average level for developing countries was 7 percent. Among 
ASEAN-5 countries, there was a difference between pre- and post-crisis. During the pre­
crisis period i.e. 1970-96, the share of FDI to GFCF in Thailand was 5.3 per cent, far 
lower than Singapore (23.8 per cent) and Malaysia (13.8 per cent). It was slightly higher 
than that of Indonesia (3.6 per cent) and the Philippines (4.1 per cent).
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To some extent, the relatively low share of FDI during this period reflected the 
way Thailand financed domestic investment beyond national saving, i.e. the investment­
saving gap. During the period 1986-96, Thailand was more reliant on other forms of 
capital flow (OFCF), i.e. portfolio, commercial bank borrowings, etc., to finance the 
country’s investment-saving gap. The value of OFCF in Thailand was the highest in 
ASEAN-5 countries and accounted for 78.1 per cent of total capital inflows during the 
period 1986-96 (Table 4.5). The share of OFCF in Thailand was the second highest 
among ASEAN-5 countries, just lower than that of the Philippines (82.8 per cent) but 
higher than Indonesia (57.6 per cent), Singapore (56.7 per cent) and Malaysia (8.7 per 
cent). As discussed in Appendix 1, OFCF tend to be more volatile than FDI. Along with 
inappropriate exchange rate policies and a poorly regulated domestic financial system, 
the high proportion of OFCF has been hypothesized as a key factor in explaining the 
crisis (Hill and Athukorala, 1998: p.24; Warr, 1999).
From 1997 to 2003, when many countries were aware of the adverse effect of 
OFCF, FDI as a ratio of GFCF increased for the developing countries. In Thailand, it 
increased to 23.3 per cent. This was still far lower than Singapore (44.8 per cent), but 
slightly higher than Malaysia (13.6 per cent), the Philippines (9.1 per cent) and Indonesia 
(-3.6 per cent).10
4.3.3 Geographical Distribution of FDI Inflows in Thailand.
Japan has been the largest direct investor in Thailand over the past three decades. 
From 1970 to the present, Japanese direct investors accounted for 23 per cent of FDI 
inflows (Table 4.6). During the period 1970-85, FDI inflows from Japan accounted for 
19.3 per cent, ranked second after the US. Since 1986, Japanese investors have become 
increasingly involved in Thailand. Its share increased to 41.1 per cent between 1986 and 
1990. Notwithstanding the greatly increased value of Japanese FDI, direct investment 
flows from North East Asian NICs increased even faster in the 1990s. As a result, the 
Japanese share declined to 19.1 per cent in the 1990s.
10The negative figure in the case of Indonesia is as a result of negative FDI inflows 
during the onset of the crisis, i.e. 1998-2001.
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Direct investors from the NICs gained in relative importance in Thailand during 
the EP industrialization period. Between 1986 and 1995, the NICs were the second 
largest direct investors, accounting for 22.5 per cent, increasing from 17.1 per cent during 
the period 1970-85. Among the NICs, Hong Kong is the most important, accounting for 
11.4 per cent of FDI inflows during the period 1970-2000. Between 2001 and 2003, its 
share declined slightly to 5.2 per cent.
The US investors were on par with Japanese ones during the period 1970-85, 
accounting for 24.7 per cent of total FDI inflows. While the dollar value of US FDI 
inflows increased, their share of total inflows has declined significantly to 10.7 per cent 
during the period 1986-95. This was a result of the sharp increase of FDI inflows from 
Japan and the NICs. From 1996 onward, the US direct investors resumed their relative 
importance, especially in the manufacturing sector. The share of US FDI to total FDI 
inflows increased to 16.7 per cent and declined to 6.7 per cent during the period 1996-
0
2000 and 2001-3, respectively. More importantly, the US FDI inflows have increasingly 
been involved in the manufacturing sector. In the 1980s, 26.7 per cent of US FDI stock 
in Thailand was in the manufacturing sector. Its proportion increased to almost 40 per 
cent in the 1990s and to 50 per cent between 2001 and 2002. Machinery, electronic 
equipment and chemical industries are the major areas where US direct investors 
increased their involvement in Thai manufacturing (Table 4.7).
During the period 1970-95, patterns of direct investment from the EU are to some 
extent similar to those from the US. The relative importance of FDI from the EU steadily 
declined until the onset of the financial crisis, from 11.5 per cent during the period 1970- 
75 to 8.7 per cent during the period 1991-5. During the onset of the financial crisis, i.e. 
1997-9, there were unusually high FDI inflows from the EU, compared to their historical 
trend over the past two decades, increasing to 22 per cent between 1997 and 1999.
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Table4.7
Sectoral Composition (per cent) of US Affiliates in Thailand, 1982-2002
1982-5 1986-90 1991-5 1996-2000 2001-2
Manufacturing 19.0 33.8 34.8 40.5 50.1
- Food and kindred products 0.5 1.3 2.7 1.4 0.5
- Chemicals and allied products 3.6 4.6 6.7 9.0 14.1
- Primary and fabricated metals 0.3 0.9 1.2 1.4 1.3
- Transportation equipment 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.9
- Machinery, electronic 
equipment and other
manufacturing 14.6 27.0 24.3 27.3 33.2
Wholesale trade 4.1 7.4 8.4 7.3 0.0
Banking 4.9 7.1 8.7 8.7 0.0
Finance banking, insurance, and
real estate 0.2 0.8 2.3 6.7 0.0
Services 0.9 1.4 1.8 0.8 0.0
Mining, petroleum and utilities 70.9 49.5 44.1 36.0 49.9
Total industries 100 100 100 100 100
Value of US FDI Stock ($million) 1,001 1,403 3,086 5,173 6,664
Source: Calculated from the US Bureau of Statistics, US Investment Abroad, various 
issues.
4.4 Manufacturing FDI
4.4.1. Trends and Patterns
Manufacturing FDI grew steadily from 1970 to the mid-1980s. The average 
annual value of manufacturing FDI inflows increased from $38 million in the 1970s to 
$126 million in the first half of the 1980s. Its annual growth rate during this period was 
19 per cent. From then on, manufacturing FDI sharply increased to $676 million and 
almost $1 billion during the periods 1986-90 and 1991-5, respectively. The rapid 
increase of manufacturing FDI was not disrupted by the financial crisis in 1997. Its value 
continued to increase at an annual average of $2.5 billion between 1996 and 2003.
Over the past three decades, the manufacturing sector has been the largest 
destination of direct investment. It accounted for 31.9 per cent from 1970 to the present, 
followed by financial institutions (22.7 per cent) and trade (18.8 per cent) (Table 4.8).
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From 1970 to the mid-1980s, manufacturing FDI accounted for less than 25 per cent of 
total FDI inflows, but from then on, it gained in relative importance its share increasing 
to almost 40 per cent of total FDI inflows in the 1990s. The influx of manufacturing FDI 
was a result of export-oriented labour-intensive FDI, especially from East Asian direct 
investors.11 This increased importance of North East Asian NIC investors in Thailand 
was consistent with the experience o f other Southeast Asian countries (Hill and 
Athukorala, 1998: p.33-4).
The sectoral breakdown of manufacturing FDI has coincided with the Thai 
industrialization process. Manufacturing FDI inflows from 1970 to the mid-1980s were 
mainly involved with import-substituting industries such as textiles, automobiles, and 
chemicals. FDI inflows to textiles, chemicals, electrical machinery and appliances, and 
foods and sugars accounted for 32.4, 16, 14.3 and 10.4 per cent, respectively, of total 
manufacturing FDI inflows between 1970 and 1980 (Table 4.8). A key incentive for 
manufacturing FDI inflows during this period was the highly-protected domestic market 
owing to an IS industrialization strategy. Manufacturing FDI inflows were typical 
market-seeking FDI (Akira, 1989). The highly-protected domestic market encouraged 
MNEs to establish affiliates in host countries and produce for the local market instead of 
producing in home countries and exporting to host countries.
From the mid-1980s onward, foreign firms shifted their interest from import- 
substituting industries to traditional labour-intensive manufacturing industries such as 
clothing, footwear, and toys classified in other manufacturing industries (Table 4.8). 
More recently, labour-intensive assembly activities in electrical machinery and electronic 
appliances have been the main attraction for foreign investors. The share of electrical 
machinery and electronic appliances in total manufacturing FDI inflows increased from 
14.3 per cent in the 1970s to 30 per cent in the 1990s.
n See a full discussion below in Section 4.2.2.
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To indicate the level of FDI involvement in Thai manufacturing, we compiled 
data from unpublished returns to the Industrial Census 1997 (data for 1996) conducted by 
NSO. The year 1996 is chosen for the study because 1997-9 data are not ‘normal’ years, 
compared to the 1996 ones. The firm coverage of the survey for 1993-5 is rather 
incomplete. The census covers 32,489 plants, belonging to 126 four-digit industries of 
TSIC. O f these, 23,677 plants responded to the questionnaire. The census was cleaned 
up by firstly deleting plants which had not responded to one or more the key questions 
and which had provided seemingly unrealistic information such as the negative value 
added, no report of value of raw materials and capital stocks, or the initial capital stock of 
less than 1,500 baht. And then, 21 industries that are either to serve niches in the 
domestic market (e.g. processing of nuclear fuel, manufacture of weapons and 
ammunition), in the service sector (e.g. publishing of recorded media, building and 
repairing of ships) or explicitly preserved for local enterprises (e.g. manufacture of ovens, 
furnaces and furnace burners, manufacture of coke oven products, manufacture of 
bicycles and invalid carriages). Plants with employment of less than 10 workers are also 
excluded.
As has been identified by Ramstetter (2004), there are some duplicated records in 
survey return, presumably because plants belonging to the same firm filled the 
questionnaire using the same records. The procedure followed in dealing with this 
problem was to treat the records that report the same value of the nine key variables of 
interest in this study , are counted as one record. There are 4,900 such cases which 
reduced to 2,064 as a result of this screening. Thus, the final sample drop to 15,624
• • 1 3plants (1,510 foreign-owned and 14,114 domestic-owned plants) across 105 industries. 
These plants accounted for 61.5 per cent of the Thailand’s manufacturing value added 
and 36.5 per cent of manufacturing labour force in 1996.
12 The nine variables are registered capital, number of male workers, number of female 
workers, sale value, values of (initial and ending periods) capital stocks, value of raw materials, 
wage paid and stock of raw materials.
13The number of domestically owned plants are higher than Ramstetter (2004), i.e. 8,672 
plants. This is because Ramstetter (2004) focuses on plants with employment greater than 20 
workers. There are approximately 6,000 plants with employment between 10-19 workers. 
Nevertheless, a number of duplicated records are at a comparable level. Ramstetter (2004) finds 
around 4,400 duplicated records, which have identical values of 9-10 key variables.
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Information at the plant level is aggregated to the industry level in order to reveal 
the level of FDI involvement in Thai manufacturing.14 Measured in all four aspects, i.e. 
gross output, value added, export and employment, FDI plays a vital role in Thai 
manufacturing. Almost 50 per cent of gross output was manufactured by foreign plants, 
accounting for 48.3 per cent of total manufacturing value added. Foreign plants tend to 
be more export oriented than local ones. The export values of foreign and local plants 
were 44.9 and 24.1 per cent, respectively, for total sales.15 As a result, the level of FDI 
involvement measured in terms of exports was even higher than gross output and value 
added. Foreign plants accounted for 58.9 per cent of manufacturing exports. 
Nonetheless, in terms of employment share, FDI involvement became less important. 
Foreign plants accounted for 35 per cent of manufacturing employment. Their relatively 
lesser importance in terms of employment reflects the capital-intense nature of foreign 
firms widely observed in many developing countries.
4.4.2 Export-oriented Labour-intensive Manufacturing FDI
As seen above, there were massive manufacturing FDI inflows from 1986 to 
2003. In this subsection, we investigate the BOl-promoted projects during the period 
1989-98 to illustrate their characteristics. Although, as mentioned in Chapter 3, the BOI 
privileges granted for export-oriented projects were in effect between the mid-1980s and 
2000, the period covered here misses some observations during the mid-1980s, due to the 
lack of available data. Nevertheless, the data set from 1989-98 is still able to shed light 
on the characteristics of these massive manufacturing FDI inflows.
In Table 4.9, the number of projects, capital investment, employment level, 
capital-labour ratio and percentage share of foreign ownership are compiled. Both the 
full sample and the export-oriented sub-sample (a firm whose export value was greater
14 See details in Appendix 9.
15 Similar to the information of foreign ownership, firms were asked to reveal their 
export-sale ratio by selecting one of these five options; zero per cent, 1-49 per cent, 50 per cent, 
50-99 per cent and 100 per cent. To approximate the firm’s export-sale ratio, we use the mid­
point average. That is, the approximated export-sale ratio of firms who reveal in the range of 1- 
49 per cent and 50-99 per cent, are 25 per cent and 75 percent, respectively.
160
than 80 per cent of total sales)16 are reported in order to examine whether the latter is 
different from the former. Three inferences can be drawn from this table. Firstly, there 
were sizable export-oriented projects receiving investment privileges from the BOI. 
3,638 out of 7,961 projects, or 45.7 per cent of total projects, were export-oriented. 
Among the export-oriented projects, electronics was the most important item, accounting 
for 25.9, 45 and 34 per cent in terms of project numbers, capital investment and 
employment, respectively. It was followed by machines and parts, processed foods, 
electrical appliances, clothing and footwear, in terms of the number of projects and 
capital investment. Nevertheless in terms of employment, processed food, clothing and 
footwear were more important than machines and parts and electrical appliances. Note 
that the increased importance of export-oriented FDI is also found in cases o f US 
affiliates. As mentioned, US manufacturing FDI has become increasingly important 
since 1986 (Table 4.8). Manufacturing FDI tends to exhibit a higher degree of export 
orientation than non-manufacturing FDI, with the former averaging 63.7 per cent of 
between 1986 and 2002, compared to 30.9 per cent for the latter (Table 4.10).
Secondly, these projects were labour intensive, compared with the rest of BOI- 
promoted projects. They accounted for only 20 per cent o f total capital investment but 
55.5 per cent of total employment. Thus, the capital labour ratio of these export-oriented 
BOI-promoted firms tends to be lower than that of the totally BOI-promoted ones. Even 
though electronics, electrical appliances, and machines and parts are widely regarded as 
high-technology and capital-intensive products, export-oriented firms in these industries 
have more or less the same level of capital-labour ratio as do products like clothing, toys, 
and processed foods.
Finally, there are systematic differences in the foreign equity holdings across 
industries. In general, the totally promoted projects exhibited lower foreign-equity 
holdings than export-oriented projects. This reflects the presence of restrictions on 
foreign ownership in domestic-market oriented projects (export-sale ratio less than 30 per
16We recognize that this is a very high cut-off point, but the choice is dictated by data 
availability.
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Table 4.10
Export-sale Ratio (per cent) of US Affiliates in Thailand, 1986-2002
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Period Manufacturing Total Industries
a ) (2) (2 )/(l)
(per cent)
(3) (4) (4)/ (3) 
(per cent)
Total Sales 
(Smillion)
Export
(Smillion)
Total Sales 
(Smillion)
Export
(Smillion)
1986 632 370 58.5 2,760 524 19.0
1987 850 546 64.2 3,391 718 21.2
1988 1,040 639 61.4 3,669 831 22.6
1989 2,132 1562 73.3 5,456 1,734 31.8
1990 2,555 1786 69.9 6,690 2,110 31.5
1991 2,836 2067 72.9 7,465 2,353 31.5
1992 2,811 1844 65.6 7,496 2,171 29.0
1993 3,104 1,900 61.2 8,171 2,215 27.1
1994 3,838 2,387 62.2 9,627 2,608 27.1
1995 5,086 2,929 57.6 12,520 3,202 25.6
1996 5,714 3,565 62.4 14,243 4,027 28.3
1997 5,763 3,622 62.8 14,745 4,644 31.5
1998 6,533 4,782 73.2 12,596 5,462 43.4
1999 9,539 5,701 59.8 14,566 5,965 41.0
2000 9,751 5,668 58.1 16,498 6,086 36.9
2001 10,491 6,461 61.6 17,530 6,938 39.6
2002 11,351 6,670 58.8 19,548 7,403 37.9
Average 63.7 30.9
Source: Calculated from the US Bureau of Statistics, US Investment Abroad (various issues).
cent). Furthermore, among export-oriented activities, it is clear that in the processed food 
industries and other traditional labour-intensive industries like clothing, footwear, and toy 
industries, they were unlikely to hold majority equity ownership. During the period 
1989-98, the share of foreign equity was 31 per cent in processed foods. This figure is 
comparable to other labour-intensive industries like clothing (43.2 per cent), footwear 
(45.6 per cent), and toy industries (32 per cent), but far below the average of all other 
industries at 63 per cent. In contrast, the pattern of foreign-equity holding figures in 
these industries is far less than in electronics (84 per cent), machines and parts (77 per 
cent) and electrical appliances (84 per cent) industries.
164
The systematic differences in foreign ownership are consistent with those in 
previous studies (e.g. Rhee et al., 1984; Oman, 1988; Moran, 2002: p.5). The economic 
rationale behind the systematic differences is due to the fact that industries like the 
processed food, apparel, footwear, and toy industries are likely to involve relatively 
stable/mature production technology that is widely available. There is less need for local 
enterprises in these industries to share ownership and control with foreign investors in 
exchange for accessing advanced technology. This is different from industries like the 
automotive, electronics, electrical appliances, and machines and parts industries where 
production technology per se is a proprietary asset and is more likely to be subject to 
rapid changes.
4.5 Conclusions
This chapter has surveyed industrialization in Thailand and the role of MNEs over 
the past four decades. Generally, MNEs can be involved in host economies through both 
FDI and non-FDI channels. Because of the unavailability of non-FDI channel data, the 
discussion in this chapter mostly relates to the FDI channel. Over the past four decades, 
the Thai economy changed structurally from an agrarian to a more industrialized 
economy. Nowadays, the manufacturing sector dominates output and export. 
Nevertheless, the growth performance and contributions to the overall economy are 
different between IS (1960 to around the mid 1980s) and EP industrialization strategies. 
The latter strategy is more beneficial than the former in terms of output growth, 
employment generation and foreign exchange earnings.
MNEs, through the FDI channel, have been extensively involved in 
industrialization in Thailand for the past four decades. It seems clear that trends and 
patterns of MNE (FDI) involvement are different, partly influenced by the nature of the 
trade policy regime. FDI involvement, measured in terms of the value of FDI inflows, 
increased dramatically in the EP industrialization period, compared to that in the IS one. 
This finding in Thai manufacturing corroborates the theoretical postulation by Bhagwati 
(1978) and empirical findings in cross-sectional inter-country analysis
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(Balasubramanyam and Salisu, 1991). Evaluated in 1996, FDI involvement accounted for 
around 50 per cent of manufacturing gross output and value added, and almost 60 per 
cent of manufacturing export. The degree of FDI involvement in Thai manufacturing is 
slightly less in terms of manufacturing employment.
In addition, FDI inflows in an EP industrialization period are likely to be more 
export oriented and labour intensive as illustrated by the pattern of BOI-promoted 
projects during the period 1986-2003. These are the areas where Thailand has a 
comparative advantage, thereby improving the resource allocation, enhancing the ability 
of foreign exchange earnings and promoting economic growth.
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Chapter 5: The FDI-Growth Nexus in the Thai Manufacturing 
Sector
This chapter probes the FDI-growth nexus in the manufacturing sector. As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, while FDI has been widely recognized as a growth-enhancing 
factor in developing countries, its effect is not automatic but depends on trade policy 
regimes in host countries, as postulated by the ‘Bhagwati hypothesis’. The growth 
enhancing effect of FDI is likely to be far less, or even negative, under an IS regime 
compared to a policy regime geared to EP. To examine the growth-enhancing effect of 
FDI, the growth equation is estimated by applying the co-integration technique to time 
series data for the period 1970-2002. Three alternative indices of trade openness, (i.e. 
the trade to goods GDP, the export-gross output ratio in the manufacturing sector and the 
incidence of applied tariff rates in the manufacturing sector), are used in order to test the 
sensitivity of results on these indices.
The analysis in this chapter is expected to provide a broad indicator of the impact 
of FDI on Thai manufacturing. In addition, despite the immense policy relevance, so far 
only a few studies have undertaken to test the role of the trade policy regime empirically 
(e.g. Balasubramanyam et al., 1996; Athukorala and Chand, 2000). While these studies 
generally provide strong support for the hypothesis in the context of inter-country cross- 
sectional analysis, the analysis is subject to two caveats. Firstly, there are also vast 
differences among countries with respect to the nature and quality of data, which makes 
cross-country comparison a rather risky business. Secondly and more importantly, the 
cross-sectional approach cannot capture the dynamic effects of a shift from an IS regime 
towards an EP regime. With the failure of an IS regime, developing countries moved 
towards an EP regime with different speed. Such a dynamic aspect cannot be properly 
captured by cross-sectional analysis.
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This chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.1 presents the empirical model 
used to examine the FDI-growth nexus. It is followed by a discussion of the data and the 
econometric method in Section 5.2. The results are presented and discussed in Section 
5.3. The final section presents key inferences and policy implications.
5.1 The Model
The empirical model in this chapter involves estimating a growth equation 
derived in the context of the new growth theory, which provides for capturing the impact 
of FDI interactively with economic openness on the growth-enhancing effect. The 
starting point of model formulation is the aggregate production function of the 
manufacturing sector.
Y= f  (A, L, K, H) (5.1)
where Y = Manufacturing output
L = Manufacturing employment 
K = Physical capital stock of the manufacturing sector 
H= Human capital stock of the manufacturing sector.
A = Total factor productivity (TFP) of the manufacturing sector
In equation 5.1, manufacturing output is a function of factor inputs consisting of 
labour (.L), and two types of capital —human and physical capital, denoted by H and K, 
respectively. The effect of technological changes is aggregated and represented by total 
factor productivity (A).
As argued in Chapter 2, FDI could directly affect output through increasing K as 
well as creating an impact on A in the host country. To capture the effect of FDI on 
manufacturing growth, K is composed of domestic and foreign physical capital stock, 
denoted by KD and KF, respectively. Firstly, FDI inflows increase KF and enlarge the 
capital stock. This leads to output expansion. In addition, since FDI is associated with
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advanced technology, an increase in KF potentially enhances the technological capability 
o f the manufacturing sector and positively affects A. All other things being equal, this 
will also enhance output growth.
Nevertheless, the net growth impact of FDI depends on the nature of the trade 
policy regime. The key hypothesis is that the more open the trade regime, the greater the 
impact of FDI on output growth. In an IS regime, FDI (as well as domestic investment) 
takes place in sectors predominately characterized by high capital intensity in production 
where the host country does not have a comparative advantage. An increase in FDI 
inflows could result in immiserizing growth. Moreover, FDI becomes an avenue for 
foreign companies to maintain a market share and reap extra profit from economic rent, 
created by the highly-protected domestic market. Such a regime also provides incentives 
for rent seeking and directly unproductive profit seeking (DUPS) activities. These seems 
to be less FDI technology spillover under an IS regime. Under this regime, FDI inflows 
are directed to industries where proprietary assets are important.1 This creates barriers to 
entry for local firms and thus constrains technology and efficiency spillovers. Moreover, 
the protection generated by an IS regime is likely to limit local competition, which is an 
important factor in stimulating firms to update new technologies in both production and 
management, and enhances their own productivity. Furthermore, it is more likely that the 
entry of an MNE affiliate creates a ‘market-stealing’ effect that adversely affects the 
productivity of local firms.
In contrast, the main incentives for FDI under an EP regime in a given host 
country are the relatively low-labour costs and/or the availability of raw materials. This 
allows foreign investors to operate in an environment that is relatively free from 
distortion, and leads to output expansion in internationally competitive and export- 
oriented product lines. Hence, FDI inflows are unlikely to result in immiserizing growth. 
Moreover, the production of firms in an EP regime is not limited by the size of the 
domestic market and has the potential to reap economies of scale through international
'Proprietary assets are defined as those that can differentiate productivity between firms 
that own them and those that do not. They can generate profit; other firms cannot quickly or 
effectively imitate (Caves, 1996).
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market penetration. Besides, an EP regime is more conducive to generating favourable 
spillover effects because FDI is mostly attracted to industries in which the country has 
comparative advantage. In such industries, there is a greater potential for local firms to 
catch up with foreign firms and achieve productivity improvement. This generates 
healthy competition among foreign and local firms that encourages them to keep 
maintaining their competitiveness in subsequent following periods. All in all, it 
positively affects output growth.
Thus, in order to capture the total impact of FDI on output growth, both KF and 
the interaction term between KF and a proxy variable for the openness of trade policy 
regimes (TP) are incorporated in the equation.
Y = F (L, H, Kd, Kf , Kf *TP) (5.2)
The impact of FDI on output growth depends on both KF as well as TP.
Since reliable data series on domestic and foreign capital stocks in the 
manufacturing sector are not available for Thailand, the ratio of gross fixed capital 
formation in the manufacturing sector, net of FDI (GFCFn) to GDP, is employed to 
represent KD in this study. This proxy variable has been used in numerous previous 
studies (e.g. Barro, 1999; Balasubramanyam et al., 1996). Similarly, KF is proxied by 
the ratio of manufacturing FDI inflow to manufacturing output. Owing to the lack of an 
appropriate direct measure of human capital stock, H is proxied by public education and 
research expenditure as a ratio of gross national income (GNI), as has been done in 
several empirical studies (e.g. McMahon, 1998; Sylwester, 2000). While there are 
alternative measures such as primary or secondary school enrolment ratios, the choice 
made here is constrained by data availability for the period under study., i.e. 1970-2002. 
In addition, since the size of the public sector in Thailand has remained more or less the
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same around 17 per cent of GDP over the same period, the ratio of public education and 
research expenditure would be a reasonable proxy of human capital development in 
Thailand.
As discussed in Chapter 3, there is no unique measure of the openness of the trade 
policy regime. This study uses three alternative proxies: (a) the ratio of total 
merchandise trade (import + export) to goods GDP, which is total GDP net of value 
added in construction and services sectors, (OPENl)\ (b) the ratio of export to gross 
output in the manufacturing sector (OPEN2)\ and (c) the ratio of incidence of applied 
tariff rates, the proportion of total tariff revenue to total imports of the manufacturing 
sector (OPEN3). These three alternatives are introduced to examine the sensitivity of 
results due to the proxies for the trade policy regime.
The first measure is superior to the widely-used trade to GDP ratio, i.e. degree of 
openness because the inclusion of non-traded activities (construction and services) as part 
of the denominator could lead to an under-estimation of exposure to foreign trade of the 
given economy (Rivera-Batiz and Rivera-Batiz, 1994). This point is particularly relevant 
in Thailand where construction and financial services recorded rapid growth during the 
latter part (from the late 1980s) of the period under study. The second measure is based 
on the premise that greater openness is a prerequisite for successful world market 
penetration in manufactured goods. In other words, export success in manufacturing is 
likely to occur under a policy regime where policies are more neutral and allow the 
market mechanism to effectively indicate the country’s comparative advantage (Edwards, 
1993). The third openness measure is simply the weighted average actual tariff in the 
manufacturing sector. The higher the tariffs, the lower the degree of openness.
Therefore, the estimating equation used in the empirical analysis is
2 The size of public sector is measured here by the per cent of the sum of public 
consumption and investment to GDP. There is no significant variation between the 1970s, 1980s 
and 1990s.
3 For a succinct discussion of various measures of openness and a detailed listing of 
related references, see Edwards (1998).
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Yt = a + ß ]Lt + ß2KDt + ß,H, + ß AKF, + ß 5(KFl *77>) (5.3)
where Y = Manufacturing output ( in log form)
L = (+) Labour force in the manufacturing sector (in log form)
Kd = (+) Gross fixed capital formation (GFCFn) net of FDI of
the manufacturing sector as a percentage of manufacturing 
output
H = (+) Public education and research expenditure as a percentage of
gross national income (GNI)
Kf = (+/-) Foreign direct investment in the manufacturing sector as a 
percentage of manufacturing output
TP = Openness of the trade policy regime, proxied alternatively by
(+) (1) OPEN1 = Ratio of total merchandise trade to goods GDP 
(+) (2) OPEN2 = Export-gross output ratio in the manufacturing sector 
(-) (3) OPEN3 — Incidence of applied tariff rates of the 
manufacturing sector 
t = Time subscript.
s  = Stochastic error term
The sign expected for the regression coefficient is given in brackets.
The coefficients ßi, ß2 and represent output elasticity with respect to labour, 
(domestic) physical capital, and human capital, respectively. Hence, they all are expected 
to be positive. The impact of FDI on growth (Y) is given by the partial derivative of Y in 
(5.4) with respect to KF, i.e.
dY
dKF ß t + ßs*  TP
(5.4)
To test the relevance of the hypothesis, the statistical significance of ß 5 is 
examined. Under the Bhagwati hypothesis, the sign of ß 5 is expected to be positive for 
OPEN1 and OPEN2 and negative for OPEN3. That is, the contribution of FDI to growth
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will be an increasing function of OPEN1 and OPEN2, and a decreasing function of 
OPEN3. The sign of ß A is ambiguous and can be positive or negative, depending on the 
nature of the trade policy bias over the entire sample period. Even when ß 4 is negative, 
it does not imply that the FDI contribution is negative. Whether its contribution is 
negative or not depends on the size of the coefficient of the interactive term of FDI and 
the trade policy regime,ß 5, compared to ß 4.
5.2 Data
The model is estimated using annual data for the period 1970-2002. The full data 
set are reported in Appendix 10. Data on manufacturing output and gross fixed capital 
formation (GFCF) are obtained from the National Income Accounts, National Economic 
and Social Development Board (NESDB) of Thailand. These data are in real terms at 
1988 prices. FDI inflows, exchange rates, tariff revenue, and international trade are from 
the Bank o f Thailand Quarterly Bulletin, the Bank of Thailand (BOT). Data series of 
FDI inflows are deflated to in terms of 1988 prices by investment price deflators.
The data on the work force come from the Key Indicators of Developing Asian 
and Pacific Countries, the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The OPEN1 variable, the 
ratio of total merchandise trade to goods GDP, and the percentage of public education 
and research expenditure to Gross National Income (GNI) are obtained from World 
Development Indicators, The World Bank.
The statistical summary and correlation matrix of these variables are given in 
Table 5.1 and 5.2, respectively. Output and FDI seem to exhibit a high correlation in the 
manufacturing sector. The correlation coefficient between manufacturing output and the 
share of manufacturing FDI is 0.64. Nevertheless, when manufacturing output and FDI 
are plotted together in Figure 5.1, it clearly indicates the correlation between output and
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FDI is likely to be increasing as the trade policy regime in Thailand become more liberal, 
as postulated by the Bhagwati hypothesis.
Table 5.1
Statistical Summary of Data used in the Regression Analysis
Measurement units Mean Min Max SD
Manufacturing value added (Y) (log) million baht 12.8 11.3 14.0 0.9
Manufacturing employment (L ) (log) 1,000 workers 7.8 6.5 8.5 0.6
FDI as a percentage of Y ( K F) [log( 1+proportion)] 0.03 0.008 0.076 0.02
Gross domestic capital formation 
net of FDI as a percentage of Y  
( K d )
[log( 1+proportion)]
0.126 0.012 0.199 0.052
Public education and research 
expenditure as a percentage of 
Gross National Income (H)
[log( 1+proportion)]
3.0 2.3 3.5 0.4
Merchandise trade to goods GDP 
(O P E N 1)
per cent
114.9 62.5 212.0 43.9
Export-output ratio (O P E N 2) per cent 20.7 0.9 57.0 18.4
1 Incidence of applied tariff in 
manufacturing (O P E N 3)
per cent
12.9 4.5 20.6 4.9
Notes: Mean = simple average; Min = minimum; Max = maximum; SD = standard deviation 
Source: Author’s calculation; see full data set in Appendix 10
Table 5.2
Correlation Matrix of Data used in the Regression Analysis
Y L K F KD H O P E N 1 O P E N 2 O P E N 3
Y 1.00
L 0.97 1.00
KF 0.64 0.59 1.00
r D -0.15 -0.16 -0.42 1.00
H 0.87 0.86 0.53 -0.31 1.00
O P E N 1 0.92 0.88 0.79 -0.42 0.79 1.00
O P E N 2 0.91 0.86 0.74 -0.42 0.83 0.95 1.00
O P E N 3 -0.94 -0.92 -0.72 0.40 -0.86 -0.95 -0.93 1.00
Note: see variable notation in Table 5.1
Source: Author’s calculation; see full data set in Appendix 10
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Figure 5.1
Manufacturing FDI (FDIM), Output (YM), Trade to goods GDP (OPEN1), Export- 
gross output Ratio (OPEN2) and Incidence Tariff of Manufactured Goods (OPEN3),
1970-2002
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5.3 Estimation Methods
Conventionally, the standard regression procedure to examine a linear relationship 
between a pair of random variables X  and Y uses the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
method in the following linear relation, Y = a+ ßX. R and the standard t-test of the OLS 
regression are used to evaluate the overall fit and the statistical significance of estimate. 
The standard regression procedure is based on the assumption that the data series are 
stationary. That is, data series grow over time in a fairly steady, constant manner, 
reflecting smoothly evolving economic forces. In this sense, fluctuations in the series are 
taken to imply the influence of cyclical or temporary factors, and eventually the series 
return to their trend growth values. Therefore, the mean, variance, and co-variances of 
the series tend to remain constant over time.
However, most economic data series are not stationary around a deterministic 
trend. They have stochastic trends so that some shocks that affect a series will have a 
permanent effect on the level of the series. This makes the series “wander” without a 
tendency to revert to mean value. Thus, the mean, variance, and co-variances of the 
series tend to vary over time. Pursuing the standard regression procedure is likely to lead 
to the possibility of a Type 1 error, i.e. accepting the relationship as significant when in 
fact the two data series are uncorrelated. In other words, the standard regression 
procedure will produce so-called ‘non-sense correlation’ or ‘spurious regression’.4
To guard against the possibility of estimating ‘spurious regression’, the first step 
of the estimation process was to examine the time series properties of the data series. 
The Dickey-Fuller (DF) for unit roots is employed for this purpose. To conduct the DF 
test for unit roots of X, the variable under consideration, the statistical significance of y  in 
equation (5.5) is examined with the null hypothesis that y  is equal to zero ( X  is non­
stationary). If the null hypothesis is rejected, X  is stationary and vice versa.
4This concept was pioneered by Yule (1926) and re-emphasized by Granger and Newbold
(1974).
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p
- aQ + yX,-\ + a2t + Z f t A^-i+1 + £i (5-5)
»=2
where t = Time trend
s t -  Disturbance terms
p = Lag length on the lagged dependent variable
The terms a0 and a2 are dropped from the regression if  they are statistically 
insignificant.5 The lag length (p) is determined by the Atiken Information Criterion 
(AIC) to ensure residual whiteness.
Table 5.3 reports the unit root tests of all variables. It indicates that all variables 
to be used in equation (5.3) are integrated processes o f order 1 or /  (1). That is, the data 
series in level accepted the null hypothesis at the 5 per cent level o f statistic significance 
or better. The series are non-stationary. But the first difference o f all these variables 
rejected the null hypothesis at the 5 per cent level o f statistic significance. All data series 
are integrated processes o f order 1 or 1 (1). This set o f variables, which is taken together 
on the basis o f economic theory, has the potential to form a co-integrating vector. The 
coefficient from the co-integration relationship can directly be interpreted as the 
equilibrium (long-term steady-state) relationship. Therefore, the model is estimated 
using the co-integration technique.
Table 5.3
Dickey-Fuller Test for Unit Roots, 1970-2002
Variables t-statistics for 1(0) t-statistics for 1(1)
Y
-3.06(4) -3.76 (0)
L -2.94(0) -3.78 (0)
KF
-2.04(0) -3.33 (3)
k d
-1.72 (0) -5.40 (0)
(contd.)
5See Chapter 4 of Enders (1995) for a comprehensive discussion.
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Table 5.3 (contd.)
Variables t-statistics for 1(0) t-statistics for 1(1)
H -1.23 (0) -4.92 (0)
OPEN1 -1.23 (4) -3.60(1)
OPEN2 -2.69 (3) -6.58 (0)
OPEN3 -3.10(0) -5.16(0)
Notes: (1) The t-statistic reported is the t-ratio on yin equation (5.5) in text.
(2) The null hypothesis of non-stationary 1(1) is accepted for all variables at the 5 per cent 
level of significance.
(3) Figures in parentheses indicate the order of augmentation required to obtain residual 
whiteness.
Source: Author’s calculation
Two alternative co-integration methods are used in this study, i.e. the Engle- 
Granger (EG) method and the fully modified OLS estimator proposed by Phillips and 
Hansen (1990). On the one hand, Engle and Granger (1987) propose a constructive two- 
stage approach to modeling economic relationships involving non-stationary variables. 
The first stage involves modeling the long-run or co-integrating relationship. All the data 
are estimated by OLS. If the residual of this estimated regression is found to be 
stationary (in terms of the DF test without a constant term and time trend in equation 5.5 
above), then the coefficients of the regression can be interpreted as representing a long- 
run (steady-state) relationship. The OLS estimator of these non-stationary variables 
possesses the large sample property of consistency and is highly efficient, i.e. super 
consistent.6 In the second stage, the short-run relationship, error-correction mechanism, 
is modeled. First differences of all variables and the lagged residuals of the first stage 
(co-integrating) regression are estimated by OLS. Since all variables are 1(1), the first 
differences are stationary and the standard tests are applicable.
Although the EG method from the co-integrating regression possesses the large 
sample property of consistency and is highly efficient, they are still biased in small 
samples. Particularly, in the small sample, omitted dynamic terms are captured in the
6The estimator converges to the true value at a rate faster than in normal asymptotics 
(Engle and Granger, 1987).
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residual, which will consequently be serially correlated for the OLS estimate (Harris, 
1995). In this case, the OLS estimator has an asymptotic distribution, which is non­
normal and is affected by nuisance parameters. This makes statistical inference difficult 
since the standard t-statistics will not be valid asymptotically (Phillips and Durlarf, 1986). 
Therefore, in this study, the fully modified OLS estimator proposed by Phillips and 
Hansen (1990) is employed.
The fully modified OLS estimator or Phillips-Hansen (PH) procedure is an 
optimal single-equation technique, which is asymptotically equivalent to maximum 
likelihood. It applies a semi-parametric correction to the standard OLS procedure to 
avoid estimation of nuisance parameters and to give median-unbiased t-statistics, which 
asymptotically follow a standard normal distribution. Interestingly, comparative Monte 
Carlo studies of co-integrating techniques have found the PH procedure an appropriate 
estimation procedure in dealing with small data samples (Phillips and Loretan, 1991; and 
Inder, 1993).
In theory, the maximum likelihood method (a full parametric correction) proposed 
by Johansen (1988) is superior to the PH procedure because, under the Johansen method, 
the unit roots are explicitly incorporated in the specification. It also takes into account 
short-run dynamics in estimating the co-integrating vector, and additionally provides for 
testing for the existence of more than one co-integrating vector. Meanwhile, the PH 
procedure yields little improvement on the precision as well as the bias of the estimator, 
particularly when the lagged dependent variables are included. Moreover, in the large 
sample, the t-statistics perform poorly (Inder, 1993).
However, the small-sample properties of the Johansen method are still unknown. 
Moreover, recent applications of this technique have encountered some practical 
difficulties (Hall, 1991). The first problem is that the criteria to determine the number of 
co-integration relations, such as trace, determinant, and eigen value, are very sensitive to 
the choice of lag length for the VAR (Vector Autoregressive). The results are also highly
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sensitive to the VAR orders selected. Severe collinearity may emerge between some of 
the regressors, particularly when dealing with VARs of reasonable size. This in turn 
renders the point estimates of the long-run elasticities even more sensitive to the choice 
of lag specification. Finally, there are no economic reasons to suggest more than one co­
integration vector for the variables under study. With these reasons, the PH procedure is 
preferred in this study. Note that, since the main interest here is in the long-run 
relationship postulated by the ‘Bhagwati hypothesis’, estimating short-run dynamics is 
not intended.
5.4 Results
The regression results are reported in Table 5.4. Note that the model has been 
estimated for the entire sample period (1970-2002) as well as for the pre-crisis period 
(1970-96). This was done in order to examine the sensitivity of the results to economic 
disturbances created by the crisis. The results are similar, apart from minor differences 
relating to the size of some coefficients. The discussion in this section focuses on the 
estimate for the entire period. The three alternative measures of TP yielded basically 
comparable results. The following discussion focuses on the results based on the export- 
output ratio in manufacturing (OPEN2). This choice was made on the basis of the 
superior stationary property of the regression residual.
Results based on the two alternative estimation methods ( EG and PH procedures) 
are reported with the corresponding unit root tests for the residuals (Table 5.4). In terms 
of the DF test, the residuals are stationary in both cases and therefore the estimated 
equations can be interpreted as long-run relationships. The coefficient estimates from 
both methods are strikingly similar. The following discussion focuses only on the 
equation estimated using the methodologically more robust PH procedure.
The estimate of ß 5 (the coefficient attached to TP*FDI) is significantly different 
from zero with the theoretically expected sign, providing support for the ‘Bhagwati 
hypothesis’. That is, the growth impact of FDI on the Thai manufacturing sector seems
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to have been significantly enhanced as the country’s trade policy regime shifted the 
emphasis from an IS to an EP regime. Moreover, the significant and negative sign of /?4 
implies the FDI inflows could have even generated a negative effect on the growth 
performance of the economy under an IS regime. Evaluating the average value of 
OPEN2 (20.65 per cent) over the past three decades, the contribution of FDI impacted 
positively on the growth performance of Thai manufacturing. The positive effect 
amounted to about 0.4 per cent of average annual growth during this period.
The results are consistent with the general inference of previous studies that the 
contribution of FDI to the overall performance of the Thai manufacturing sector was not 
significant during the 1970s and early 1980s (e.g. Tambunlerchai, 1975; Santikam 1981; 
Pongpisanupichit, 1985; Akira, 1989). Under an IS regime, high domestic trade 
protection attracted foreign investors mostly to share economic rents with local firms. 
Manufacturing FDI inflows during the 1970s and early 1980s were mostly involved with 
import-substituting industries such as finished consumer goods, textiles, automobiles, and 
chemicals. The nature of manufacturing FDI during this period was typical market­
seeking FDI. Foreign investors established affiliates to enjoy the domestic market 
growth under tariff protection as well as investment promotion privileges. In such 
industries, local firms were unlikely to participate equally in the market (Akira, 1989).
Furthermore, the highly-protected domestic market encouraged local firms to 
produce products not directly competitive with those produced by foreign affiliates. In 
such an environment, foreign affiliates may operate in ‘enclaves’ in isolation from local 
firms (Kokko, 1994). This was evident in the textile and tyre industries (Akira, 1989: 
p.185; Jongwanich, 1999).
Table 5.4
Long-run Determinants of Manufacturing Growth, 1970-2002
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(A) Estimation Period 1970-2002
TP = OPEN 1 TP = OPEN 2 TP = O PEN 3
EG PH EG PH EG PH
INTP 3.56 3.29 3.38 3.22 3.85 3.75
(5.89) (7.58) (5.79) (8.07) (5.55) (7.86)
L 0.99 1.05 1.03 1.09 0.97 1.01
(8.41) (12.67) (9.06) (14.29) (7.78) (11.80)
KD 3.09 3.46 3.08 3.62 3.35 3.87
(3.49) (5.89) (3.38) (6.40) (3.37) (5.93)
H 0.35 0.26 0.29 0.16 0.29 0.17
(2.35) (2.60) (1.91) (1.64) (1.87) (1.68)
KF -12.85 -15.12 -3.64 -5.80. 17.62 20.67
(-1.90) (-1.82) (-0.89) (-2.21) (3.84) (6.69)
k f *t p 0.12 0.13 0.2 0.3 -1.25 -1.50
(2.97) (4.94) (2.82) (5.71) (-2.77) (-4.99)
DF -4.64 -5.48 -5.09 -6.11 -4.76 -5.80
(B) Estimated Period 1970-96
TP = OPEN 1 TP = OPEN 2 TP = O PEN 3
EG PH EG PH EG PH
INTP 5.85 5.88 4.68 4.47 5.18 5.13
(6.96) (14.83) (6.33) (9.53) (4.71) (6.89)
L 0.69 0.70 0.86 0.92 0.78 0.81
(5.32) (11.35) (7.22) (12.07) (4.80) (7.29)
Kn 3.50 3.63 3.34 3.42 4.09 4.54
(3.36) (7.23) (2.80) (4.72) (3.39) (5.47)
H 0.36 0.34 0.-27 0.17 0.27 0.21
(2.88) (5.84) (2.00) (2.13) (1.89) (2.16)
-44.02 -57.19 -7.73 -10.68 32.25 35.52
(-3.79) (-9.63) (-1.94) (-4.29) (2.24) (-3.54)
(contd.)
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Table 5.4 (contd.)
TP = 01PEN 1 TP = OPEN 2 TP = O PEN 3
EG PH EG PH EG PH
k f*t p
DF
0.38
(3.93)
-3.35
0.46
(9.60)
-4.57
0.6
(2.95)
-3.59
0.7
(5.74)
-4.01
-2.25
(-2.25)
-3.86
-2.64
(-3.71)
-4.55
Notes: (1) EG = Engle-Granger estimation and PH = Phillip Hansen estimation
(2) Number in parenthesis is the corresponding /-statistics.
(3) DF is the corresponding t-statistics of lagged residuals from testing DF unit roots on 
residuals. 95 per cent and 90 per cent critical value for rejecting the hypothesis that residual is 
characterized as I (0) is -4.48 and -4.09, respectively. This critical value is from the table of 
response surface developed by McKinnon (1991).
Source: Author’s estimation.
From the late 1980s, FDI inflows gradually shifted to light manufacturing 
industries, particularly labour-intensive assembly activities in electronic and electrical 
goods where the country has a comparative advantage in international production. The 
new FDI firms are more export oriented relative to those of the 1970s, as indicated in 
Chapter 4. With a relatively smaller technology gap, the presence of such foreign 
affiliates likely demonstrates managerial as well as international marketing know-how 
and has consequently enhanced the export propensity of local firms.
5.5 Conclusions
This chapter has conducted a broad evaluation of the impact of FDI on the Thai 
manufacturing sector, and the relationship between growth of manufacturing output and 
manufacturing FDI inflows, over the period 1970-2002. The key hypothesis is built 
around the ‘Bhagwati hypothesis’ emphasizing the role of the trade policy regime. An 
EP regime is more conducive than an IS regime for host countries to maximize the 
growth-enhancing effect of FDI. Based on the co-integration estimation, the key findings 
are consistent with this hypothesis. While alternative measures of trade policy regimes 
are used, the results seem to be insensitive to these measures. Excluding the crisis- 
affected period from the estimation, the results still favour an EP regime over an IS
regime.
Appendix 10
Data used in Regression Analysis of FDI-growth Nexus
Y L Kr G C F H O PEN 1 O P E N 2 O P E N 3
1970 81 0.7 26 14 2.3 65.0 0.9 19.9
1971 90 0.7 14 15 2.5 62.5 1.3 20.6
1972 102 1.3 20 17 2.5 64.4 2.3 19.8
1973 118 1.2 34 23 2.5 65.1 3.8 19.1
1974 125 1.7 57 15 2.5 80.5 4.1 16.2
1975 132 1.4 37 15 2.6 72.0 4 .0 15.3
1976 152 1.1 30 27 2.5 75.7 5.2 17.3
1977 174 1.6 48 26 2.5 83.5 3.6 18.3
1978 189 1.6 39 26 2.5 82.0 6.6 18.3
1979 205 2.0 41 30 2.5 92.3 7.7 16.3
1980 211 1.8 55 25 2.4 93.6 6.8 14.6
1981 224 1.9 132 31 2.9 94.7 6.5 14.5
1982 230 2.0 119 25 3 88.1 6.8 13.6
1983 256 2.2 121 43 3.1 82.1 5.2 12.4
1984 272 2.1 182 40 3.2 86.0 6.0 14.9
1985 268 2.3 78 33 3.3 88.3 17.0 15.6
1986 295 2.4 109 42 3.2 85.9 20.1 15.4
1987 342 2.7 218 65 3 99.5 23.9 14.2
1988 403 2.6 732 94 2.7 115.8 26.4 12.6
1989 468 3.0 1014 114 2.8 123.6 16.6 13.3
1990 541 3.1 1309 132 3 133.0 17.8 13.2
1991 604 3.7 1035 155 2.9 131.0 17.7 10.2
1992 673 3.9 806 163 3.2 130.4 23.2 10.1
1993 782 4.2 981 176 3.4 134.4 24.5 10.0
1994 857 4.2 875 193 3.1 138.5 34.5 10.9
1995 958 4.6 1185 195 3.2 150.2 41 .0 9.0
1996 1,021 4.7 1662 236 3.5 139.1 36.3 9.5
1997 1,036 4.6 2302 186 3.5 159.7 45.2 6.3
1998 924 4.6 2963 86 3.5 172.4 57.0 4.5
1999 1,033 4.6 2260 91 3.5 176.5 46.8 5.0
2000 1,096 5.0 3156 83 3.5 211 .0 55.9 4.5
2001 1,111 4.9 3972 112 3.5 212 .0 55.0 4.5
2002 1,196 5.1 1973 119 3.5 201.9 51.9 4.8
Notations:
Y
L
GCF
H
OPEN1 
OPEN2
= Manufacturing value added at 1988 prices (billion baht)
= Manufacturing labour (million workers)
= Manufacturing FDI inflows (Smillion)
= Manufacturing gross capital formation at 1988 prices (billion baht) 
= Education expenditure to gross national investment (per cent)
= Trade to goods GDP (per cent)
= Export-gross output ratio (per cent)
OPENS = Average manufacturing tariff (per cent)
Sources: as discussed in the text.
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Chapter 6: FDI and the Technological Benefit to Thai 
Manufacturing: A Cross-industry Analysis
This chapter examines the technological benefit to Thai manufacturing from FDI 
that is often argued to be the most desirable benefit any host country can anticipate. In 
general, the entry of MNE affiliates could affect technological capability in two broad 
ways. Their entry implies there are new enterprises in the host economies. Their level of 
technology directly affects the overall technological capability of the host country. In 
addition, due to the fact that technology is partially a public good, MNE affiliates are 
unlikely to fully internalize all benefits from associated technology. Hence, it could 
create positive externalities to locally non-affibated firms, thereby raising technological 
capability. The latter is referred to as FDI technology spillover. While previous studies 
emphasize FDI technology spillover, its overall effect on Thai manufacturing (i.e. the 
sum of direct impacts and FDI technology spillover) has been ignored. MNE affiliates 
might not generate any technological benefits to locally owned enterprises but they might 
be more efficient and directly contribute to the overall capability of the manufacturing 
sector. Hence in this chapter, both FDI technology spillover and the overall impact on 
Thai manufacturing are examined.
As discussed in Chapter 2, technological benefits from FDI are conditioned by the 
nature of the trade policy regime according to the ‘Bhagwati hypothesis’. Thus, the key 
hypothesis focuses on the role of the trade policy regime. That is, technological benefits 
from FDI are likely to be far less or even negative under an IS regime, compared with a 
policy regime geared to EP.
To examine the technological benefit from FDI, an inter-industry cross-sectional 
econometric analysis is undertaken, using the unpublished returns to the Industrial 
Census 1997 (data for 1996). Two alternative measures, i.e. NRP and ERP, are used to 
proxy the nature of the trade policy regime that varies across industries. Both
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productivity and FDI determinants equations are estimated simultaneously in order to 
guard against any potential simultaneity problem. By the single-equation estimation, i.e. 
productivity determinant, the estimated positive relationship between FDI and the 
productivity of domestic manufacturing might simply reflect the fact that foreign 
investment gravitates towards more productive industries rather than representing any 
technology spillover from FDI.
The expected outcome from this chapter complements the findings of the previous 
chapter. While, in the previous chapter, we examine the FDI-growth nexus for total 
manufacturing, this chapter concentrates on technological benefits from FDI. Over and 
above the outcome from this chapter, it could contribute to the general literature on FDI 
technology spillover. Despite policy relevance, empirical studies to test the role of the 
trade policy regime are sparse. The only published empirical study, which has explicitly 
tested the ‘Bhagwati hypothesis’ in analyzing the spillover effects of FDI is Kokko et al. 
(2001). This study focuses on technology spillover conditioned by the country’s trade 
policy regime, based on Uruguayan firm-level inter-industry analysis. In the study, the 
year 1973 where Uruguay embarked on trade liberalization reform is used as a 
benchmark in separating EP FDI from IS FDI. Foreign firms set up before 1973 were 
classified as IS firms and those set up after 1973 were classified as EP firms. In general, 
the findings support the ‘Bhagwati hypothesis’. There are, however, two major caveats 
that need to be attached to this study. Firstly, the classification of EP and IS firms using 
1973 as the base year is problematic because the liberalization reforms implemented in 
that year were partial and some manufacturing sectors continued to remain under heavy 
protection (Favaro and Spiller, 1991). Secondly, the analysis suffers from a failure to 
address the possible simultaneity involved in the relationship between productivity and 
the presence of foreign affiliate. The positive relationship between the foreign presence 
and productivity of local firms uncovered by the single-equation model might simply 
reflect the fact that foreign investment gravitates towards more productive industries 
rather than representing any technology spillover from FDI (Aitken and Harrison, 1999).
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The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.1 presents the 
model of productivity and FDI determinants used to examine technology spillover. It is 
followed by a discussion of the data and econometric methods in Sections 6.2 and 6.3. 
The results are presented and discussed in Section 6.4. Section 6.5 extends the model 
developed in Section 6.1 to examine the total effect of FDI on technological capacity in 
host countries. Results are presented in the following section. The final section presents 
key inferences and policy implications.
6.1.1 Productivity Determinants
To examine factors determining industry productivity, we start with the Cobb- 
Douglas production function of the locally owned industry specified as equation (6.1);1
where Yd = Output (value added) for the locally owned j ih industry.
Ld = Number of workers of the locally o w n ed /h industry 
K d = Value o f capital stocks of the locally o w n ed /h industry 
Aj = Total factor productivity (TFP) of the locally o w n ed /h industry 
£j = Random disturbance term, capturing stochastic variations in the
technical or productive capabilities, measurement error or missing 
variables of the locally owned j  industry.
The production function in equation (6.1) is transformed into the intensive form to 
reduce the problem of heteroscedasticity, which may arise from cross-sectional data.
'There are several alternative functional forms such as translog, and constant-elasticity- 
of-substitution (CES). Choices of the function forms are selected according to the empirical 
estimates based on the Thai manufacturing data. Based on the diagnostic tests, i.e. functional 
form and residual normality, the Cobb-Douglas form performs better than the others.
6.1. The Model
(6 . 1)
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Other possible econometric problems, such as simultaneity arising from having 
endogenous explanatory variables (the inputs L and K), or multicollinearity arising from 
the interdependence of the two inputs, are further reduced by using the intensive form of 
production (Intriligator et al. 1996: p.289).
Dividing equation (6.1) by Ldjt
n d \ a 2
wr ,ej Ai
r Vd
£ L
Ldv y
(*7)<a,+,,'V ' (6 .2)
Take natural logarithm in equation (6.2)
f Yd^
Ldv j y
= ln Ad + In
I d\  LJ )
+ ß 2 InKd +€
Lpd = TFPd + ß
ldv j y
+ß2kd + £ j (6.3)
where LPd = the value added per worker or labour productivity of the locally
ownedyth industry , 1 n
LdV
TFPj = ln Aj
k>
lj
( K d, 
~ In - i  
Id V Lj
kl = In K
ßl =  \  -  Oil
ß2 = 1-0!/-
Equation (6.3) represents the intensive form of Cobb-Douglas production 
function. Note that in equation (6.3), the capital stock ( kd) is included as an additional 
variable in order to relax the constant-retum-to-scale assumption.
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According to equation (2.23) in Chapter 2, the level of technology represented by 
TFP is influenced by the level of foreign presence and the nature of the trade policy 
regime in host countries. To capture the effect of the trade policy regime, an interaction 
variable of foreign presence ( FOR) and trade policy proxy (TP ) is added to the model. 
Moreover, as argued by a number of empirical studies (e.g. Sachs and Warner, 1995; 
Edwards, 1998), TP itself could also have an impact on TFP. Hence,
TFP. = ß 0 + ß,FORj + ß 4FORj * TPJ + ß 5TPj (6.4)
where FORj = foreign presence in thef b industry
TPj = proxy of the trade policy regime in th e /h industry
By substitution equation (6.4) in (6.3), we obtain
LPf = ßo + ßi
r kdj ^
\  j J
+ ß 2lcd + ß 3FOR: + ß t FOR, * T + ß sTP, + yX, + e , (6.5)
where Xj = a set (matrix) of explanatory variables containing industry-specific 
factors of t h e /h industry .
Note that the specification in equation (6.5) does not imply that all industries must 
have the same capital-labour ratio. Rather we draw an inference of the impact of capital- 
labour ratio on the industry’s productivity across industries. These industries must 
exhibit a significant level of variation in their capital-labour ratio from each other. 
Otherwise, the coefficient associated with the capital-labour ratio variable is not likely to 
be obtained. This functional form is widely used in previous studies using industry-level 
data (e.g. Blomström and Persson, 1983; Kokko, 1994).2
2 One alternative is to use the firm-level data to examine the ‘Bhagwati hypothesis’. The 
estimation of equation (6.5) can be undertaken into 2 steps. Firstly, we estimate production
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The impact of FDI on the industry’s productivity is given by the partial derivative 
of LPd with respect to FOR.
8LP[_
dFORj = ß ,+ ß J P j
(+/-) (-)
(6.6)
To test the role of the trade policy regime, i.e. ‘Bhagwati hypothesis’, the 
statistical significance of ß 4 is examined. Under the ‘Bhagwati hypothesis’, the sign of 
ß 4 is expected to be negative. That is, technology spillover from FDI to the industry’s 
productivity will be a decreasing function o f the level of trade restrictiveness. The sign 
of /?3 is ambiguous, depending on the nature of the trade policy bias over the whole 
manufacturing sector.
Foreign presence, FOR , is measured by the output share of foreign firms to total 
industry. In some previous empirical studies, employment or capital shares have been 
used to measure the foreign presence. Expressing foreign presence as an employment 
share tends to underestimate the actual role o f foreign affiliates because MNE affiliates 
tend to be more capital intensive than locally non-affiliated firms. On the other hand, the 
capital share can easily be distorted by the presence of foreign ownership restrictions. 
Such a restriction was in effect in Thailand during the study period.3 The capital share 
would not be a good proxy for the foreign presence in a country as in Thailand where 
there is a foreign ownership restriction. Hence, the output share is the preferred proxy.
function for each industry separately. The estimated intercept from the industry’s production 
function can be regarded as its TFP. The second step is to examine the relationship between TFP 
and other explanatory variables as in equation (6.5) (i.e. FOR, FOR*TP, TP and X).
However, the estimated intercept from the above estimation procedure can represent the 
industry’s TFP if and only if the industry exhibits the constant-retum-to-scale assumption. Such 
an assumption seems to be restrictive at the firm level. For example, Bloch and Tang (2000), 
who estimated the return to scale of Singaporean manufacturing firms during the period 1975-94 
find that there are only five out of 22 Singaporean industries that exhibit constant-retum-to-scale. 
Hence, it does not appear to pursue this alternative.
3 See details in Chapter 3.
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The trade policy regime (TP) is proxied using two alternative measures, namely 
NRP and ERP. These two measures have been used in previous empirical analysis. 
However, there is no consensus amongst economists as to choice of one over the other. 
ERP is obviously theoretically superior to NRP since it measures “true” net pulls on 
resource allocation and true proportional inflation of payments to factors by the overall 
tariff structure (Corden, 1966). On the other hand, NRP is presumably a more visible 
indicator of protection to interest groups, which generally tend to demand changes in 
protection on nominal rates on their outputs rather than seeking changes in the rates of 
tariffs on inputs (Cheh, 1974).
In addition, as guided by the theory and previous empirical works on the 
determinants of inter-industry changes in productivity, three additional explanatory 
variables are used. Firstly, this study takes into account the role of labour quality (QL) in 
determining productivity. A high quality of labour is likely to contribute to an increase in 
value added per worker. The ratio of supervisory and management workers to total 
employment is used here to proxy the quality of labour. The rationale of this proxy 
regards supervisory and management workers as skilled labour. Thus, the higher the 
ratio, the higher the labour quality. A positive sign to the associated coefficient is 
expected.
Secondly, the technology gap (TECH) between foreign and local firms is another 
key determinant of the degree of technology spillover. TECH is proxied by the ratio of 
average value added per worker between foreign and local firms net of capital intensity 
and firm size. While the ratio of average labour productivity of foreign firms to that of 
locally owned ones has been widely used in previous studies, this measure suffers from 
the possibility that the larger labour productivity is due to the greater degree of capital 
intensities and/or the larger scale of production rather than differences in technologies,
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i.e. the ability to transform inputs into outputs.4 Differences in capital intensity and/or 
sales could be due to several factors that might not be directly related to technological 
capability. For example, foreign and local firms would face different relative costs of 
labour and capital because of their different ability to access factor inputs. This would 
differ their capital intensity from one another and not necessarily imply different 
technological capability. Moreover, a firm with a longer period of operation in a given 
country could well be larger in size, compared to a new firm even if they have the same 
level of technology. Therefore, to guard against these possibilities, the effects of capital 
intensity as well as size would be excluded when measuring the technology gap. Using 
the plant-level data, the difference in labour productivity between domestic and foreign 
establishments is estimated for each industry, after accounting for capital intensities and 
scale of production based on equation (6.7).
LP:. = a„ + b,;:\ —
1(7 / '  ij
+ blijsaleij + b^j foreign (6.7)
where LR  = Labour productivity of the i firm in thej  industry (in log)
— = Capital-labour ratio of the i,h firm in the j th industry (in log)
V /  Jij
sale.j = Value of total sales of the ith firm in the j th industry (in log)
foreign= Dummy variable, which equals to 0 if the share of foreign 
ownership is zero and 1 otherwise.
According to equation (6.7), the coefficient b3j is a measure of the difference in
technology after taking into account capital intensity and firm size. The larger the 
coefficient by , the more the technology gap of foreign firms is superior to the local ones.
The lower the technological gap between the foreign affiliate and a local firm in a given 
industry, the easier the latter will be able to emulate the technology brought in by the
4 See the full definition of technology used in this study in Chapter 2. The approach to 
measure the technology gap between foreign and local firms is previously used in Sjöholm 
(1999a: p.61)
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former. For this reason, a negative relationship is hypothesized between TECH and LPd 
across industries.
Thirdly, market concentration (CON) is included as an explanatory variable 
because two industries with the same technical efficiency may show a different value 
added per worker because of different domestic market concentration. In addition as 
argued by Hall (1988), the impact of any possible exogenous factors on industry 
productivity would be conditioned by the degree of market competition. Hence, the 
market concentration is needed to be incorporated into the model. Two widely-used 
proxies are chosen for market concentration, market share of the five largest firms (CR5) 
and the Herfindahl-Hirshman index of concentration (HHI). The formulae to calculate 
both proxies for market concentration are in equations (6.8) and (6.9), respectively. 
Hence, a positive sign is expected for the corresponding coefficient.
CR5, /  =  1 n
HHI: i s iI ' -
where st = Total sales of the ith firm in the j th industry.
(6 .8)
(6.9)
6.1.2 Foreign Presence
In order to redress the problem of simultaneity involved in the relationship 
between FOR and LPd , equation (6.5) is estimated together with a separate equation to 
explain the FDI determinants at industry level. The specification of the second equation 
is discussed below before presenting the two-equation model. In addition to a potential 
relationship with LPd, FOR is a function of market size, tariff barriers, and labour 
quality. These three variables have been widely used in previous empirical studies on 
FDI determinants.
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TP is included as an explanatory variable to examine the validity of the ‘tariff 
hopping’ hypothesis that protective tariff barriers stimulate IS FDI. This hypothesis has 
been supported by various empirical studies (e.g. Lim, 2001; Jun and Singh, 1997). The 
size of the domestic market would be one of the relevant factors for MNEs when 
deciding modes of entry, i.e. either producing at and exporting from the home country, or 
locating and producing within the host country. The size of the domestic market 
(MSIZE) is measured by the sum of gross output and (net) import at the 4-digit ISIC 
level, averaging over the period 1986-94. MNEs are more likely to establish affiliates in 
large domestic markets.
In a small open economy like Thailand, TP or MSIZE alone might not be 
significant enough to attract FDI. It would be more appropriate to add the interaction 
term to capture the impact of both TP and MSIZE. The interaction between TP and 
MSIZE implies the impact of TP in stimulating FDI is likely to depend on MSIZE. At a 
given level of tariff protection, a larger market size enhances the stimulating impact of 
tariff barriers on a foreign presence. Similarly, in Thailand, market size per se might not 
be large enough to attract a MNE to locate its affiliate and to substitute international trade 
for investment. In other words, the impact of market size on FDI determinants depends 
positively on tariff barriers. Hence, the coefficient of interaction term is expected to be 
positive while the coefficients associated with TP and MSIZE could be either positive or 
negative. Even though the coefficients associated with both these variables turn out to be 
negative, it is not possible to conclude tariff barriers or market size exhibit a negative 
relationship with the foreign presence, as it also depends on the interaction effect.
Finally, the standard hypothesis that quality of labour will encourage ‘efficiency­
seeking’ FDI inflows is incorporated in the analysis by taking the variable labour quality 
(QL) into account. Some foreign investors locate entrepreneurial activities across 
countries in order to access cheaper and/or better quality raw material and/or labour to 
enhance productivity. This hypothesis is in evidence to explain the behaviour of FDI 
inflows in the late 1980s, especially in developing countries like Thailand and Malaysia.
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6.1.3 The Model
Based on the above discussion, the estimating equations are specified as follows;
r‘ . > j
+ß1kä] + ß iFORi +ßtFOR*TP] + ßsTP,+ß(,CON,+ß1TECHJ +ßaQL. + s t (6.10)
FOR,. = Qj+yJPj + y 2MSIZEj + r 3TPj * + y iQLj + (6 . 11)
where LPf = Labor productivity of locally owned/h industry (in log)
' k ^
lJ,V j
FOR;
TP;
CON;
= Capital-labor ratio of locally ownedy'th industry (in log)
= Capital stocks of locally owned firm /h industry (in log)
= Foreign presence proxied by the share of foreign output to they'th 
industry (in log)
= Trade policy regime proxied alternatively by (in log)
1. NRPj = Nominal rate of protection of th e /h industry
2. ERPj = Effective rate of protection of they'th industry
= Market concentration index of they'th industry alternatively proxied by
(in log)
1. CR5j = Sum of market share of the first five largest firm in the f h
industry
2. HHIj = Herfindahl-Hirshman index of concentration of the j lh industry 
TECH.= Technology gap between local and foreign firms in thef h industry
proxied by estimation using equation (6.7)
QLj = Labour quality of they'th industry proxied by the ratio of supervisory
and management workers to total industry employment (in log)
MSIZEj = Market size of th e /h industry measured by the sum of gross output and
(net) import at the 4-digit ISIC level(in log).
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6.2. Data Description
Data for the study are compiled from unpublished returns to the Industrial Census 
1997 (data for 1996) conducted by the National Statistics Office (NSO). A well-known 
limitation of the cross-sectional data set with each industry representing a single data 
point is that they make it difficult to control for unobserved industry specific differences. 
Long-term averages tend to ignore changes that may have occurred over time in the same 
country. These limitations can be avoided by using the panel data set compiled by 
pooling cross-industry and time-series data. Particularly, in the nature of technology 
spillover that involves a time-consuming process, panel data is more appropriate. 
Unfortunately, given the nature of data availability in this case, this preferred data choice 
is not possible. Data are available electronically for all years from 1993-9. The year 
1996 is chosen for the study because 1997-9 data are not ‘normal’ years, compared to the 
1996 ones. The firm coverage of the survey for 1993-5 is rather incomplete.
The census covers 32,489 plants, belonging to 126 four-digit industries of TSIC. 
As a result of the data cleaning fully described in Chapter 4, the final sample drop to 
15,624 plants (1,510 foreign-owned and 14,114 domestic-owned plants) across 105 
industries. These plants accounted for 61.5 per cent of the Thailand’s manufacturing 
value added and 36.5 per cent of manufacturing labour force in 1996.
The analysis can be undertaken either at a plant or industry level. This study 
pursues at the industry level because it allows us to use a simultaneous-equation approach 
where both technology spillover and FDI determinant equations are brought together to 
rectify the simultaneity problem. In addition, several plant characteristics in the 
Industrial Census are rather incomplete. For example, information on market orientation 
is reported approximately, divided into four-wide bands, i.e. less than 50 per cent, 50 per 
cent, greater than 50 per cent and 100 per cent. Information on foreign equity holding 
and local content is more or less similar to that on market orientation. Such incomplete 
information seems to be highly relevant in explaining firms’ productivity. For example, 
plants, which export almost 50 per cent of total sales tend to be more efficient than those
205
whose export-sale ratio is less than 10 per cent. The information available at the plant 
level is not able to distinguish these two types of plants. Nevertheless, this problem tends 
to be less severe at the industry level. There are several proxies for the industry’s market 
orientation such as export-output ratio, NRP and ERP.
To estimate the foreign presence, the ratio of sales of foreign firms to total sales 
(local and foreign) is measured. All firms with FDI (regardless of the magnitude of the 
foreign share in capital stock) are considered to be foreign firms for the identification of
local firms. LPa
ldv 1 /
and hd are the result of the sum of locally owned firms within
the / h industry. Value added is defined as the difference between gross output and raw 
materials net of changes in inventories, whereas capital stock is represented by the value 
of fixed assets at the initial period. CR5, HH1 and TECH are constructed from data for 
all plants as formulae discussed above. For measuring labour quality, the supervisory 
and management workers are defined as employees not directly engaged in production or 
other related activities. The actual number o f supervisors and management workers are 
not available in the census. So the number of non-production workers reported would 
also include clerical and administrative staff. Nevertheless, the number of non-production 
workers could still to some extent be a reasonable proxy of that of available supervisors 
because the number of support staff is likely to go hand in hand with that of supervisors 
and management workers.
Data on ERP and NRP are from Athukorala, Jongwanich and Kohpaiboon 
(2004). They reflect the protection structure in 1997. Even though the NRP and ERP 
estimates mainly capture the only tariff protection, this is not a major limitation because 
there are not many quantitative restrictions (QRs) and subsidies in Thai manufacturing. 
In addition, the ERP series used is the weighted average of import-competing and export- 
oriented ERP, so that the impact of various tariff rebate programs is incorporated in ERP 
estimates.5 Data for the gross output, export and import on 4-digit ISIC industries are 
obtained from UNIDO series held at the International Economic Data Bank of the
5See a full discussion in Chapter 3.
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Australian National University. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 provide a statistical summary as well 
as a correlation matrix of all relevant variables in this analysis.
Table 6.1
A Statistical Summary of the Key Variables
Mean S.D. Min Max
LPj
k d ^
(log) thousand baht/worker 5.34 0.77 3.87 9.04
J
u , (log) thousand baht/worker 5.86 0.94 3.93 10.69
(log) thousand baht 14.36 1.55 10.65 18.45
L P J
f k  ]
(log) thousand baht/worker 5.94 0.68 4.77 9.32
J
U J (log) thousand baht/worker 6.10 0.93 3.93 10.61
k j (log) thousand baht 14.93 1.49 11.42 18.45
FORj (log) proportion 0.37 0.20 0.00 0.69
NRPj (log) proportion 0.14 0.07 0 0.47
ERPj
CR5j
(log) proportion 
(log) proportion
0.13
0.42
0.19
0.13
-1.28
0.14
0.69
0.68
QLj (log) proportion 0.22 0.10 0.07 0.54
TE C H  j none -0.12 0.46 -1.42 1.31
M SIZEj (log) Smillion 6.23 1.67 1.39 8.94
H H Ij proportion squared 0.12 0.11 0.01 0.63
Notes: (1) Mean = simple average; Min = minimum; Max = maximum; SD = standard deviation
(2) Estimates of LPj, LPd , V
\ li j
'kp
r‘ . V j  J
, /: and k d are the logarithmic transformation
of their value. The other variables are converted into logarithmic form as log(l+x) where x is the 
variable
Source-. Author’s computations based on data sources described in the text.
6.3 Econometric Procedure
Initially the equations are estimated using the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
method while paying attention to the possible presence of outliers as well as their 
performance in terms of standard diagnostic tests relevant for cross-sectional regression
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analysis of this nature (i.e. functional form, heteroscedasticity, and residual normality). 
Due to the nature of cross-sectional data, it is likely the outliers could impact on and 
mislead the estimated parameters and therefore careful treatment of outliers is needed. 
Cook’s Distance0 is used to identify suspected outliers. To accommodate the outliers, 
intercept dummies are introduced and estimated to test both changes in estimated 
parameters and significance of the interested dummy. Having decided upon the basic 
form of equations (6.10) and (6.11), which contain current endogenous variables as 
explanatory variables, they are re-estimated using the two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
method.
Unbiasedness and consistency of OLS estimates rest on the assumption that the 
explanatory variables are uncorrelated with the stochastic disturbance terms. This 
assumption becomes invalid for any individual equation in a system of equations 
whenever at least one of the explanatory variables of that equation is jointly-determined, 
making the use of OLS inappropriate. The alternative estimators devised to be used in 
this situation fall into two main categories: system methods and single-equation methods. 
The system methods, of which three-stage least squares (3SLS) and full-information 
maximum likelihood (FIML) are best known, are superior to the single-equation methods 
in terms of efficiency of the estimates. However, in using 3SLS or FIML, all equations 
in the system must be properly specified. Since these methods utilize information on the 
interconnection among all the equations in the system, what is happening elsewhere in 
the system will be transmitted throughout the whole system, causing biases and 
distortions. Based on a Monte Carlo experiment of a finite sample, 2SLS has emerged as 
a good compromise choice among available alternatives. 2SLS generally performs well in 
terms of both bias and mean-squared error, shows a relatively higher degree of stability 
and is not greatly affected by specification (Intriligator et al. 1996: p.389). Moreover, 
2SLS and 3SLS estimates are equivalent asymptotically (Wooldridge 2002: p.199).
6Cook’s distance is the ‘influence statistic’ developed by Cook (1977). The statistics take 
into account both the studentized residuals (i.e. the residual divided by its standard error) as well 
as the estimated variances of the residuals to identify outliers. For details see Belsley et al. (1980) 
and Barnett and Lewis (1994).
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2SLS involves applying OLS in two stages. The first stage involves regressing 
each of the explanatory endogenous variables on all the pre-determined variables. In the 
second stage, the fitted values of the explanatory endogenous variables, obtained from the 
first regression, are used in place of their observed values to estimate the structural form 
coefficients. This two-stage procedure avoids the simple one-stage least square bias and 
inconsistency in the estimates by eliminating from the explanatory endogenous variables 
that part o f the variation that is due to the disturbance.
6.4. Results of FDI Technology Spillover
The regression results relating to determinants of productivity are reported in 
Table 6.3. All equations in Table 6.3 included intercept dummies for four observations 
(industries) which were found to be outliers in terms of the Cook’s Distance test. 7 
Equation 6.3.1 represents the OLS estimating results, where FOR, TP proxied by ERP 
and their interaction term are included. The estimated equation passes the F- test for 
overall statistical significance at the one per cent level and performs very well by the 
standard diagnostic tests. Despite obtaining theoretical expected sign, these three key 
variables in interest are not significantly different from zero. This would be due to the 
presence of the multicollinearity problem that occurs among them. In the absence of a 
strong theoretical reason in favour of dropping one variable over the other, two 
alternative functional forms are estimated. On the one hand, the interaction term is 
dropped from equation 6.3.1 and the equation is re-estimated as reported in equation 
6.3.2. On the other hand, equation 6.3.3 is the OLS estimating result o f equation 6.3.1, 
from which ERP is dropped. The OLS estimating results of both equations perform 
equally well in terms of the overall fit and the standard diagnostic tests, especially the 
functional fonn test. Nevertheless, only the interaction term between ERP and FOR in 
equation 6.3.3 is statistically significant with the theoretically expected sign. Hence, the
7 These are manufacture of other special purpose machinery, manufacture of 
accumulators, primary cells and primary batteries, manufacture of office accounting and 
computing machinery, and manufacture of insulated wire and cable. In the first two industries 
foreign investors play a very limited role. By contrast, shares of foreign presence in the last two 
industries are very large.
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functional form in equation 6.3.3 is the preferred choice. This function form is also 
applied when TP is proxied by NRP as in equation 6.3.5
The 2SLS estimates o f equations 6.3.3 and 6.3.5 are reported as equations 6.3.4 
and 6.3.6, respectively. Even though two alternative estimation methods provide 
remarkably similar, the equations estimated by 2SLS are our preferred estimation.8 The 
reason is what there would be an endogeneity problem between the productivity o f 
locally owned industry and the foreign presence.
Regression estimates turn out to be remarkably resilient to the use o f the two 
alternative trade policy variables. As discussed in Chapter 2, there was a significant 
impact o f various tax rebate schemes on incentive structure, so ERP estimates would be a 
better indicator to reflect the nature o f  trade policy regime across industries. Hence, the 
following discussion focuses on the equation estimated using the 2SLS regression with 
the ERP as the trade policy measure. The concentration indices, CR5 and HHI, yielded 
similar results. Based on the overall statistical significance (F-test), only the C^J-based 
estimates are reported. Most o f the estimates except FOR and QL are significantly 
different from zero with the theoretically expected signs.
Despite the mild statistical significance (i.e. 10 per cent level), the negative 
coefficient o f FOR*ERP fails to reject the ‘Bhagwati hypothesis’ that industries with 
trade policy regimes characterized by greater outward orientation tend to yield more 
benefits in the form o f technology spillover from foreign affiliates. The evidence that the 
coefficient o f FOR is not statistically different from zero points out that foreign presence 
could either negatively or positively affect the productivity o f locally owned industry, 
depending on the nature o f trade policy regime, i.e. ERP greater or less than zero. This 
finding is in line with previous studies that have examined the more aggregated data, e.g. 
Balasubramanyam et al. (1996); Athukorala and Chand (2000) and the finding in the 
previous chapter. At the mean level o f ERP (i.e. 16 per cent), the foreign presence
8 3SLS estimation does not alter the estimated results apart from some minor changes.
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generates the net negative impact on the productivity o f locally owned industry. A 
percentage increase in FOR reduces the labour productivity by 0.15 per cent.
The coefficient of TECH is significantly different from zero at 1 per cent level 
with the theoretically expected (negative) sign. This suggests that, given the level of 
foreign presence and degree of trade restrictiveness, a locally owned industry that 
exhibits laggard technology capability relative to a foreign firm tends to exhibit lower 
labour productivity.
For the impact of competition, the coefficient ß b for CR5 reaches a positive sign 
and is statistically different from zero. This suggests a highly concentrated market 
structure significantly impacts on the value added per worker. The coefficient associated 
with QL is not statistically significant.
Table 6.4 presents the regression results relating to determinants of foreign 
presence in Thai manufacturing. All equations in Table 6.4 included intercept dummies 
for four observations (industries) which were found to be outliers in terms of the Cook’s 
Distance test.9 Equations 6.4.1 and 6.4.4 represent the OLS results based on ERP and 
NRP, respectively, as a proxy of TP. While MSIZE, TP and their interaction are all in 
both equations and it is likely the estimates are affected by the multicollinearity problem, 
all estimated coefficients still obtain the theoretically expected sign and are statistically 
significant at the 10 per cent level. As argued by Gujarati (1999: p.327), the 
multicollinearity problem would be acceptable as long as most individual regression 
coefficients are statistically significant. In addition, if the objective of the study is to 
estimate a group of coefficients (e.g. the sum or difference of two coefficients) fairly 
accurately, this can be done even in the presence of multicollinearity.
9 Based on ERP as TP, they are manufacture of grain mill products, manufacture of 
builders’ carpentry and joinery, manufacture of tobacco products, and manufacture of machinery 
for mining, quarrying and construction. Regarding the equations based on NRP, there are 
manufacture of grain mill products, manufacture of builders’ carpentry and joinery (same as in 
the ERP case) and manufacture of refined petroleum products.
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Table 6.3
Determinants of Labour Productivity in Locally Owned Industry (LP. ):
Regression Results with Alternative Measures of Trade Policy Regime
TP=ERP TP=NRP
6.3.1 6.3.2 6.3.3 6.3.4 6.3.5 6.3.6
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS1 OLS 2SLS1
INTERCEPT 3.84
(4.23)*
3.88
(4.31)*
3.81
(4.24)*
4.25
(3.03)*
3.97
(4.44)*
4.19
(3.55)*
( k \ d .
l / J J
0.49
(6.08)*
0.49
(6.13)*
0.49
(6.15)*
0.47
(5.30)*
0.47
(5.84)*
0.47
(5.53)*
0.10
(1.91)**
0.09
(1.90)**
0.10
(1.92)**
0.09
(1.66)**
0.10
(2.03)**
0.10
(1.82)**
f o r , -0.81
(-2.23)*
-0.91
(3.44)*
-0.74
(-2.55)*
-1.14
(-1.03)
-0.46
(-1.27)***
-0.68
(-0.78)
FOR* TP j -0.59
(-0.35)
-1.03
(-1.55)"*
-1.74
(-1.25)***
-2.92
(-1.62)***
-3.05
(-1.45)***
TPj -0.14
(-0.33)
-0.26
(-1.04)
TECHj -0.52
(-4.54)*
-0.53
(-4.82)*
-0.51
(-4.60)*
-0.51
(-4.45)*
-0.51
(-4.62)*
-0.51
(-4.56)*
CR5j 0.83
(1.62)***
0.83
(1.62)***
0.82
(1.60)***
1.07
(1.43)***
0.81
(1.61)***
0.91
(1.49)***
QLj -0.03
(0.06)
-0.003
(-0.01)
-0.06
(-0.11)
-0.08
(-0.14)
-0.13
(-0.25)
-0.14
(-0.25)
Adjusted-R-squared 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.61 0.64 0.63
/^-statistics 15.5* 17.1* 17.2* 16.0* 17.5* 17.3*
Number o f outliers 4 4 4 4 4 4
Diagnostic Tests2
Functional form
2.10
(p=0.15)
2.04
(p=0.15)
2.13
(p=0.14)
1.32
(p=0.25)
1.93
(p=0.17)
1.54
(p=0.22)
Residual normality
5.27
(p=0.07)
5.46
(p=0.07)
5.16
(p=0.08)
3.27
(p=0.20)
6.40
(p=0.05)
5.25
(p=0.73)
Heteroscedasticity
0.69
(p=0.41)
0.64
(p=0.42)
0.71
(p=0.40)
0.15
(p=0.70)
0.84
(p=0.36)
0.17
(p=0.68)
Overidentification
2.31
(p=0.29)
1.26
(p=0.32)
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are /-statistics and *, **, and *** indicate the level of statistical 
significance at 1, 5, and 10 per cent, respectively.
'The instrument variables are MSIZE and ERP as well as their interaction with TP.
2See details of diagnostic tests in Appendix 12.
Source: Author’s estimates based on data series discussed in the text.
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Hence, the functional form where three variables in the equations are incorporated is the 
preferable choice.
The equation passes the F- test for overall statistical significance at the five per 
cent and performs well in terms of the standard diagnostic tests. The 2SLS estimates of 
equations 6.4.1 and 6.4.3 are reported in equations 6.4.2 and 6.4.4, respectively. Due to 
the presence of endogeneity problem, the 2SLS estimates are preferable. The regression 
estimates turn out to be insensitive to the use of the two alternative trade policy variables 
(NRP and ERP) except LPd . For the purpose of estimate comparison, the following 
discussion focuses on the equation estimated using the 2SLS estimation with ERP as the 
trade policy measure.
The coefficient associated with LPd in equation 6.4.2 is negative and statistically 
insignificant. Interestingly, the estimated coefficient also attains the negative sign and is 
statistically significant in equation 6.4.4 where NRP is a proxy of TP.W The results of 
negative coefficient of LPd from both equations reject the comment made on previous 
single-equation-approach studies that FDI likely gravitates to the highly productive 
domestic sector. The positive and significant estimate of QL suggests there exists 
evidence that labour quality is one of several factors attracting flows of FDI into Thai 
manufacturing. This evidence is widely cited by previous studies, e.g. Ramstetter (1997); 
Tambulertchai and Ramstetter (1991). Low-cost and high-quality workers in Thailand 
have attracted foreign investors, especially from East Asian countries, to transplant and 
use the country as their export base from the late 1980s onward. Nevertheless, the 
inference drawn from this estimated coefficient must be interpreted with caution because 
the proxy used is to some extent approximate.
10 Perhaps the negative coefficient found here reflects a pattem of FDI allocation across 
industries because the value added per worker to some extent could reflect the capital intensity 
feature of industry. The higher the value added per worker, the more the degree of capital 
intensity. That is, based on Thai manufacturing across industries, foreign investors tend to 
participate more in labour-intensive export-oriented industries.
Table 6.4
Determinants of Foreign Presence in Thai Manufacturing: 
Regression Results with Alternative Measures of Trade Policy Regime
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TP=iE R P T P = N R P
6.4.1 6.42 6.43 6.44
OLS 2SLS1 OLS 2SLS1
INTERCEPT 1.06
(3.26)*
0.95
(2.00)**
1.77
(4.41)*
1.90
(2.74)*
LPj -0.05
(-1.73)**
-0.04
(-0.89)
-0.07
(-2.63)*
-0.08
(-1.52)**
M SIZEj -0.03
(-1.60)***
-0.03
(-1.63)**
-0.08
(-2.28)*
-0.08
(-2.24)*
TPj -0.76
(-1.23)***
-0.78
(-1.25)***
-2.86
(-2.15)**
-2.86
(-2.15)**
TPj * MSIZEj 0.11
(1.28)***
0.11
(1.27)***
0.38
(1.93)**
0.38
(1.92)**
QLj 0.41
(1.99)**
0.41
(1.98)**
0.27
(1.36)***
0.27
(1.37)**
Adjusted R- 
squared
0.07 0.08 0.11 0.11
/^-statistics 2.00** 2.00** 2.56* 2.54*
Number o f 
Outliers
4 4 3 3
Diagonostic tests2
Functional form 2.53
(p=0.11)
2.03
(p=0.16)
0.03
(p=0.85)
1.46
(p=0.23)
Residual normality
3.89
(p=0.14)
4.11
(p=0.13)
4.22
(p=0.12)
3.93
(p=0.14)
Heteroscedasticity
0.42
(0.52)
1.50
(p=0.22)
1.68
(p=0.20)
2.60
(0.11)
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. *, **, and *** indicate the level of statistical
significance at 1,5, and 10 per cent, respectively.
The instrument variables are
k d \
V* Jj
2See details of diagnostic tests in Appendix 12.
Source: Author’s estimates based on data series discussed in the text.
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Another interesting result from the FDI determinants equation relates to the 
degree of protection and size of the domestic market as well as their interaction. Despite 
the mild level of statistical significance (i.e. at the 10 per cent), the positive and 
significant coefficient of the interaction term between ERP and MSIZE supports the 
hypothesis that, in a small-open economy like Thailand, neither protection nor the size of 
the domestic market individually is enough to explain FDI determinants.11 At the given 
level of MSIZE, any increase in the tariff rate invites additional foreign investment to 
locate and establish plants in order to share the economic rents created by the tariff 
increase. Similarly, over and above the impact of trade barriers in attracting foreign 
investors, the larger the domestic market size, the greater the direct investment from 
abroad.
6.5 FDI and Technological Capability in Host Countries
In addition to FDI technology spillover, FDI itself could affect technological 
capability in the host country. This is due to the general belief that MNE affiliates are 
more productive than local firms, so that their entry means there are new and more 
productive firms in the host country economy, thereby raising overall industry 
productivity. However, empirical results do not always support this general belief. For 
example, Ramstetter (2004) finds there is no significant difference in productivity 
between locally owned and foreign firms in Thailand. Hence, it is worthwhile to 
explicitly examine the total impact on the manufacturing sector. To evaluate such an 
impact, equation (6.10) is re-estimated by using the whole sample covering both foreign 
and locally owned firms. That is,
LPj ~ßo+ ß\V +ß 1ki + ß,FOR, +ßfO R , * m + ß 5m +  ß6CONj + ß 1TECHj + ßtQL + ej (6.12)
where LP- = the labor productivity of the whole j  industry (in log)
11 The NRP-based estimate of the interaction is statistically significant with the positive 
sign at the five per cent level.
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V
v h j
= the capital-labor ratio of the whole/h industry (in log)
kj = the capital stocks of the w hole/h industry (in log) 
Other variables are the same as in equation (6.10)
The key hypothesis still focuses on the role of the trade policy regime. The 
impact of the foreign presence on the whole industry’s productivity is given by the partial 
derivative of LP with respect to FOR.
dLPj
dFORj ßi + ßJPj
(+/-)  (-)
Note that the partial derivation of LP with respect to FOR in equation (6.12) is 
different from that in equation (6.10). The partial derivation here captures both the direct 
impact of the presence of MNE affiliates on productivity and its technology spillover to 
locally owned firms. In particular, ß z represents both the advanced technology associated 
with MNE affiliates and a part of FDI technology spillover.
The econometric procedure used to estimate equation (6.12) is similar to that 
applied to equation (6.10). That is, equations are estimated using the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) method while paying attention to the possible presence of outliers as well 
as their performance in terms of the standard diagnostic tests. The functional forms that 
perform well in the standard diagnostic tests for cross-section analysis are re-estimated by 
2SLS in order to take into account the presence of an endogeneity problem. Where the 
FDI determinants equation is concerned, we do not re-estimate equation (6.11) by using 
LP , the productivity of total industry to address the possibility that foreign investment 
gravitates towards more productive industries. It is more appropriate to use the 
productivity of locally owned industry ( LPd) only to address such a possibility rather 
than using the productivity of industry as a whole, where foreign firms are also included.
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6.6 Results of FDI and Technological Capability in Host Countries
The regression results relating to determinants of productivity of the 
manufacturing sector are reported in Table 6.5. All equations in Table 6.5 included 
intercept dummies for four observations (industries) which were found to be outliers in 
terms of the Cook’s Distance test. Equation 6.5.1 is the OLS estimating results, using 
ERP as a proxy of TP. In this equation, FOR, TP and their interaction term are all 
included. Similar to the productivity determinant equation of locally owned industries, 
the presence of multicollinearity problem causes all estimated coefficients corresponding 
to these three variables to be statistically insignificant. To solve the multicollinearity 
problem, the same econometric procedure used in Section 6.4 is also applied here. 
Equations 6.5.2 and 6.5.3 are the OLS estimating results after dropping the interaction 
term and TP, respectively, from equation 6.5.1. While the estimates corresponding to TP 
and its interaction with FOR in equations 6.5.2 and 6.5.3, respectively, are both 
statistically significant, equation 6.5.3 is chosen because the latter is slightly better in 
terms of the overall fit (F-test). The 2SLS estimates of equation 6.5.3 are reported as 
equation 6.5.4. Equations 6.5.5 and 6.5.6 are the OLS and 2SLS estimating results, 
respectively, using NRP as a proxy of TP. As discussed earlier, the equations estimated 
by 2SLS are our preferred estimation.
There is no significant difference between the two alternative trade policy 
measures, NRP and ERP. The following discussion focuses on the equation estimated 
using the 2SLS regression with ERP as the trade policy measure and CR5 as the 
concentration index for the purpose of estimate comparison. Most of the estimates except 
QL and FOR are significantly different from zero with the theoretically expected signs.
12 They are manufacture of refined petroleum products, manufacture of other special 
purpose machinery, manufacture of office accounting and computing machinery, and 
manufacture of tobacco products.
218
Table 6.5
Determinants of Labour Productivity in Thai Manufacturing:
Regression Results with Alternative Measures of Trade Policy Regime
TP =E R P T P = N R P
6.5.1 6.5.2 6.5.3 6.5.4 6.5.5 6.5.6
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
INTERCEPT 3.95
(5.54)*
4.03
(5.68)*
3.90
(5.52)*
4.12
(5.14)*
4.04
(5.81)*
4.07
(5.20)*
Cl 0.53
(8.33)*
0.53
(8.41)*
0.53
(8.41)*
0.52
(7.84)*
0.51
(8.25)*
0.51
(8.09)*
kJ 0.08
(2.47)*
0.08
(2.37)*
0.09
(2.49)*
0.09
(2.32)*
0.09
(2.63)*
0.10
(2.53)*
FORj -0.05
(-0.22)
-0.22
(-1 17)***
0.32
(0.16)
-0.38
(-0.56)
0.34
(-1.35)***
0.39
(0.43)
FO R * TPj -1.15
(-0.97)
-1.75
(-2.56)*
-2.18
(-2.48)*
-3.75
(-3.14)*
-4.28
(-2.98)*
TPj -0.19
(-0.61)
-0.43
(-2.44)*
TECHj -0.27
(-3.24)*
-0.29
(-3.55)*
-0.26
(-3.20)*
-0.28
(-3.06)*
-0.27
(-3.39)*
-0.27
(-2.84)*
CR5j 0.41
(1.03)
0.40
(1.07)
0.40
(1.08)
0.68
(1.24)***
0.33
(0.91)
0.35
(0.64)
QLj -0.07
(-0.19)
-0.02
(-0.05)
-0.09
(-0.28)
-0.08
(-0.22)
-0.12
(-0.34)
-0.13
(-0.36)
Adjusted-R-
squared
0.76 0.76 0.76 0.75 0.77 0.77
F-statistics 15.5* 31.3* 31.6* 28.9* 32.9* 32.8*
Number o f outliers 4 4 4 4 4 4
Diagnostic Tests2
Functional form
2.84
(p=0.09)
2.28
(p=0.13)
3.12
(p=0.08)
1.17
(p=0.28)
2.57
(p=0.11)
2.38
(p=0.12)
Residual normality
3.73
(p=0.16)
4.60
(p=0.10)
3.30
(p=0.19)
3.47
(p=0.18)
2.66
(p=0.27)
2.33
(p=0.31)
Heteroscedasticity
0.24
(p=0.62)
0.15
(p=0.70)
0.27
(p=0.60)
1.70
(p=0.19)
0.12
(p=0.73)
0.25
(p=0.62)
Overidentification
0.11
(p=0.30)
1.68
(p=0.31)
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are /-statistics.
*, **, and *** indicate the level of statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 per cent,
respectively.
'The instrument variables are MSIZE and ERP as well as their interaction with TP. 
2See details of diagnostic tests in Appendix 12.
Source: Author’s estimates based on data series discussed in the text.
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The overall results are similar to the estimates of FDI technology spillover. The 
negative coefficient of FOR*ERP also supports the overall hypothesis that industries 
with trade regimes characterized by greater outward orientation tend to yield more the 
technological benefit from foreign presence. The coefficient of FOR, that is not 
significantly different from zero, indicates that the entry of MNE affiliates does not 
always have significant contribution to industry productivity. The impact is mainly 
conditioned by the nature of the trade regime. Evaluating at the mean level of ERP (16 
per cent), the foreign presence generates a net negative impact. A percentage increase in 
FOR reduced the labour productivity by 0.26 per cent for the overall manufacturing 
sector. This finding is consistent with previous studies of Thai manufacturing e.g. 
Khanthachai et al. (1987); Akira (1989); Tambunlertchai and Ramstetter (1991); 
Ramstetter (2004). In particular, Akira (1989: p. 185, 198) argues that the technology 
associated with FDI in the Thai manufacturing sector under an IS regime usually belongs 
to simple, standardized processes, rather than advanced methods. The evidence found 
here is also in line with general findings in host developing countries pursuing an IS 
regime (Moran, 2001).
6.7. Conclusions
This chapter examines the effect of FDI on technological capability in host 
countries based on a cross-industry analysis of Thai manufacturing. The prime objective 
has been to test the ‘Bhagwati hypothesis’ that technological benefit is unlikely to take 
place in highly trade-restricted industries, compared with more export-oriented ones. 
Two key aspects of the effect on technological capability in host countries are examined. 
Firstly, FDI technology spillover is examined, i.e. whether foreign presence affects the 
productivity of locally owned industry. In order to allow for the simultaneity between 
sectoral productivity and foreign presence, this study uses a system of two equations 
(productivity determinants and FDI determinants) to test the key hypothesis. The 
regression results support the ‘Bhagwati hypothesis’. Technology spillover tends to be 
far less or even negative under an IS regime, compared to policy regime geared toward
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EP. There is also evidence that trade barriers as well as the size of the domestic market 
play an important role in determining inter-industry differences in FDI participation.
Secondly, the analysis is extended to test whether the foreign presence affects 
industry productivity. The sample covers both foreign and locally owned firms. In 
circumstances where there is no FDI technology spillover, MNE affiliates themselves 
could still positively enhance productivity of the industry because they are associated 
with advanced technology. The empirical evidence suggests the trade policy regime still 
plays a pivotal role in determining the technological benefit from MNE affiliates. In 
circumstances where the trade policy regime is restrictive, the entry of MNE affiliates 
does not contribute significantly to technological capability.
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Appendix 12
Diagnostic Tests of Cross-sectional Regression Analysis
1. Functional form
A test of functional form is based the well-known RESET test developed by 
Ramsey (1969). In this test, a comparison is made between our preferred structural 
model and an alternative model involving a higher order polynomial, used to represent a 
different functional form. The RESET test in its most common form consists of the 
following regression:
(A. 13.1)
where YnKl=[Yt -
ßl ■■■ ßm]
r r * , = [ r ,  ■ ■ ■
n = Number of observations
m = Number of explanatory variables including intercept o f the 
preferred structural model.
Yjnxi = Predicted value j th powered from the preferred structural model
0 ' ® '  ^ n x  1 —  - ^ n x m ß m x l  ) •
Subtracting X nxmß mx] from both sides of equation (A. 13.1), we obtain
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The null hypothesis that y rxl =0 is tested using the F-distribution.
2. Heteroscedasticity Test
The simple test of the (unconditional) homoscedasticity assumption proposed by 
Koenker (1981) is used in this study. The test is by running the following regression:
where üt = Residual from the preferred structural model at time t
i e .  rwl = ■
Yt = Predicted value of dependent variable at time t.
(A. 13.2)
The test is conducted with the null hypothesis, a -  0 , using the standard F-test.
3. Residual Normality Test
Normality test pursued in this study is based on Bera-Jarque test proposed by 
Bera and Jarque (1982). The test is conducted as follows:
BJ = — SK2 +— {EK -  3)2 
6 2 4 v '
where SK = skewness
(A.13.3)
EK = kurtosis
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J.
n X»;
n = number of observations 
ut = residual at time t
Under the null hypothesis that the error term is normally distributed, BJ will be 
distributed as j 2(2).
4. Over-identification Test
There is a possibility that we have more instrumental variables than we need to 
identify the equation, hence the over-identification test is needed to ensure whether the 
additional instruments are valid. As proposed by Hausman (1978), the test is obtained 
the product of number of observation (n) and R] from running the following regression;
^ = Z nJ rxl (A.13.4)
s  =the 2SLS residuals of the2SLS estimations
n r 2 c is distributed as x \  where Q is the number of over-identifying restrictions,
i.e. the difference between number of instrumental variables and the endogenous 
variables. If the null hypothesis is rejected, the logic for choosing the instrumental 
variables must be re-examined and vice versa.
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Chapter 7: An Industry Study of the Thai Processed Food and 
Automotive Industries
This chapter surveys the development of the processed food and automotive 
industries over the past three decades. This is to lay the foundation for probing the 
mechanisms of MNE involvement and its contribution in the following chapter. Both 
industries are successful cases, but the trade policy regime toward them seems to be 
strikingly different. On the one hand, in the processed food industry, where four major 
export products, i.e. canned pineapple, canned tuna, processed chicken, and processed 
shrimp (together henceforth referred to as PF4s) are emphasized, Thailand is one of the 
major world exporters. The trade policy regime related to these products is to some 
extent neutral. In addition, the industry is typically export oriented.
On the other hand, in the automotive industry, covering car and component 
manufacturing, Thailand has recently successfully developed to become the regional hub 
in Southeast Asia for several leading MNE car manufacturers. Interestingly, the Thai 
government has long attempted to influence economic incentives by providing protection 
for vehicle manufacture, as well as imposing local-content requirements (LCRs) to 
promote local parts manufacture. These incentives tend to be biased in favour of the 
domestic market as opposed to export. This is because the car assembly industry has a 
high potential to promote linkages to the rest of economy. Promoting the car assembly 
industry could lead to the development of supporting industries. Nevertheless, since the 
early 1990s, selective policies for the automotive industry have noticeably liberalized. 
Thus, examining the automotive industry could address the role of backward linkages and 
gains from FDI. This also provides an opportunity to look at the role of MNE 
involvement within a specific industry under a different policy environment. Over and 
above their individual contribution to the existing literature, the comparison between 
these two successful industries can provide evidence of the role of trade policy regimes in 
regulating gains from MNE involvement.
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This chapter is composed of three sections. The first two sections are devoted to 
the processed food and automotive industries and begin with an examination of domestic 
policy regimes, especially trade and investment policies over the past three decades. This 
is followed by the performance of these two industries in terms of output growth, 
employment and foreign exchange earnings, and an inter-country comparison. The last 
subsection illustrates the role of MNE involvement. Finally, Section 7.3 provides an 
inter-industry comparison.
7.1 The Processed Food Industry
7.1.1 Trade and Investment Policy
Trade and investment policies related to these PF4 products are relatively open. 
Almost all commercial transactions in PF4s are operated by the private sector, with a few 
exceptions where regional trade is conducted on a state-to-state basis (Jaffee and Gorden, 
1993; p.45). Investment policy is liberal and there is no restriction on foreign investment 
producing PF4 products. PF4 industries are listed in the export-oriented promoted 
activities of the Thai Board of Investment (BOI) where foreign ownership restrictions 
(less than 49 per cent) do not apply.
Concerning trade policy, tariffs on finished PF4 products are high but this has no 
effect on consumption patterns over time (Table 7.1). Even though the high tariffs may 
lead to the perception that the trade policy regime involved in PF4 products is in line with 
an IS regime, indeed, such high tariffs are redundant for two reasons. Firstly, Thailand 
has been the world’s major exporter of PF4 (see below). Furthermore, there has not been 
a large domestic demand for these PF4 products. Local consumers prefer fresh to 
processed products, i.e. canned/ frozen. Hence, the presence of PF4 tariffs has not 
effectively been able to encourage enterprises to shift their resources toward the highly 
protected domestic market. The high tariffs are also found in other major primary 
exports such as rice and cassava. In particular, while Thailand is both one of the most
242
efficient rice producers and largest exporters in the world, the Thai government still 
maintains high level of protection (Warr, 2000: pi 228-9).
The canned pineapple and processed shrimp industries are reliant on locally- 
produced primary products. Hence, the existing tariff on these raw materials seems to be 
redundant. By contrast, production of canned tuna relies heavily on imports of raw fish. 
In 2002, while the scheduled tariff rates are extremely high at 60 per cent, the applied 
tariff rate was Only 30 per cent (Table 7.1). Taking into account the presence of various 
tax rebate schemes for export-oriented industries, the incidence of applied tariffs would 
be far lower.1
Table 7.1
Statutory and Applied Tariff Rates (per cent) of the PF4s, 2002
Scheduled tariff rates Applied rates
Canned pineapple (HS2008.20) 60 30
Canned tuna (HS1604) 60 30
Raw fish (HS0302) 60 5
Processed chicken (HS0207) 60 30
Processed shrimp (HS1605) 60 20
Agricultural products (average HS 01-24) 44.7 23.5
Source: Ministry of Finance
The only exceptional case is processed chicken, where inputs are subject to high 
levels of trade protection. In particular, chicken feed ingredients, i.e. soybean, minced 
fish, and maize, have been subject to both tariff and non-tariff measures. Three of these 
ingredients accounted for around 70 per cent of the total cost of chicken meat. The high
’For example, data complied from the Ministry of Commerce sources indicate that the 
incidence of applied tariff rate for raw fish was a mere 0.2 per cent in 1993. During firm 
interviews, no reference was made to any adverse impact from the tariff on raw fish (see details 
of interviews in Chapter 8).
2 Recently, the import restriction imposed on these three ingredients of chicken feed was 
replaced by the quota tariff, i.e. a lower tariff rate for import quantities under the quota. All 
details are available at http://www.dft.moc.go.th/import index.htm. as well as WTO (1995)
AIV5.
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protection on these inputs has adversely affected the industry’s international 
competitiveness (Suphachalasai et al, 1999).
Quality and factory inspection has been another area where the government has 
been involved. Such regulations are general procedure and sometimes are due to a 
request by importing countries. Where some products are concerned, importing raw 
materials and exporting these products needs government permission. For example, 
importers of yellow fin tuna must show an import certificate for environmental 
conservation and dolphin preservation. This permission is pursued for health, safety and 
environmental concerns rather than with the intention of creating any import and export 
transaction barriers. Several government agencies such as the Department of Fisheries, 
Ministry of Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives, and the Department of Industry 
Standards, Ministry of Industry, play a role in quality and factory inspection, which have 
to be undertaken before export certification is issued.
In addition, the Thai government has been actively involved in R&D activities, 
especially at the farm level. Several government agencies, especially the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives, have undertaken R&D activities involved 
with enhancing production efficiency at the farm level, such as post-harvest, feed 
technology, and disease control.3 4 Apart from the farm R&D activities, the Office of 
Export Promotion, Ministry of Commerce regularly arranges an international trade fair 
that provides opportunities for potential local exporters to meet their potential customers, 
and advertises products from Thailand. While a consensus could not be reached on the 
significance of the contribution these activities make to private sector competitiveness, 
they are unlikely to create any adverse effect on the industry’s international 
competitiveness.
3 See detail in WTO (1995) in Table AIV5 and AIV8.
4 For example, see lists of R&D activities for shrimp farming in Suphachalasai et al. 
(1999: p.2-44-5).
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7.1.2 Economic Performances of the PF4 Industries
Over the past three decades, the processed food industry has become increasingly 
important to the Thai economy as a major exporter. Table 7.2 illustrates the export 
performance of the processed food industry during the period 1970-2003. The export 
value of processed foods began exhibiting rapid growth from the mid 1970s, increasing 
from $237 million over the period 1970-5 to $3,108 million and $7,615 million, 
respectively, over the periods 1986-90 and 1996-2000. From 2001-3, the export value 
reached $8,257 million. The annual growth rate was 18 per cent during the period 1970- 
2003.
Compared with agricultural products, the growth performance of processed food 
has been outstanding. The export share of processed foods in agricultural exports 
increased to 61.8 and 67 per cent, respectively, during the period 1996-2000 and 2001-3, 
from around 22.5 per cent during the period 1970-5. In 2003, its share was almost 80 per 
cent. Nevertheless, this rapid growth of processed food exports lags behind that of 
labour-intensive manufacturing, such as garments, electrical appliances, electronics, 
jewelry and gems, etc. The latter’s export value began to take off around the mid-1980s, 
with growth rates much faster than those of traditional export products and processed 
foods. The share of processed food exports to total exports increased until the mid- 
1980s, from 15 per cent in the period 1970-5 to around 19.0 per cent in the 1980s. From 
1990 onward, its share steadily dropped because labour-intensive manufacturing export 
grew even faster. In 2001-3, the share of processed food exports accounted for 12 per 
cent (Table 7.2).
The rapid export growth of processed foods has been driven by the export boom 
in PF4 products. The share of PF4s to processed food exports increased from 24.6 per 
csnt in 1970-5 to 45.3 per cent in 1991-5. From 1996 to the present, PF4 exports 
axounted for around 40 per cent, of which processed shrimp is the biggest export item. 
Processed shrimp accounted for 64 per cent of total PF4 exports during the period 1990-
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2003, followed by processed chicken (15.1 per cent), canned tuna (12.6 per cent) and 
canned pineapple (8.6 per cent) (Table 7.2).
In general, as indicated by the value added per worker figure,5 the processed food 
industry is labour intensive. The value added per worker from 1970-2000 was around 
B0.24 million a worker with a steadily increase from B0.13 million a worker from 1970- 
80 to B0.34 million a worker from 1991-2000. The value added per worker figure is 
always far lower than the average of the manufacturing sector at B0.34 million per 
worker from 1970-2000 (Table 7.3). Hence, an expansion of the processed food industry 
also contributed to employment. Its employment share in the manufacturing sector was 
around 23 per cent from 1970-2000. Nevertheless, its share of manufacturing 
employment declined slightly to 24.5 per cent in 1981-90 and 17.1 per cent in 1991— 
2000. The slight decline was a result of the boom in labour-intensive manufacturing 
exports e.g. clothing and electronics, which have taken off since the mid-1980s (Table 
7.3).6
PF4 exports have exhibited rapid growth since the mid-1970s. The export take­
off began with canned pineapple, with an export value of less than $4 million before 
1973, increasing to $69 million by 1980. During the period 1981-2003, exports 
continued to grow steadily at a rate of 9 per cent per annum (Figure 7.1). The steady 
growth of canned pineapple exports is due to the fact that pineapples must be cultivated 
in coastal areas and require a certain type of soil. In the case of Thailand, such areas are 
limited to a few provinces around the western, eastern and some parts of the southern 
coast, mainly Prachuab Kiri Khan (which has 50 per cent of the total harvested area), and 
Rayong, Pethchburi, Chonburi and Chumphon, thereby constraining harvested output.
5The value added per workers to some extent can be regarded as a broad indicator of the 
degree of capital intensity. The greater the value added per worker, the higher the capital 
intensity.
6 For example, the employment share of the clothing industry increased from 1.1 per cent 
in 1970-80 to 10 and 18.5 per cent in 1986-90 and 1991-2000, respectively. Data are from 
UNIDO, Industrial Statistics (CD-ROM).
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Table 7.3
Performances of Processed Food and Automotive Industries, 1970-2001 
(Output Growth, Employment Absorption and Value Added per Worker)
Processed Automotive
foods Industry
Annual growth o f output (per cent) 
1970-80 7.1 14.2
1981-90 7.4 13.3
1991-2001 5.1 11.3
1970-2001 6.5 12.9
Share o f Manufacturing Output (per cent) 
1970-80 23.4 9.7
1981-90 19.2 7.9
1991-2001 14.5 7.8
1970-2001 19.1 8.5
Share o f M anufacturing Employment (per cent) 
1970-80 26.3 3.1
1981-90 24.5 3.2
1991-2000 17.1 4.0
1970-2000 23.0 3.4
Value added per worker (1,000 baht/worker) 
1970-80 133.7 350.6
1981-90 265.7 439.6
1991-2000 335.5 1008.8
1970-2000 239.6 575.6
Notes: 1. Output growth data for 2001 are preliminary.
2.Output is measured by value added at 1988 prices.
3. Data for employment are rather incomplete. Data in some years are missing. The
figures above are the average over the available data.
4. Value added per worker for processed foods is the data for the food industry excluding 
tobacco and beverages. Since tobacco and beverage industries are very capital intensive, 
inclusion of these two industries might mislead as to the degree of capital intensity of the 
processed food industry.
Sources: Value added is from National Economic and Social Development Board available at 
www.nesdb.go.th and data for employment are from UNIDO, Industrial Statistics, (CD ROM).
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Figure 7.1
Export Value ($million) of Canned Pineapple, 1970-2003
300  -
1980 1985 20001970 1975 1990 1995
Sources'. Compiled from the UN COMTRADE database available at International 
Economic Data Bank (IEDB), the Australian National University for 1970-2000. Data for 
2001-3 are from the World Trade Atlas database.
Figure 7.2
Export Value ($million) of Canned Tuna, 1970-2003
2000
Source: See Figure 7.1.
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Figure 7.3
Export Value (Smillion) of Processed Chicken, 1970-2003
300 -
200  -
100  —
1990 2000
Source: See Figure 7.1.
Figure 7.4
Export Value (Smillion) of Processed Shrimp, 1970-2003
2500
2000
1500
1000
1990 1995 2000
Source: See Figure 7.1.
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Similarly, the export boom in canned tuna took place in the late 1970s. Its export 
value reached $20 million by 1980, from only $6.7 million during the period 1970-5. 
The rapid growth in the export value of canned tuna during the period 1980-2003 
remained at around 22.4 per cent a year (Figure 7.2). The export patterns for processed 
chicken and shrimp are similar to those for canned pineapple and tuna. As in Figure 7.3, 
the export value of processed chicken took off during the late 1970s. Export value in 
1975 was only around $0.5 million but had increased to $33 million by 1980. Its export 
growth rate was around 17 per cent during the period 1980-2000. Despite a later take-off 
in the mid-1980s, the export value of processed shrimp rapidly increased from $273 
million in 1985 to $508 million and to over $1 billion, respectively, in 1987 and 1990 
(Figure 7.4).
Nevertheless, the production process of PF4s transcends general agricultural 
and/or primary products. They need further processing before they reach the consumer. 
This additional processing consists of several complementary and value added activities, 
ranging from articulating consumer demand and designing the products, transforming 
raw agricultural materials into semi-cooked/cooked food, disease control, packaging, 
storing and transporting to consumers (Breimyer, 1976). For example, the production 
process of canned tuna starts from the selection of species and size. Frozen fish are then 
stocked in the cold store according to size, species, and incoming date. Frozen fish are 
thawed in water to an internal temperature of 0 to 5 degree Celsius, eviscerated by hand, 
sorted by size, loaded onto trays stacked on movable shelf racks and transported to a pre­
cooker. Pre-cooked fish is cooled by water spray and later air-cooled. After cooling, fish 
are transferred to a cleaning area for loin cleaning. The head and skin are removed and 
the loin fillet is separated from the skeleton. This is one of the most important parts of 
the production process for determining the end competitiveness of the product. White 
(light) meat that is used for human consumption is further separated from the red (black) 
meat used for pet food. Meat is packed in water, brine or oil in hermetically sealed tin
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cans. The cans are then subjected to a heating process in a stream retort, water-cooled, 
stacked and labeled.7 8
While the production technology involved in further processing is not 
complicated in itself, the key to success in international marketing is how to combine all 
these value added activities. In addition, bad product quality can adversely affect 
consumers’ health. Such an adverse effect on consumers might not be immediately 
observed, but its effect will persist for a longer time. As a result, many importing 
countries impose several Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) regulations on imported 
processed foods including PF4s. In many cases, food safety regulations frequently 
change according to new scientific discoveries. As a result, even though PF4 products as 
well as other processed foods exhibit several favourable economic advantages such as 
lucrative global demand, high unit value, product differentiation, and high income 
elasticities, only a limited number of developing countries export them successfully 
(Jaffee and Gorden, 1993; Athukorala and Jayasuriya, 2003).
In terms of export value, Thailand has gained prominence in world markets in 
these processed food products (Table 7.4). During the period 1999-2001, Thailand was 
the world’s largest exporter of canned pineapple (43 per cent of world exports), canned 
tuna (31 per cent) and processed shrimp (16 per cent). In the case of processed chicken, 
the export value for Thailand accounted for 5.7 per cent. However, the major role of 
France, the Netherlands, Hong Kong and Switzerland in the world export o f processed 
chicken is most likely due to the re-export phenomenon. Their export values were
• • ,  O
associated with the greater value of chicken meat imports. Excluding these countries, 
Thailand was the world’s fourth largest exporter.
7The information is summarized from data available at 
www.foodmarketexchanae.com/datacenter/product/seafood/tuna/dc pi sf tuna03.htm
8 These four countries imported considerable amounts of processed chicken from the US, 
Brazil, China and Thailand. Hong Kong and the Netherlands imported considerable amounts of 
chicken from the US, Brazil, China and Thailand. In contrast, France and Switzerland imported 
heavily from The Netherlands and China.
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Table 7.4
World Market Shares (per cent) of Selected Countries in the PF4s, 1999-2001
Canned Pinea sple1 Canned Tuna"
Rank Country Share Rank Country Share
1 Thailand 43.1 1 Thailand 30.6
2 The Philippines 15.5 2 Spain 13.1
3 Indonesia 12.2 3 Cote d' Ivoire 6.8
4 Kenya 5.9 4 Ecuador 6.5
5 The Netherlands 3.7 5 Seychelles 6.1
sum 80.5 sum 63.0
Processed Chicken1 Processed Shrimp"
Rank Country Share Rank Country Share
1 The United States 21.6 1 Thailand 16.3
2 Brazil 12.7 2 Indonesia 10.7
3 France* 13.3 3 India 10.3
4 The Netherlands* 10.5 4 Vietnam 8.0
5 China, PRC. 6.8 5 Mexico 5.5
6 Thailand 5.7 6 Argentina 3.0
7 China, Hong Kong* 6.2 7 China 3.3
8 Switzerland* 2.6 8 Ecuador 4.8
9 Denmark 2.1 9 Bangladesh 3.3
sum 81.5 sum 65.4
Notes: * refers to countries that exhibited very high import values of frozen chickens. Their
import values were even higher than their corresponding export values. Also, see footnote 8 
for more detail.
Sources: 'Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Fishery Yearbook Statistics, 2001.
2Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Commodities Yearbook Statistics, 2001.
Thailand has done well to comply with the SPS standard. Data from US Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) records9 on detention of import shipments following border 
inspection, could to some extent illustrate the high capability of Thai exporters in terms 
of product quality and hygiene in the US market. The level of rejections for a given 
country depends not only on its ability to meet SPS standards but also on the overall 
export volume. The export value per detention is a better measure of the volume effect,
9 This information is provided by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The 
information, for each shipment detained, includes the name/address of the exporter, the product, 
and the reason for detention, and is available on a monthly basis (with a time lag of about two 
weeks) for the given month and preceding eleven months. Data are available at 
www.fda.gov. oasis
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demonstrating competitiveness in the processed food industry. The higher the export 
value per detention, the higher the capability of exporters for a given country.
Table 7.5 indicates the performance of developing countries according to export 
value i.e. $0-500 million and greater than $500 million. Controlling the export value 
range is necessary to make a reasonable comparison because, all other things being equal, 
a country with a large export value is more likely to be subject to export detention. 
Figures in Table 7.5 clearly reveal the superior performance of Thai exporters in the US 
market, compared with other developing countries. Firstly, Thailand was the largest 
individual exporter of PF4 products in the US market during the period May 2001-April 
2002.l0 The export value was $1,782 million, accounting for 18 per cent of total exports 
from developing countries to the US market. This value was comparable to Chile and 
Mexico, which are geographically close to the US market, thereby making it more 
advantageous to export perishable foods. Secondly, the export value per detention for 
Thailand is $2.6 million, far greater than the average level of developing countries, i.e. 
$1.5 million per detention. That is, the likelihood a PF4 shipment from Thailand was 
detained at the US border was far lower than other developing countries. Even 
considering countries whose export values were greater than $500 million, Thailand was 
ranked second after Chile.
7.1.3 MNE Involvement in the Thai PF4 Industries
Measured by FDI inflow, the foreign presence in the processed food industry 
seems small, compared with other industries. FDI inflows to the food and sugar 
industries were steady during the period 1970-85, at around $6 million annually (Table 
7.6). From then on, a considerable increase in FDI inflows took place. The annual 
average of FDI inflows increased to $59 million and $124 million, respectively, during 
the first and second half of the 1990s. In 2003, the value of FDI inflows was $123 
million. The growth of FDI inflows is still relatively small, compared with some other 
industries, especially the electronics and electrical appliances industries. Thus, the share
10Processed chicken is not included in the US FDA records.
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Table 7.5
Import Detention by the US Food and Drugs Administration:
Number of Detentions, Total Value of Food Exports to the US and Export per 
Detention between May 2001 and April 2002
N o . o f  
c a se s
T o ta l E x p o r t to 
U S  (S m illio n )
E x p o r t p e r  d e te n tio n  
(1 ,0 0 0 $  p e r  c a se )
Export value 0-500
Smillion
G h a n a 8 0 .4 51
S e n e g a l 4 0 .7 185
T u n is ia 6 0 .7 111
N ig e r ia 18 1.8 102
S ri L a n k a 46 11 2 4 7
P a k is ta n 65 15 223
E l S a lv a d o r 15 17 1,103
U ru g u a y 7 23 3 ,2 5 0
M a la y s ia 32 38 1 ,189
D o m in ic a n  R e p u b lic 579 59 102
P e ru 82 74 9 0 7
T u rk e y 138 91 6 6 0
B a n g la d e s h 84 101 1 ,2 0 6
K o re a , R e p u b lic  O f  (S o u th ) 31 4 108 343
T a iw a n , R e p u b lic  O f  C h in a 392 205 523
C o lo m b ia 75 28 2 3 ,7 5 7
A rg e n tin a 138 332 2 ,4 0 5
H o n d u ra s 41 341 8 ,3 1 4
P h ilip p in e s 421 3 9 9 94 8
B ra z il 150 4 0 6 2 ,7 0 8
G u a te m a la 69 6 4 1 8 601
Export value greater than
500 $mil
In d o n e s ia 415 5 0 0 1 ,205
In d ia 461 605 1 ,313
C o s ta  R ic a 85 773 9 ,091
C h ile 154 1 ,597 1 0 ,3 7 2
M e x ic o 1,325 1 ,620 1 ,222
T h a ila n d 695 1 ,782 2 ,5 6 4
Developing countries 6,446 9,800 1,520
Notes: (1) the PF4s consist of fish and shellfish (No. 16), vegetables (No. 20-22) and fruit (No. 24-25) 
(2) Developing countries are classified by the level of income according to the World Bank 
Classification.
Source: Complied using data from import detention from the US Food and Drugs Administration
available at (www.fda.gov.oasis) and data for export to the US from the US International Trade 
Commissions, USITC website (www.usitc.gov)
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of capital inflow into the food and sugar industries as a share of the total industrial sector 
dropped from 14 per cent in the period 1970-5 to 5 per cent in the period 1996-2000, 
further reducing to 3 per cent from 2001-3.
Table 7.6
Annual Inflows of FDI in the Processed Food and Automotive Industries,
1970-2003
Processed Foods Automotive
Value
(Smillion)
Share of 
Manufacturing 
(per cent)
Value
(Smillion)
Share of 
Manufacturing 
(per cent)
1970-5 4 14.0 1 3.9
1976-80 4 8.9 4 8.7
1981-5 12 9.4 10 7.7
1986-90 47 7.0 37 5.4
1991-5 59 6.1 87 8.9
1996-2000 124 5.0 545 22.1
2001 114 2.9 646 16.3
2002p 38 1.9 393 19.9
2003p 123 6.2 582 29.2
Notes: p = preliminary data
Data on FDI inflows into the processed food and automotive industries are from the food and 
sugar, and machinery and transport equipment industries, respectively.
Source: Bank of Thailand, online-data-base available at www.bot.or.th.
The production technology for the PF4s is mainly involved with sterilization or 
freezing. It is rather simple and mature and generally available for arm’s length 
purchase. It becomes of less concern to be linked with MNEs through the FDI channel in 
order to access advanced production technology. Instead, in such industries, the 
likelihood of global market penetration is reliant on accessing knowledge of international
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marketing. Hence, local firms tend to acquire such knowledge from MNEs through non- 
FDI channels. As discussed in Chapter 4, during the period 1986-98, the foreign equity 
share of PF4 firms was 30.7 per cent for the export-oriented BOI-promoted projects, well, 
below the average of export-oriented industries at 62.4 per cent. The low level of foreign 
equity shares rather suggests the presence of MNE involvement through non-FDI 
channels.
7.2 The Automotive industry
7.2.1 Trade and Investment Policies
The automotive industry is one of the few industries where the Thai government 
has been involved in creating a policy-induced incentive structure to promote local 
assembly activities. Trade policy plays a pivotal role in influencing private sector 
decisions and performance. Trade policy concerning the automotive industry initially 
involved imposing high tariff rates on vehicles to promote local assembly activities. The 
government also imposed LCRs on vehicle assemblers in order to promote local policy- 
induced backward linkages. The presence of high tariffs and LCRs is in line with the 
‘infant industry’ argument that promotion of the automotive industry can lead to the 
expansion of numerous complementary investments by auto parts firms, thereby laying 
down the basis for broad-based industrial growth. Initial assistance in terms of protection 
is needed for these parts manufacturers, so the argument goes, to grow and benefit from 
dynamic economies (i.e. falling costs as in the length of time over which output has 
proceeded) which occurs in the following period. When manufacturers gain these 
economies, protection is no longer needed.
In Thailand, an IS strategy began in the early 1960s with high tariff rates on 
completely built-up (CBU) vehicles together with the provision of investment incentives 
to entice MNE car manufacturers to Thailand. During 1960-70, tariffs were 60, 40 and 
20 per cent, respectively, for CBU passenger cars, vans and pick-up trucks. Tariffs for 
completely knocked-down (CKD) vehicles were 50 per cent lower than those for all 
categories of CBU vehicles. These tariff rates were among the highest applied during
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this period. While they provided protection to locally assembled vehicles against 
imports, the tariffs that discriminated between CBU and CKD vehicles created policy- 
induced economic incentives for local assembly activities.
During the first decade of automotive industry development, however, the 
expectation that the localization of assembly activities would create vast backward 
linkages and build broad-based industrial growth in Thailand was not met. In the 1960s, 
MNE car makers in Thailand were unlikely to be able to procure locally produced parts 
because the domestic market was very small and it was unlikely any parts manufacturers 
could achieve scale economies in their production. In addition, Thailand was in the early 
stages of industry development, and technological capability of indigenous firms was 
very limited.
The government imposed LCR measures under the presumption that, regardless 
of the existing level of technological capability of local firms, LCR measures would give 
an opportunity for local parts suppliers to engage with MNE car makers. Beginning in 
1971, domestically assembled cars, vans and pick-up trucks had to use locally produced 
parts to at least 25 per cent of the total value of the vehicle, in dollars, in order to qualify 
for CKD import duty. Such policy-induced backward linkages took effect in early 1975.
As argued in Chapter 2, the imposition of LCR measures can, to some extent, be 
regarded as a protection for local parts manufacturers, thereby creating policy-induced 
incentives for them. LCR measures imposed additional costs on locally assembled 
vehicles. Hence, in 1970, tariff rates on both CBU and CKD vehicles were increased to 
compensate for the expected additional costs arising from LCR measures. Tariff rates on 
passenger cars, vans and pick-up trucks were raised by 20 per cent for all CBU and CKD 
vehicles. As a result, tariff rates on CBU vehicles increased to 80, 60 and 40 per cent,
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respectively, whereas imports of CKD kits were subject to an import duty of 50, 40 and 
30 per cent, respectively.11
From 1975-90, protection on vehicles was strengthened and the target of local 
content of locally assembled vehicles was raised. In 1978, high tariffs were replaced with 
an import ban on CBU passenger vehicles, and import tariffs on CKD kits were raised to 
80 per cent. Vans and pick-up trucks, which had not yet been banned, also faced higher 
tariff rates. The tariffs for these CBU and CKD vehicles were at 80 and 60 per cent, 
respectively. Increases in production of passenger car series and the establishment of 
new assembly plants were simultaneously prohibited. In 1984, the government limited 
the domestic assembly of passenger cars to 42 series, each limited to two models.
The LCR system was also changed slightly between 1975 and 2000. From 1975— 
81, the LCR system at 25 per cent was based on the percentage of vehicle values. The 
greater the vehicle value, the greater the dollar amount of parts car assemblers had to buy 
locally to fulfill the 25 per cent LCR target. This obviously caused an uneven, adverse 
effect on car assemblers between large and small engine vehicles. The former seemed to 
find it more difficult than the latter to comply with the same LCR target.
After 1981, the government replaced the value-based system with a point system. 
Every part was assigned points. Auto assemblers were required to use locally produced 
parts up until the total points earned had achieved the government target.12 For example, 
the LCR target in 1984 was 45 per cent (or points) and the total score of all items in the 
auto body was 23 points. If a car maker procured all these items locally, it automatically 
earned 23 per cent. To fulfill the LCR target, car makers needed to procure an additional 
22 points. However, the 23 points assigned to all items of the auto body did not 
necessarily reflect relative production costs. Relative points were assigned with 
consideration given to existing and expected technical capability. They were not
“ During the early 1970s, the government also rationalized the models and engine sizes as 
well as minimum capacity and investment. However, this rationalization policy lasted only 6 
months (Nawadhinsukh, 1983).
12 See full details of list of auto parts and their points assigned in Buranathanun (1995).
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intended to reflect relative production costs o f  parts (Nawadhinsukh, 1983: p.190). 
Hence, caution is needed in any simple comparison o f LCR targets over periods in 
drawing inferences on protection for locally manufactured parts. The double LCR target 
did not necessarily mean double the protection impact o f LCR. Similarly, the 
comparison o f LCR measures by focusing on the LC target across countries is even more 
difficult.
The LCR system was again modified in 1986 and applied throughout 1986-2000. 
The government changed the local-content usage programme for passenger cars to a 
mandatory account A and selective account B. Passenger cars must abide strictly by 
account A (27 points) and can choose to use more items from account B. The total 
percentage o f LCR in compliance with both lists was to be at least 54 points for 
passenger vehicles.13 For pick-up trucks, LCR measures were more or less the same. 
There were two lists: compulsory and selective lists without the assigned points. 
Assemblers had to procure all items on the compulsory lists. If there was no local 
production in some o f the items in the compulsory lists, assemblers had to select 
substitutes from the selective lists to fulfill the requirement. In 1989, the government 
also began requiring assembly plants for one-ton pick-up trucks to fit locally produced 
diesel engines and the local-content requirements were up to 70 per cent in 1991.
Interestingly, some studies argued that the real value added o f vehicles assembled 
in Thailand was far lower than the official target (Doner et al., 2004: p. 191). In 
particular, Veloso et al. (1998: p. 17) estimated the actual local content was closer to 20 
per cent. While the evidence from interviews14 suggests the 20 per cent estimates seem 
to be unrealistically low, it nevertheless seems clear that LCR measures were unlikely to 
create a prohibitive adverse impact on car makers. Indeed, auto assemblers were 
involved in the design o f the LCR formula (Doner, 1991: p.200; and interview with car 
assemblers). Hence, the measures were practical and acceptable in terms o f the existing 
technological capability o f indigenous parts suppliers. The words ‘practical and
13 See full details of list of auto parts and their points assigned in Buranathanun (1995).
14 See the firm interviews in Chapter 8.
260
acceptable’ in this context refer to a circumstance where car assemblers can still benefit 
from the protection on CBU imported vehicles. In the LCR formula, quasi non-traded 
parts, as well as parts that car makers used before the introduction of the LCR, accounted 
for a sizable number of points in both 1981-5 and 1986-2000 LCR formulas. The 
presence of quasi non-traded parts such as auto bodies,15 tyres, batteries, exhaust systems, 
suspension systems, and radiators implies that regardless o f the presence of LCR 
measures, car makers tended to procure them locally. For example, in the 1981-5 LCR 
formula, the auto body accounted for 23 per cent. Thus, it meant car assemblers had 
already achieved half of the total required score, i.e. the LCR target was 45 per cent. For 
other quasi non-traded parts like paint, fuel tanks, seat assemblies, glasses, carpets, and 
wiring harnesses, car makers procured locally before the local-content requirements were 
affected (Nawadhinsukh, 1983). Similarly, in the 1986-2000 LCR formula, parts lists in 
account A were all items assemblers had used previously. In addition, the total score for 
3 main items i.e. trim panels, auto bodies and accessories was 20 out of the 27 additional 
points required from account B.
During the economic boom between 1986 and 1996, the policy towards the 
automotive industry became more liberal as opposed to earlier periods. The economic 
boom caused a rapid growth in domestic demand, causing a shortage of locally assembled 
vehicles (Poapongsakom and Wangdee, 2000 and see below in Section 7.2.2). In 1990, 
the limitation on the number of allowed series was repealed. Meanwhile, the Ministry of 
Commerce replaced passenger-car import restrictions with tariff measures.16 Tariff rates 
for CBU passenger vehicles over 2,400 cc. were reduced to 68.5 per cent in 1992, from 
300 per cent before 1991. Similarly, for CKD kits of passenger cars with 2,400 cc. 
engines and below, the tariff was reduced to 42 per cent (Table7.7). Nonetheless, tariff 
rates for the automotive industries were still relatively high, compared to other industries.
15 Bulky external body parts related to vehicle appearance (e.g. bonnets, boots, etc.), are 
usually integrated into the assembly production line as in-house, thereby already contributing to 
the LCR requirement. Other auto body parts (e.g. interior soft trim, door-trim panel) were 
already contracted out to local suppliers. (Evidence from interviews with car assemblers.)
16 However, imports of used cars were prohibited.
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The Thai government also kept its strong commitment to abolishing the LCRs by 
the year 2000. Despite the 1997 economic crisis, in 1998 the Thai government approved 
keeping the WTO commitment to abolish LCR policies on schedule in January 2000. To 
cushion the potential adverse impact of LCR abolition, the tariff rates on CKD vehicles 
were raised slightly from 20 per cent in 1999 to 33 per cent in 2000. The import duty on 
CBU vehicles remained at 80 per cent (Table 7.7). Nevertheless, while tariffs for vehicles 
remain high, compared to other industries, absolute protection was considerably reduced 
for the auto assembly industry from the early 1990s to the present.
Table 7.7
Tariff and Taxes (per cent) related to Completely Built-up (CBU) and Completely 
Knocked-down (CKD) Vehicles, before 1991-2000
Before 1991 1992 1999 2000
Completely built-up (CBU) 
vehicle
Passenger cars over 2,400 cc.1 
Tariff rate 300 68.5 80 80
Excise tax 44-55 41.8 43-50 41-48
Passenger cars under 2,400 c c .1 
Tariff rate 180 42 80 80
Excise tax 44-55 35.75 41.25 38.5
Pick-up truck 
Tariff rate 120 60 60 80
Excise tax 9.9 n.a. 5.5 3.3
Completely knocked-down 
(CKD) vehicle
Passenger cars over 2,400 c c .1 
Tariff rate 112 42 20 33
Excise tax 44-55 41.8 43-50 41-48
Passenger cars under 2,400 cc.1 
Tariff rate 112 42 20 33
Excise tax 44-55 41.8 41.25 38.5
Pick-up truck 
Tariff rate 72 20 20 33
Excise tax2 9.9 3 5.5 3.3-19.83
Notes: Before 1992, the classification of a passenger vehicle is 2,300 cc.
2 Excise tax includes the municipal tax.
3 Excise tax for one-ton pick-up trucks is 3.3 per cent whereas for the so called ‘pick-up
passenger vehicle (PPV) it is 19.8 per cent. 
Source: Ministry of Finance.
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Table 7.8 provides the chronological order of trade and investment policies for the 
Thai automotive industry. It becomes clear that these policies can be divided into two 
sub periods: pre- and post-1990. During the pre-1990 period, the government 
extensively used both tariffs and non-tariff measures (i.e. import ban, and LCRs) to 
promote the industry. Such measures were significantly reduced from 1990 onwards and 
the government has become more reliant on market mechanisms. Policy changes to some 
extent happened when MNE car assemblers changed their production strategy. As can be 
seen below, both of them played a pivotal role in explaining why Thailand was selected 
as the regional hub in Southeast Asia.
Table 7.8
A Chronology of Trade and Investment Policies of the Thai Automotive Industry,
1960 -2000
Period Event
1960s Increase tariffs of vehicles and apply an escalating tariff structure, i.e. 
tariffs of CKD vehicles were 50 per cent lower than those of CBU.
1970 Increase tariffs of CKD and CBU vehicles by 20 per cent.
1971 Impose local content requirement (LCR) measures that take effect in 1975. 
Domestically assembled vehicles had to use locally produced parts to at 
least 25 per cent of the total dollar value of the vehicle.
1975-90 - Modify the LCR system used from value-based system 
1975-81: LCR system was point-based system.
1982-2000: Revise assigned points of individual parts.
- Impose import ban on CBU passenger vehicles and raise tariffs rates of 
CKD passenger vehicles, peaking at 180 per cent.
- Raise tariffs of CKD and CBU commercial vehicles, peaking at 72 per 
cent and 120 per cent, respectively.
- Prohibit increases in passenger car series and the establishment of new 
assembly plants from 1978-90.
(contd.)
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Table 7.8 (contd.)
Period Event
- Limit domestic assembly of passenger cars to 42 series (each limited to 
two models) from 1984-90.
1990 - Revoke the limitation on the number of allowed series.
- Replace import restrictions of passenger cars with tariff measures.
1991 Lower tariff rates in all types of vehicles considerably.
1999 Raise tariffs of CKD vehicles to cushion the potentially adverse impact of 
LCR abolition.
2000 Abolish LCR measures.
Source: Author’s compilation.
7.2.2 Economic Performances of the Thai Automotive Industry
The automotive industry in Thailand has experienced rapid growth over the past 
three decades. Between 1970 and 2001, the output value of transport equipment, which 
was dominated by the automotive industry, grew at a rate of 13 per cent a year in real 
terms (Table 7.3). This growth performance was more or less comparable to overall 
economic growth, resulting in a constant share of total manufacturing of 8 per cent.
Industrialization of the automotive industry in Thailand began in the early 1960s 
as a result of MNE entry. MNE car manufacturers were first enticed to enter by the open- 
investment regime and the policy-induced economic incentives from trade protection. 
During the 1960s, nine multinational car manufacturers entered Thailand and assembled 
vehicles locally for the domestic market. Several world leading car manufacturers from 
America, Europe and Japan were involved. Many of them, especially Japanese car 
makers, were linked with large local conglomerates, although foreign ownership 
restrictions had not yet been implemented. The further increase in vehicle tariff rates 
enticed more car manufacturers, although the BOI stopped granting investment 
privileges. As a result, in the mid-1970s, there were 20 assemblers operating in 
Thailand.
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Vehicle production in Thailand rapidly increased from around 500 units in 1960 
to 32,000 units by 1974 (Figure 7.5). Nevertheless, around 50 per cent of local demand 
was still served by imported vehicles until the mid-1970s. In addition, the locally 
assembled vehicles were highly import-dependent (Nawadhinsukh, 1983; Guiheux and 
Lecler, 2000: p.210). The technological capability of local suppliers was weak and the 
domestic market during that period was small. This made it difficult for local producers 
of auto parts to achieve economies of scale in their production. Only a few auto parts, 
such as shock absorbers, leaf springs, suspension systems etc., were locally manufactured 
for the replacement equipment manufacture (REM) market.
Figure 7.5
Production and Net International Trade of Vehicles in the Thai Automotive
Industry, 1961-2002
Net Trade o f Vehicles (-import/+export) 
Production (1,000 units)
It 11II,1 11 III
Source: Thai Automotive Industry Association (2003)
As a result of the LCR measures that took effect in 1975, MNE car manufacturers 
began procuring parts locally from 1970 onward. Car assemblers commenced local 
procurement in two ways. Firstly, they invited some MNE parts suppliers to establish 
affiliates in Thailand. A few Japanese MNE parts manufacturers did enter Thailand, such
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as Cheena Gasket (1973), Art-Serina Piston (1974), Thai Safety-Glass (1974), Thai 
Arrow (1975), Nippon Denso (1976) etc.17 However, many others were reluctant to 
manufacture in Thailand because of the limited domestic market during the 1970s and the 
lack of infrastructure and manpower. Secondly, car manufacturers searched for potential 
indigenous parts suppliers and invited them to become original equipment manufacture 
(OEM) suppliers. Most were medium-size firms in the REM markets. Hence, backward 
linkages between MNE car manufacturers and parts suppliers began. Before 1970, there 
were only 20 parts manufacturers, half of which were locally owned firms. The number 
o f parts manufacturers had increased to around 180 enterprises by 1980 (Doner, 1991: 
p. 191) with around 20-30 being foreign parts suppliers (Higashi, 1995; Buranathanung, 
1995). The range of locally manufactured auto parts widened and included rubber parts, 
suspension systems, radiators, inner panel pressed parts, brake drums, gaskets, pistons, 
safety glass, electrical equipment and wiring harnesses.
Combined with the first oil shock, the introduction of the LCR measures affected 
the entry-exit pattern of MNE car manufacturers. As mentioned, the LCR system from 
1975-80 was a value-based system at 25 per cent. This created an uneven adverse effect 
on car assemblers, as it implicitly favoured small-engine vehicles where Japanese 
assemblers had a marked advantage over western firms. The larger the engine, the 
greater the value of locally produced parts assemblers were required to procure. 
Considering the still weak technological capability of Thai parts manufacturers, it was 
harder for larger-engine car assemblers to comply with the LCR measures. Meanwhile, 
the sharp increase in oil prices during the early 1970s following the first oil shock caused 
Thais to prefer smaller-engine vehicles to save on energy consumption. All in all, the 
result was five assemblers ceased to operate, most those linked with non-Japanese MNEs. 
This was followed by the prohibition of the establishment of new assembly plants in 1978 
and an import ban on CBU vehicles. Hence, the number of car makers dropped to 12 and 
remained unchanged until the early 1990s (Table 7.9).
l7These examples are drawn from Table 4.3 by Buranathanung (1995).
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The volume of vehicle production in Thailand still expanded at a rapid rate, 
increasing from 31,000 units in 1975 to 110,000 units in 1985 (Figure 7.5). Almost 70 
per cent of locally assembled vehicles between 1975 and 1984 were commercial vehicles, 
in particular one-ton pick-up trucks (Figure 7.6). This was because commercial vehicles 
tended to be multi-purpose vehicles suitable for both rural and urban areas. There were 
larger domestic demands for commercial vehicles, especially one-ton pick up trucks, than 
for passenger vehicles. In addition, commercial vehicles have been subject to lower trade 
protection and consumption tax (excise tax) than passenger vehicles over the past three 
decades. Hence, the price of a one-ton pick-up truck was about half that of a mid-size 
passenger car (Doner et al., 2004: p. 188). Nevertheless, with this domestic market size, a 
single assembler was still unlikely to reach the economies of scale of approximately 
40,000-50,000 units per model achieved by the existing assemblers (interview and 
Abrenica, 1998: p.15).
Figure 7.6
Percentage of Locally Assembled Commercial Vehicles to Total Vehicles,
1961-2002
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Source'. Thai Automotive Industry Association (2003)
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The economic boom caused rapid growth in domestic demand for vehicles 
between 1986 and 1996 (Figure 7.5). From 1986-91, production volume doubled every 
two years. The volume of vehicle production increased from 74,000 units in 1986 to 
154,000 units in 1988 and 300,000 units in 1990. The rapid expansion of vehicle 
production continued and the production volumes peaked at almost 600,000 units in 
1996. One-ton pick up trucks exhibited the most rapid growth. Production volume 
increased from 47,000 units in 1986 to 185,000 units by 1990. In 1996, production 
volume reached 360,000 units (Figure 7.5).
The rapid expansion of domestic demand reduced the gap between capacity and 
domestic consumption. For example in 1988, the consumption volume was 154,000 
units, accounting for 96 per cent of total capacity. This pattern continued until the mid- 
1990s. The consumption of vehicles was approximately equal to production capacity in 
1994. This provided an opportunity for the government to undertake policy reform in the 
early 1990s. Many car assemblers expanded production capacity rapidly, from 160,280 
units in 1988 to 486,100 and 901,200 units in 1994 and 1996-9, respectively (Table 
7.10). Incumbent assemblers expanded production capacity and there were also new 
entrants. Ford, Daimler Chrysler and General Motor (GM) re-entered in the mid-1990s 
with the export of one-ton pick up trucks as the prime objective. As a result of the 1993 
merger with Mazda, Ford became involved with local vehicle assembly in 1995, using 
Mazda’s existing production base in Thailand. Similarly for Daimler Chrysler, the 
merger agreement with Mitsubishi allows the company to be involved in Thai car 
manufacture. GM established its new assembly line in 1996.
As a result of the rapid growth in vehicle demand, Thailand has had the largest 
domestic demand for vehicles among four South East Asian countries (i.e. Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand) since 1989, except between 1997 and 1999 
(Table 7.10). From 1989-96, the annual vehicle sales of Thailand were 405,800 units, 
accounting for around 42 per cent of the total sales in these four countries. It was 
followed by Indonesia (27 per cent), Malaysia (21 per cent) and the Philippines (10 per 
cent). In addition, for passenger vehicles, the sales volume in Malaysia exceeded that of
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Thailand, being dominated by the Malaysian National car, the Proton. For example, in 
1995, the total sales of passenger vehicles were around 224,991 units and 163,371 units 
for Malaysia and Thailand, respectively.18 For non-Proton vehicles, the sales volume was 
lower than 15,000 units. It is unlikely any MNE car assembler in Malaysia would achieve 
the minimum efficient scale. This applies specially to commercial vehicles because 
Thailand has become the world’s second largest production base for one-ton pick-up 
vehicles (Doner et al., 2004: p. 187).
Table 7.10
Vehicle Sales of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand combined and 
(percentage) Shares of the Total Sales for Each Individual Country, 1980-2005
Indonesia 
(per cent)
Malaysia 
(per cent)
Philippines 
(per cent)
Thailand 
(per cent)
'otal
(per cent) (1,000 units)
1980 41.1 24.2 13.3 21.3 100 418.0
1981 46.3 22.5 11.3 19.9 100 448.8
1982 43.3 23.5 12.3 20.9 100 435.6
1983 34.4 27.7 11.1 26.8 100 441.1
1984 37.6 31.4 3.0 28.0 100 405.1
1985 41.9 31.1 2.0 25.0 100 344.4
1986 50.7 23.4 1.4 24.6 100 319.4
1987 49.3 16.7 2.6 31.3 100 324.2
1988 40.7 17.7 5.0 36.5 100 388.8
1989 32.0 22.1 8.5 37.4 100 556.1
1990 33.4 22.6 7.0 36.9 100 822.9
1991 33.6 25.7 6.2 34.5 100 777.5
1992 23.0 19.7 8.2 49.2 100 738.0
1993 23.3 17.1 9.3 50.4 100 905.1
1994 28.9 18.0 9.3 43.7 100 1111.3
1995 27.8 20.9 9.4 41.9 100 1364.2
1996 22.9 25.2 11.2 40.7 100 1448.0
1997 29.8 31.2 11.1 28.0 100 1299.1
1998 13.1 36.7 18.0 32.3 100 446.1
1999 13.9 42.8 11.0 32.4 100 674.2
(contd.)
I8Data for Malaysia were from Guiheux and Lecler (2000: p.215) and Sugiyama and 
Fujimoto (2000: p. 191). Data for Thailand are from Thailand’s Automotive Industry Directories 
2003.
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Table 7.10 (contd.)
Indonesia 
(per cent)
Malaysia 
(per cent)
Philippines 
(per cent)
Thailand 
(per cent)
"otal
(per cent) (1,000 units)
2000 15.3 29.1 17.5 38.2 100 687.2
2001 21.0 28.0 16.3 34.7 100 857.8
2002 20.2 29.9 16.0 33.9 100 1002.0
2003 23.5 26.7 14.5 35.3 100 1275.0
2004 21.7 27.3 13.6 37.5 100 1842.0
2005 22.1 26.6 12.8 38.5 100 1920.0
Notes: Total is the sum of vehicle sales of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand.
Data for 2000-5 are the forecast except for Thailand in 2000-1.
Source: data for Thailand are from Thailand’s Automotive Industry Directory 2003^4, and data 
for other ASEAN countries from Guilheux and Lecler (2000: p.226) and Standard and Poor 
(S&P) (2000). The forecasted data are from Fourin (1998).
Having the largest domestic market among these four ASEAN members means 
that MNE car assemblers operating their assembly in Thailand are more likely to achieve 
scale economies than those in other ASEAN neighbours. In the case of one-ton pick-up 
trucks, where there are only four such assemblers, i.e. Isuzu, Toyota, Mitsubishi and 
Nissan, all of these assemblers are likely to have achieved economies of scale since 1990.
The recent economic crisis dramatically disrupted this rapid growth momentum. 
Production volume dropped sharply to 144,243 units in 1998, causing an excess capacity 
for existing car manufacturers. The industry seemed to have fully recovered from the 
crisis by 2002. Volumes of assembled vehicles had rebounded and reached 584,897 units 
(Figure 7.5).
However, the relative importance of the industry’s output to the manufacturing 
sector has not gone hand in hand with that of the industry’s employment. As indicated by 
the value added per worker, the automotive industry is capital intensive. The value added 
per worker in transport equipment manufacture was far greater than the average for the 
manufacturing sector over the past three decades. As a result, employment in 
transportation equipment manufacture remained at around 3 per cent of total
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manufacturing employment (Table 7.3). Over the past three decades, value added per 
worker, which slightly increased from BO.35 million per worker during 1970-80 to BO.44 
million per worker between 1981 and 1990, dramatically increased to B1 million per 
worker between 1991 and 2000. The dramatic increase in value added per worker was 
due to changes in the nature of MNE involvement in the Thai automotive industry, from 
being a highly-protected domestic market to becoming more export-oriented.
Similar to its employment contribution, the automotive industry did not generate 
considerable foreign exchange earnings until the early 1990s. Most locally assembled 
vehicles were domestic-market-oriented. This resulted from an IS strategy. The presence 
of LCR measures reduced international competitiveness whereas the high protection on 
CBU vehicles encouraged car makers to produce for the domestic market. Nevertheless, 
since the early 1990s, there is evidence of structural change in the market orientation of 
MNE car makers in Thailand. While the first exports of CBU vehicles by MMC Sittipol 
(MSC), the Mitsubishi Motor Corporation’s affiliate, took place between 1988 and 1994, 
CBU vehicle exports during this period were rather a one-off event. Export values of 
CBU vehicles increased tremendously from $3 million in 1987 to $80 and $53 million in 
1988 and 1989, respectively (Figure 7.7). The export value declined to less than $20 
million by 1994.
A structural change in market orientation took place in the mid-1990s. 
Mitsubishi, Nissan and Isuzu explicitly stressed their export plan for one-ton pick-up 
trucks in the late 1980s.19 Pointedly, the decision to export one-ton pick-up trucks 
occurred after their local assembly activities were likely to attain economies of scale. 
These companies began their export of one-ton pick-up trucks in the mid-1990s. The 
structural changes in market orientation were reinforced by another two factors. The first
19 For example, Nissan’s expanded Thai operation planned to export pick-up trucks to 
South Korea, Malaysia, Australia and New Zealand as part of the company’s global plan 
(Bangkok Post, October 1986 cited in Doner, 1991). As well, Isuzu announced a three-step 
export plan involving first parts, then engines, and eventually CBUs (Nation, December 1986 
cited in Doner, 1991). These Japanese MNE car manufacturers regarded overseas markets as a 
major channel for overtaking the dominant position of Toyota in Thailand (Doner 1991: p.208).
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factor was the relocation of the two US MNEs, Ford and General Motors in the mid- 
1990s, to use Thailand as a regional export base for one-ton pick-up trucks. Secondly, 
the onset of the financial crisis caused all MNE car makers in Thailand to experience a 
huge excess capacity. In addition, the sharp currency depreciation catalyzed the shift in 
market orientation of these car manufacturers. The export values of CBU vehicles 
rapidly increased to $567 million and $717 million in 1997 and 1998, respectively. The 
export value of vehicles dramatically increased to around $ 2 billion from 2001-3 (Figure 
7.7).
Figure 7.7
Export Value ($million) of Thai CBU vehicles, 1986-2003
Source: Compiled from the UN COMTRADE database available at the International Economic 
Data Bank (IEDB), the Australian National University.
As expected, the export of CBU vehicles has been dominated by one-ton pick-up 
trucks. Between 1997 and 2003, they accounted for almost 70 per cent of total vehicle 
exports. Passenger cars with engines between 1,500 cc. to 3,000 cc. and those with 
engines between 1,000 cc to 1,500 cc. registered promising export growth. In 2003, their
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export values were $369 million and $375 million, respectively, for small and medium 
vehicles (Table 7.11).
7.2.3 MNE Involvement in the Thai Automotive Industry
Between 1970 and 2003, there was a considerable change in the pattern of MNE 
involvement in the Thai automotive industry. MNEs became increasingly involved in the 
Thai automotive industry from the mid-1980s (Table 7.6). FDI inflows in the industry 
were more or less unchanged from 1970-85, with annual inflows amounting to less than 
$5 million. Its share of total manufacturing FDI inflows was around 5 per cent. 
Following this, the inflows increased dramatically to $37 and $87 million during the 
periods 1986-90 and 1991-5, respectively. FDI inflows in the Thai automotive industry 
continued to increase from 1996 to the present, accounting for $545 million from 1996- 
2000 and remaining more or less at this level until 2003. The dramatic increase in FDI 
inflows resulted in a share of 19.3 per cent of total FDI inflows for the manufacturing 
sector between 1990 and 2003.
The huge increase in FDI inflows was a result of the capacity expansion of 
incumbent car assemblers, the entry of the two US MNEs, and MNE parts manufacturers 
around the world. As mentioned earlier, the rapid growth of domestic demand for 
vehicles in Thailand led to rapid capacity expansion of car assemblers, both Japanese 
incumbents and the US new entrants. In addition, from the late 1980s onward there were 
a number of MNE parts manufacturers entering and establishing their affiliates in 
Thailand. During the period 1971-85, there were around 30 MNE parts manufacturers in 
Thailand, dominated by Japanese MNEs (Buranathanun, 1995; Higashi, 1995). From 
1987-2003, an additional 282 foreign parts suppliers entered into Thai auto parts 
manufacturing. During this period several new parts, such as power steering tanks, air 
cleaners, wheels, gearboxes, etc. were locally manufactured. In addition, from the mid- 
1990s, there were several non-Japanese suppliers involved, such as Jason Engineering
20The number of foreign parts suppliers from 1987- 2003 was compiled from the BOI 
Investment Statistics available at www.boi.or.th.
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(UK affiliate), Siam Calsonic Co. Ltd and Visteon and Halla Climate Co. Ltd (Ford 
Suppliers). By 2002, the number of MNE affiliates in the parts manufacturing industry 
reached 355 firms, consisting of 287 foreign majority firms (81 per cent of the total 
number) and 68 joint ventures (Thai Automotive Industry Association, 2003).
Three factors contributed to the huge increase in FDI inflows:
(1) The Japanese Yen Appreciation between 1986 and 1995.
Between 1986 and 1995, the Japanese yen exhibited persistent appreciation. As a 
result of the Plaza Accord, the exchange rate instantaneously decreased from 238.54 
yen/$ in 1985 to 168.52 yen/$ in 1986 and dropped further to 94.06 yen/$ by 1995. Such 
currency appreciation adversely affected the international competitiveness of Japanese 
car assemblers and parts manufacturers, which traditionally exhibited a lesser degree of 
internationalization and preferred to service overseas markets through exports from 
Japanese not-offshore production. To maintain their international competitiveness, they 
had to commence relocating their production base abroad.
(2) Global Market Competition
From the late 1980s onward, the global environment for the automotive industry 
has exhibited intense competition among MNE car assemblers. The principal automobile 
markets in the Triad regions (North America, Western Europe and Japan), which account 
for over 90 per cent of global sales of vehicles, are nearly saturated (Abrenica, 1998). In 
contrast, promising growth perspectives for vehicle sales have been exhibited in 
emerging market economies. In the meantime, governments in a number of these 
emerging market economies have moved away from highly protective policies based on 
quantitative restrictions and prohibitively high tariffs (Takayasu and Mori, 2004:
21 In 1980, the US Big Three averaged almost 35 per cent of their production abroad, the 
major European firms almost 19 per cent, and Toyota and Nissan had a combined average of 
roughly 1 per cent (Doner, 1991: p.64).
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p.209). The liberalization approach of their automotive industry takes place faster 
through a regional rather than a global context (Humphrey and Oeter, 2000: p.42; 
Humphrey and Memedovic, 2003: p.2). Many countries have formed regional 
groupings such as the European Union (EU), the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), the 
North America Free Trade Area (NAFTA), and regional integration in the Latin 
American countries (namely Mercosur) to liberalize regional trade in cars and their parts. 
In several cases, extra efforts have been made in order to accelerate regional 
liberalization schemes for particular industries. For example, under the AFTA 
agreement, ASEAN countries strengthened their industrial cooperation program, namely 
ASEAN Industrial Cooperation (AICO) that would be regarded as a shortcut to benefit 
ASEAN regional liberalization.24 This has encouraged MNE car assemblers to become 
involved with local assembly in these emerging markets.
22
MNE car assemblers and parts manufacturers changed their strategy as a result o f 
increased global competition. Prior to this, auto assemblers used to allocate assembly 
facilities in each country to access the highly-protected domestic markets. Their 
assembly facilities manufactured whatever vehicles they could under these limitations at 
prices that allowed them to earn a profit in local markets. When the market started to
22T wo exceptional cases, China and India, should receive special attention. These two 
countries have gigantic domestic markets as a key to attracting auto maker MNEs to establish 
affiliates, even though the trade and policy regimes within these two countries are still highly 
restrictive. See details in Humphrey and Oeter (2000).
23 Similarly, as argued in Bora (2001, cited in Brooks et al. 2004), many developing 
countries have been reluctant to call off local content requirement measures applied to the 
automotive industry.
24 In 1996, the new ASEAN Industrial Cooperation (AICO) scheme was introduced in 
order to encourage intra-ASEAN trade. Firms, which operated in more than one ASEAN country 
(defined by the 30 percent or more by the ASEAN equity within a given company) traded goods 
with lower tariff rates in order to enhance production efficiency and international 
competitiveness. The AICO is the broader version of the Brand-to-Brand (BBC) scheme, which 
was limited to the automotive industry. Under the AICO scheme, firms benefit a preferential 
tariff rate in the range of 0-5 per cent for intra-ASEAN trade. The benefit is immediate upon 
approval under the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) scheme under the ASEAN Free 
Trade Area (AFTA) that a preferential tariff will take effect in 2003. 90 per cent of these 
approved applications were related to the automotive and electronic industries. The estimated 
value of transactions was still low at around $1,173 million or 1.4 percent of intra-ASEAN trade 
in 2001. Nevertheless, it is too early to make any conclusion on the effectiveness of the AICO 
scheme.
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become more liberal, the excessive investment driven by protectionist barriers resulted in 
overcapacity problems (Doner et al. 2004: p.159). Production capacity in a country 
might be able to serve demand in other countries within a region or worldwide. All car 
assemblers compete against each other in order to maximize their market share in the 
emerging market economies. Hence, assembly facilities in a country must allow them to 
provide markets with products that meet international standards of quality and price. To 
mitigate overcapacity problems, assembly facilities that used to be scattered within a 
region must be consolidated to specialize in certain types of vehicles. Both car assemblers 
and parts manufacturers tend to utilize resources scattered throughout the world. They 
must decide which models to produce at which locations, at what prices and quality 
standards, and for which markets (either region or global) (Takayasu and Mori, 2004).
To select locations to produce certain types of vehicles, size of domestic market 
and its growth prospects are the most important factors (Doner et al., 2004). Since there 
are certain scale economies in producing a vehicle model (i.e. 40,000-50,000 units/a 
model), the greater the market size the more likely MNE car assemblers are to attain 
them. Besides market size, MNE car assemblers should select a location where the 
policy environment is relatively more liberal and stable. In such an environment, they are 
likely to maximize resources scattered throughout the world to strengthen international 
competitiveness. This is especially true of small-open economies like individual ASEAN 
countries where assembly facilities are unlikely solely to serve highly-protected domestic 
markets.
(3) The Favourable Economic and Policy Environment in Thailand 
The economic and policy environment in Thailand was relatively more favourable 
than ASEAN-4 neighbours so that MNEs in the automotive industry relocated their 
production bases and turned the country into the regional hub of vehicle production. 
Firstly, as mentioned, Thailand has the largest domestic demand for vehicles in the region 
(Table 7.10). Thus, there are many vehicle models, especially one-ton pick-up trucks, for 
which assembly operations are likely to attain the scale economies level. Secondly, 
during the late 1980s and the early 1990s when MNE car assemblers were searching for
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production sites, the commercial environment of the automotive industry in Thailand was 
relatively more liberal and stable than that of other ASEAN-4 neighbours. Thailand did 
not have an explicit target in nationalizing local parts firms, as was the case in Indonesia 
and the Philippines (Doner, 1991: p.61). At the same time, Thailand never had an 
explicit goal to promote a national car, as occurred in Malaysia.25 Furthermore, the 
degree of policy uncertainty, i.e. the frequency of reversing policy direction, was 
relatively higher in Indonesia and the Philippines. This was especially true in Indonesia 
where modification of its specific objectives occurred more frequently than for any of its 
three neighbours (Doner, 1991: p.54).
Besides the absence of a national car policy, Thailand was the first country in the 
ASEAN region to begin liberalizing the automotive industry. As mentioned, protection 
on vehicles was reduced dramatically in the early 1990s so that import competition 
increased, in contrast to other ASEAN regions, where the policy regime toward the 
automotive industry remained more or less unchanged (Doner, 1991).
Even though the Thai government still retained the LCR measures, so did other 
developing countries, including ASEAN-4 neighbours. Nevertheless, as discussed in 
Section 7.2.1, car assemblers were significantly involved in designing the LCR system so 
it was not prohibitive to implement according to the existing capability of parts 
manufacturing industries. More importantly, when a country is selected as the regional 
hub, the local content requirement imposed tends to become redundant. Car assemblers 
tend to increase local procurement, regardless of the presence of LCR measures. The 
reason is a vehicle consists of numerous parts and components, some of which are quasi 
nontradable. There are sizable transaction costs involved in procuring all the parts so that 
the proximity between car manufacturers and parts suppliers saves on the transaction 
costs. This also allows more efficient cooperation between car manufacturers and parts 
suppliers to match their production plan and delivery schedule. It also reduces exposure
25 President of Toyota Motor Thailand argues that ‘ Thailand is the best candidate for 
hub status because it has no ‘national-car’ policy and offers a level of playing field’ (Bangkok 
Post Economic Review, 1999 cited in Techakanont, 2002)
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to exchange rate risk if they can source local parts. In addition, car manufacturers can 
exploit their existing comparative advantage as host countries in manufacturing a vehicle.
Nevertheless, this process took place gradually. Japanese MNE parts suppliers 
moved in as a result of the appreciation of the yen. In addition, when some Japanese car 
assemblers commenced their plan of using Thailand as an export base,26 they first 
encouraged their suppliers in their keretisu network to enhance their involvement in 
Thailand. Several new parts, such as power steering tanks, air cleaners, wheels, gear 
boxes, etc. began to be locally produced. The rapid growth of domestic demand and the 
further appreciation of the Japanese currency reinforced the relocation of production 
bases, thereby widening the range of OEM parts available there and raising quality. This 
motivated the re-entry of the US MNEs, General Motors (GM) and Ford with the prime 
target of CBU export, which in turn further enticed even more foreign parts suppliers into 
the Thai automotive industry during the mid-1990s. There were also several non- 
Japanese suppliers involved, such as Jason Engineering (UK affiliate), Siam Calsonic Co 
Ltd and Visteon and Halla Climate Co Ltd (Ford Suppliers). Finally, the process of 
relocation was further stimulated by the sharp currency depreciation during the onset of 
the Asian financial crisis starting from m id -199 7,28 as well as the abolition of foreign 
ownership restrictions.
All in all, Thailand has become a regional hub of vehicle production in Southeast 
Asia, as is indicated in Figure 7.8. A wide range of vehicle models of the US car 
assembler, Ford, is assembled in Thailand, such as the Ford Ranger, the Ford Everest, 
and the Mazda Fighter. Similarly, Honda (Thailand) exports the Honda Accord and the
26 The earlier movement of these car assemblers is a result of oligopolistic reaction 
among car assemblers in Thailand. Smaller firms want to use the export market to enhance 
production efficiency and assume the dominant position in the market.
27 The keiretsu system is deliberately intended to facilitate long-term partnership between 
large assembly firms and their multiple suppliers. The system emphasizes vertically structured 
networks among individual firms that concentrate on different tasks in a closely connected 
production process. Firms specialize in different areas of production while becoming more 
dependent on each other’s activities.
28 The Thai baht depreciated from around 25 baht/$ in the 1997 to 40 baht/$ by 2002.
Data are from IMF, International Financial Statistics (CD ROM).
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Honda City to Indonesia and the Philippines and imports the Honda Stream from the 
Honda affiliate in Indonesia.
Figure 7.8
Pattern of Regional Division of Labour in the Automotive Industry: 
Evidence of Southeast Asian Economies
Honda Stream
Honda Stream 
Peugeot 206
The Philippines
Thailand
Indonesia
Ford Laser Ford Escape 
Mazda Protege 
Mazda Tribute
Ford Lynx Ford Escape
Mazda Protege Mazda Tribute
Ford Ranger 
Ford Everest 
Mazda Fighter 
Volvo S80 
Chevrolet Zafira 
Honda Accord 
Honda City 
Nissan Sentra 
Nissan Cenfiro 
Toyota Altis 
Toyota Vios 
Isuzu D-Max 
BMW 3/5 Series
Ford Everest Ford Ranger
Mazda Fighter (planned)
BMW 3/5 Series Chevrolet Zafira
Honda City Honda Accord
Mitsubishi Lancer Toyota Vios/Hilux
Isuzu D-Max/SUV
Source: Firm interviews.
7.3 Conclusions and an Inter-industry Comparison
Table 7.12 provides a comparison between the processed food and automotive 
industries in five respects; trade policy regime, factory intensity, market orientation, FDI 
involvement and international position. The first respect is trade policy regime, in which 
they contrast sharply. On the one hand, enterprises in the processed food industry seem to 
operate under a distortion-free environment. This environment is to some extent in line
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with an EP regime as defined in Chapter 2. On the other hand, in the automotive 
industries the Thai government imposed both tariff and non-tariff measures (i.e. import 
ban on CBU vehicles and LCR measures on car assemblers) in promoting both car 
assembling and parts manufacturing industries. Intensive use of these protection 
measures took place between 1970 and 1990. Trade policy during this period seems to be 
in line with an IS regime. Nevertheless, from the early 1990s onward, the trade policy 
regime in the automotive industry has gradually changed, moving toward an EP regime.
The processed food industry is more labour intensive, compared to the automotive 
industry. Thus, the processed food industry seems to be in areas where Thailand has the 
comparative advantage, i.e. labour abundance (see Chapter 3). As it conforms with the 
country’s comparative advantage, the market orientation of processed food industry is for 
export, whereas most locally assembled vehicles are domestic-market oriented. Export 
values of Thai assembled vehicles gradually gained their relative importance from mid 
1997 onward.
FDI inflows into the processed food industry are relatively low, compared to other 
industries throughout the past three decades. Based on the FDI figures, MNE 
involvement seems to be limited in the processed food industry. By contrast, until the 
mid-1980s, the share of FDI inflows into the automotive industry was limited, compared 
to the total manufacturing FDI inflows. After this, FDI inflows into the automotive 
industry increased dramatically, accounting for almost one fifth of the total 
manufacturing FDI from 1995 to the present. The patterns of FDI inflows into the 
automotive industry corroborates the theoretical postulation by Bhagwati (1978) and 
empirical findings in cross-sectional inter-country analysis (Balasubramanyam and 
Salisu, 1991).
Finally, the international position of both industries suggests that they should be 
regarded as being successful. In the processed food industry, which concentrates on four 
major export items or PF4s (i.e. canned pineapple, canned tuna, processed chicken, and 
processed shrimp), Thailand is the world’s major exporter. Thai enterprises upgraded
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their production facilities, successfully penetrated the global market from the late 1970s 
onwards, and retained their leading position in the global market. On the other hand, 
Thailand has become the regional hub in Southeast Asia for numerous leading car 
assemblers worldwide.
In conclusion, their dominant position in the global market makes these two 
industries interesting in terms of gaining insight into the factors contributing to their 
success. The preliminary evidence from the survey in this chapter pointed out the role of 
MNE involvement. It is worth gaining insight into the mechanisms of how MNE 
involvement contributes to this success and how the role of domestic policy, especially 
the trade policy regime, conditions gains from MNE involvements.
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Chapter 8: Firm-Level Case Studies: the Processed Food and 
Automotive Industries
This chapter provides in-depth firm-level case studies of the Thai processed food 
and automotive industries in order to gain insight into the mechanisms of how MNEs 
become involved in, and contribute to, the technological capability of indigenous firms. 
Information in this chapter is mainly gathered by interviewing senior managers of a 
sample of Thai firms in both industries. As discussed in Chapter 2, MNE involvement 
can take place through both FDI and non-FDI channels. Nevertheless, the quantitative 
analyses in Chapter 5 and 6 concentrate on the statistical relationship between FDI 
channels and economic performance measures such as output growth and valued added 
per worker. Actual mechanisms of how MNEs affect host countries’ economics cannot 
be revealed, so the statistical relationship uncovered by these quantitative analyses is 
merely suggestive of the potential FDI has to create a favourable impact on host 
economies. In reality, MNEs can substantially influence business operations of 
enterprises in host countries through various non-FDI channels such as technology 
licensing, international subcontracting, and MNE buyer channels. Most of these non-FDI 
channels are not quantifiable. All in all, it highlights the need for firm-level case study 
analysis in order to gain insight into these mechanisms of MNE involvement.
The chapter begins with a description of the research methodology pursued in the 
firm-level studies, covering the sampling process, characteristics of samples, and the 
study period. In the following two sections, the evidence of firm-level studies of the 
processed food and automotive industries are discussed, respectively. Section 8.4 
provides an inter-industry comparison between these two industries.
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8.1. Research Methodology
This study uses ‘purposive’ rather than ‘probability’ sampling techniques (Patton, 
1990). The latter refers to the method that achieves samples by random selection 
amongst all units of the population and permits confident generalization for a larger 
population. In the former method, samples are purposively chosen from information-rich 
cases for in-depth analysis related to the central issues under study. The main objective 
here is to qualitatively examine the behaviour of particular groups of firms, i.e. MNEs 
and local manufacturers interacting with one another within and/or across industries. 
Firms with certain characteristics of individual industries were selected to address and 
examine technology spillover. For example, in the processed food industry, the focus is 
on export success so that export rather than domestic firms must be selected. Likewise, 
in the context of this study, auto parts producers should be limited to original equipment 
manufacture (OEM) suppliers, which are directly engaged with MNE car assemblers, to 
examine the impact of backward linkages from MNEs on their technological 
improvement. This cannot be achieved by probability sampling that uses a variety of 
sample characteristics to draw quantitative inference. Firms, which have not been 
involved with MNEs and whose products are sold in limited niche markets, might not be 
relevant to an examination of the issues involved.
In the processed food industry, the samples concentrate on exporting firms 
because the issue is to examine whether MNEs have contributed to the process of 
technology acquisition and export success. Among exporting firms, various firm 
characteristics, i.e. firm sizes, product types, and export destinations are covered to guard 
against any systematic bias selection. Therefore, this study interviewed 16 PF4 firms 
composed of 3 canned pineapple producers, 4 canned tuna producers, 5 frozen chicken 
processors, and 4 frozen shrimp processors. These 16 firms accounted for around 60 
percent of the industry’s total export value during the period 2000-2.1
'The export share would be more appropriate than the population share (the number of 
interviewed firms to total industry population) to indicate how well the sample coverage in this 
interview represents the processed food industry. Although there are a large number of small and
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The automotive industry covers both car assemblers and parts manufacturers. The 
aim of interviewing MNE affiliates in the car assembling industry is to examine their 
efforts in creating linkages and to determine any changes in their efforts. Where parts 
manufacturers are concerned, samples concentrate on Thai-owned enterprises whose 
products feed directly into auto assembly plants, to address the role of backward linkages 
and technology spillover. Because a wide range of auto parts needs to be covered to 
prevent any possible selection bias, 3 car assemblers, and 8 parts manufacturers were 
chosen for the study. Samples of car assemblers cover both Japanese and US affiliates. 
The former have extensive experience in Thailand, whereas the latter entered the industry 
in the mid-1990s. The spectrum covered by auto parts is wide, including auto bodies, 
other pressed parts, radiators, rubber parts, exhaust systems, suspension systems (leaf and 
coil spring), and aluminium die casting. Most of these auto parts enterprises were 
initially Thai owned. All of them had experience as OEM suppliers for the past thirty 
years.
Before the firm-level case studies began, the interview guide was pre-tested on 
several firms between December 2002 and January 2003. Feedback from firm interviews 
during the pre-testing period was used to improve the final version of the interview 
questions. The final interviews were conducted from December 2003 to February 2004. 
They mostly took place at firms’ headquarters located in Bangkok. A few firms are in 
the Eastern provinces, e.g. Rayong province. High-level managerial staff in these Thai 
enterprises was interviewed in both the processed food and automotive industries. The 
interview period varied in length from 30 minutes to one and a half hours. Some firms 
provided second-round interviews by setting up visits to their production site and making 
different interviewees available. In addition, interviews with high-profile officers of the 
Board of Investment as well as several industry associates were conducted to obtain
medium processed food enterprises in Thailand and the number of samples covered here might be 
low, compared to the total population, the main objective in this study is to understand how local 
firms successfully penetrate and maintain their position in the global market. Thus, a firm with 
extensive business experience in the global market would better serve the main objective here, 
rather than a large number of firms with limited export experience. Thus, instead of using a ratio 
of the total population, the export share is used as a better indicator.
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various viewpoints on industry development. All interviews were conducted by the 
researcher.
A flexible interview guide was used, requesting respondents to relate their 
experience in their own words and their own sequence. The main advantage of this 
flexible approach is that it minimizes the likelihood that important aspects of the story 
will be missed. The main disadvantage is that some respondents whose experience may 
be limited to a particular interest cannot always be asked all of the questions in the 
interview guide (Morawetz, 1981). Second-round interviews with different interviewees 
could mitigate this disadvantage in several cases.
The guide for these interviews begins with the general company profile, i.e. size, 
ownership production process, product destination, product covers, etc. A series of 
opening probes into the process of acquiring technological capability follow, hi the 
processed food industry, this starts with their general perception of industry development, 
followed by opinions about contributions of FDI and non-FDI channels to their 
technological capability, especially their export capability. Then questions follow 
concerning their sources of knowledge and the factors contributing to their export 
success. Finally, general questions concerning current problems, the role of government 
and future prospects for the industry are addressed.
In the automotive industry, the interview guide for car assemblers differs from 
that for parts manufacturers. Where car assemblers are concerned, the questions begin 
with the general perception of industry development and their involvement in enhancing 
the capability of local suppliers: how car assemblers contribute to parts suppliers’ 
capabilities, whether the effort to make such a contribution applies to particular auto parts 
or to auto parts in general, and whether the degree/effort of their involvement in parts 
suppliers’ capabilities changes over time. Then general opinions on current problems, the 
role of government and industry perspectives are raised. On the other hand, the questions 
for parts manufacturers relate to building up technological capability to become OEM 
suppliers, to assistance from car assemblers, to any possible change in the procurement
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process as well as the level of involvement from car assemblers. Finally, their general 
perception of institutional factors and the economic environment in promoting or 
retarding technology spillover are addressed with all the interviewed firms in both 
industries. Interview guides are detailed in Appendix 13.
Note that since the purpose of the interview is to understand the mechanisms of 
how MNE involvement affects the technological capability of indigenous firms, most of 
information is unquantifiable. Specific examples are illustrated to provide insight as well 
as general inferences are being drawn. Hence, findings from firm interviews are unlikely 
to be comparable across firms or industries. Appendix 14 summarizes the characteristics 
and key interview findings of each finn.
8.2 The Processed Food Industry
Even though FDI inflows are low in the processed foods industries, including 
those involved with PF4 products, evidence from firm interviews suggests a considerable 
degree of MNE involvement. Such involvement occurring through both FDI and non- 
FDI channels creates favourable technological impact on Thai food processors and allows 
them to gain a foothold in international markets. It also stimulates local firms to engage 
actively in the process of technological development.
8.2.1 Canned Pineapple
MNE involvement played a vital role in introducing pineapple plantations into 
Thailand and in linking up local firms with the global market. The entry of Dole Co Ltd 
(a US affiliate) and Thai Pineapple Canning (a Taiwanese direct investor) during the 
early 1970s demonstrated the export business opportunity. This motivated many local 
firms to commence production of canned pineapple.
These foreign firms not only demonstrated business opportunity but also showed 
local firms how to operate a commercial pineapple plantation designed to produce fruit 
for canning and what necessary processing facilities they needed to install. There are
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significant differences between plantations of pineapples for the direct-consumer market 
and those destined for canning. Plantations of pineapples for direct consumption aim to 
produce a large harvested product. The larger the pineapple, the higher the price farmers 
can expect to charge. In contrast, canning pineapples are relatively small so they can be 
packed into a can with minimal waste. The different sizes of harvested products result in 
a different seed density in the cultivated area, i.e. the number of seeds sown in the 
cultivated area. This smaller harvested pineapple for canning allows farmers to plant 
around 10,000 seeds per rai, twice the number for pineapples for direct consumption. In 
addition, the fruit processing operation is complicated by the fact that pineapples grown 
for canning need to have a higher degree of acid than those for direct consumption in 
order to extend the product’s shelf life. Hence, this results in differences in pineapple 
seed types as well as fertilizer formula. Local enterprises also have to install an 
automatic peeling and coring machine, called a ‘Ginaca’, as this cannot be done 
manually. The high acid content also makes the canning and sterilization process more 
difficult than for other canned fruit. One factory manager (Sample No.l) emphasised that 
incorrect canning of high-acid fruit like pineapple could lead to can explosion. Although 
no specific example was provided, the company owner of Sample No.2 gained 
knowledge on how to run the canned pineapple business from its own working 
experience in MNE affiliates.
Since tacit knowledge was required in the early stage of this business operation, 
many local enterprises used the labour mobility channel, which is complementary to the 
demonstration effect of FDI. These local firms hired high-profile workers (e.g. the 
technical heads) from MNE affiliated companies to assimilate the knowledge. All firms 
interviewed pointed out the relative importance of the labour mobility channel in the 
early stage of business operations. In particular, one pineapple processor (Sample No.l) 
hired Taiwanese technicians from a foreign company to assist in the starting period. 
They helped the company in a wide range of activities from raw material preparation, and
2 ‘Rai’ is a unit of area measurement in Thailand. One unit of rai is 1,600 square meters 
and 0.16 hectares.
3 ‘Ginaca’ was invented by Herry Ginaca, a technician in Dole Co Ltd at the end of the 
19th century.
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flows of inputs and outputs in the factory, to setting up the canning facility and 
sterilization process. These technicians were also hired by other local firms later on.
In addition to playing an important role in the preparation of raw materials and on 
the production process, non-FDI channels are also of greater importance than FDI when it 
comes to opening new marketing channels. There is no evidence of technology 
licensing/intemational subcontracting channels in the canned pineapple industry. The 
production technology involved, e.g. sterilization and canning, is fairly mature and 
widely known. Local firms can access machines and/or other production facilities 
through general arm’s length purchase (e.g. import machines or purchase locally- 
produced machines). The most crucial skill local firms lack is international marketing 
knowledge. The global market structure of canned pineapple is to some extent an 
oligopoly, dominated by MNEs (Rohrbach et al., 2003: p.4). Global market penetration 
must be associated with well-established brands. As revealed by one international 
marketing manager (Sample No.3), these well-established brands might differ from 
market to market. Even though any exporter can pay for the right to use these brands, 
they must have a good understanding of the global market in order to use the right brand 
for the right market. In addition, exporters must obtain purchasing orders around the 
world that are large enough to utilize their production capacity economically. With their 
extensive international marketing networks, MNEs are likely to be in a better position to 
acquire this knowledge than individual firms.
It is very difficult for individual enterprises, especially from a developing country, 
to launch their own brands in the global market. The general impression gained from 
interviews suggests that it would be time-intensive and very expensive to launch a locally 
owned brand internationally. Moreover, the likelihood of successfully exporting canned 
pineapple under a Thai-owned brand would be very low. The director of a company with 
success in launching a brand on the local market (Sample No.l) stated that launching of a 
Thai-owned brand of pineapple on the global market would need strong financial 
commitment for 10-20 years and even then there would be no guarantee of success. 
Currently, it is unlikely that any local company could undertake such a venture. An
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international marketing manager (Sample No.3) revealed the same difficulty, even though 
his company also has its own brand in the local market. For locally non-affiliated firms, 
therefore, the link with MNE buyers is still crucial to penetrate the global market 
successfully.
Nevertheless, the general impression gained from all interviewed firms is that 
apart from marketing channels, contribution from these buyers is limited. MNE buyers 
merely bring in orders and assign brands for local firms at given prices. As long as local 
firms can comply with their price requirements, they place orders. The limited 
contribution of MNE buyers would be as a result of the nature of the product. Canned 
pineapple is subject to a limited degree of product differentiation, namely slices, chunks, 
or crushed (solid pack) pineapple and these product specifications are also internationally 
standardized, so MNE buyers have not been important in influencing the design and style 
of such products. Global success depends heavily on price competitiveness. In addition, 
the technological contribution from MNE buyers is negligible. There has not been any 
dramatic change in production technology. ‘Ginaca’ was introduced in 1925 and is still 
used in factories (Interview and Rohrbach et al, 2004: p.2-3). Besides, canned pineapple 
does not involve a transformation from ‘raw’ to ‘cooked’ food so the risk of 
contamination is low. Food safety issues therefore are not a great concern, so there has 
not been significant contribution on the part of MNE buyers in helping local firms with 
food safety regulations, as is the case with other processed foods.
The success of Thai canned pineapple exports since the early 1980s highlighted 
how capable local enterprises have been enhancing technology and exploiting market 
opportunity with the help of MNEs. Note that despite MNE dominance in global trade 
and production, Thailand is one of the few countries4 where local enterprises are 
significantly involved in global production and trade (Rohrbach et al, 2003: p.4). The 
interviewed firms, all of which are domestically owned, accounted for 41.5 percent of 
total exports between 1999 and 2001. This high capability would be due to the fact that 
the entry of MNE affiliates has been to the country’s comparative advantage so that local
4 The other country is Indonesia (Rohrbach et al., 2003: p.4).
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enterprises have had the absorptive capability to observe, learn and adapt what they have 
demonstrated. Thailand has extensive experience in agricultural production and export. 
When the export opportunity arrived, Thai enterprises effectively relied on this existing 
comparative advantage.
In addition, Thai workers are skilled in food transformation processes, and play 
an important role in the pineapple production process. After harvested pineapples are 
peeled and cored, workers need to separate high quality pineapple — a yellow-gold 
colour — from low quality — a yellow-white colour — before the sterilization and 
canning process. All interviewed firms claimed labour skill as the advantage Thailand 
has over other competing countries. Workers learn very quickly how to grade pineapple 
chunks and can do it very efficiently. Finally, Thai enterprises are also involved in 
intensive R&D activities to improve the efficiency of farm production and maintain their 
international competitiveness. Global competition in the export business encourages all 
economic agents to seek technological innovation to improve efficiency and to survive. 
Most R&D activities are related to farm production and factory management. For 
example, the interviewee in Sample No.3 claimed a strategy to enhance competitiveness 
by making use of pineapple waste from the canning process, i.e. fruit skins and pineapple 
cores being used to produce sugar and cattle feed (Rohrbach et a i, 2003) was the result 
of a Thai enterprise R&D effort. Such a strategy has been widely adopted by other firms, 
including foreign affiliates.
8.2.2 Canned Tuna
The role of MNE involvement in the canned tuna industry is to some extent 
similar to that in the canned pineapple industry. First, the MNE affiliate creates 
significant demonstration effects to introduce a new business opportunity to local 
entrepreneurs. After that MNEs, through non-FDI buyer channels, play a vital role in 
assisting local firms to gain a foothold in world markets. As argued by one interviewee 
(Sample No.4), during the 1970s, there was a tiny domestic demand for canned tuna. 
This was different from the situation in other countries, especially developed countries, 
where there was a huge demand for canned tuna. Local firms at the early 1970s did not
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realize such business opportunity existed until the entry of foreign affiliates. After the 
establishment of the Australian affiliate producing under the brand ‘SAFCO’ in 1973, the 
first canned tuna processor in Thailand, several current leading companies of canned tuna 
export were established at the same time a few years later.5
In contrast with canned pineapple, the labour mobility channel as a conduit of 
technology transfer seems to be less important in the canned tuna industry. No 
interviewed firm pointed out its importance. This is because there is not as much tacit 
knowledge required in the early stage of business operation as in the canned pineapple 
industry. The production process is internationally standardized and easily accessed 
through general arm’s length purchase. The key factor in determining price 
competitiveness is labour skill, which is acquired through a Teaming-by-doing’ process. 
For example, after eviscerating the tuna, workers have to sort the fish carefully by size in 
order to ensure minimum losses during the pre-cooking stage (US Department of Labor, 
2004). This skill is more likely to be acquired over a period of time.
After the entry of MNE affiliates, local firms tend to benefit more from MNE 
involvement through non-FDI channels. There are at least three areas where local firms 
can benefit from the MNE buyer channel. Firstly, to penetrate the global market 
successfully, locally non-affiliated firms need to be linked to MNE buyers. Similarly to 
canned pineapple, there are well-established brands of canned tuna on the global market. 
It is unlikely that local firms who want to penetrate international markets would use their 
own brand. The evidence that Thai Union Frozen, the leading local company, chose to 
purchase the well-established US brand (i.e. Chicken of the Sea) instead of developing 
their own company brand, sheds light on how hard it is to launch a local brand 
internationally. Hence, local firms export their products through MNE buyers under 
these well-established brands such as Chicken of the Sea, SAFCO, Bumble Bees, and 
StarKist.
5 For example, Unicord was established in 1978, and Pattaya Food, Thai Union Frozen, 
and Tropical Canning in 1979.
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Secondly, since the production process involves transforming ‘raw’ food into 
‘cooked’ food, locally owned firms really need an understanding of how to comply with 
the complicated regulations. MNE buyers also help local firms to comply with the food 
safety regulations of importing countries. MNE buyers, with their extensive international 
marketing networks and wide experience in international trade, are better at 
understanding and complying with these regulations. Before local firms export their first 
shipment, representatives from these MNEs buyers conducted a factory visit and 
provided useful advice to ensure that the former comply with all the food safety 
regulations. One firm’s quality control manager (Sample No.5), who had long-term 
experience as a government authority in inspecting and approving food processing 
factories, revealed that such advice was very helpful. Sometimes, there are details that 
are not even in the interest of enterprises in developing countries but need to be fulfilled. 
MNE buyers mainly emphasize sanitary concerns in the production process. This applies 
to larger firms as well. However, once a locally owned firm manages to export, MNE 
buyers visit the factory less frequently.
Finally, MNEs buyers also help local firms to overcome export obstacles. 
Sometimes each importing country imposes its own food safety and border inspection 
regulations. This causes difficulties for processors coping with various sets of 
requirements and regulations across countries. These regulations also occasionally 
change at short notice. The marketing manager of a medium-size exporter (Sample No. 
4), mentioned that one European country requires all canned tuna exporters to comply 
with a test that measures net weight after draining water off the tuna for 15 minutes. This 
departs from the usual practice of around 2 minutes draining time. As a result, their 
exported canned tuna failed to meet this requirement. Eventually, this case was easily 
overcome with the assistance of the company’s MNE buyer counterpart. He asked the 
company to add a new line in the labeling ‘55% conform STAS 6516/78’. This means the 
conversion ratio between gross and net weights conforms to the international standard. 
With the inclusion of this additional sentence, the company’s export product could pass 
border inspection.
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Interestingly, one firm’s quality control manager (Sample No.5) revealed that 
there are some foreign buyers who behave very differently from MNE buyers. They 
mainly emphasize low price with less concern for quality. Most of them are from the 
Middle East. Such buyers are unlikely to be of technological benefit to local firms.
The long period of export success is also contributed to by the high absorptive 
capability and R&D investment, including labour training by Thai enterprises. The 
canned tuna industry is in the area where Thailand has comparative advantage. The cost 
competitiveness heavily relies on labour skills involved in production process. It tends to 
be less difficult for local firms to learn and benefit from MNE involvement. One 
interviewed firm (Sample No.6) pointed out that many leading Thai firms learned how to 
run their canned tuna business in the global market from MNE buyers, referred during the 
interview to as ‘strategic partners’. With their entrepreneur skill, many of them took the 
advanced step of investing abroad by buying their own well-established brand.6 For 
example, one of the leading US canned tuna brands, Bumble Bee, was taken over by 
Unicord during the late 1980s.7 8 In 2000, the second largest US brand, ‘Chicken of the
• QSea’, was taken over by Thai Union Frozen (holding a 50 per cent share). Nowadays, 
many local firms have become actively involved in outward direct investment in canned 
tuna in other developing countries like China, Vietnam and American Samoa (Interviews; 
Pananond, 2004).
In addition, Thai firms in the canned tuna industry actively strengthen their own 
competitiveness by providing labour training and being alert to innovation in order to 
survive global competition. Sample No.7 revealed that the company concerned has 
actively undertaken several activities to improve their labour efficiency and strengthen 
their international competitiveness. For example, the company kept improving the speed 
of inputs and intermediate goods flows in its factories. Workers were also trained to
6 Note that the primary motivation was to acquire the brand name, rather than any 
‘reverse engineering’ considerations.
7 During the crisis, the company sold out the brand. However, this initial step encouraged 
other locally owned firms to follow suit.
8 See also at http://www.chickenofthesea.com/company.aspx.
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reduce the waste in transforming ‘raw’ to ‘semi-processed’ fish. In addition, in order to 
maintain longer term industry competitiveness, several local firms (Samples No.6 and 7) 
began exploring the market opportunity for cooked tuna in new type of package, i.e. the 
retort pouch.9 The quality of tuna in a retort pouch is better than that in cans so it is more 
expensive. Many companies plan to switch to retort packaging when domestic wages 
become less competitive.
8.2.3 Processed Chicken
Though important, the role of MNE involvement in processed chicken is quite 
different from canned pineapple and tuna. There is no evidence that the entry of MNE 
affiliates in the processed chicken industry has generated a demonstration effect to entice 
local enterprises into the business. Instead, MNEs, which have been involved in the 
upstream industries, i.e. chicken hatcheries, broilers, and feeds, induce attempts to 
upgrade chicken farms and export chicken meat. In other words, there is technology 
spillover through forward linkages. Farming chickens for domestic consumption was not 
new in Thailand but mostly not at the commercial plantation level. Chicken farmers used 
locally bred chicks. The modem chicken farming began in the early 1970s with the 
establishment of the Arbor Acres Fann Inc, a joint venture between the US company, 
International Basic Economy Corporation (IBEC), and a local firm, the Chareon 
Pokphand Group (CP Group). This joint venture brought in advanced technology in 
chicken breeding, enhancing the quality of chicks.
The CP group had entered the animal feed industry in the late 1960s. Following 
the entry into the joint venture with IBEC, the CP group ventured into full integration of
9The retort pouch is a three-layered laminate with flexible plastic films as the outer and 
inner layers and aluminium foil in the middle. Tuna in a retort pouch is of better quality than that 
in a can because it overcomes the excess heat problems associated with processing canned tuna. 
Since food is not a good conductor of heat, excess heat needs to be applied to the can's surface for 
a period of time to guarantee sufficient heat at the centre, or “cold spot”, in order to destroy any 
organisms that might cause spoilage and disease. This method of preservation causes foods to 
lose their juices, texture, flavour, and nutrients. In contrast, the pouch, which is approximately 19 
mm (0.75 in) thick, and is filled and sealed under vacuum, has a large surface-to-volume ratio. 
Heat needs to penetrate less than 10 mm (0.38 in) from the surface to the “cold spot”, thereby 
yielding greatly improved products. Source: Microsoft® Encarta® Encyclopedia 2003. © 1993- 
2002 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
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chicken meat production so that the group ultimately provided all inputs (day-old chicks, 
animal feed, medicines, credit, services) as well as processing and marketing the chicken 
meat outputs (Goss et al, 2000). At the same time, the group began to organize a system 
of contract farming to encourage small and medium farmers to operate modem chicken 
farms. While the main purpose of the company’s full integration was to increase total 
sales of inputs, it positively affected production efficiency at the farm level. For example, 
in order to increase sales of inputs, the company has to promote modem chicken farm 
practice among local farmers. The greater the number of farmers running modem 
chicken farms, the greater the expected sales of inputs. The company also actively 
provides technical support and shares its own R&D outcomes with farmers in order to 
increase their farm efficiency (the number of chickens that survive, their net weight), 
which subsequently promotes the company’s sales. Under the contract farming system, 
the findings of the company’s R&D laboratories can easily benefit small and medium 
chicken farmers. This eventually enhances the production efficiency of poultry industries, 
putting Thailand in an advantageous position to access chicken meat at competitive prices 
(Gronski, 1994: p .ll cited in Goss et al., 2000; Akira, 1989: p.270). Hence, the 
combination of technology spillover through forward linkages and the CP group 
modernized the production of chicken meat in Thailand.
In the international marketing knowledge area, the MNE buyer channel is far 
more important than the FDI channel. This is because most processed chicken products 
are preserved by freezing (pasteurization) rather than sterilization. This preservation 
process does not kill all types of bacteria, but merely prevents their multiplying. 
Exporters must comply with more complicated food safety regulations to ensure the level 
of hygienic quality than those needed for sterilized foods. The first processed chicken 
exporter interviewed (Sample No.8) highlighted the contribution of MNE buyers to the 
company’s export success. The company was enticed into the processed chicken export 
business by Japanese buyers. These buyers helped the company to prepare its production 
facilities for the sale of processed chickens in Japan. The production facilities requested 
by export firms were far different from those producing for the domestic market during 
the early 1970s. While details were not specifically revealed during the interview, the
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most difficult requirements concerned the slaughter house and sanitary management in 
the factory. With assistance from MNE buyers, the company has successfully exported 
processed chicken to Japan. The relationship between the company and the buyers has 
been long term and was still operating at the time of the interview. The relationship 
between export success and MNE buyers’ channel is also revealed by other interviewed 
firms, including the CP group, which formed its international marketing channels with 
the help of Mitsui & Co of Japan (Akira, 1989: p.270).
Note that the special feature of the Japanese market, the largest export destination 
o f Thai processed chicken is that Japanese MNE buyers also provide this marketing 
channel for local suppliers. The internal trade system of the Japanese market is highly 
complicated and dominated by a handful of these Japanese MNEs. It is unlikely local 
suppliers could export goods to Japan without having links with these MNEs.10
Apart from assistance in complying with food safety regulations, the role of 
MNEs buyers is crucial for local enterprises in successfully adapting to changes in 
regulations in importing countries. Similar to the case of canned tuna, regulation changes 
occasionally occur in importing countries and can adversely impact on sales and interrupt 
export flows. Sample No.9 illustrated the relative importance o f MNE buyers. Without 
clear reference as to date, the company concerned revealed that the EU had introduced a 
new tariff schedule discriminating between unprocessed and processed frozen chicken 
with the former subject to higher tariff rates than the latter. This had the potential to 
affect Thai exporters adversely, mainly those exporting unprocessed chicken breasts to 
the EU. The MNE buyers assisted local firms to evade the new tariff discrimination by 
advising them to add salt to the frozen chicken, so that it would be classified as a 
processed product and subject to the lower tariff rates.
In the Japanese market, there is a high degree of product differentiation ascending 
from simple portion cuts like chicken breasts and drumsticks, to ready-to-cook/ready-to
10 The evidence is summarized from a personnel interview with some Japanese MNEs in 
Suphachalasai et al. (1999).
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eat products (e.g. marinated, roasted chicken with herbs, inner fillets, steamed and diced 
chicken, and roasted chicken with soy sauce). Japanese MNE buyers have been involved 
with the development of new products. Most of these new products are at the higher 
level on the quality ladder. Moving into a higher position on the quality ladder is not 
automatic, especially where ready-to-cook/ready-to-eat products are concerned. Local 
entrepreneurs must acquire knowledge of how to produce these products at a competitive 
price so that they have an acceptable flavour and appearance to consumers in importing 
countries. To do so, companies would have to send their marketing teams to Japan and 
conduct extensive marketing research into acceptable flavours and marketing 
opportunities. The Thais and Japanese do not necessarily enjoy the same flavours. All 
interviewed firms in both the processed chicken and shrimp industries (Samples No.8-10 
and 12-14) whose products destination is Japan were in agreement on this issue.
Japanese buyers bring in guideline recipes and work with local suppliers to 
formulate practical recipes that give details of ingredients. Sometimes, slight departures 
from the recipes are possible to save on production costs and/or to adjust to the 
manufacturing environment. With the assistance of Japanese buyers, many Thai 
exporters successfully manufacture various types of ready-to-eat and/or ready-to-cook 
food for the Japanese market.
For the EU market, the second largest export destination of Thai processed 
chicken, product differentiation is less complicated and mainly involves simple further 
processing, i.e. cutlets, steaming. This kind of assistance from MNE buyers is less 
important than it is for the Japanese market. Price competitiveness of the final products is 
far more important.
Apart from the contribution of MNE involvement, absorptive capability, the great 
entrepreneurship of the CP group and the R&D investment of local firms are other 
contributing factors to Thai export success. As discussed earlier, the CP group 
aggressively and efficiently relied on the presence of MNE affiliates in the upstream 
industry, thereby widely benefiting chicken farmers countrywide. Over and above, the
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CP group factor, the production process of processed chicken industry requires 
agricultural skill to farm chickens and labour skills to slaughter, dismember and slice 
them where Thailand has comparative advantage.11 In addition, for the ready-to- 
eat/ready-to-cook products, labour skill is crucial to the manufacturing process. Thus, the 
absorptive capability of local enterprises is likely to be high in this industry.
Local firms frequently invest in their own R&D to strengthen their 
competitiveness. At the farm level, the CP group and other leading chicken growers (e.g. 
Betago, Saha Farm) have successively conducted R&D activities to improve farm 
efficiency. At the processing level, local firms, which manufacture ready-to-eat/ready-to- 
cook products, must establish their own R&D teams to work with MNE buyers and to 
turn ‘guidelines’ into ‘practical’ recipes. R&D teams must then work out how to 
manufacture these recipes at very competitive prices. The faster this can be done, the 
more efficient the firm’s performance. This helps Thai firms to maintain their leading 
position in the global market.
8.2.4 Processed Shrimp
To some extent, the role of MNEs in the processed shrimp industry is similar to 
that in the processed chicken industry. The Japanese joint venture and the CP group 
played a crucial role in developing intensive shrimp farms in Thailand. This significantly 
improved the yield of shrimp farms, expanded raw material availability and lowered their 
prices, eventually making exporting a possibility. In other words, there is technology 
spillover through forward linkages. There is no evidence that the entry of foreign shrimp 
processors demonstrated the business opportunity of frozen/processed shrimp export to
11 Thailand is at a disadvantage where raw materials are concerned, especially chicken 
feed (i.e. soybean, and com) in comparison to the major competitors e.g. the US and Brazil. The 
disadvantage is a result of protection on these inputs. See details in Chapter 7. To overcome this 
disadvantage, Thai chicken processors exploit their advantage in skilled and cheap labour to 
penetrate the global market. Thailand exports portion cuts of chicken instead of the whole 
chicken as the other two major competitors do.
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local enterprises. In fact, Thai enterprises have been involved in frozen seafood exports 
since the late 1960s.12
From 1960 to the mid-1980s, Thailand’s export industry mainly relied on ocean 
catch. Nevertheless, this source of raw materials was rather limited and subject to high 
uncertainty, and was clearly constrained by the limited size of the catchment area. 
During the late 1970s, ocean catch became even more limited as a result of the 
finalization of the Law of the Sea Treaty (Goss et al., 2000). In addition, an increase in 
oil prices during the second half of the 1970s raised operating costs for Thai trawling 
vessels. The demand for shrimp in developed countries has increased noticeably to 
become the most sought after item of international trade in fisheries from 1985 onward 
(Goss et al., 2000). This stimulated Thai enterprises to become involved in processed 
shrimp exports.
Therefore, Thailand, led by the CP group, introduced intensive shrimp farming. 
Farmers cultivate shrimp larvae within an inland, prepared pond, in which feeding and 
quality of water are controlled. This is in sharp contrast to extensive farm production 
where farmers use wild larvae deposited in the culture area with tidal changes being 
relied upon for water exchange (Goss et al., 2000: p.516). The latter depends on 
numerous uncontrollable factors, and cultivated areas are limited to coastal areas only. 
As a result, yields from intensive shrimp farms are far higher than those from extensive 
ones. The extensive system yields up to approximately 500 kilograms per hectare per 
crop (live weight), far below the intensive system’s yields of 5,000-20,000 kilograms per 
hectare per crop13.
During the mid-1980s, Thailand lacked the technology required to run intensive 
shrimp farms, such as breeding technology for shrimp larvae, feeds, and farm practices. 
As a result, the CP group formed a joint venture with the Mitsubishi Corporation, namely
12 There is no evidence to confirm who the first exporter of frozen seafood was. Several 
exporting firms were established during the late 1960s, such as Thai Agriculture Food (1966) and 
Asian Food Cold Storage (1968).
13 All details are available at http://www.shrimpnews.com/About.html
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CP Aquaculture14, in order to access the breeding technology (Goss et al., 2000; Akira, 
1989: p.270). In the initial period, the Mitsubishi Corporation, knowing what kind of 
advanced technology was needed and where to search for and acquire it, hired Taiwanese 
technicians to assimilate breeding know-how. They were chosen because it was in 
Taiwan that intensive shrimp farming was first developed and applied until the industry 
collapsed in the late 1980s. This collapse further stimulated the search for alternative and 
cheaper production sites, one of which was Thailand.
After accessing the initial technological requirements for production, the CP 
group undertook full vertical integration as it did in the processed chicken industry. The 
CP group supplies all related raw materials (i.e. shrimp larvae and feed) and related 
services (i.e. diagnostic services, pond lining, and educational services), as well as being 
a shrimp processor.15 This full vertical integration enabled the CP group to promote local 
farmers to cultivate shrimp and to access shrimp for further processing as well as to 
maximize the company’s sale volumes of raw materials, i.e. larvae and feed. The CP 
group has also been actively involved in R&D activities to improve shrimp farming 
yields as well as to reduce the likelihood of shrimp farm epidemics. Under this full 
vertical integration structure, any R&D outcomes from the company laboratories can 
easily spread to local shrimp farmers. There was consensus in all interviewed firms that 
R&D activities by the CP group are very important to maintain international 
competitiveness at the farm level.
MNE buyers seem to be more important than MNE affiliates in the expansion of 
shrimp exports. All interviewed firms agreed that FDI inflows in processed shrimp 
exports are negligible. In particular, one interviewee (Sample No. 15) pointed out that, 
even though there were a number of small and medium Taiwanese direct investors 
involved in processed shrimp exports in the late 1980s, these direct investors are unlikely 
to transfer any advanced technology to local firms. They operate the intensive shrimp 
farming ponds and are engaged in the simple freezing process. At the shrimp farming
14 The joint venture ended in 1992 when the CP group acquired 100 percent control of CP 
Aquaculture in a buy-out of Mitsubishi’s share (Goss et al., 2000).
15 Information is drawn from Figure 2 of Goss et al (2000: p.519).
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level, the role of the CP group in supplying advanced technology and new development 
dominated any potential technology spillover from these direct investors. At the 
processing level, the technology associated with the freezing process was widely known 
among Thai enterprises long before Taiwanese involvement. The technology gap 
between these direct investors and local enterprises seems to be narrow. In addition, 
sales representatives of freezing technology suppliers regularly reported any innovations 
related to the freezing process.
In contrast, the general impression from the firm interview suggests that the MNE 
buyers’ channel is crucial to providing international marketing knowledge and 
contributing to current export success, especially where the market destination is Japan. 
As with processed chicken, Japanese MNE buyers also provide a marketing channel for 
local suppliers because of the complicated internal trade system and the dominant role of 
Japanese MNEs (see above).
During the interview, each firm revealed its own experience of various kinds of 
assistance from MNE buyers. The MNE buyer for the company in Sample No. 14 is 
closely involved with its production process. The buyer’s representative visits the 
company every month and goes through even minor matters in the production process. 
For example, the representative noticed production workers who were wearing their hats 
incorrectly and requested changes in order to ensure good hygiene controls. MNE buyers 
bring in recipe guides to work with the company as in the case of processed chicken. 
They work together with the company to achieve appropriate flavours and appearances 
(packaging, colours, sizes) at competitive prices. In addition, MNE buyers introduce new 
products. Sample No. 14 gave the example that shrimp for sushi is the latest product that 
MNE buyers brought, with a guide as to how to produce this product. Even though the 
product seems to be just boiled shrimp, it needs to be processed very quickly to preserve 
freshness. Such knowledge is unlikely to be acquired without any help from MNE 
buyers.
304
The company in Sample No. 16 expressed the same view about the role of MNE 
buyers although they had also received different kinds of assistance from the company in 
Sample No. 14. Since the company’s export destination is the US, where the degree of 
product differentiation is less, compared to the Japanese market, the kind of assistance 
from the buyer is in overcoming any potential export obstacles. Even though the 
company is small (its export value is less than $5 million), it has never been on the US 
food and drug administration (FDA) detention list in the past thirty years because of its 
close cooperation with its buyer. The buyer had informed the company of the US 
requirement that exporting firms had to attain ISO certification so that it provided a 
longer preparation period, and the buyer even introduced this local firm to some qualified 
ISO auditors. It seems difficult for firms, especially local small and medium firms from 
developing countries, to undertake this requirement within a short period of time. For 
example, firms must search for an appropriate auditor, and take the time to attain ISO 
certification. Early information from the MNE buyer helped this company to avoid any 
potential export disturbances.
Another company (Sample No. 12) also indicated the extensive involvement of a 
MNE buyer’s representative in their operation. In their experience, local firms need most 
help from their MNE buyers in international marketing channels. They argued that, as far 
as the production process is concerned, local firms are in better position to source raw 
materials and manufacture final goods at a competitive price. What they lack is 
knowledge as to what products should be sold and what flavours and appearances are 
acceptable to consumers in importing countries. They maintained that, if the company 
just produces whatever appeals to Thais and launches it abroad, especially in the Japanese 
market, it is unlikely to be successful. MNE buyers are in a better position to understand 
their consumers’ demands.
All of these firm-specific experiences highlighted the need to be linked with MNE 
buyers in order to penetrate the global market successfully and maintain their long-term 
international competitiveness. It is important to note that all the companies involved in
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the above samples have had long-term relationships of 20-30 years with these MNE 
buyers.
For processed shrimp, there were no well-established brand in the way there were 
in the canned pineapple and fish industries. As claimed by one interviewee (Sample 
No. 15), inland grown, black tiger prawns were introduced in the US market after 
Thailand had successfully developed intensive shrimp farming. Thus, there are other 
foreign buyers and they emphasize low price. Most of these foreign buyers are small and 
medium trading companies. Their orders are mainly for a simple processed shrimp, e.g. 
frozen headless and pilled shrimp, boiled shrimp, and shrimp cocktail. Most of these 
products are supplied to the US rather than the Japanese market. Such foreign buyers are 
unlikely to contribute any significant technological benefit to Thai exporters.
As occurred in the previous products, the high absorptive capability of local firms 
and the R&D investment of local firms are the other contributing factors to Thai export 
success. The CP group considerably enhanced the benefits from the presence of MNE 
affiliates in the upstream industry. The production process of processed shrimp industry 
requires agricultural skill to farm shrimps and labour skills to pill and cook them, where 
Thailand has comparative advantage. Thus, the absorptive capability of local enterprises 
is likely to be high in this industry. Similar to the case of processed chicken, local firms 
also invest in their own R&D to strengthen their competitiveness both at the farm and 
processing levels. Local shrimp farms as well as shrimp processors have successively 
conducted R&D activities to boost their production efficiency.
8.2.5 Inter-product Comparison
In summary, MNE involvement is the key factor contributing to the 
industrialization process of the Thai PF4 industries. MNE involvement was through both 
FDI and non-FDI channels, especially the MNE buyers’ channel. The contribution of 
MNE involvement is different in the case of each PF4 product (Table 8.1). Several key 
inferences can be summarized as follows:
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1. For all PF4 products, MNE involvement plays a vital role in the 
industrialization process. MNE involvement began with establishing affiliates (FDI 
channel), which generated considerable technology spillovers and enticed local firms to 
undertake the manufacturing process. For canned pineapple and tuna, FDI technology 
spillover took place through demonstration effects. There was no domestic demand for 
these two products in Thailand during the early 1970s. Local enterprises did not realize 
there was an export business opportunity until the entry of MNE affiliates. By contrast, 
in the processed chicken and shrimp industries, there is no demonstration effect from 
MNE affiliates. Instead, the entry of MNE affiliates in upstream industries significantly 
induced local enterprises to upgrade their production (i.e. chicken and shrimp farms) and 
export. In other words, local firms in the processed chicken and shrimp industries 
benefited from technology spillover through the forward linkage channel of FDI.
2. In the canned pineapple industry, where there is tacit knowledge involved in 
the initial period of business operation, the labour mobility channel of FDI is needed to 
complement its demonstration effect. The tacit knowledge is a result of the high-acid 
property of harvested pineapple for canning that makes the production process more 
complicated than for other preserved fruit. Experienced factory technicians were needed 
to assist local inexperienced firms in the initial period. There is no evidence of the 
significance of the labour mobility channel with other PF4 products.
3. MNE buyer linkages play a far more important role than FDI channel in 
contributing to international marketing knowledge and export success (Figure 8.1). 
International marketing here can be broken down into three main areas, in which MNE 
buyers contribute to export success of Thai PF4:
(3.1) Marketing channel
MNE buyers brought in the marketing channel for local enterprises to penetrate 
the global market successfully. The need to be linked with MNE buyers varies 
depending on the product. In the canned pineapple and tuna industries, there were well- 
established brands on the market, especially in developed countries. It is unlikely local
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firms can launch their local brand on the international market. Thai firms have to 
produce and sell their products under these well-established brands. Besides, knowledge 
is needed of what the right brands are for each market as well as of where the market 
opportunity is around the world, to ensure the firms obtain purchasing orders large 
enough to run their business. Hence, MNE buyers, with their extensive international 
marketing networks, are in a better position to acquire the knowledge. In the case of 
processed chicken and shrimp, where there are no well-established brands, the role of 
MNE buyers in providing marketing channels is still relevant to the Japanese market 
where the internal trade system is complicated and dominated by Japanese multinational 
trading companies. For other markets like the US and European Union, the role of MNE 
buyers becomes less important. Nevertheless, the Japanese market is the largest export 
destination of processed chickens and shrimps
(3.2) Compliance with regulations of importing countries
MNE buyers play a very important role in assisting local firms to comply with the 
food safety regulations and overcome any potential export obstacles. The role of MNE 
buyers is important in all PF4 products except for canned pineapple. In the canned tuna 
industry, its production process is involved with transforming ‘raw’ to ‘cooked’ foods. In 
the processed chicken and shrimp industries, its final products are still either ‘raw’ or 
‘semi-cooked’ foods preserved by the freezing process. The food safety issue is of great 
concern and related food safety regulations seem to be more complicated than for canned 
pineapple. In addition, there are cases in the canned tuna and processed chicken 
industries where MNE buyers have helped to overcome some export obstacles or 
occasional changes of regulations induced by governments in importing countries.
(3.3) Development of new products
Regarding processed chicken and shrimp, whose product specifications are not 
internationally standardized, MNE buyers have been involved with the development of 
new products. MNE buyers introduce Thai firms to new products and work together to 
ensure final goods will sell in importing countries. This role of MNE buyers is likely to 
be relevant only for the Japanese market where there is a high degree of product
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differentiation. This considerably contributes to moving up to the higher level of quality 
ladder.
4. For all PF4 products, Thai enterprises seem to have a high absorptive capability 
to learn and maximize benefits from MNE involvement because its open trade policy 
regime causes MNE involvement take place in areas where Thailand has the comparative 
advantage, i.e. agricultural plantation and labour skill in processing foods. In addition, 
this regime allows the global competitive pressure to encourage all economic agents to 
seek technological innovation to improve efficiency and to survive.
Figure 8.1
MNE Involvement in the Processed Food Industry
Producers Consumers
Raw material 
preparation
- Farm 
preparation
- Farm
modernization
MNE buyers 
Involvement
Packaging 
and labeling
FDI Involvement 
/FDI technology 
Spillover
Food processing
Sterilization
Freezing
International
marketing;
- Marketing channel
- Complying with 
food safety 
regulations
- Development of 
new products
Source: Author’s compilation
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5. In the export success of processed chicken and shrimp industries, the CP group, 
the Thai MNE, a ‘Fortune 500’ company, was an important element of the enabling 
environment to make maximum benefits from MNE involvement with its solid business 
history and strong entrepreneurial skills. It played a pivotal role in harnessing MNE 
involvement in the upstream industries. Besides, the active involvement of the CP group 
in R&D activities at the farm level significantly contributes to strengthen competitiveness 
and improving quality through the use of improved inputs.
8.3 The Automotive Industry
The firm interviews found a considerable level of MNE involvement in the Thai 
automotive industry. This occurs through both FDI and non-FDI channels. Through FDI 
linkages, there have been numerous MNE affiliates in both car making and parts 
manufacturing industries in Thailand. Where non-FDI linkages are concerned, there was 
evidence that local parts manufacturers access advanced technology from MNEs under 
technology licensing contracts. There was not evidence of other non-FDI channels.
MNE involvement contributed to the technological capability of Thai parts 
suppliers. Obviously, some Thai firms directly use technology licensing agreements to 
acquire production technology. This results in technological improvement in local parts 
suppliers. On the other hand, there is FDI technology spillover in the Thai automotive 
industry. The key FDI channel is through backward linkages developed between car 
assemblers and local parts suppliers. Other FDI channels, like the demonstration effect 
and/or labour mobility, are relatively less important. MNE car manufacturers demand 
finished parts made to precise specifications so they need to contact parts suppliers to 
ensure that the manufactured parts measure up to precise specifications. This involves a 
great deal of complex information that is unlikely to be effectively absorbed by simply 
observing other existing foreign-owned parts suppliers (demonstration effect) or by 
employing a few high-profile workers who used to work with foreign firms (labour 
mobility). As a result, backward linkages are the key channel for FDI technology
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spillover. Nonetheless, this does not imply that there is no technology spillover taking 
place through other channels. Rather their contribution is likely to be relatively less 
important, compared with that from backward linkages.
Note that the discussion here emphasizes the OEM market where parts 
manufacturers supply their products directly to car assemblers, in order to examine the 
role of backward linkages and gains from FDI. In contrast, there is another market for 
parts, the REM market where parts manufacturers sell their products as spare parts. 
Customers are general car owners not car assemblers, so this is not an area where direct 
linkages are involved.
When parts suppliers want to be OEM suppliers, they must build up technological 
capability to ensure that they are able to produce finished parts made to precise 
specifications. Since orders from MNE car assemblers are relatively large, this motivates 
individual suppliers, especially local ones, to invest in upgrading their technological 
capability to boost their existing production capability. Usually MNE car assemblers are 
able to take part in the selection of capital equipment and production technology of 
suppliers. Based on the Thai automotive industry, MNE car assemblers usually demand 
their locally non-affiliated suppliers to be under technology licensing contracts with 
MNE parts suppliers to acquire well-established production technology. In order to 
obtain reliable quality, car assemblers also always request that their OEM parts suppliers 
run quality tests on manufactured parts. Local suppliers must install several quality 
testing facilities and conduct these tests. In the ongoing process, there are continuous 
flows of new products, thereby creating a demand for successively upgrading production 
technology. All of these activities are instrumental in causing backward linkages to boost 
the technological capability of parts suppliers.
Over the past three decades, there has been a notable structural change in the 
nature of backward linkages in the Thai automotive industry. This affects the way that 
linkages positively affect the technological capability of parts suppliers. There is no 
clear-cut time period during which backward linkages have been changing, but many
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firms mention they have gradually changed since the late 1980s (Samples No. 17-19). 
Hence, a distinction in the nature of linkages is roughly drawn between before and after 
the mid-1980s. Note that, as argued in Chapter 7, car assemblers gradually commenced 
their strategy change around the late 1980s and it became clear from the mid-1990s 
onward. The time of linkage change to some extent coincided with the changes in 
government policy toward the Thai automotive industry as discussed in Chapter 7 (see 
above).
8.3 1. Linkages during the period of the 1970s to the mid-1980s.
Linkages occurring during this period would be regarded as ‘policy-induced’ 
linkages. Part procurement by car assemblers was not completely reliant on market 
mechanisms. Instead these assemblers had to procure locally made parts to fulfill the 
LCR measures. With the policy-induced linkages, car assemblers still positively affected 
the technological capability of local parts suppliers by requesting that locally non- 
affrliated firms use well-established production technology. However, technological 
benefits derived from this type of linkages are limited and do not lead to sustainable 
development of part manufacturing as seen below. Car assemblers provided lists of 
accepted technology owners. This reduced the transaction costs involved in technology 
searches as well as lowered the risk of acquiring inappropriate technology. Local parts 
suppliers had to comply with this request as a prerequisite for becoming OEM suppliers. 
This compliance led to upgrading the production and technological capabilities of these 
firms.
Under these contracts, technology owners that are usually MNE parts 
manufacturers not only sold machinery but also sent their technicians to train their 
customers (i.e. local suppliers) to operate the machinery properly. Three interviewed 
firms producing rubber parts, radiators, and pressed parts (Samples No. 18, 20-21) all 
argued that the modem technology production of their companies commenced when they 
became OEM suppliers in the early 1970s. Even though these companies were large and 
successful in the REM market during the 1960s, their production technology at that time 
was rather informal. It was not reliant on any well-established production technology.
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As long as they could imitate OEM parts (i.e. genuine parts) as closely as possible at 
competitive prices, they could survive in the REM market.
The decision to create linkages came about to fulfill the LCR obligation and 
locally assembled vehicles were sold on the highly-protected domestic market. Hence, 
after car assemblers requested reliable production technology, they did not seem to care 
what technology local suppliers acquired under the technology licensing agreement. As a 
result, local suppliers, who realized they were protected by LCR measures, complied with 
this request by bringing out-of-date technology and second-hand machines. This was 
confirmed by many interviewed suppliers (Samples No. 18, 19 and 21).
In addition, foreign technicians that were usually associated with the technology 
licensing contracts were limited. A die casting supplier (Sample No. 19), which was a 
Thai-owned firm during this period, pointed out that one foreign technician looked after 
around 20 machines. This has changed completely since the mid-1980s when the 
company became a MNE affiliate. Now one technician looks after only 2 machines. 
This same pattern was found in the case of Thai-owned rubber parts suppliers (Samples 
No. 18 and 21). For parts like aluminium casting and rubber hoses, local workers need 
close supervision to learn how to fine-tune machines and to overcome normal day-to-day 
problems in operating them. This skill is mainly developed through a leaming-by-doing 
process rather than once-and-for-all training. This education will help firms to save on 
operating costs and improve production efficiency. For example, the skill of fine-tuning 
machines is important in determining a firm’s efficiency. If the firm is very skillful, it 
can reduce waste occurring through trial-and-error at the start-up period, i.e. by setting 
the right pressure, temperature and vulcanizing periods. It also saves time in changing 
from one mould to another and increases production efficiency.
Linkages between car assemblers and local parts suppliers are rather weak. Car 
assemblers brought parts samples and/or 3-dimensional drawing and asked their local 
parts suppliers to duplicate the samples at the negotiated prices. Sometimes, local 
suppliers were requested to conduct a few quality tests. The level of technological
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capability required to do this job was merely the capability to run mass production with 
uniform quality, i.e. quality control capability.
In addition, car assemblers saved on the cost of monitoring the quality of 
manufactured parts by minimizing lists of quality tests. The requirement to conduct 
quality tests is one of the important mechanisms to force parts suppliers to learn and 
improve their production capability and efficiency. In the policy-induced linkages, 
quality tests were far shorter than the usual practice. A radiator supplier (Sample No.20) 
argued that there were only 5-6 items, for which car assemblers requested quality tests 
during this period. More importantly, these items were simple and obvious. A Japanese 
car assembler (Sample No.25) confirmed that these lists of quality tests were short, and 
further argued that in some cases local suppliers were not even capable of doing these 
simple quality tests. Instead, the assembler had to perform them himself. As long as they 
were of ‘acceptable’ price and quality, car assemblers complied with the LCR measures. 
The word ‘acceptable’ in terms of price refers to the price level that allows car 
assemblers to earn a profit on the local market. ‘Acceptable’ in terms of quality means a 
level of quality that does not jeopardize the long-term goodwill of the car maker, 
especially in terms of car safety.
The LCR measure gave parts suppliers economic rents but did not provide any 
economic incentive for them to convert the created rents into developing their 
technological capability. Even though, it would have benefits from learning by doing in 
the manufacturing process, the general impression from firm interview suggests such 
benefits were not significant. Once they were successfully linked up with MNE car 
assemblers, there was no incentive for them to strengthen their technological capability 
further. Manufacturing parts became routine. In particular, a supplier (Sample No.20) 
even argued that as long as customers bought their products, there was no reason to waste 
sizable amounts of money in learning and upgrading technological capability. A 
Japanese car assembler (Sample No.26) also gave a good example in the case of 
radiators. The LCR measure might encourage local suppliers to import well-established 
production technology to manufacture radiators (made of copper) but there was no
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ongoing enforcement to keep updating technology. While the technology has changed to 
using aluminium because of its better heat dissipation, the presence of LCR measures has 
allowed these suppliers to put off adopting this innovation.
Under this policy environment, it was unlikely car assemblers would work jointly 
with local parts suppliers in developing parts for any new vehicles. In reality, there are 
various stages before mass production that car assemblers and parts suppliers can work 
together and benefit from each other through backward linkages. As illustrated in Figure 
8.2, there are long lists of such activities. In this study, these activities are divided into 7 
stages (Figure 8.2).16 In Stage 1, the concept of a new vehicle model is expressed in 
order to enhance competitiveness with a new product that meets market needs. Usually, 
this is done entirely by car assemblers. This stage will only provide a vehicle concept 
without any engineering or technical information. This is followed by Stage 2, ‘part 
design’, which involves the design of the functional characteristics and basic structure 
required to implement the vehicle concept in Stage 1. Stages 3 to 6 are conducted in 
order to obtain all necessary information for the manufacturing process, namely Stage 7. 
Such information is represented in 2 - or 3-dimension drawings. From Stages 2 to 6, car 
makers and parts manufacturers must work together intensively. The production of a 
vehicle requires various types of manufactured components (such as metal, plastic, 
rubber, glass, and electronics). Car makers are not necessarily specialists in all these 
parts. They need assistance from manufacturers that specialize in individual parts to 
improve vehicle quality and enhance competitiveness of the overall vehicle. However, to 
be able to be involved in these stages, parts suppliers must attain a technological 
capability that is higher than mere quality control, i.e. product development and product 
engineering.
It is unlikely that the deepening linkages would go beyond the mass production 
stage in an environment where linkages are ‘policy-induced’. As mentioned earlier, local 
suppliers were unresponsive to innovations and requests to improve their product quality.
16 Seven Stages mentioned here conform with the classification of Takayasu and Mori 
(2004: p.228-9) which separates these activities into three stages, namely product development 
(Stages 1 to 2), process engineering (Stages 3 to 6) and mass production (Stage 7).
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It was difficult to find capable suppliers. The protection of vehicles allowed car 
assemblers to stagnate and enjoy policy-induced economic rents. In this environment, as 
substantiated by several car assemblers (Samples No.25 and 26), locally assembled 
vehicles were old models launched previously in other markets, namely ‘repeat’ models. 
For the ‘repeat’ model, stages 2 to 6 were all completed elsewhere and car assemblers 
acquired complete information of how to manufacture parts. That is, they worked with 
MNE parts manufacturers. Assistance from Thai parts suppliers in product engineering 
and product design was not needed.
8.3.2 Linkages from the late 1980s -present.
As mentioned, global competition in the automotive industry became increasingly 
intense during the late 1980s and the early 1990s (see above). This caused car assemblers 
to change their strategy from operating behind a protection wall to exploiting the 
regional/global network to strengthen their international competitiveness. As discussed 
above, one of the outcomes of the strategy change was to increase local parts 
procurement only when production site is likely to be able to operate efficiently and 
attain economies of scale in production. Hence, some countries, which fail to achieve 
from such condition, are dropped off the regional/global network. The increase in local 
content naturally occurred in order to strengthen international competitiveness of car 
assemblers. Hence, linkages during this period would be regarded as ‘natural’ linkages.
With ‘natural’ linkages, car manufacturers also require higher technological 
capability from their parts suppliers. Local suppliers are expected to attain the 
technological capability to work on product development and product engineering 
(Stages 2-6 in Figure 8.2). The expectation of supplier capability was even higher when 
many car assemblers developed the strategy of launching the same model on multiple 
markets at the same time, namely the ‘original’ model strategy.17 This meant car
17 This strategy aims to reduce R&D costs per vehicle. The scope of multiple markets 
can be either a region e.g. ASEAN or worldwide. For example, the one-ton pick-up truck is the 
global vehicle for both developing and developed countries (Takayasu and Mori, 2004: p.219- 
20) .
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Figure 8.2
Series of Backward Linkages in the Automotive Industry
Stage 1- Statement of requirement
1
Prototype
Stage 4 -Prototype testing
Stage 7 -  Mass production
Stage 2- Part design
2-or 3-Dimension drawing
Automaker evaluation
Stage 3 -Finite element and simulation testing*
Stage 6- Approved part and identifying engineering specification
Stage 5- Prototype assembly and running test
Source: Firm interviews
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assemblers did not have full information on producing a vehicle because it had not 
already been produced somewhere else. Hence, after car assemblers decided where to 
produce this model, they and the parts suppliers jointly work out all necessary 
information for the manufacturing process (Stages 2 to 6), based on input prices available 
at selected production sites to minimize total costs of a vehicle. In Thailand, this strategy 
began in 1996 (Techakanont, 2002). This is sharply different from producing ‘repeat’ 
models where car assemblers were not involved in the manufacturing production of 
vehicles. As argued by a Japanese car assembler (Sample No.26), car assemblers 
nowadays just provide engineering properties and product qualification as well as assign 
space where parts have to be fitted to the vehicle. Parts suppliers must do this to retain 
their status as OEM suppliers. Backward linkages become longer-term relationships 
because Stages 2 to 6 commence a few years before the vehicle is launched on the 
market. This allows parts suppliers to be involved beyond the mass production stage. 
Car assemblers and parts suppliers set up their staff teams and work closely together from 
product design, to prototype production and then mass production.18
In addition, car assemblers have placed far more emphasis on the quality and 
performance of parts suppliers. The radiator supplier (Sample No.20) stated that the 
MNE car assemblers extended the list of quality testing from 5-6 tests to almost 40. 
These additional tests were far more complicated. This was totally different from the 
situation between 1970 and the early 1990s.19 New quality testing facilities had to be 
installed and the company had to learn how to pass these quality tests. Interestingly, 
although the company had been manufacturing these parts for the past thirty years, it was 
not until these new and longer lists of quality tests were introduced that they realized how 
complex the manufacturing process really was. This supplier emphasised that these 
additional lists were not a result of technological progress. The delay in applying them 
was entirely due to a lower expectation of parts’ quality.
18Techakanont (2002) provides a detailed case study of inter-firm cooperation in the 
automotive industry.
19 The car assembler corresponding to this supplier commenced the strategy change in the 
early 1990s. In fact, the changes in the nature of backward linkages in other car assemblers 
began in the late 1980s.
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As revealed by many rubber suppliers (Samples No. 18, 21 and 23), car 
assemblers rate their suppliers according to ability to comply with requirements. This 
rating depends on several aspects of supplier performance such as delivery, defect ratio, 
etc. The higher the score, the higher suppliers are ranked for allocation of future 
contracts. Greater emphasis on quality and performance of parts suppliers increases 
competition pressures and forces suppliers to improve X-efficiency.
This competition among parts suppliers has become even more intense after the 
entry of the US Big 3, namely Ford, GM and Daimler Chrysler. The parts procurement 
policy of these US car assemblers heavily relies on price bid competition among parts 
suppliers around the world. This prompted other car assemblers to follow suit. In the 
traditional practice of Japanese car assemblers, it was usual for a parts supplier to be 
attached to only one car assembler. This practice changed from around 1995 onward. A 
parts supplier is now allowed to supply more than one auto maker. Orders are heavily 
reliant on the competitiveness of suppliers. This also enhances the likelihood of parts 
suppliers benefiting from scale economies.
Suppliers, in addition, must propose their cost-reduction plans to car assemblers, 
i.e. cutting production and operating costs by a certain per cent within given time periods 
(revealed by Sample No.22). This is to enhance the competitiveness of assembled 
vehicles. For example, Toyota has set a 25 per cent cost reduction target within 3 years. 
Isuzu and GM have adopted a target of cost reduction of about 5 per cent a year.
Interestingly, there is evidence of car manufacturers providing assistance to 
locally owned suppliers. Car assemblers conduct regular factory visits to informally 
audit parts manufacturers’ capability. Where some parts are concerned, like pressed parts 
or suspension parts, where car assemblers are familiar with their production technology, 
i.e. pressing technology, they provided useful suggestions. A technician of a pressed 
parts supplier (Sample No.24) pointed out that from around the early 1990s, the 
frequency of factory visits from car assemblers and their intention to help local parts
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suppliers has increased remarkably, compared to the early 1980s. Sometimes, car 
assemblers would give useful recommendations regarding jig arrangements and 
machining processes so as to reduce the defective rates and dollar costs per unit of 
manufactured parts. A similar pattern was found in the case of suspension parts (Sample 
No.22). During a factory visit, car assemblers worked with the company to overcome 
production cost reduction problems.
Even though they were still reliant on the technology licensing channel to acquire 
advanced technology, technology owners with influence over the car assemblers 
gradually requested on upgrading production technology. The more cutting edge 
production technology was transferred with close supervision from foreign technicians, 
and many interviewees pointed out that this is when the real development of local labour 
skills began. According to one multi-parts supplier (Sample No. 17), these foreign 
technicians even “ate and slept with local workers”. The number of foreign technicians 
has increased remarkably. Local labour is now able to produce relatively more 
complicated parts. This is verified by the deputy head of factory engineers of an 
aluminium casting supplier (Sample No. 19) which used to be Thai-owned. More 
importantly, local firms began investing in R&D activities as a result of increased MNE 
involvement.
8.3.3 Comparison between ‘Policy-induced’ and ‘Natural’ Linkages
Key different aspects between ‘policy-induced’ and ‘natural’ linkages are 
summarized in Table 8.2. Firstly, the technological capability car assemblers expect 
from parts suppliers is far higher in ‘natural’ linkages than ‘policy-induced’ ones. Where 
the latter are concerned, the capability car assemblers expect is the ability to duplicate 
parts samples with well-established production technology. Whether parts suppliers 
acquire out-of-date or cutting edge production technology is not of interest to the car 
assemblers. Where ‘natural linkages’ are concerned, on the other hand, parts suppliers 
are expect to be capable of producing engineering and design. Even though locally non- 
affiliated firms use the technology licensing channel as they did the ‘policy-induced’ 
linkages, more cutting-edge technology is requested to be transferred.
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Secondly, the level of backward linkages is different between these two types. 
‘Policy-induced’ linkages occur only at the mass production stage. One is unlikely to 
find the deeper level of backward linkages at some stages of the product development 
process as one would with ‘natural’ ones. In addition, the relationship in ‘natural’ 
linkages is longer term than the ‘policy-induced one. In the former relationship, car 
assemblers and parts suppliers commence their co-operation a few years before launching 
vehicles. This enhances the likelihood that parts suppliers benefit from other types of 
advanced technology (e.g. managerial skills) from car assemblers.
Thirdly, the emphasis on price competitiveness and parts quality by car 
assemblers is far less in ‘policy-induced’ linkages than in ‘natural’ ones. Greater 
emphasis promotes healthy competition pressure and forces parts suppliers to improve 
their X-efficiency in the short-run and to keep alert to innovation subsequently.
Finally, there was no evidence that car assemblers significantly assist local parts 
suppliers to improve production efficiency in ‘policy-induced’ linkages. This contrasts 
with ‘natural’ linkage where car assemblers are more actively involved in the 
improvement of production efficiency of local parts suppliers.
All of these four respects are the key mechanisms in causing backward linkages to 
boost the technological capability of parts suppliers. The evidence from the Thai 
automotive industry shows that the policy-induced linkages distort the mechanism and 
retard growth-enhancing effects from FDI backward linkages.
Nevertheless, only a handful of indigenous parts suppliers can pass the new 
requirement standards and benefit from ‘natural’ linkages with car assemblers. In 2002, 
there were 354 Thai-owned OEM suppliers (Figure 8.3). The other 1,100 Thai suppliers 
were indirectly linked with car assemblers through first-tier suppliers. In the opinion of 
interviewees (Samples No. 19, 20, 22 and 25), these official figures of Thai-owned OEM
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suppliers tend to grossly overstate the number of surviving firms. The number of purely 
Thai firms must be around 10-15 suppliers. The official figure above would include 
some OEM suppliers that manufactured parts for old car models, i.e. the models that were 
being assembled before the strategy changes.
It can be argued that OEM suppliers that survive in the new environment are 
likely to be large firms that are able to access longer-term financial support in order to 
comply with the new requirements. In addition, since car assemblers have employed the 
modularization system where OEM suppliers must be fully responsible for a module 
instead of individual parts, this reinforces the notion that OEM suppliers must be large 
firms. It has become harder for small and medium firms to survive as OEM suppliers. 
Nevertheless, the general impression gained from the interviews is that the main obstacle 
is the difficulty of acquiring higher technological capability within a short transition 
period. This finding could shed light on the ineffectiveness of the policy packages, i.e. 
protection of vehicles and imposition of LCR measures to promote the Thai automotive 
industry.
Parts suppliers need time to accumulate technological capability from the quality 
control level to the product engineering and product design levels. This seems to be 
consistent with the ‘infant industry’ argument of temporary protection to gain dynamic 
economies in following periods. However, there is no evidence to suggest that the LCR 
measures enabled local suppliers to achieve dynamic economies. The LCR measures 
commenced 20 years before the strategy change but only a handful of local suppliers 
survived. In addition, the reason that local suppliers (Samples No. 17 and 22) passed the 
new requirement standard was not directly related to the protection provided by LCR
20 Under modularization, parts suppliers are classified into three levels, namely first-, 
second- and third-tier suppliers, according to their relationship with car assemblers. First-tier 
suppliers are required to take responsibility for the design as well as the manufacture of modules 
and not just individual components. If any suppliers fail to attain this requirement, they will be 
classified in the lower tiers, i.e. the second- or third- tiers. The lower tier suppliers are not directly 
involved with car manufacturers but are responsible for individual parts and/or raw materials and 
deliver their products to the first-tier suppliers.
21 The firm in Sample No.24 is another one that survived. However, interviewees were 
not in a position to give convincing evidence of this transition.
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measures, but because they received significant assistance from the car assembler whose 
production strategy in the late 1980s shifted towards exporting vehicles from Thailand 
(see above). Hence, these firms undertook their technological upgrading from the late 
1980s onwards. This longer transition period enabled these firms to build up their 
technological capability gradually and maintain their positions successfully in the OEM 
market.
Figure 8.3
A Relationship Structure in the Thai Automotive Industry
14 auto 
makers
/F irs t tier suppliers \  
'(287 foreign owned, 68 
joint ventures, and 354 
Thai owned)
1,100 Second and third tier 
suppliers
Source: Thai Automotive Industry Association (2003).
It is unlikely to be able to reject that during the IS period, local suppliers did gain 
technological capability benefit from the presence of LCR and the other protection 
measures granted so far. The relevant question is whether such protection measures 
generate sufficient benefits to induce sustainable development of the automotive sector, 
especially the auto parts industry, where local firms participate. The firm-level study 
failed to uncover any evidence in support of the proposition that LCR measures had any 
lasting positive impact on local part suppliers. Such measures, in other words, were not a 
sufficient condition in building up the technological capability of local suppliers and
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allowing them to benefit from the gains of dynamic economies. They did help local firms 
to acquire well-established quality-controlled production technology but failed to 
motivate them to use this technology efficiently and advance to even higher levels of 
technology. When car assemblers changed their strategy, a few suppliers were able to 
pass this new requirement standard. Hence, they enticed MNE parts manufacturers to 
establish affiliates in Thailand, thereby rapidly increasing FDI inflows in the automotive 
industry. OEM suppliers have been supplanted by MNE affiliates. Some of these parts 
manufacturers were technology owners and provided such knowledge to local parts 
suppliers under technology licensing agreements (Samples No. 18, 20, and 21). As 
evidenced by a rubber parts supplier (Sample No. 18), these technology owners have 
expressed their intention to be co-owners since the late 1980s where car assemblers 
commenced their strategy changes. The tendency of strengthening their involvement 
with local parts suppliers was observed during the first half of the 1990s (Samples No. 18 
and 21). When the foreign ownership restriction was abolished during the onset of the 
crisis in 1997, these technology owners took full control of the OEM market. Local 
partners are responsible for production for the after market (i.e. repaired parts for vehicle 
services and maintenance).
Therefore, the ‘infant industry’ argument for protection to promote dynamic 
economies is not supported by the experience of the Thai automotive industry. These 
findings are in line with previous studies, e.g. Battat et al. (1996) and Moran (1998, 
2001). The LCR and ‘policy-induced’ linkages retard rather than promote growth and 
efficiency. In particular, Moran (1998: p.46) points out:
‘In short, the imposition of domestic-content requirements on foreign 
investors —far from generating a dynamic learning process in which 
foreign subsidiaries, local suppliers, labor, and host authorities work 
together to grow from infant industry status to internationally competitive 
operations — contains multiple sources of breakdown and stagnation.’
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8.4 Inter-industry Comparison
Table 8.3 provides a summary of channels of MNE involvement and their 
contribution to these two industries. In both industries, MNEs have been involved 
through both FDI and non-FDI channels and have significantly contributed to their 
success. In the processed food industry, MNEs are more likely to have non-FDI buyer 
linkage with local enterprises. In contrast, despite the presence of both FDI and non-FDI 
channels, MNEs in the automotive industry prefer the FDI channel.
In both industries, MNE involvement plays a vital role in their industrialization 
process. MNEs act like an industrial catalyst to entice local enterprises to undertake the 
manufacturing process. Production of PF4 products at the commercial plantation level 
commenced after the MNE involvement. Similarly, production of locally owned parts 
suppliers started using the modem technology production of their companies as a result 
of MNE involvement.
MNE involvement occurs through both FDI and non-FDI channels. The non-FDI 
channel was through MNE buyers in processed foods and technology licensing in the 
automotive industry. The relative importance of FDI and non-FDI channels is different 
for these two industries. While in the processed food industry MNE involvement is 
likely to rely on the MNE buyer channel, in the automotive industry, MNEs tend to prefer 
FDI. The rationale is that the processed food industry is likely to involve mature/stable 
production technology that is generally available for arm’s length purchase. It becomes 
of less concern for local enterprises to be linked with MNEs through the FDI channel and 
to share ownership and control in order to access advanced production technology. 
Hence, local firms tend to acquire such knowledge from MNEs through the non-FDI 
channel. In contrast, in the automotive industry, where production technology per se is a 
proprietary asset, MNEs prefer the FDI to the non-FDI channel to secure their proprietary 
asset. As seen, since the late 1980s many MNE parts suppliers have expressed their 
intention to be co-owners with local counterparts.
Table 8.3
MNE Involvement and their Contribution 
in the Thai Processed Food and Automotive Industries
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Processed Food Industry Automotive Industry
MNE Involvement - Presence in both FDI and non- 
FDI channels.
- More likely to be non-FDI 
channel (MNE buyers)
- Presence in both FDI and 
non-FDI channels.
- More likely to be FDI 
channel
Technological
Contribution
- Significant throughout the 
past three decades.
- The contribution of MNE 
affiliates under an IS 
regime was limited and far 
less than that under an EP 
regime.
FDI-Channel - Emphasis on production 
process
- FDI-channel occurs through
(1) Demonstration effect (canned 
pineapple/tuna)
(2) Labour mobility (canned 
pineapple)
(3) Forward linkages ( processed 
chicken/ shrimp)
- Create backward linkages 
from car assemblers to 
local enterprises
- No evidence of technology 
spillover through other 
FDI-modes
- ‘Policy-induced’ (an IS 
regime) and ‘natural’ (an 
EP regime) linkages are 
significantly different from 
each other
Non-FDl Channels - Presence of MNE buyers
- Provide international 
marketing know-how.
- Presence of technology 
licensing channel
Source: Author’s compilation.
The inter-industry comparison supports the central hypothesis of this dissertation. 
There exist considerable technological benefits from MNE involvement in the processed 
food industry. Where FDI channel is concerned, technology spillover occurs through 
various channels such as demonstration effects (canned pineapple and tuna), labour 
mobility (canned pineapple) and forward linkages (processed chicken and shrimp). The 
contribution through the FDI channel is related to building up production capability for 
export, e.g. raw material preparation. On the other hand, MNE buyers considerably help 
local firms to acquire international marketing knowledge (marketing channel, compliance 
with border regulations, and the development of new product) and to penetrate the global
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market successfully. Despite the difference in pursued methodology, the finding, to some 
extent, are in line with the findings in previous studies, e.g. Kokko et al. (2001). In 
particular, Kokko et al. (2001) find that international marketing, export skills, quality 
control, and design are potentially important for EP industries, based on the econometric 
analysis of Uruguayan manufacturing firms.
In the automotive industry, FDI technology spillover is mainly through the 
backward linkage channel. There was also evidence of MNE involvement through the 
technology licensing channel. Nonetheless, the contribution of MNE involvement is 
radically different between the IS and EP regime periods. Backward linkages occurring 
in an IS regime are ‘policy-induced’ (LCRs-induced), not reliant on underlying economic 
factors. Linkages between car assemblers and locally-owned parts suppliers are rather 
weak. The factors that generally cause backward linkages to boost the technological 
capability of parts suppliers were distorted by the ‘policy-induced’ linkages. Local 
suppliers who realized they were protected by LCR measures were unresponsive to 
innovations and requests to improve their product quality. The protection of vehicles 
allowed car assemblers to stagnate and enjoy policy-induced economic rents. This 
resulted in the unsustainable development of local parts suppliers.
In contrast, backward linkages under an EP regime are mostly driven by 
economic factors (i.e. ‘natural’ linkages). Backward linkages seem to be more beneficial 
to technological capability of parts suppliers. All the factors seem to function well. Car 
assemblers place far more emphasis on the quality and performance of parts suppliers. 
Backward linkages become longer-term relationships and are deeper than ‘policy- 
induced’ ones. Car assemblers and parts suppliers are involved beyond the mass 
production stage, contrary to what occurred in the case of ‘policy-induced’ linkages. 
There is also evidence of car manufacturers providing assistance to locally owned 
suppliers. Only a handful of indigenous parts suppliers can pass the new requirement 
standards and benefit from ‘natural’ linkages with car assemblers.
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Contrary to the ‘infant industry’ argument, there has not been evidence of 
dynamic economies arising from the 30 year-long protection for parts manufacturing. 
Even though MNE car assemblers created ‘policy-induced’ linkages with many locally- 
owned suppliers from the early 1970s onward, technology spillover through these kinds 
of linkages could not lead to the sustainable development of these suppliers. When MNE 
car assemblers required higher technological capability, a handful of local parts suppliers 
survived.
Even though the magnitude of technological benefit from MNE involvement 
cannot be precisely quantified by the analysis undertaken in this chapter, the findings 
support the empirical evaluation found in Chapters 5 and 6 that gains from MNE 
involvement are conditioned by the trade policy regime in host countries. This chapter 
provides insight into how FDI has helped local enterprises to build up their technological 
capability. An open trade policy regime provides the setting for MNE involvement to 
take place in areas where Thailand has comparative advantage. Local firms have a high 
absorptive capability to learn technological benefits from MNE involvement and adapt to 
local market conditions. In addition, the global competition pressure stimulates local 
firms to invest in R&D activities and to be alert to innovation in order to strengthen their 
international competitiveness. This leads to the sustainable development for locally- 
owned firms. These technological benefits are not necessarily detected by the widely- 
used productivity measures such as total factor productivity and labour productivity. In 
particular, the benefits in terms of opening up market channels as occurred in the 
processed food industry are also unlikely to be fully captured by these quantitative
measures.
Appendix 13
Guide for Interview Questions
Processed Food Industry
Company profile
□ Main products
□ Year of establishment
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□ Size of work force
□ Ownership structure (foreign affiliate, joint venture, fully locally owned 
company)
□ Sales destination (domestic sales versus export)
□ Major export markets
□ Year the company started exporting
□ Brand name of products
Technology Spillovers
□ Opinion about overall development of the Thai processed food industry and 
export performance
□ Role of foreign affiliates in the industry’s development and exports
□ Role of foreign buyers in the industry’s development and exports
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□ Contributing factors of the export success (quality of input and production 
technology, trading company)
□ Process of building and strengthening technological capability
General opinion
□ Obstacles and problems for the industry (both domestic and international 
markets)
□ Role of government in industry development
□ Position of Thai products in the world market and international competitors
□ View on future trends in the industry
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Auto Assembly Industry
Company profile
□ Main products
□ Production capacity and the changes in recent years
□ Size of work force
□ Sales destination (domestic sales versus export)
□ Major export markets
□ Year the company started exporting
Backward Linkages
□ General opinion about development of the Thai automotive industry
□ Linkages between auto parts industries and auto vehicle assemblers
□ Assistance to parts suppliers in terms of technological capability
□ Special Assistance for any particular auto parts
□ The impact of the local-content requirements policy, dynamic economies, 
technological capability of indigenous parts suppliers
General opinion
□ Role of government in the industry’s development
□ Obstacles and problems for the industry
□ View on future trends in the industry
334
Auto Parts Industry
Company profile
□ Main products
□ Production capacity and the changes in recent years
□ Size of work force
□ Ownership structure (foreign affiliate, joint venture, fully locally owned 
company)
□ Sales destination (OEM/ REM/ Export)
□ Recent changes in sales destination
□ Year the company started exporting
□ Opinion about the export market
Production technology
□ Sophistication of production technology (simple, medium or very complicated)
□ How to acquire advanced technology
□ Assistance from car manufacturers
□ Changes in backward linkages over the past three decades
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□ Role of foreign investors (foreign affiliates in the same parts industry) in 
production technology development
General opinion
□ Role of government agency and/or associations in assisting technology 
improvement
□ Obstacles and problems in the industry (both domestic and international markets)
□ View on future trends in the industry
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Chapter 9: Conclusions and Policy Inferences
The purpose of this dissertation has been to examine and evaluate the impact of 
MNE involvement in the industrialization process in Thailand over the past three 
decades, with a view to understanding its contribution and to formulating policies for 
maximizing the benefits derived from this involvement. The key hypothesis is that gains 
from MNE involvement are not automatic but are conditioned by the policy environment 
of the host country. The scope of MNE involvement covers not only FDI but also non- 
FDI. A combination of quantitative and qualitative analyses is employed to achieve this 
purpose. The quantitative analysis is undertaken at both macro- and industry-levels to 
provide quantitative indicators of the FDI contribution. A firm-level case study 
complements these analyses in order to provide insight into non-FDI channels of MNE 
involvement. This chapter summarizes the major findings of the dissertation (Section 
9.1) and discusses policy implications of these findings (Section 9.2). Limitations of the 
study are discussed in the final section with a view to providing directions to further 
research.
9.1 Findings
Over the past forty years, Thailand has successfully built and maintained a 
general investment climate conducive to enticing foreign investors (Chapter 3). As part 
of the import-substitution (IS) industrialization strategy between the 1960s and the early 
1980s, the government used trade policy and investment promotion regimes to influence 
resource allocation in the private sector. Policy-induced incentives were titled in favour 
of domestic rather than export-oriented industries. From the mid-1980s, policy regimes 
have been gradually changed toward export promotion (EP) and the incentives have been 
increasingly neutralized.
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Trends and patterns of MNE involvement in Thai manufacturing, especially 
through the FDI channel, correspond to the evolution of the domestic policy regime 
(Chapter 4). The involvement began with old-style, rent-seeking FDI in the 1960s. From 
the mid-1980s onwards when trade and investment policy regimes became more EP 
directed, export-oriented and efficiency-seeking FDI has been increasingly involved in 
Thai manufacturing. Dollar values of manufacturing FDI inflows have increased sharply, 
compared to the two previous decades. Most of the new FDI is in labour-intensive 
industries, where Thailand has the comparative advantage. According to the data based 
on the Industrial Census 1997, FDI accounted almost 50 per cent of gross output and 
value added of Thai manufacturing in 1996. Foreign firms were generally more export- 
oriented than local ones. The level of FDI involvement measured in terms of exports was 
even higher than gross output and value added. Foreign firms accounted for nearly 60 
percent of manufacturing exports and 35 per cent of manufacturing employment.
Against this backdrop, we started our analysis of the role of MNEs in industrial 
transformation in Thailand by probing the FDI-growth nexus for total manufacturing 
(Chapter 5). This is done by estimating a growth equation derived in the context of the 
new growth theory, which provides for capturing the impact of FDI interactively with 
openness in manufacturing output growth. The co-integrated estimates support the 
hypothesis that gains from FDI in manufacturing output growth are conditioned by the 
nature of trade policy regimes. Under an IS regime, gains from FDI seem to be far less or 
even negative, compared to a policy regime geared to EP. The key results from three 
alternative indices of trade openness are strikingly similar. Evaluated at the average 
value of the export-output ratio in the manufacturing sector (20.65 per cent), FDI 
contributed to almost 0.4 of average annual growth of the Thai manufacturing over the 
past three decades.
The analysis of the FDI-growth nexus is followed by an inter-industry cross 
sectional econometric analysis in order to examine two key aspects of the contribution of 
MNE involvement, technological benefit, namely FDI technology spillover (i.e. 
technological benefit to locally owned industries) and the direct impact on overall
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benefits to the manufacturing sector (Chapter 6). The findings support the role of trade 
policy regimes in conditioning technology spillover and the overall technological 
benefits. Two alternative measures of trade protection are used, namely the nominal rate 
of protection (NRP) and effective rate of protection (ERP). The findings are consistent 
with those in the macro-level analysis. Technological benefits are unlikely to take place 
in highly trade-restricted industries as opposed to more export-oriented ones. Over and 
above the technological benefits, the estimates of the FDI determinants equation suggests 
that trade barriers as well as the size of the domestic market play an important role in 
determining inter-industry differences in FDI participation.
In-depth firm-level case studies of the Thai processed food and automotive 
industries are undertaken in Chapters 7 and 8 in order to gain insights into both FDI and 
non-FDI channels of MNE involvement, with emphasis on the latter. The processed food 
industry7 study covers four major export products (i.e. canned pineapple, canned tuna, 
processed chicken and processed shrimp, referred to as PF4). The examination of the 
automotive industry covers both car and component manufacturing. Both industries are 
successful cases, but they are different from each other in several aspects. The processed 
food industry is labour intensive and exhibits a higher degree of export orientation than 
the automotive industry. Interestingly, the trade policy regime toward them seems to be 
strikingly different. Even though tariffs on finished PF4 products are high, Thailand has 
been the world’s major exporter and there has not been a large domestic demand for these 
products. Hence, the presence of PF4 tariffs has not effectively been able to encourage 
enterprises to shift their resources toward the highly protected domestic market. The 
trade policy regime in the processed food industry is to some extent classified as an EP 
regime. For the automotive industry, the trade policy regime commenced with an IS 
regime (a high level of tariff protection and the presence of local-content requirements, 
LCRs) and then has been gradually liberalized since the early 1990s.
The findings from the firm-level case studies suggest that MNE involvement 
plays a vital role in the expansion process of both industries (Chapter 8). MNEs act as a 
catalyst to entice local enterprises to undertake the manufacturing process. Production of
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PF4 products at the commercial plantation level commenced after MNE involvement. 
Similarly, in the automotive industry, locally owned parts suppliers started modem 
technological production as a result of MNE involvement.
In both industries, MNE involvement occurred through both FDI and non-FDI 
channels. The non-FDI channel was through MNE buyers in processed foods and 
technology licensing in the automotive industry. The relative importance of FDI and 
non-FDI channels is different for these two industries. While in the processed food 
industry MNE involvement occurred largely through the MNE buyer channel, in the 
automotive industry, MNEs tend to prefer FDI. The rationale is that the processed food 
industry involves mature/stable production technology that is generally available for 
arm’s length purchase through the non-FDI channels. It becomes of less concern for 
local enterprises to be linked with MNEs through the FDI channel and to share ownership 
and control in order to access advanced production technology. In contrast, in the 
automotive industry, where production technology per se is a proprietary asset, MNEs 
prefer FDI to the non-FDI channels to secure their proprietary asset. Since the late 
1980s, many MNE parts suppliers entered into joint ventures with local manufacturers.
The inter-industry comparison supports the central hypothesis of this dissertation. 
There are considerable technological benefits from MNE involvement in the processed 
food industry. As regards FDI channel, technology spillover occurs through various 
channels, such as demonstration effect (canned pineapple and tuna), labour mobility 
(canned pineapple) and forward linkages (processed chicken and shrimp). These factors 
help enhance production capability of local firms for export. Non-FDI channels take a 
number of forms including links with MNE buyers, technology licensing, international 
subcontracting. Of these, the role of MNE buyers was found to be the most important. 
MNE buyers help local firms penetrate global markets by forging market links and 
providing them with international marketing knowledge (compliance with border 
regulations, and the development of new products).
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In the automotive industry, FDI technology spillover is mainly through backward 
linkages. There was also evidence of MNE involvement through the technology 
licensing. Nonetheless, the contribution of MNE involvement is radically different 
between the IS and EP regime periods. ‘Policy-induced’ backward linkages occurring in 
an IS regime between car assemblers and locally owned parts suppliers were rather weak. 
Moreover, local suppliers who realized they were protected by LCRs imposed on car 
manufacturers were unresponsive to innovations and requests to improve their product 
quality. Heavy trade protection allowed car assemblers to enjoy policy-induced 
economic rents without paying attention to productivity improvement. This resulted in 
the unsustainable development of local parts suppliers.
In contrast, backward linkages under an EP regime are mostly driven by 
economic factors (i.e. ‘natural’ linkages). Backward linkages seem to be more beneficial 
to the technological capability of parts suppliers. All the factors seem to function well. 
Car assemblers place far more emphasis on the quality and performance of parts 
suppliers. Backward linkages become longer-term relationships and are deeper than 
‘policy-induced’ ones. Car assemblers and parts suppliers are involved beyond the mass 
production stage, contrary to what occurred in the case of ‘policy-induced’ linkages. 
There is also evidence of car manufacturers providing direct technical assistance to 
locally owned suppliers.
There is no clear evidence of dynamic economies arising from the 30-year long 
protection for parts manufacturing, contrary to the ‘infant industry’ argument. Even 
though MNE car assemblers created ‘policy-induced’ linkages with many locally owned 
suppliers from the early 1970s onward, technology spillover through these kinds of 
linkages could not lead to the sustainable development of these suppliers. When MNE 
car assemblers began to place emphasis on higher technological capability in a free 
market environment, only a handful of locally parts suppliers survived.
The findings of the case studies support the quantitative analysis in Chapters 5 
and 6 by providing insights into how FDI has helped local enterprises to build up their
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technological capability. An open trade policy regime causes MNE involvement to take 
place in areas where Thailand has a comparative advantage. Local firms have a high 
absorptive capability to learn technological benefits from MNE involvement and adapt to 
local market conditions. In addition, under this regime, the global competition pressure 
stimulates local firms to invest in R&D activities and to be alert to innovation in order to 
strengthen their international competitiveness. This leads to the sustainable development 
of locally owned firms. These technological benefits are not necessarily evident in the 
widely-used productivity measures such as total factor productivity and labour 
productivity.
9.2 Policy Implications
Four policy implications can be drawn from this dissertation, which have general 
implications for other latecomers as FDI recipients, especially low-wage, densely 
populated economies. Firstly, the experience of the Thai manufacturing sector makes a 
strong case for the simultaneous liberalization of trade and investment policy regimes. 
Liberalizing the foreign investment regime must go hand in hand with liberalizing the 
trade regime in order to maximize gains from MNE involvement. The role of the trade 
policy regime could influence whether MNE involvement in host economies is of the old- 
style rent-seeking or the efficiency-seeking type. Different types of MNE involvement 
imply considerable difference in benefits host countries would anticipate from MNE 
involvement. Efficiency-seeking MNEs tend to be involved in areas where host countries 
have a comparative advantage. It is more likely for local firms to make use of advanced 
technology associated with MNEs. The open trade regime would be more likely to bring 
in efficiency seeking MNEs and more appropriate technology for host economies.
Above all, the open trade regime also brings in healthy competition that 
stimulates local firms to invest in R&D activities and to be alert to innovation in order to 
strengthen their international competitiveness. This is another key element that enables 
host economies to maximize benefits from MNE involvement.
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The trade policy regime covers not only trade restrictions but also trade-related- 
investment measures like LCRs. The firm-level case-study of the automotive industry 
provides insights into the mechanisms of backward linkages in the presence of LCRs. 
Even though dynamic economies exist in industries like the automotive industry and as 
argued under the ‘infant industry’ argument protection may positively affect the 
industry’s development path, imposing LCR does not seem to be a wise choice for 
governments in host countries to help local firms benefit dynamic economies. This 
would result in a general deterioration of technological and management skills and retard 
rather than promote growth and efficiency.
Secondly, the presence of a difference between ‘policy-induced’ and ‘natural’ 
linkages indicates that the magnitude of backward linkages is not a good proxy of the 
magnitude of benefits from MNEs. The quality of backward linkages is a far better 
indication of potential benefits from MNEs. The evidence indicates that the quality of 
‘natural’ linkages is far higher than that o f ‘policy-induced’ ones.
Thirdly, the conventional approach of focusing solely on FDI as the sole link 
between MNEs and domestic manufacturing tends to overlook an important part of the 
story relating to the role of MNEs in the industrialization process. MNEs contribute 
significantly to export-led industrialization through various non-FDI channels such as 
providing marketing channels, improving technological capability, and assisting to 
overcome export obstacles.
Finally, the complementary role of governments in host countries should involve 
building basic infrastructures, not only physical but also various forms of ‘non-physical’ 
infrastructures such as R&D expertise, education and training investment, human 
resource development and the creation of good institutional environments. Availability 
of physical infrastructures, such as electricity, water supply and high-quality 
telecommunications, seems to be a pre-requisite for enticing MNEs in any host economy. 
Interestingly, evidence from the firm-level case study analysis points out that all 
successfully local firms have to continuously commit themselves to R&D investment in
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order to fully assimilate and adapt advanced technology associated with MNE 
involvement. Such investment really needs non-physical infrastructures. Investment in 
non-physical infrastructures in Thailand was still below the average of middle-income 
developing countries. In addition, even though the in-depth analysis of the effectiveness 
of R&D promoting measures, such as double tax deduction of R&D expenditure, the 
industry institutes, and public research institutes cannot be addressed in this study, the 
general impression from the firm interviews suggests that these measures have not served 
well the need from the private sector. Some firms complain about marginal incentive 
from the double tax deduction measures, comparing to the costs incurred from 
complicated bureaucratic procedures. Most firms still heavily rely on their own R&D 
activities. The challenge of policymakers is to give adequate financial incentives for 
local firms to promote R&D investment countrywide, to build supportive intellectual 
property rights and to establish the link between granted incentives and performances.
9.3 Limitations of the Study
There are at least three limitations of the analyses conducted in this study, which 
need to be addressed in future research. Firstly, given the nature of data availability, the 
econometric analysis of technological benefits from FDI (in Chapter 6) was undertaken 
using cross-sectional data for a given year (1996). Given that technology acquisition is 
essentially a time-dependent process, the ideal data set for examining technological 
benefit from FDI need to be examined using a panel data set with considerable time 
difference between each observation.
Secondly, because of time and financial constraints, the firm-level case studies 
were based on a limited number of firms in only two industries, processed foods and the 
automotive industry. While the studies provided valuable insights into the process of the 
MNE contribution to technological capability of local firms through both FDI and non- 
FDI channels, it was not possible to undertake quantitative analysis of the magnitude of
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the MNE contributions. A major research effort involving a survey of a representative 
sample of firms covering a number of industries is required to fill these gaps in the 
present study. Moreover, it is not possible to make inferences about the form of MNE 
involvement and their contribution to the overall industrialization process, based on only 
two industries.
Thirdly, the inference of the impact of policy transition from IS to EP regime on 
the automotive industry (Chapter 8) needs to be treated with caution. Although the 
reform measures commenced in the early 1990s, in reality a notable shift from an IS 
regime to an EP regime occurred from about the mid-1990s. Hence, the inference of the 
study covers at best the short to medium effect only. It is too early to examine the long 
term development impact.
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